(10.29 am)

MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Good morning.
MR DICKER: My Lord, we now move on to the evidence in relation to the German law issues.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Yes.
MR DICKER: Subject to your Lordship, I was proposing to call Professor Mülbert.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Indeed.
Evidence of PROFESSOR PETER OTTO MÜLBERT (sworn)
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Professor Mülbert, good morning, do sit down. Do you have a glass of water? If you need a break, let me know.
A. Thank you, my Lord.

Examination in-chief by MR DICKER
MR DICKER: Professor Mülbert, can you just confirm again your name and address for the purposes of the transcript?
A. The full name is Peter Otto Mülbert. I have a title -doctor, which in Germany is part of the name so I don't know whether the full name from an English perspective would be Dr Peter Otto Mülbert or just Peter Otto Mülbert. The address is Eisgrubweg 9, 55116, Mainz, Germany.
Q. Thank you. Could you take one of the bundles which

Page 1

I hope you will have, it is marked volume 4 on the spine and it says "Foreign law expert reports."

Just to confirm your evidence as far as it is in writing, could you turn to tab 7 of that bundle. Can you confirm that that is your first expert's report and it is your signature that appears on page 96 of the bundle at the end of the report? (Pause)
A. Yes, I can confirm that this is the first expert report.
Q. You prepared a reply expert opinion, which I think you will find at tab 9. Again, just formally confirm it is your signature on page 207 of the bundle, if you would?
A. Yes, $I$ can confirm that this is my signature.
Q. Then a consolidated report at tab 11, and likewise, confirm your signature at page 277.
A. Yes, I can confirm that this is my signature.
Q. Thank you.

You and Herr Fischer prepared a joint report which you should have at tab 13. As I understand it, there was one section that you wanted to include in the joint report which was objected to by my learned friend's clients and which it was subsequently agreed should be admitted. I just wanted to show you the text of that as I understand it, which is at tab 15.

It is a letter from Freshfields dated
23 October 2015 and the text of the passage you wanted Page 2
to include is at pages 527 and 528 . Can you confirm
that?
A. It is tab?
Q. Tab 15.
A. Tab 15.
Q. It is behind a letter --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and the text is at pages 527 and 528 .
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you.

As I understand it, there is one matter that you would like to correct, or clarify. Can you go back to tab 13 , which is the joint experts' report. It is paragraph 21 on page 358 . You will see paragraph 21, in the English version says:
"The experts are in agreement that no default can occur by serving a warning notice after the institution of a German insolvency proceeding."

Can you now turn back to your consolidated report at tab 11 and go to page 263, paragraphs 89 to 91 . I just wonder, can you explain the clarification that you would like to make to paragraph 21 of the joint experts' report?
A. Yes. The clarification regards paragraphs 90 and 91, namely that the clarification is that this agreed

$$
\text { Page } 3
$$

statement in 21 is, from my perspective, only true for the estate, not the debtor as an entity or the debtor in person.

This is explained in paragraph 90 of my report, my Lord.
Q. Thank you.

Professor Mülbert, you have chosen to write your expert reports in English. Could you briefly describe to the court your experience of working in the English language and why you have chosen to produce your reports in English?
A. My Lord, I have written or authored several papers in English. Most recently a paper on managing risk in the financial system published in Oxford University Press,
but others as well. I wrote these papers always in English myself and they were obviously reviewed by a native speaker, but I was -- I thought that it might be helpful to the court, and myself, if I would try to produce the reports in English, given that it would be difficult for a translator to adequately translate my German into English. In order to be more clear and to be more understandable, even for myself, I have chosen to produce the report in German -- obviously not in German but in English, I am sorry.
Q. Thank you. You have behind you a number of bundles, Page 4

| 1 | including German cases and textbooks, to which reference | 1 | of interest on the compensation claim, that's right, isn't it? |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | has been made both by yourself and Herr Fischer. We | 2 |  |
| 3 | obviously have both English and German language | 3 | A. My Lord, could the question be rephrased? |
| 4 | versions. When my learned friend is questioning you, do | 4 | Q. Please, if you don't understand a question, please ask |
| 5 | you have a preference as to whether you are shown the | 5 | e to put it again and I will. Let me try again. |
| 6 | German version or the English version? | 6 | You agree with Judge Fischer that when looking at |
| 7 | A. I have a preference to be shown the German version, or | 7 | he compensation claim payable on termination of the |
| 8 | at least be able to consult the German version in order | 8 | agreement, payable after termination, there is no |
| 9 | to | 9 | ovision in the German master agreement that provides |
| 10 | MR DICKER: Thank you, I am sure my learned friend will hav | 10 | for interest on that claim. That is agreed by you, |
| 11 | had that in | 11 | isn't it? |
| 12 | Professor Mülbert, thank you very much. My learned | 12 | A. Yes, yes, my Lord, that is agreed. |
| 13 | friend will have some questio | 13 | Q. Thank your |
| 14 | Cross-examination by MR ALLISON | 14 | You agree in particular don't you that clause 3, sub |
| 15 | MR ALLISON: Good morning, Professor Mülbert, have you given | 15 | ause (4) has no interest right in relation to the |
| 16 | expert evidence in England before? | 16 | termination claim? |
| 17 | A. My Lord, I have never given expert evidence in England. | 17 | A. We agree on that as well. Yes. |
| 18 | Q. Let's j | 18 | Q. The second point is that you agree that, where you don't |
| 19 | erstand the role of an expert in England. Do you | 19 | ave a contractual entitlement, the question as a matter |
| 20 | understand that you are an independent expert whose role | 20 | German law is whether a claim for further damages for |
| 21 | is to assist his Lordship in reaching decisions in this | 21 | pryment can be made? |
| 22 | case? | 22 | A. My Lord, the answer -- may I clarify that this is not |
| 23 | A. I fully understand that my overriding duty is to the | 23 | e only -- that this is only part of the answer. There |
| 24 | court | 24 | is -- may I expand or explain a bit in detail what |
| 25 | Q. You understand therefore that you are not an advocate | 25 | $I$ have in mind? |
|  | Page 5 | Page 7 |  |
| 1 | for any party in these proceedings? | 1 | Q. Maybe let me just see if I can -- it might be quicker if |
| 2 | A. I understand that I am not an advocate, yes. | 2 | I try and agree it with you. There is no contractual |
| 3 | Q. We are going to start with the default and insolvency | 3 | titlement under the German master agreement, and |
| 4 | issues that arise in this case. We will look at some of | 4 | erefore what you and Judge Fischer say is that |
| 5 | the underlying materials together. I was going to do it | 5 | ction 288 of the German civil code is a relevant |
| 6 | by reference to the English materials because they ar | 6 | provision to consider? |
| 7 | translations that have been agreed by the parties via | 7 | A. Yes. |
| 8 | an agreed translator, but of course if you need to refe | 8 | Q. And there is an automatic entitlement in cases of delay |
| 9 | to the German as well please do sa | 9 | der subsection 1 to a basic rate of interest, that is |
| 10 | Once I have asked my questions and look | 10 | right, isn't it? |
| 11 | materials I would like to look at with you, just so you | 11 | A. Yes. |
| 12 | know, Mr Dicker can then ask you further questions an | 12 | Q. You both agree that the question then is whether there |
| 13 | take you to further materials if he wishes. | 13 | can also be a claim for further damage under |
| 14 | Let's start with where you and Judge Fischer have | 14 | subsection 4? |
| 15 | reached together, because I understand you have made | 15 | A. Yes, that's right. |
| 16 | considerable progress in relation to the default and | 16 | Q. Thank you. |
| 17 | insolvency issues in your joint statement. That's | 17 | The third point is that you agree with Judge Fischer |
| 18 | correct, isn't it? | 18 | that a claim for further damage must be proved? By that |
| 19 | A. We agreed on a number of issues in the joint statement. | 19 | in other words I mean that it has to have been caused by |
| 20 | Q. Let's start there, because I think it will help, both me | 20 | e delay in payment and established to have been caused |
| 21 | in the way I ask my questions and his Lordship in | 21 | by the delay. |
| 22 | understanding the way the issues arise, if we can just | 22 | A. The claim for further damages pursuant to section 288, |
| 23 | check what is agreed before we look at the materials. | 23 | paragraph 4, has in that sense to be proved. |
| 24 | First, you agree that the German master agreemen | 24 | Q. Thank you |
| 25 | does not contain a contractual provision for the payment | 25 | The fourth point is that you both agree that no |
| $\text { Page } 6$ |  | Page 8 |  |


|  | claim for further damage under section 288(4) may be |  | Q. That is your agreed position -- |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | brought by a creditor unless it can establish that the | 2 | A. Yes. |
| 3 | debtor was in default within the meaning of section 286 | 3 | Q. -- in the joint statement, isn't it? |
| 4 | of the German civil code? | 4 | A. |
| 5 | A. We agree on that, yes. | 5 | Q. The final point, perhaps an obvious one but important |
| 6 | Q. Can we just turn up section 286, so we can see | 6 | e, is you agree that a warning notice cannot be |
| 7 | together before we look at the next point of agreement | 7 | rved once the debt has been repaid? |
| 8 | The German law issues translation should be labelled | 8 | A. Yes, we agree on that as well. |
| 9 | "Volume 2 of 2" on the spine for my Lord's benefit as | 9 | Q. Thank you, Professor Mülbert. That is very helpful, |
| 10 | well. | 10 | entworth certainly and I am sure to his Lordship as |
| 11 | If we go to tab 83, right towards the back | 11 | well. |
| 12 | volume, behind tab 83, you will find the provisions of | 12 | Let's move to consider how a claim becomes due and |
| 13 | German civil code. It is sub tab N that I would | 13 | payable, how performance becomes due for the purpose of |
| 14 | u to go to, which should, I hope be headed | 14 | section 286. We have agreed that the claim doesn't |
| 15 | "Section 286, default of the debtor", do you see that? | 15 | arise unless you have a payment obligation that is due. |
| 16 | A. Yes, I see that. | 16 | Now let's look at how that inter reacts with the |
| 17 | Q. Just in case we need to look at with the next point | 17 | compensation claim under the German master agreement. |
| 18 | The fifth | 18 | Before I look at the detail, the first point |
| 19 | that a default cannot arise under this provision prior | 19 | establish is you understand that the question of |
| 20 | to the time at which performance of the payment | 20 | construction of the agreement, so the actual question of |
| 21 | obligation has fallen due. That's correct, isn't it | 21 | construing clauses 8 and 9, is one for his Lordship to |
| 22 | A. Yes, we agree on that | 22 | ischer on the |
| 23 | Q. The sixth point is you agree that is not enoug | 23 | relevant principles of Germa |
| 24 | You also need the service of a warning notice or for one | 24 | A. I understand that concept. |
| 25 | of the exceptions to that to a Page 9 | 25 | Q. You also understand that Judge Fischer has said in his Page 11 |
|  | A. We a | 1 | evidence, in both his first, second, third and fourth |
| 2 | Q. You also agree, my seventh of your a | 2 | ports, that the compensation claim doesn't become due |
| 3 | the formal requirements for a warning notice und | 3 | til after LBIE entered into administration. You have |
| 4 | section 286(1) are that | 4 | seen that from his reports, haven' |
| 5 | words that you use together, "a clear definitive dem | 5 | A. I have seen that, yes. |
| 6 | from the obligee for payment of an amount that is due | 6 | Q. You didn't address the timing of a compensation claim in |
| 7 | That a warning notice, isn't it | 7 | ur first or second reports, did you? I could not find |
| 8 | A. These are the requirements for warning | 8 | anything about it in those reports. |
| 9 | Q. Than | 9 | A. At the moment I am not aware that I dealt with that |
| 10 |  | 10 | estion in the first report and my reply, but I would |
| 11 | an obligor was not in default prior to the opening | 11 | have to check the report. |
| 12 | German insolvency proceedings, you cannot establish | 12 | Q. At a relevant moment do check and come back to me, but |
| 13 | a default by the service of a warning notice after | 13 | although Judge Fischer dealt with it in his first and |
| 14 | commencement of German insolvency proceedings? | 14 | second reports, the first time that you dealt with the |
| 15 | A. My Lord, this relates to the clarification I just sought | 15 | timing issue was in your third report. Just so we |
| 16 | for point 21. We agree that this is not possible with | 16 | derstand what your evidence is before we look at the |
| 17 | respect to the estate. | 17 | ases, your point can be put very shortly, as you say it |
| 18 | Q. We will come and look at the case in due course. Thank | 18 | becomes due immediately on the automatic termination of |
| 19 | you. | 19 | the German master agreement. That is what you say? |
| 20 | The ninth point -- I have 10 -- is that you agree | 20 | A. That is what $I$ say, yes. |
| 21 | that filing a proof of debt in a German insolvency | 21 | Q. Thank you. |
| 22 | proceeding does not establish a default under | 22 | Before looking at the reasons for disagreement, can |
| 23 | section | 23 | e just spend a moment seeing if we can agree the |
| 24 | A. We agree that according to the majority opinion | 24 | relevant principles of construction as a matter of |
| 25 | Germany and the case law, this is not possible. <br> Page 10 | 25 | German law, the principles for his Lordship to apply. <br> Page 12 |


| 1 | The first point, again, you may think an obvious one | 1 | helpful if you think I have put a point you agree with, |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | but an important one, is that you and Judge Fische | 2 | say yes and that is fine. But if you would like to |
| 3 | agree that the interpretation of a contract is based on | 3 | expand, of course you may do so. |
| 4 | the objective intentions of the parties. Don't you? | 4 | evidence, raise two |
| 5 | A. We agree on that, yes. | 5 | different arguments in support of your assertion that |
| 6 | Q. You would agree with Judge Fischer that the starting | 6 | the compensation claim becomes due on termination. |
| 7 | poin | 7 | tion 271(1) of the German |
| 8 | intentions, is the words chosen in the contract? | 8 | de, don't you, that is one provision you seek |
| 9 | A. We agree on that as well | 9 | rely on? |
| 10 | Q. Just so we can see that, can we just look at on | 10 | A. Yes, I rely on that provision. |
| 11 | decision of Germany's highest court that makes the point | 11 | Q. We will look at that in a moment. The second point is |
| 12 | could please be given authority | 12 | between the German master |
| 13 | dle 1 and behind tab 30 of authority bundle 1 you | 13 | aster agreement, don't you? |
| 14 | ould I hope find a 2009 decision of the | 14 | A. Again, my Lord, may I explain. It was not an exact |
| 15 | Bundesgerichtshof, that is Germany's highest court, | 15 | parallel, it was that the intentions of the drafters of |
| 16 |  | 16 | German master agreement were such that they wanted |
| 17 | A. This is the highest court in civil law. | 17 | ects of the ISDA master agreement. |
| 18 | Q. Sorry, I know there is a constitutional one as well, but | 18 | Q. Thank you, that is very helpful. We will look shortly |
| 19 | civil matters it is Germany's highest court? Thank | 19 | to see whether that actually is a point that can be |
| 20 |  | 20 | ts |
| 21 | Tab 30, just to see how the Bundesgericht | 21 | together. |
| 22 | it, if you could turn to the second page. Do you | 22 | ooking first at section 271 of the German civil |
| 23 | the bottom of the page, paragraph 14A. | 23 | code if you could be given authorities bundle 2 , |
| 24 | A. Yes. | 24 | u may still have it, again behind the tab we were |
| 25 | Q. The second sentence, what the court says is Page 13 | 25 | behind before, tab 83, and it is letter J this time. Do <br> Page 15 |
| 1 | "The interpretation | 1 | u see section 271, "Time of performance" just to check |
| 2 | primarily the wording chosen by the contractual parties | 2 | are in the same place? Letter J? Thank you. |
| 3 | to the agreements and the intentions objec | 3 | me probably very uncontroversial questions, but |
| 4 | declared by the parties which can be assumed from this | 4 | think we need to explore it. The time of performance |
| 5 | wording." | 5 | the time from which the creditor would be able to |
| 6 | That is what you and Judge Fischer agr | 6 | demand performance; isn't |
| 7 | relevant principle? | 7 | A. Yes. |
| 8 | A. Yes. | 8 | Q. With a money debt, it is the time from which the |
| 9 | Q. Sorry, I know that you nodded, it was very helpful but | 9 | creditor could require payment? |
| 10 | it is just so we can see the answers on the transcript | 10 | A. Yes. |
| 11 | as | 11 | Q. Let's just see how that works again in a decision of the |
| 12 | You would also agree with Judge Fischer that whe | 12 | Bundesgerichtshof. Bundle 1, this time, which again |
| 13 | one is dealing with a standardised contract, like the | 13 | I think you might have, do you have volume 1 there. |
| 14 | German master agreement, the words are particularly | 14 | If we go to tab 26 of bundle 1, I think you have |
| 15 | important. Aren't they? | 15 | beaten me there but you should see a 2007 decision of |
| 16 | A. My Lord, I would like to -- I cannot answer that | 16 | the Bundesgerichtshof. There are just two paragraphs |
| 17 | a yes or no question. I would like to expand a bit | 17 | I would like to look at with you, the first is on the |
| 18 | that if you allow me to expand a bit. | 18 | cond page, paragraph 13, so expressly referring to |
| 19 | The objective meaning to be derived from the words | 19 | section 286, the section which is relevant here, do you |
| 20 | in the contracts is what is particularly important, so | 20 | see that? |
| 21 | the objective understanding by a reader of the | 21 | hat the court says is. |
| 22 | provisions would be of particular importance in the | 22 | As is also the case in other instances, |
| 23 | interpretation of the relevant general business term. | 23 | section 286(1) to (3) of the German civil code, |
| 24 | Q. Thank you, that is very helpful. If you want to expand | 24 | a prerequisite for the occurrence of delay is that the |
| 25 | on answers at any point, please do just say. It is very <br> Page 14 | 25 | creditor's claim should have fallen due for settlement." <br> Page 16 |



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A. Yes.
Q. If you look at your index, you will see it is Artz, in
        Erman?
    A. Thank you.
    Q. You would agree with that, because it is a filling of
        loopholes you agreed earlier it applies to filling
        loopholes?
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    A. Yes, I agree with that.
    Q. I think we have established you agree with
        Judge Fischer's evidence that section 271 only fills
        gaps when the time for performance is not apparent from
        the contract or the circumstances?
    A. I agree with that.
    Q. You also agree, from what you have just said, that you
        can look at the circumstances to see whether there has
        been an agreement as to the time for performance?
    A. I agree with that.
    Q. Those circumstances include the nature of the
        contractual obligation, don't they? Would you like me
        to show you something first?
    A. Yes -- could we clarify what the nature of the --
    Q. Let's look at one passage together to see if you can
        agree it. I would be surprised if it was controversial.
        Tab 48, which should be in your volume 1, do you have
        tab 48, sub divider A.
            Page 21
    A. Yes.
    Q. I know, Professor Mülbert, you asked me the question
        last time, this is Judge Gruneberg in Palandt, so you
        know the text we are talking about.
    A. Thank you.
    Q. Judge Gruneberg, he is a judge of the Bundesgerichtshof,
        isn't he?
    A. Yes.
    Q. He is one of the nine judges of the 11th Senate, isn't
        he?
    A. Yes.
    Q. That is the senate responsible for banking and finance
        law; isn't it?
    A. That is true.
    Q. Paragraph 9 on the third page is what I would like to
        look at with you, do you see the subheading
        "Determination based on the circumstances"?
    A. Excuse me, it is which page?
    Q. I am so sorry, it is the third page, if you turn in one,
        two, three --
    A. It is \(\mathbf{A}\) ?
    Q. Yes, do you see a 9 on the left-hand side and then the
        letter B just next to it?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Do you see that?
                    Page 22
    A. Yes.
Q. You see that is headed "Determination based on the circumstances", yes?

## A. Yes, I see that.

Q. What the judge tells us is:
"This method should be applied when there is no contractual agreement and statutory special regulations."
Then what the judge says is:
"The nature of the contractual obligation, the common usage and characteristics of the service must be taken into account."

You would agree that the nature of the contractual obligation should be taken into account?

## A. May I answer -- my Lord, may I give more detailed

 answer.I agree that Judge Gruneberg has written that, but he does not explain what he means by at first glance at least within these few sentences, he doesn't explain what is meant by that, the nature of the contract, so --
Q. Maybe I can just help you with that by looking at one of his examples. Within the same paragraph, so where he is looking at the same issue, if you go four lines up from the bottom of the paragraph, you should see a sentence beginning "The claim ..." do you see that?

Page 23

What the judge says is, giving an example of one of those cases, he says:
"The claim for repayment of the deposit [in the case of a lease] is valid as soon as after termination of the rental agreement, the claim of the lessor have been defined with regard to the amount."

What he is saying, isn't it, is that a tenant cannot demand payment of the deposit immediately, but only after the landlord has determined his deductions. That's correct, isn't it?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. Thank you.

Where a calculation is required, as in this case, Judge Gruneberg says that performance is not due until the landlord has done that calculation. That is what he says, isn't it?
A. My Lord, I cannot answer by a simple yes or no but I would like to give a more -- if you allow I would like to give a more detailed answer.
Q. Can I just try one more question and see if you need to. I think you may have agreed the point already a moment ago, is that in that case, until the landlord has worked out what has to be deducted from the deposit, the tenant cannot claim immediate payment of the deposit?

Page 24

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A. That is right.
Q. Thank you.
You would agree that the German courts have also said that where a claim cannot be ascertained, its performance will not be due until you have ascertained how much has to be paid. That is right, isn't it?
A. My Lord, I would like -- I cannot answer that question with a simple yes or no.
Q. Can I maybe show you a case then, a decision of the Bundesgerichtshof in that context to see where we go?
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Mr Allison, do you think he should be
allowed to expand if he wishes to at this time? You can test it by reference to the next --
MR ALLISON: I am not for a moment suggesting
Professor Mülbert should not answer the questions, we were just going to look at an example together.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Which would you wish to do, do you
wish to add to your previous answer now or would you rather see this case first?
A. I would like to give my previous answer now.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Yes.
A. Thank you, my Lord.
Regarding the landlord tenant case, it is obvious that this was decided by the German court and
Judge Gruneberg just uses that -- cites that case, but
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Page 25
this statement is restricted to that situation and, for my perspective, it is not obvious that this has anything to do with the nature of the contractual obligation, but it has a lot to do with the purpose of that deposit.

Therefore I cannot see, or I cannot see it as an illustration of the nature of the contract.

Again, this -- so this would be the first answer, my Lord, and there was a second question as to my understanding, $I$ haven't answered yet, but again it is for you to decide whether to ask that, given the answer to the second question or if you want me to answer the subsequent question?

It is a statement, but a general statement as
regards what German courts have said. Do you want me to answer it?
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: By all means describe what your understanding of that second question is.
A. Yes. My answer would be that the court in the landlord tenant case has exactly said, but this is not what German courts in general have said, that the claim only falls due if the amount has been calculated or decided in all cases.

It is just one case decided along these lines.
MR ALLISON: Thank you, from that clarification, just two further questions before we move on. Would you agree
though that the general rule is that where a debtor cannot determine how much they have to pay before they receive an invoice, the amount does not become due until the invoice is provided?
A. My Lord, as a matter of German law, I think that the majority would require the bill to be presented to the debtor.
Q. The debtor then knows how much they are paying?

## A. The bill.

Q. Can we then just look at one case, again it is a landlord case but it is in the Bundesgerichtshof, it is in bundle 5. Behind tab 3 you should have a ruling of the Bundesgerichtshof dated 19 December 1990. Do you have that?
A. Yes.
Q. My Lord should have on the spine, I think it should be "Further German authorities", that should be what the spine says?
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: In tab 3 you say?
MR ALLISON: My Lord, yes.
MR DICKER: My Lord, can I just rise at this point. As I understand it, this is a new authority. It was indicated to us only on Tuesday evening. I only received a copy of the bundle of authorities this morning. When it was provided on Tuesday evening, as Page 27

I understand it, copies of German authorities and translations were provided, apparently by the agreed translator, although this was the first that we had heard of this.

I have not had a chance to look at these authorities, for obvious reasons. I don't know whether Professor Mülbert has had an opportunity to consider them. I do, my Lord, object to my learned friend simply rising and seeking to refer to these authorities without even indicating to your Lordship that we had indicated they were not agreed.

The short position is they are not dealt with in any of Herr Fischer's reports, so the first reference we received was on Tuesday evening. We asked what the relevance of the authorities was, we were told that the relevance would be indicated to us. That has not happened yet. For my learned friend simply to rise at this stage and seek to put to Professor Mülbert an authority which he knows has not been agreed on our part, my Lord, in our respectful submission, is not an appropriate way of dealing with this.

If my learned friend wants to refer to this bundle of authorities, in our submission he should make an application to do so and he should explain to your Lordship why they were only provided at this stage, why Page 28
the analogy, are you, with late citation of English authority because my understanding, and you can correct me if I am wrong, my understanding is that in this court, German law is an issue of fact.
MR ALLISON: My Lord, it is.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: In this court therefore you are adducing evidence of that whenever you cite an authority of German law.
MR ALLISON: My Lord, of course.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I think Mr Dicker's point is that it is late but the lateness has been compounded by what I understand from him to be a failure on your part to identify to him clearly the reasons why the evidence is being put forward late and to what purpose it is being adduced.
MR ALLISON: My Lord, if I can answer that quickly, what
these cases go to are to the answers given by
Professor Mülbert and the evidence given by Professor Mülbert. They are all incredibly short. A number of the authorities in this bundle are actually translations of statutory provisions that
Professor Mülbert cites in his report, but which were not in the bundles otherwise so we thought it important for those to make their way into the core bundle.
-
they are not dealt with by Judge Fischer, what are the points to which they go and we should have an opportunity to respond.

None of that has occurred and at the moment, in our respectful submission, my learned friend should not be permitted to proceed in the way that he would like.
MR ALLISON: My Lord, I hope I can answer that quickly.
This is a cross-examination of a foreign expert of law on issues of law. If there is a relevant authority that goes to the issues of law and the case that is being made by the expert in front of your Lordship, it is of course relevant material. It is no different to Mr Dicker bringing an authority in for the very first time during reply submissions on an issue of English law. Professor Mülbert has just given the answer that the landlord cases are different, he says, because they are concerned with deposits.

This is a decision of the Bundesgerichtshof in the landlord context, but not in the context of a deposit, where it makes clear that a debt does not become due from a tenant until you ascertain how much has to be paid.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Well --
MR ALLISON: It is a very short --
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: -- I am not sure you are right abou Page 29

MR ALLISON: This case is not, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: No. I think that is Mr Dicker's point.
MR ALLISON: The short answer to that in our respectful
submission is that it would assist my Lord to hear the
answer and to the extent that Mr Dicker wishes to
re-examine in relation to the authority, of course he
has every opportunity to do so.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: There are two aspects here, apart fron
the unsatisfactory general nature of it.
One is that Professor Mülbert should not be put at a disadvantage simply because you have sprung some evidence on him.

The second is that Mr Dicker should not be put at a disadvantage in protecting his witness from being sprung and from directing his witness in re-examination for my assistance.

Equally, I accept the overarching point that it would be a great pity if I were to proceed on
an imperfect or incomplete examination of German law, which is unknown to me.
I am sorry about this argument, Mr Mülbert.
MR ALLISON: My Lord, they were not provided for the first
time this morning. The agreed translations as
I understand it were provided I think late on Tuesday Page 31
night, maybe on Wednesday morning. They were not just provided today.

I don't know whether Professor Mülbert has had a chance himself to look at them. If not, maybe we should give him the chance to read it carefully.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Professor Mülbert may be familiar with them. Mr Dicker, the overriding purpose of all this is to try and get into my head the German law as far as relevant. I am anxious that my understanding should not be artificially curtailed in this. There is a discrete point, at least as regards this authority, which Professor Mülbert, as I understand it, has begun to educate me about. Which is that there may be a rule as to landlord and tenant, and in particular deposit, which discloses no general principle. I do not know what he is going to tell me, but I suspect that is what it is.

Do you need time or does your witness need time? We can ask you each in turn.
MR DICKER: My Lord, I certainly do. As I said I only
received this bundle this morning. I have not even had a chance to do more than open it.

My Lord, we entirely accept the overarching
principle. That is undoubtedly right but not, we say,
if it would cause unfairness to this side.
My learned friend did not explain the reason why
Page 32
these authorities were not produced earlier, nor why they didn't take the course that they required us to take, namely to exhibit them to a further report by Herr Fischer and to explain their relevance.

I mentioned that when they were provided to us we were told the relevance would be explained. That didn't happen. It still has not happened. The first time my learned friend said anything along those lines was on his feet 30 seconds ago.

My Lord, as far as I am concerned, I do need time. The idea that later this afternoon I should be expected to re-examine Professor Mülbert in relation to these authorities, we say, is frankly obviously unfair. I don't know what Professor Mülbert's position is, no doubt he could explain it. I don't know whether there are further materials he would like to research that he is not able to, given that he is presently sitting in court. My Lord, again that is obviously a matter for him.

My Lord, your Lordship is plainly right in relation to the overarching principle but not at the expense we say of causing unfairness to this side with which we cannot adequately deal.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Can we take it in stages. Professor Mülbert, are you familiar with this Page 33
authority or this case or extract?
A. Unfortunately not, for a very simple reason. It has to do with landlord tenant case and, given the specialisation among German academics I have written on law on contracts but the vast area of landlord tenant law I am not that -- I am not familiar with. So I am not familiar with that case, this decision.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Looking at it, without committing yourself, do you think this is a matter on which you would need to undertake further research in order to give me a full picture of the answer?
A. Just from the heading, it says it is about the bill for heating costs. It is obviously not about a deposit, but it has a relationship to the situation where bills are required for a debt to fall due. So I would have to take a closer look at whether that particular decision fits in with this more general body of law, I just agreed to.

In order to do that, it would be very helpful if
I could be allowed -- if I have to give an answer to
that -- if I would be allowed to take a look at the
German version or the original German version of the
decision and obviously have to read it through, and to familiarise myself.

This is I am afraid the best $I$ can do and have your Page 34

## Lord understanding German law even better.

MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Mr Allison, this is not a particularly
satisfactory position. I can understand how these
things arise, but nevertheless I think Mr Dicker must be right that it must be done fairly and it is impossible for me to assess the extent to which this opens up
an avenue which would require the Professor in all good conscience to have a look to see quite where it leads.

Are you able to proceed with your cross-examination and park this, and then -- with apologies to all -- I am going to suggest that it be reviewed over the short adjournment and see whether it is a matter which can be bottomed or whether, without wishing to sound rude to anybody, this is a bit of a, as regards this particular bit, storm in a tea cup. It may be something that discloses only a small point which is discrete, alternatively it may lead, as sometimes landlord and tenant cases in this country do, to an unfathomable iceberg.
MR ALLISON: Can I give my Lordship of course a yes, but with two comments before I get to that yes. Just so my Lord know the authorities, of which this is a three-page report, were provided at 1.00 on Tuesday to Freshfields. It is not that they have just been provided this morning, they have had them since Tuesday Page 35
with a day out of court yesterday. I don't know whether Professor Mülbert has been provided with them in advance or not.
A. I have been provided with them yesterday evening.
Q. You have had an opportunity to look at them?
A. If I had disregarded everything else, I would have had an opportunity to take --
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: You didn't spot it? Did you spot it or didn't you spot it?
A. I spot these decisions, but the bundle contains about $\mathbf{1 0 0 - - 6 0}$ decisions. It is difficult for me to ascertain whether these -- it was impossible for me to ascertain in the short period of time whether these court decisions are of particular importance or just for the questions at hand.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I am going to suggest we have a look over the short adjournment to try and measure this. I am anxious not to be circumscribed in trying to understand the German law.
MR DICKER: I entirely understand that. Can I just make two points. The first of all is we were promised with an explanation as to why the cases are relevant. We have not received it. It really would be very helpful, if Kirkland \& Ellis can now provide that explanation, in other words a proposition for which my learned friend is Page 36
going to contend each of the authorities stands for.
That is the first.
The second, with the greatest respect to my learned friend, I have not had any answer to. The translations that were provided to Freshfields on Tuesday while the rest of us were in court and which Professor Mülbert received late last night appear to have been translated by the agreed translator. That may have taken some time, we don't know when they were provided to the translator, nor has your Lordship heard any explanation as to why they were not given notice at that stage of these authorities.

I would simply ask through your Lordship for that explanation to be provided.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Mr Allison, I think one of your tasks over the short adjournment is to provide an explanation as to when the German interpreters were first asked to perform this, but also I think if your instructing solicitors are able to provide a short explanation as to any authorities not mentioned in either the two experts' reports or not notified well in advance, what the proposition sought to be derived from them is.
MR ALLISON: My Lord, of course. A great deal of this material is actually referred to by Professor Mülbert but didn't make it through into the agreed bundles.

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MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: That is in a different category. MR ALLISON: My Lord, I said I had two points before Mr Dicker stood up, before I said yes. The first was seeing whether Professor Mülbert had been given them and already read them, which was yes, he has been supplied with them.

The second was to try and help Professor Mülbert with this case, although it is only four pages, just to direct his attention to letter B on page 3.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Yes.
MR ALLISON: The point where the court discusses the fact that something does not become due until you ascertain what is due by way of submitting a bill. That is the point.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Thank you. As I say, I don't want to
be artificially constrained. This is a mercifully short
case, there may be other more daunting cases for all
I know to come but this one is, I think, capable of being bottomed over the short adjournment. Let us return to it then, you having alerted the Professor to the particular part of it you wish to --
to the extent that there are other cases within this bundle that we intend to take Professor Mülbert to, although he has already seen the cases, which particular

Page 38
paragraph we would like his comments on this afternoon.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Yes. Thank you.
MR ALLISON: With that rather lengthy distraction -- for
which I apologise, Professor Mülbert -- you just agreed
that the general rule is that where someone does not
know how much they have to pay until they get
an invoice, I think you said the majority of the
commentators take the approach that it doesn't become
due until the debtor gets the invoice so they know how much they have to pay.

The next point --
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I think Mr Mülbert wants to comment or that.
MR ALLISON: Of course.
A. Yes.

There must have been a misunderstanding. I can't remember having said that. Maybe counsel could show me where I have --

MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Let me see if I have understood what you have said. I think it was put to you that until the debtor received the bill or invoice, in the ordinary course, the majority opinion in Germany was that he was not required to pay until that time.
A. Yes.

MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Is that right?
Page 39
A. That's right, but this only refers to situations where
the parties, their bill is required based on the
contract, there are many situations where no bill is
required and in situations where no bill is required,
the situation is different.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: If the contract provides for payment
without invoice, either expressly, implicitly or by the
nature of the agreement, the person who owes the money
must pay it without being reminded to do so?
A. Yes.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Is that right? I don't want to put
words in your mouth.
A. I think there might be different, without being able to
ascertain the whole range of decisions that have been
rendered on that issue, but I think the majority -- or
at least some decisions will certainly say that the debt
falls due, even though the debtor does not exactly know
the amount he has to pay.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Right, I was going to ask you about
that.
Is it the majority view, or the unanimous view in
Germany, that the debtor, before being required to pay,
must know the sum that he must pay, by whatever process?
A. No, there is no general rule that a debtor must know
exactly the amount he has to pay for the debt to fall
Page 40

10 (Pages 37 to 40)
due. There is no such general rule.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: That makes it quite difficult, doesn't
it, for a debtor because he cannot really give a blank
cheque? It makes it difficult.
A. Yes, that sometimes make it very difficult.

MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: What is the solution to that?
A. The solution is that without the debt falling due -- the sheer fact that the debt falls due does not imply any additional consequences, in particular under German civil law, it does not entail, except for certain exceptions, that the debtor would have to pay default interest, unless warning notice is served on him or there is an exception from the requirement of a warning notice.

Depending on the situation, the idea that a debt can fall due without a debtor actually knowing the specific amount he has to pay is also in some situations thought to be a protection of the claimant -- of the creditor. So in certain instances, may I refer your Lordship to the amendments that I annexed to the Freshfields letter, where I explain that, in some cases, for example the early -- I cite the early termination of a loan contract, the debt falls due immediately upon termination, even though the debtor does not know the exact amount he has to pay.

MR ALLISON: My Lord, we will look at those in a moment.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I will let you explore it. I am sorry to interrupt.
MR ALLISON: No, no, my Lord of course. Just so my Lord knows, there is nothing cited by Professor Mülbert in any of his reports by way of commentary or case law in support of this debt falling due at the early time of termination, apart from two cases, one a road traffic case and the other the prepayment case that Professor Mülbert has just referred to that we will look at in a moment.

We have established that section 271 is a gap filling provision, that is where we were in relation to 271, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Just indulge me with this, even if section 271 does apply, as you understand Judge Fischer says it doesn't apply here, but even if it does apply, the way it operates is that "immediately" is to be understood objectively, isn't it? Would you like to see the section again?
A. Yes.
Q. If you go behind 83/J.

This is, even if you are right and section 271 does
apply in relation to the German master agreement, I am Page 42
asking you what is meant by the word "immediately". My question to you was, even where it is engaged,
"Immediately" is to be understood objectively, isn't it?
A. My Lord, may I explain a bit? "Immediately" is part of a statutory provision and as such must be interpreted along the lines of the rules developed by German courts on the interpretation of German statutory provisions.

This is a general answer. It does not imply that the rules of construction or of interpretation of German statutes are not such that statutory provisions must be only interpreted objectively, whatever that means in that context.
Q. Let me try a different question to see if we can agree.

> In a payment obligation case such as this, it would mean that the debtor must pay as quickly as possible by objective standards taking into account preparation time to pay, wouldn't it?
A. My Lord, I am not sure that that implies preparation time. "Immediately" means without -- that the debtor, since he knows that he has to pay, he must -- there is -- that is the interpretation, he must pay immediately, not being given any preparation time.
Q. Can we just see then, behind tab 58, what Kruger has to say in relation to this very issue.

If you go behind tab 58 -- I am so sorry, do you Page 43
have tab 58.
A. Yes, but it is a different bundle.
Q. Right towards the back of that tab, the last page of proper text before one gets the footnotes, you should find paragraph 32 on the right-hand side?
A. Yes.
Q. That's the paragraph I would like to look at with you. Do you see paragraph 32 ?
A. Yes.
Q. You see what Kruger says is:
"The term 'immediately' is to be understood objectively. This means that the debtor must pay as quickly as possible by objective standards, taking into account an approximately necessary preparation." Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. What he says then is that "Immediately" doesn't mean the very same time, does it? There must be at least some opportunity to prepare to make the payment, that is what he is saying, isn't it?

## A. That is what he says, yes.

Q. It is difficult to see how a few minutes could be the sufficiently long period to prepare to make payment, let's say 20 minutes. That's right, isn't it?
A. My Lord, 20 minutes in times of internet banking is Page 44

| 1 | very long time, so depending on -- I think in that | 1 | at them -- sorry, I have just been reminded may be |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | sense, depending on the circumstances, "immediately" can | 2 | fore we embark on the authorities that this may be |
| 3 | mean immediately even within $\mathbf{2 0}$ minutes. | 3 | onvenient moment for both my Lord and the witness. |
|  | Q. Looking at this case then, you would say that | 4 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Yes, are you feeling like a break now |
| 5 | mediately in this case, when automatic termination was | 5 | Yes, we will have a five-minute break |
| 6 | er of minutes before the | 6 | (11.51 am) |
| 7 | ministration order was made is objectively long enoug | 7 | (A short adjournment) |
| 8 | for the debt to fall due? | 8 | (11.56 am) |
| 9 | A. My Lord, "in this case" refers to LBIE's administration | 9 | MR ALLISON: Professor Mülbert, we were just going to look |
| 10 | case? May the question be clarified? | 10 | or the sum |
| 11 | Q. Yes, of course. In this case what we are looking at | 11 | becoming due on the automatic termination. |
| 12 | an application for an administration order made before | 12 | Two points before we look at those cases, would you |
| 13 | markets opened on a Monday morning without telling | 13 | gree that both of those cases arise in the context |
| 14 | anyone about it and the court making an administration | 14 | of |
| 15 | order a few minutes later. | 15 | case, and the other |
| 16 | Is your evidence that "Immediately" in section 271 | 16 | a breach of contract, the loan prepayment case? |
| 17 | should be understood such that it has become due in the | 17 | A. My Lord, the first case, namely the termination for |
| 18 | minute while the administration application was being | 18 | ment of |
| 19 | heard by the court but before the court made | 19 | bviously the second is a tort law |
| 20 | an administration order? | 20 | case |
| 21 | A. My Lord, the answer to that is that "Immediately", as | 21 | Q. So yes? There is a breach of duty, one of tort and one |
| 22 | Kruger states, has to be understood objectively, given | 22 | contrac |
| 23 | the interpretation following the rules of interpretation | 23 | A. It is -- I am not sure, my Lord, whether from the |
| 24 | of German statutory provisions. I still think that the | 24 | ish law, you could say that there is |
| 25 | necessary preparations, that the question whether -- | 25 | a breach of a duty of care -- it is a general tort case, |
| Page 45 |  |  |  |
| 1 | which amount of time is required in order to make | 1 | I explained |
| 2 | necessary preparations. And whether there is required | 2 | Q. Your worry is the tort case, because crashing into a car |
| 3 | adequate time for -- whether it is necessary to have | 3 | a tort, is that your point |
| 4 | adequate preparation time for the payment or for | 4 | A. That is my point, yes. |
| 5 | payments to be made, depends on the specific situation. | 5 | Q. Thank you. |
| 6 | Therefore I still -- I would be surprised if German | 6 | e second, again an obvious point, the cases do not |
| 7 | courts in a case like this, would not -- I would be | 7 | se in the context of a contractual netting procedure, |
| 8 | surprised if German courts would not hold that | 8 | do they |
| 9 | "Immediate" means right after, immediately after the | 9 | A. Yes. |
| 10 | termination notice in a case of a termination notice | 10 | Q. You agree with that, yes |
| 11 | immediately after the termination has been served. | 11 | A. Yes, I agree with that. |
| 12 | Q. After the service of a termination notice | 12 | Q. Let's go to the first one. It is not actually referred |
| 13 | A. Yes. | 13 | in your report, but we were provided with it after |
| 14 | Q. Then, let's move to the two cases that you have | 14 | e joint meeting. It is bundle 1, tab 29A. |
| 15 | identified that you say support the settlement sum | 15 | think it is referred to in the supplemental |
| 16 | becoming due immediately on the automatic termination. | 16 | cument you provided. If you have tab 29A, it should |
| 17 | The first is a decision from 2008 of the | 17 | be ther |
| 18 | Bundesgerichtshof arising out of a road traffic | 18 | Do you have |
| 19 | accident, do you remember that one? | 19 | A. Yes. |
| 20 | A. Yes. | 20 | Q. The 2008 decision of the Bundesgerichtshof in relation |
| 21 | Q. The second is a 2012 decision of the Frankfurt regional | 21 | the road traffic accident? |
| 22 | court, so several levels below, arising out of a breach | 22 | A. Yes. |
| 23 | of a loan agreement. That is the second one? | 23 | Q. That case concerned physical damage to property; didn't |
| 24 | Yes. | 24 | it? |
| 25 | Q. Let's just see if we can agree two points before we look | 25 | A. Yes. |
| Page 46 |  | Page 48 |  |

> Q. It was damage to a car as a result of a car accident?
> A. Yes.
> Q. The questions for the court included the time at which the cost of the repairs became due; didn't it?
> A. Yes.
> Q. The facts you would accept are very different to this case, aren't they?
> A. Yes.
> Q. Can we look at paragraph 9 together, on page 3 .
> Let's just look at the first two sentences together:
> "The concept the due date refers to the point in time when a creditor may demand performance." You agree with that?
> A. Yes.
> Q. And if the time performance is not defined or is not apparent from the circumstances, that is when section $271(1)$ applies. You agree with that?
A. Yes.
Q. Perhaps you could just read to yourself the rest of the paragraph, before I ask you some questions. (Pause)
A. May I consult -- my Lord, may I consult the German version of the decision?

MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Of course.
MR ALLISON: Of course. My only comment, I understand that
you had some German versions which were marked up with Page 49
comments. If it is the German versions provided by Linklaters, the clean ones, I think that will be preferable.
A. My Lord, I did not mark -- I have no versions with annotations. I have versions which highlighted, were I highlighted some passages with a yellow highlighter.
MR ALLISON: I think Linklaters do have clean versions in court as well, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: That is fine. I mean I am not sure yellow highlighting is going to give the answer to the case, but there we are.
MR ALLISON: It is paragraph 9, if you could just read the rest of paragraph 9. (Pause)

Do you have it, it is 29A.
A. Yes, I do have. (Pause)
Q. Okay?
A. Yes.
Q. You see the court refers to, "Then the due date is the same as the date when the damage to the legally protected interest occurred".

In that case, it was obvious, wasn't it, that the
damage to the legally protected interest occurred when the car crash occurred?
A. Yes.
Q. The calculation of a claim in tort for breach, when you Page 50
already know that there has been a breach, is not comparable to a netting procedure after termination of a contract, is it?
A. Well, yes, the calculation is different, yes.
Q. You agree?
A. Yes.
Q. This case actually goes further and it doesn't say that -- what the court says is that a claim will only become due once the party -- and I am picking up the words in the English five lines up from the bottom:
"... it will only become due as soon as the injured party has the information needed to assert his claims."

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. The injured party has to have the information necessary to assert his claims before the claim becomes due; you would agree with that?
A. The problem is -- my Lord, I read the German version different from the English translation.
Q. It is an agreed translation. Let's see if we can agree things. The first thing you did agree is the due date is the same when the damage to the legally protected interest occurs, yes?

Sorry, could you just --
A. Yes.

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Q. -- for the transcript. Thank you.

You also agreed that a breach of duty giving rise to an immediate claim was different to a termination and a netting procedure, didn't you.
A. Yes.
Q. The point that I was putting to you in the English is that what the court tells us in the translation agreed by the parties is that the claim becomes due when the injured party has the information needed to assert his claims.
A. My Lord, this is exactly the part where, according to my understanding, the English translation deviates from what the court says in German. What the court says in German is that as soon as the injured party has the information needed to assert his claims, he can put the liability in default with the claim, with the claim due.

It doesn't say -- the short sentence "by making the claim due" is not what it says in the German version. The German version it says that he can put the liability insurer in default with the claim due.
Q. Just testing that point, it is a surprising one on the English translation because of the word "or". It says: "As soon as the injured party has the information needed to assert his claims, he can in principle put the liable party or his insurer in default."

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| 1 | Our translation appears to be talking about both the | 1 | case before we look at the important point. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | liable party and the liability insurer | 2 | The case concerned a cancelled loan; didn't it? |
| 3 | A. It says -- in this respect it says respectively, but my | 3 | A. Yes. |
| 4 | nt is, my Lord, not about whether it is the injured | 4 | Q. A loan that the borrower had agreed but then decided not |
| 5 | rty or the liability insurer, it is about the term "by | 5 | o take up, that's righ |
| 6 | making the claim due". This | 6 | ofessor Mülbert, was that a yes? I am so sorry, |
| 7 | Q. Do you say that in this case the Bundesgerichtshof went | 7 | n't make its way on to the transcript. |
| 8 | on to find, as a fact, that the claim was due | 8 | A. It is -- I am sorry, I have -- may I just take a look at |
| 9 | h taking place? | 9 | the case -- |
| 10 | A. My Lord, that is my reading of paragraph 9 of that | 10 | Q. Of course. |
| 11 | decision. | 11 | A. -- my Lord? |
| 12 | Q. Let's look at that point together. If you go to | 12 | Q. Of course. (Pause) |
| 13 | agraph 1 , do you see paragraph 1 ? We see in the | 13 | A. My Lord, could the question be repeated? |
| 14 | t sentence that the traffic accident took place on | 14 | Q. Of course. The question was, we agreed it concerned |
| 15 | 12 December 2006? | 15 | a cancelled loan. |
| 16 | A. Yes. | 16 | I am so sorry, would you mind just indicating |
| 17 | Q. You see that. You would say the claim | 17 | whether you agree or not? |
| 18 | the answer you just gave me? | 18 | A. May I ask whether, my Lord, cancelled loan means a loan |
| 19 | a yes? | 19 | t or -- |
| 20 | A. From my understanding of my reading of paragraph 9, | 20 | Q. Let me put it a different way. You agree the case |
| 21 | I | 21 | ncerned a loan that the borrower had agreed to take |
| 22 | Q. Can we now go to paragraph 18 together. Can | 22 | then decided not to take up? |
| 23 | the last two lines, the last two sentences together -- | 23 | A. My Lord, may I just be given time to familiarise myself |
| 24 | the court actually finds, doesn't it, that the repair | 24 | th the facts because it is about -- the case is about |
| 25 | claim was due at the latest at the time of the letter of Page 53 | 25 | the calculation of prepayment fees which requires the Page 55 |
| 1 | 14 February, so some two months after |  | lean to be taken out. Therefore I would like, if it is |
| 2 | doesn't it | 2 | ermitted, I would like to familiarise myself again with |
| 3 | A. Yes, the court finds that it was due, at the latest. | 3 | the facts of the case |
| 4 | Q. That was the time at which the defendant had pai | 4 | Q. Professor Mülbert, it is one of your two authorities |
| 5 | a certain amount of the claim, but the replacement value | 5 | cited by you in your writing but if you do feel you need |
| 6 | of the car, but had failed to pay the balance of the | 6 | ne, of course. |
| 7 | repair costs, that is right, isn't it? | 7 | A. Thank you. (Pause) |
| 8 | A. My Lord, in order to give an answer, I would have to | 8 | Ah, my Lord, according to my understandings of the |
| 9 | fully familiarise myself with the facts of the case | 9 | ct of the case, the loan was taken out but was |
| 10 | Q. I am so sorry, it was one of the two cases you relied on | 10 | minated for cause later on. |
| 11 | Professor Mülbert, that is why I was just checking the | 11 | Q. Was terminated for cause by who, I am so sorry? |
| 12 | question. Maybe we could just agree from paragraph 18 | 12 | A. Was terminated for cause later on by the lender. |
| 13 | that what the Bundesgerichtshof says is that the due | 13 | Q. It was a breach of contract by the borrower that led to |
| 14 | was at the latest some two months after the traffic | 14 | cancellation of the loan by the lender? |
| 15 | ident, it doesn't say the due date was at the date of | 15 | A. Yes. My Lord, may I give further explanation or ... |
| 16 | the accident, does it? | 16 | Q. I was going to take you to paragraph 57, which may |
| 17 | A. Yes. | 17 | answer the point that you were looking for. |
| 18 | Q. I am so sorry, yes you agree with me? | 18 | You see in the second sentence, what happened is the |
| 19 | A. Yes, I agree this is what the Bundesgerichtshof says. | 19 | defendant, which was the bank, the lender, cancelled the |
| 20 | Q. Thank you. Let's move to the second case that you rely | 20 | disputed loan due to a breach of the borrower. As |
| 21 | on. That is behind tab 39. This is a decision of the | 21 | a result of that, they demanded damages due to |
| 22 | higher regional court of Frankfurt, do you see that, | 22 | non-fulfilment by the borrower, with regard to the |
| 23 | 23 November 2011? | 23 | damages that occurred as a result of the early repayment |
| 24 | A. Yes. | 24 | of the loan. |
| 25 | Q. Let's just see if we can agree the background to the | 25 | Do you see that? |
|  | Page 54 |  | Page 56 |

## A. Yes. <br> Q. The bank had a claim for damages for breach of contract, didn't it? <br> A. Yes. <br> Q. The non-performance by the borrower was the failure to fulfill the loan agreement which led to the cancellation?

A. Yes.
Q. Can you just keep that case open and, if we can go to volume 4, not of the authorities but of the expert reports, where you saw your expert reports earlier, I don't know if you still have that --
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: It does appear to me, and I must be corrected, that the loan was taken out but for whatever reason there was a breach of the loan terms, it was called in early and the question is what the consequences were of those events.

MR ALLISON: My Lord, absolutely.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Yes.
MR ALLISON: It is not, in other words, an automatic termination case, it is a breach of contract case and how the claims work in that context.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: No, all I wanted to clarify was that
I think that the Professor was correct in his not accepting that it was a case where no loan was drawn Page 57
down, which is I think what was put to him. I do not know whether it makes any difference, but I just want to be sure of my factual basis.
A. My Lord, if you allow, I would briefly comment on that --
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Please.
A. -- whether there is a distinction.

Under German law there is no distinction made between the situation where a borrower does not take out the loan and the situation where the loan is terminated for good cause. In both situations the bank will be entitled to damages. However, there is a difference insofar that in the second case, where the loan is terminated for good cause, it is not only the claim for damages but also the claim for the repayment of the principal that the bank has.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I see. Once the bank has offered the money, if the borrower does not take it up, the bank nevertheless has a claim in respect of its loss for having allocated some money to the borrower, whether or not the borrower takes the opportunity?
A. It goes even beyond that. It is a claim for the loss of profits the bank does not make because of the early termination.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Thank you.
Page 58

> MR ALLISON: Is that a claim for loss of profits under section 252 of the German civil code?
> A. That is -- yes.
> Q. Yes.
> Volume 4, you should have the expert reports, could you go to divider 16, please. In this you should find Judge Fischer's fourth report, do you see that? If you could turn to page 4, could you read paragraphs 8 and 9 , please. (Pause)
A. I have, my Lord, in front of me the German version of Judge Fischer's fourth report, so I do not know whether to read out aloud these paragraphs or just read it by myself.
Q. I am so sorry, read it by yourself. You will find the English immediately in front of the German.

## A. That would be divider --

Q. It is divider 16, page 532, bottom right-hand number.
A. Thank you.
Q. Have you found that?
A. Yes.
Q. If you could just read those paragraphs to yourself, please.
A. That is paragraphs?
Q. 8 and 9, please.
A. Sorry, they are not -- excuse me. My Lord, they are not Page 59
on page 4 , it is page 3 of the German version.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: In the German they are page 540 as th bundle is numbered --
A. Yes.

MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: -- in the English version they are at page 532, as the bundle is numbered.
MR ALLISON: My Lord, yes.
What Judge Fischer says, as you see, is that the
case we have just looked at is very different because there was a breach of contract by the borrower which gave rise to an immediate right for damages.
You see what he says there?
A. Yes.
Q. You would agree that where one has a breach of contract, you do have an immediate right to assert a damage claim?
A. Yes, I do agree with that.
Q. Would you also agree that in the case that we have just looked at, there was therefore, as a result, no dispute as to when the damages claim of the bank actually did fall due for payment.
A. Yes, I will agree this, because that is generally the accepted principle.
Q. As a result of the breach, yes. Thank you.

That is all I wanted to ask you about section 271 and the two authorities on which you seek to rely.

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The second part of your evidence relevant to the timing of the compensation claim was your reference to the ISDA master agreement that we touched on earlier. I would like to ask you a few questions about that.

What you say -- I don't know whether you can recall, if not by all means we will look at it together. You observed that the German master agreement has, as its overall objective, the aim of replicating under German law the ISDA master agreement.
A. That is my understanding from -- my Lord, this is my understanding from the comments I found in the literature on the ISDA master agreement, and of some people that might even have been involved in drafting the agreement but I don't know that.
Q. Can we just see how you put it in your evidence, back within the volume we just had open.

It is mentioned in your consolidated report, which you will find behind tab 11 at paragraph 67.

Have you found that?
A. Yes.
Q. You say:
"The overall objective [the point I just made to you] is to replicate the ISDA master agreement and also its closeout netting provisions in particular."

You cite one text in support of that proposition. Page 61

Can we just turn that text up together. You will find that behind tab 43 of the German authorities.
A. That would be volume, sorry?
Q. Sorry, volume 1, tab 43. This is the text you footnote at paragraph 67 in support of your evidence. Headed "Banking law" do you see that? I think it is footnote paragraph 1 that you rely on. That is right, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. That is a general statement that it is intended to replicate it for the ISDA and in terms of closeout netting, yes?
A. My Lord, I am not sure whether this meant that this is my statement in the report or the statement in the --
Q. Sorry, in the authority we are just looking at, that is a general observation in relation to the parallel between material agreements without going into the detail of the provisions, isn't it?
A. Yes, that is true.
Q. Thank you.

Would you also agree that the relevant textbooks observe that the German master agreement contains a lot less detail than the ISDA master agreement?

## A. Yes, I agree.

Q. In particular a lot less detail in relation to termination and the consequences of termination?

## A. I agree with respect to the consequences of the termination. <br> Q. You say that the parallel between the two agreements is important when working out when the compensation claim becomes due?

A. My Lord, this is, again, not a yes or no answer.
Q. Can we look at paragraph 67.

I am just going to show Professor Mülbert his evidence on the point.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Have a look at your evidence but if you want to qualify it, you must say so.
A. Yes.

MR ALLISON: Back in paragraph 67, the second sentence, you say:
"Therefore it would be surprising if post an English administration of the counterparty, the ISDA master agreement was capable of giving rise to an entitlement to default interest but the GMA was not."
A. Yes. May I now add my qualification?
Q. Of course, if you wish to.
A. This is not meant to say -- "surprising" in that context is not meant to say that is a -- that is something that has to be taken into account by necessarily interpreting the or in construing the contractual provision, it is simply meant to say that from the perspective of market Page 63
participants it would be surprising if there was such a wide deviation between the operation of the German master agreement and the ISDA master agreement, my Lord.
Q. Let's just test your evidence that the German master agreement is intended to replicate in German law the ISDA master agreement.

Three separate parts of the ISDA to look at.
I don't know whether you have the core bundle there, access to the core bundle? If you could go to tab 7 of the core bundle, you should I hope find the ISDA master agreement. It is only here in case you don't agree with what the points I am about to make to you so we can look at the clauses together.
The ISDA master agreement does not have automatic termination on bankruptcy unless the parties expressly provide for it; does it?
A. My Lord, I would have to consult the ISDA master
agreement with the help of counsel because I was not
asked to opine on the ISDA master agreement and I may add that the first sentence of my expert opinion states that the overall objective of the GMA is to replicate under German law as best as possible, that is the manner in which the ISDA master agreement operates, but it does not -- since this only, this is not possible that it mirrors the ISDA master agreement, there are inevitable Page 64
Page 66

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deviations between the two.
Q. To avoid needing to take you through all of the
    provisions, let's see if we can agree a proposition
    instead.
            On the assumption that the ISDA master agreement
    does not provide for automatic termination unless the
    parties specify that, you would agree that the
    termination for insolvency in the German master
    agreement, which is automatic, is materially different
    to the ISDA?
    A. My Lord, it is materially different but it is
        a deviation from the ISDA master agreement that the
        German drafters of the German master agreement expressly
        incorporated in order to make it possible for the
        closeout netting under German law. This was
        incorporated with a view to avoid any obstacles from
        German insolvency code.
    Q.Let's just briefly explore why that is the case, because
        under German insolvency code there is a maximum period
        of five days after termination in which a netting has to
        take place, that is right, isn't it? It is a five-day
        period after insolvency in which the netting has to
        occur under section 104?
    A. My Lord, may I -- since that is a general insolvency
        provision and I would like to consult the provision.
Q. Let's just briefly explore why that is the case, because under German insolvency code there is a maximum period of five days after termination in which a netting has to take place, that is right, isn't it? It is a five-day period after insolvency in which the netting has to occur under section 104 ?
A. My Lord, may I -- since that is a general insolvency provision and \(I\) would like to consult the provision.
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        Page 65
    Q. Of course. It is my volume 2, I think it should be your
    volume 2 as well. Tab 84, section 104. The relevant
    provision is over the page at 104(3) that forces the
    closeout on the fifth working day at the latest.
    MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Could you give me that reference
        again, I am terribly sorry?
    MR ALLISON: My Lord, of course. Tab 84, sub tab E --
    MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Thank you.
    MR ALLISON: -- it is the second page, subsection (3).
        You said that the reason the German master agreement
        has automatic termination was to deal with the rules of
        German insolvency, yes.
    A. Yes, I said that.
    Q. This is the relevant rule in relation to netting that
        takes place after insolvency, isn't it?
    A. As -- my Lord, as the law currently stands. However,
        the ISDA master agreement was drafted prior to
        a revision of section 104 of the German insolvency code
        and as \(I\) understand the reasons for the automatic
        termination clause then was in order to avoid cherry
        picking by the administrator that would have been
        possible under section 104.
            At that time when -- the reasons that I understand
        from reading materials, from reading German materials on
        that. Again, I am not familiar, I am not an expert in Page 65
    Q. Of course. It is my volume 2, I think it should be your volume 2 as well. Tab 84, section 104. The relevant provision is over the page at 104(3) that forces the closeout on the fifth working day at the latest.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Could you give me that reference again, I am terribly sorry?
MR ALLISON: My Lord, of course. Tab 84, sub tab E -MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Thank you.

MR ALLISON: -- it is the second page, subsection (3).
You said that the reason the German master agreement has automatic termination was to deal with the rules of German insolvency, yes.
A. Yes, I said that.
Q. This is the relevant rule in relation to netting that takes place after insolvency, isn't it?
A. As -- my Lord, as the law currently stands. However, the ISDA master agreement was drafted prior to a revision of section 104 of the German insolvency code and as I understand the reasons for the automatic termination clause then was in order to avoid cherry picking by the administrator that would have been possible under section 104.

At that time when -- the reasons that I understand from reading materials, from reading German materials on that. Again, I am not familiar, I am not an expert in
insolvency law in this matter so I relied on the German
materials explaining that.
Q. You do agree though that the German master agreement has automatic default which, on the assumption that the ISDA
does not have it unless the parties specify it, is
a material difference between the two master agreements?
A. My Lord, I am sorry, it has automatic termination, not automatic default.
Q. I think I said -- I am so sorry, I meant automatic termination. One has automatic termination, the German master agreement, the ISDA master agreement does not, unless the parties elect it and that is a material difference between the two agreements?

## A. That is an obvious difference between the two.

Q. Thank you.

The next is when the equivalent claim to the compensation claim under the German master agreement becomes due under the ISDA. If you could look in the ISDA that I have given to you, look at page 155, do you see the heading "Calculations"?
A. Yes.
Q. If you could just read (i) and (ii) to yourself, just so you know (i) deals with the calculation of the settlement sum and (ii) deals with the day on which it becomes payable.

Page 67

You see in the payment date, the settlement sum becomes due on the day that notice of the amount payable is effective. It is when one party tells the other party what the claim is, do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. You say that in relation to the German master agreement it becomes payable at a much earlier time on the automatic termination?
A. I say that based on the lack of a provision -- of a contractual provision -- to the effect of the ISDA stipulation.
Q. It doesn't then reflect the ISDA master agreement?
A. Yes, it does not.
Q. Then, if we can look, the final area "interest", in section D(ii) that you just read, the last two sentences deal with interest. Do you see that the ISDA master agreement has an express contractual right to interest?
A. My Lord, may I be taken to the last two sentences again?
Q. Of course, you see that the penultimate sentence talks,
"Such amount will be paid ..." That is the settlement sum?
A. Yes.
Q. "... together with [and we can miss the bracket] interest thereon."

There is an express term for the payment of
Page 68
interest; do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you see that the interest is dealt with and is to be paid at the applicable rate, do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Then, at page 160 , you will see the definition of default rate, which applies in circumstances where there has been a default within insolvency. Do you see that?

You would agree then that there is an express contractual right to interest in the ISDA master agreement that is missing in the German master agreement?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you previously --
A. Yes, I agree.
Q. Thank you.

You previously suggested in your evidence that clause 3(4) of the German master agreement could give an interest claim on the compensation claim. You no longer run that argument, do you?
A. My Lord, the answer is that I talked about clause 3(4) in my report. I didn't opine on whether clause 3(4) would be applicable to the closeout amount, I was simply answering the question, the agreed question, put to me and I did not opine in either direction. I agreed later Page 69
on with Dr Fischer that 3(4) does not apply to the closeout amount, but this was due to the phrasing of the questions of the agreed questions.
Q. You accept now then that the contractual arrangements for interest in the German master agreement, of which there are none, are for the termination sum are materially different to those found in the ISDA master agreement?
A. My Lord, from the reading of the ISDA master agreement, at this moment I agree.
Q. Just drawing that together, would you accept that your attempt to draw a parallel between the German master agreement and the ISDA master agreement is made at a very high level of generality only?
A. Yes, I agree with that.
Q. You would accept then that the interest provisions within the ISDA master agreement do not help you one way or another in working out interest entitlements under the German master agreement?
A. Yes, I accept that and if I may add, in my report I did not rely on the ISDA master agreement, except for noting that the -- except for the general observation made in paragraph 67 of my report.
Q. Professor Mülbert, thank you. I think that is all I was going to ask you about when the claim becomes due.

I was now going to move on to the question of the other requirements for a default under section 286.

We agreed earlier that even if a claim is due, that is not enough on its own for there to be a default within section 286. That is right, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. You also need the service of a warning notice or the application of one of the exceptions to the service of a warning notice?

## A. Yes.

Q. Could we just go back to section 286 together. It is behind tab 83, at letter N . You may need some assistance clearing some paper away; I am worrying you are being overburdened.

## A. I wouldn't want to put the arch levers up like this

 (Indicated), because that would obstruct my view, so ...Q. It should be volume 2, tab 83, letter $N$.
A. Thank you.
Q. Do you have it?
A. Yes.
Q. A couple of short questions before we look at the detail of your arguments.

First, you would agree that the general rule is that
a warning notice has to be served to trigger a default?
A. Yes, I agree.

Page 71
Q. We know that no warning notices were filed in the present case. Have you been told that?

## A. I have been told.

Q. In your third report you seek to develop for the first time two different arguments about default. The first, just to check that I understand them, is that you contend that while filing a proof in a German insolvency proceeding does not amount to a warning notice, this, to use your words, "... may be different in an English administration"?
A. Yes.
Q. The second argument that you propose is that the administration application by LBIE's directors triggered a default within subsection 2 number 3 of this provision, in other words that it constituted a serious and definitive refusal of performance by LBIE?
A. Yes.
Q. That's correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you.

Let's start with the proof of debt and whether it can be construed as a warning notice. You are aware that a creditor can only pursue a claim for interest in a German insolvency proceeding for the period after commencement of insolvency if there was a default prior Page 72

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { to the commencement of insolvency? } \\
& \text { A. My Lord, again, this is not a simple yes or no answer, } \\
& \text { but goes back to the amendment to the joint statement. } \\
& \text { I agreed that with respect to the insolvency estate, the } \\
& \text { creditor can only pursue his claim by proceedings, by } \\
& \text { the insolvency -- by the proceeding provided for by the } \\
& \text { German insolvency code. } \\
& \text { Q. They cannot recover interest within that proceeding } \\
& \text { unless they have a default before the proceeding starts? } \\
& \text { A. Yes. } \\
& \text { Q. As we have just heard, you agree with Judge Fischer that } \\
& \text { a proof of debt in a German insolvency proceeding would } \\
& \text { not amount to a warning notice? } \\
& \text { A. Yes, I agree. } \\
& \text { Q. Let's now look at the requirements for a warning notice. } \\
& \text { Let me put a proposition to you to see if you agree with } \\
& \text { it. A warning notice requires an unequivocal demand for } \\
& \text { payment of a sum due. Do you agree with that? } \\
& \text { A. Yes, I agree with that. } \\
& \text { Q. You would also agree, would you, that a warning notice } \\
& \text { requires the obligor to receive a clear definite demand } \\
& \text { from the obligee for the payment of an amount due? } \\
& \text { A. Yes, I agree. However, this clear demand may be either } \\
& \text { express or implied. } \\
& \text { Q. Can we just look at one decision of the }
\end{aligned}
$$ Page 73

Bundesgerichtshof to see how that works. It is tab 28 of the authorities. Do you have that?
A. Yes.
Q. If we can look at paragraph 10 together, on page 82, you see next to 10 , then there is a number 3 , and we are told by the first sentence that:
"The decision depends upon whether the appellant had already warned the respondent as defined by section 286 , paragraph 1."

> Ie, a warning notice? Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Then paragraph 11 tells us what a warning notice is, the court expresses it in the following way:
"It has to be a final payment demand that establishes default in any clear and specific request in which the creditor unambiguously expresses a demand for the performance owed."

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. There is no mention there of any possibility of an implied request, is there?
A. My Lord, it does not say it must be express or implied, it simply says that it must be expressed unambiguously.
Q. Let's look at the reasons why a proof of debt in
a German insolvency proceeding is not considered to be
a warning notice.
Would you agree with Judge Fischer that -- his evidence is that the filing of a proof of debt is not a request by a creditor to the debtor for the payment of the debt, it is actually a request to participate in the insolvency. Do you agree with that?

## A. I agree with that, yes.

Q. The commentators also speak with one voice on that issue, maybe let's just turn up one or two to see how they work. If we could look at what Judge Gruneberg says, behind tab 48, you should have some sub tabs within it and it is behind $B$ and it is the second page behind B, paragraph 21, do you see that? It is the last sentence, where the judge expresses his opinion. He says:
"On the other hand insufficient are: declaratory action; an action for future performance; and the registration of the receivable in case of insolvency proceedings."

## A. I see that, yes.

Q. Judge Gruneberg is saying that registering a claim in an insolvency process is not equivalent to a warning notice?

## A. He says so, yes.

Q. Let's also see how the point has been addressed by the Page 75

Bundesgerichtshof. If you go to tab 37 -- sorry, there is one more before we go there. It is tab 59A, it is one of the other prominent commenters so we see at least one more, it is the commentary in Staudinger.

## A. Volume 2, is it?

MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Just at the end of volume 1.
MR ALLISON: I think it might be in your volume 1, it is in my volume 2.
A. Yes, thank you, my Lord.
Q. It should be the very first page of sub divider A, paragraph 66. Do you have that, paragraph 66?
A. Yes.
Q. The bit that I wanted to show you was the last sentence, where the authors express the view that the filing of claims in the insolvency does not replace the caveat, ie the need to serve a warning notice, because it does not contain any request for payment to the debtor. Do you see that?
A. Could you take me please -- could I please be taken to the paragraph you were just reading from? It is section 286 but the paragraph you were just reading from.
Q. I just want to check we are in the same place. I was at tab 59A. Do you have a copy --
A. Yes.

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Q. The paragraph number was 66, top left-hand number?

MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: It begins "Bringing a declaratory action."
A. The same page is in here twice.

MR ALLISON: I see. The point I think is the same in both, is that the author has expressed the view that the filing of a claim in an insolvency does not replace the need for a warning notice, because it does not include a request for payment. You would agree with that?
A. I would agree with that, yes.
Q. Thank you.

The next place was the decision of the Bundesgerichtshof at tab 37 where they consider the question. Do you have tab 37 .

## A. Yes.

Q. Do you see number 3, the third question in the headnote, makes clear the issue being considered, one of the issues was: does the filing of a bankruptcy claim in the table of claims entail a payment request justifying the default of the bankrupt debtor? Do you see that?
A. I see that, yes.
Q. Then if we can turn, there is just one paragraph that deals with it, it is the very last page, and it is the very last paragraph of the report. Do you see that what the court says is the question to ask is: whether the Page 77
plaintiff went into default because the defendant filed its claim in the bankruptcy proceedings against the plaintiff's assets?

## A. Yes, I see that.

Q. Yes? Then you see that the court answered that question no and, reading what they say, they say it is to be answered in the negative because the filing of the bankruptcy claim to be entered in the schedule of claims entails no demand made to the debtor for payment. Do you see that?
A. Yes, I see that.
Q. The same point that was being made by the authors, you don't have a demand for payment being made by proof of debt?

## A. Yes, my Lord.

May I just add one observation as to the authority. I think you said it was the German federal high court --
Q. I am so sorry, it was the Reichsgericht, wasn't it?
A. Which, my Lord, would be the predecessor to the Bundesgerichtshof.
Q. To the Bundesgerichtshof. Thank you Professor Mülbert.

You seek to draw a distinction between the filing of a proof of debt in a German insolvency proceeding and the filing of a proof of debt in an English administration, don't you?

Page 78

## A. Yes.

Q. You say that in a German insolvency proceeding, in your third report, that the proof in a German insolvency proceeding is directed to the insolvency administrator and not the debtor as a person?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you aware that under English insolvency law the obligation is to file your proof with the administrator, not with the company?
A. I am aware of that based on the short summary on the English administration.
Q. Can we just look at what Judge Fischer has to say about this in his third report, so it is volume 4, behind tab 12.

My Lord, I think the next questions may take about five minutes, I don't know whether that is a convenient moment or whether I should plough on?
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: If it is going to be about five minutes and you then come to a natural break --
MR ALLISON: My Lord, it will be about five minutes and then it is a natural break.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Then let's carry on.
MR ALLISON: Thank you.
It is tab 12, Professor Mülbert, paragraphs 37, 38, and 39 is where Judge Fischer explains what has to Page 79
happen under German law.
Could you just have a look at those paragraphs and see whether you agree with the points he makes, so for example, in paragraph 37 , do you agree with the point that he makes that filing a claim in a German insolvency proceeding is not the same as serving a demand, because when those proceedings are instituted the debtor has forfeited the power to dispose of its assets?

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        It is page 321, I am so sorry.
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A. Yes. And, please, I was -- the page is different from the organisation, the English and German version are different in that respect. My Lord, I was a bit confused. May I be taken again to the paragraph you were reading from.
Q. Of course, it was paragraph 37, to see whether you agree with what Judge Fischer says. He says at the end of that paragraph that the filing of a claim in a German insolvency proceeding is not -- and the not means not a warning notice -- because when those proceedings are instituted, the debtor has forfeited the power to dispose of its assets. Do you agree with that?
A. Yes.
Q. Then, paragraph 38, Judge Fischer summarises important aspects of German insolvency law and in the second sentence he says:

Page 80
"Once insolvency proceedings have been instituted,
insolvency creditors can pursue their claims only as
provided under insolvency law."
Do you agree with that?
A. I agree -- my Lord, I agree based on section $\mathbf{8 7}$ of the
German insolvency code cited by Judge Fischer which will
prevent a German court from admitting --
Q. The claims cannot be brought outside the insolvency
proceeding. That is the point, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Instead, as he says in the next sentence, "They must
file their claims, proofs of debt for entry in the
schedule".
A. Yes.
Q. Then he says at the bottom, after they have been filed
in the schedule the last sentence:
"... the debtor's assets are distributed among the
creditors in accordance with the terms of the insolvency
code."
Do you agree with that?
A. Yes.
Q. Over the page, he says that:
"If a court action or the service is a demand for
payment in summary debt recovery proceedings, which
a legal action is equivalent to a warning notice are
Page 81
invalid for the above reasons, the same holds all the more true for the warning notice itself."

What he does two lines on, he says:
"No insolvency creditor is supposed to be able to gain an advantage over the community of creditors through its own actions against the debtor."

Do you agree with that?
A. My Lord, I agree with that provided that Judge Fischer implies that this is true with the distribution of the estate.
Q. Just recapping, you agree that after a German insolvency proceeding creditors cannot bring legal proceedings against the debtor, they have to file their claims in the insolvency schedule?
A. My Lord, I agree they cannot bring an action before a German court.
Q. You agree that what the creditors have to do is to file a proof of debt and then participate in any distribution of the assets?

## A. Yes, I agree with that.

MR ALLISON: Thank you Professor.
That is a convenient moment, if it is for my Lord?
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Yes, 2.05.
Are you on track Mr Allison?
MR ALLISON: Almost exactly, my Lord, yes.
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MR JUSTICE HILDYARD:Thank you.
        2.05.
    (1.06 pm)
        (The Luncheon Adjournment)
    (2.05 pm)
    MR ALLISON: Good afternoon, Professor Mülbert.
    A. Good afternoon.
    Q. We had just finished looking at the proof of debt, which
        was your first argument for the triggering of a default
        by way of a warning notice. I was now going to turn to
        your second argument, which, as we established before
        lunch, is that the administration application by the
        directors of LBIE constituted a serious and definitive
        refusal by LBIE to perform, thereby engaging one of the
        exceptions.
            Before looking at the statute and some of the cases,
        can we just see if we can agree a few propositions in
        relation to this theory of yours.
        The first is that you have not cited any German
        authority which suggests that an application to commence
        insolvency proceedings should be viewed as a serious and
        definitive refusal to perform, have you?
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    A. No, I haven't.
    Q. It is correct, is it not, that a creditor can only seek
        interest within a German insolvency for the period after
        Page 83
        that insolvency, if there was a default before
        insolvency? I think that is something we looked at this
        morning as well.
    A. My Lord, yes, with respect to the claims he pursued
        against the estate.
    Q. Against the insolvent estate, yes. Thank you.
    A. Yes.
    Q. We also established before lunch that you agree with
        Judge Fischer that the filing of a proof of debt in
        a German insolvency does not trigger the default.
    A. Yes.
    Q. The point that you raise in these proceedings would be
        potentially important in German insolvencies generally,
        wouldn't it?
    A. My Lord --
    Q. The suggestion that an application could be an exception
        to a warning notice.
    A. My Lord, that could be of -- that would be of interest
        to German substantive law, yes.
    Q. Thank you.
        We agreed before though, there is no authority that
        supports it in Germany.
    A. There is -- my Lord, there is no prior authority.
    Q. Just focusing on the words, "Serious and definitive
        refusal to perform", you would agree that the cases and
        Page 84
    |  | the commentators consistently say those words are | 1 | exceptions to the warning notice listed in subsection (2). Do you see that? |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | subject to strict requirements? | 2 |  |
| 3 | A. My Lord, the commentators and the cases say that there | 3 | A. Yes. |
| 4 | are strict requirements for a serious or definite | 4 | Q. One of the exceptions is: |
| 5 | refusal to be -- yes. | 5 | "The debtor seriously and definitively refuses to |
| 6 | Q. Thank you very much. In fact, as you acknowledge in | 6 | perform." |
| 7 | your report, the commentators who have looked at the | 7 | In your expert report, you rely on section 323(4) |
| 8 | point say that an application to commence insolvency | 8 | don't you? You can find that at S. |
| 9 | proceedings does not constitute a serious and definitive | 9 | A. My Lord, may I qualify the answer? I rely on |
| 10 | refusal to perform | 10 | section 323, paragraphs 2 and 4 in conjunction. |
| 11 | A. My Lord, there is one decision by a -- my Lord, before | 11 | Q. Paragraph 4, just looking at it, paragraph 4 says, "The |
| 12 | I answer the question, may the question be rephrased, | 12 | creditor may revoke the contract before performance is |
| 13 | please? | 13 | e if it is obvious that the requirements for |
| 14 | Q. Yes, we will come back to them later but, just to flag | 14 | revocation are met". |
| 15 | the point now, for my Lord, the -- in the commentaries, | 15 | Do you see that? |
| 16 | Schwarze and Staudinger says that an application for | 16 | A. Yes. |
| 17 | insolvency would not be a serious and definitive refusal | 17 | Q. It uses the test of obvious, doesn't it? |
| 18 | to perform. That is right, isn't it? Would you like to | 18 | A. Yes. |
| 19 | see that? | 19 | Q. Not the test of serious and definitive refusal to |
| 20 | A. Yes. Yes. | 20 | perform. |
| 21 | Q. It is bundle 2, tab 70. (Pause) | 21 | A. My Lord, this is true but may I explain the working |
| 22 | It is paragraph 95, do you see paragraph 95 | 22 | of -- the main part is a section, from my reading of |
| 23 | A. Yes, I have looked. | 23 | that provision the main part is paragraph 2 , where it |
| 24 | Q. Where the commentators start by saying there is not | 24 | says that the specification can be dispensed with if, |
| 25 | a refusal to perform present in the following cases -Page 85 | 25 | (1), the debtor is serious and definitely refuses to Page 87 |
| 1 | do you see those words? | 1 | perform. And the prerequisites for that to happen are |
| 2 | A. Yes. | 2 | relaxed based on paragraph 4, if it is obvious before |
| 3 | Q. Then you see a whole long list of matters, and if you | 3 | the performance is due that the preconditions set out in |
| 4 | turn over the page you see the penultimate one is th | 4 | paragraph 2 will be met. |
| 5 | petition to open insolvency proceedings alone. Do you | 5 | Q. Thank you. Just on 323(4), you would agree that the |
| 6 | see that? | 6 | test of whether something is obvious may be satisfied by |
| 7 | A. Yes, I see that. | 7 | something other than a serious and definitive refusal to |
| 8 | Q. They refer to a case of the Munich courts that we will | 8 | perform? |
| 9 | come back to in due course. | 9 | A. Yes. |
| 10 | You say that the parallel should be drawn in this | 10 | Q. For example, the cases in the textbooks talk about |
| 11 | case, between a serious and definitive refusal to | 11 | an alternative way of satisfying it, being where there |
| 12 | perform under section 286(2) and an obvious test under | 12 | is a high probability of non-performance, that is |
| 13 | section 323(4), that is the section you rely on, isn't | 13 | correct, isn't it? |
| 14 | it? | 14 | A. That's correct. |
| 15 | A. Could you please -- my Lord, could the question be, the | 15 | Q. Let's see how your case develops in relation to this |
| 16 | first part of the question -- | 16 | provision, but let's start with section 286, which is |
| 17 | Q. Shall I try again? | 17 | the key provision for his Lordship. |
| 18 | A. Yes, and may I take a look at the pertinent provision, | 18 | If you turn to letter N , you should find that. Do |
| 19 | namely 280 -- | 19 | you have section 286, letter N? |
| 20 | Q. Of course, we will look at it in detail in a moment, but | 20 | A. N ? |
| 21 | you will find it behind tab 83, behind N, you find | 21 | Q. Yes. |
| 22 | default? | 22 | A. Sorry, yes. |
| 23 | A. Yes. | 23 | Q. Let's see if we can agree the basic framework. The |
| 24 | Q. We looked at this before lunch, warning notice is the | 24 | exception you seek to rely on is section 286(2), number |
| 25 | general rule in subsection 1 and then there are the | 25 | 3. |
|  | Page 86 |  | Page 88 |

## A. Yes. <br> Q. Can we look at what the legislative history of that provision is. If you turn forward to tab 87A, do you have 87A? <br> A. Yes. <br> Q. Then what is said, looking first at page 145, is that: <br> "A mere delay of performance beyond the due date does not result in any significant legal disadvantages." <br> That is the general point. Then the next sentence, the third sentence, talking about the need for default, it says: <br> "This requires the fault of the debtor and awarding notice or equivalent circumstance." <br> Do you see that? <br> A. My Lord, could it be clarified which part of -- <br> Q. Of course, it is the very first paragraph on page 145 headed, "With the default of the debtor, preliminary remark". It is the third sentence that I am looking at with you, beginning, "This requires ..." <br> Do you see that? <br> A. Yes. <br> Q. "This requires the fault of the debtor and a warning notice or equivalent circumstance." <br> Yes? <br> A. Yes.

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Q. Then it says, "... with these warning notice
substitutes". Do you see that as well?
A. Yes.
Q. We agreed earlier that a warning notice requires a clear definite demand from the obligor to the obligee for payment of an amount due, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. The logic of the words here, is that one would expect the equivalent circumstances, or the substitutes to be seen as something equal to a warning notice, wouldn't one?
A. My Lord, this is again an answer $I$ cannot just give by saying yes or no. I would like to expand a bit on that.

The warning notice -- I think it must be understood from the perspective of the purpose of the warning notice, the warning notice which has the purpose of inducing the creditor -- the debtor to pay on time and to make it clear that he will suffer consequences, negative consequences, if he does not pay in time. The cases where the law dispenses with the requirement of a warning notice are situations where, for different reasons, there is no need for a warning notice to be given because there is no need because the debtor either knows that he will suffer negative consequences or, whether for other reasons, the law

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thinks that on balance the interests of the creditors are to be put above the interest of the creditor and therefore the warning notice is not required.

If I may take your Lord to section 286, paragraph 2,
number 4, there you will find that the idea of a balancing of interests is most clearly expressed and most clearly comes across. The idea is that the general idea with paragraph 3 and, or numbers 3 and 4, are that it is the interest of the creditor that prevail over the interests of the debtor. Therefore not requiring a warning notice.
Q. Two points from that. First, you must recognise that the insolvency of the debtor is not one of the triggers listed within 286 for not needing a warning notice?

## A. Yes, obviously not.

Q. Second, let's just look at what the legislative history says about the two exceptions.

If you turn over to page 146 behind tab 87A, and we are going right towards the bottom of the first column, where you will see what is said is that:
"Paragraph 2, number 3 [the serious and definitive refusal to perform] is new in comparison to the applicable law."

It draws attention to two other statutory provisions where there is the similar language, doesn't it, you Page 91
have the similar language of serious and definitive refusal in 281(2) and 323(2), don't you?
A. Yes.
Q. Then it says that:
"The case law regarding the dispensability of the warning notice or a warning notice surrogate is to be deepened. This pertains to the generally acknowledged case of an earnest and final refusal to fulfill from the debtor..."
A. Yes.
Q. That is what it is aimed at, isn't it? It is an earnest and final refusal to fulfill?
A. Yes.
Q. It also goes on to say, doesn't it, that the paragraph you just referred to, which is not developed in the joint statement to any great extent, paragraph 2, number 4:
"... is also new and the provisions specify special circumstances that justify the immediate onset of default in consideration of the mutual interests. This case group is also acknowledged in the case law. It should not be extended beyond the current formulation." You see that?
A. Yes.
Q. There is no suggestion that $323(4)$ or $286(2) /(4)$ would Page 92

> be triggered by an application for insolvency proceedings in either the case law or the literature, is there?
A. No, not in the materials.
Q. And not referred to in any of your reports either?
A. My Lord, could the question be clarified?
Q. I think your answer was, "...not in the materials". You don't refer in your reports to any materials that support it applying where there is an application for insolvency proceedings; do you?
A. No.
Q. Thank you.

That is 286. If we could now look at section 323 and see how it works differently.

That is tab 83 S .
This is 323 , and let's see if we can agree what this provision is aimed at. It concerns the revocation of a contract where there has been a breach of contract by reason of non-performance or defective performance, doesn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. 323(1) requires a grace period to be specified before the exercise to revoke is actually taken up; doesn't it?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. The setting of the grace period is dispensed with under

Page 93
certain circumstances in 323(4), yes? I am so sorry, 323(2), I misspoke.
A. Yes.
Q. That is the provision that has the same language that we saw in section 286(2)(3) isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Moving on to subsection (4), this is not about the right to revoke after a breach of contract, is it?
A. Yes. Yes. This is.
Q. You agree with me?
A. Yes, I agree with you.
Q. Thank you very much.

It is about the right to revoke in anticipation of a breach of contract.
A. Yes.
Q. It is dealing with a different situation to section 286, which requires performance to actually have been due, yes?
A. Yes -- it applies to different situations, yes.
Q. The word used is "obvious" isn't it?
A. Pardon? My Lord, the word used in paragraph 4 is
"obvious"?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. I would suggest to you that, as a matter of language,
the word "obvious" is broader than, "A serious and
definitive refusal to perform."
You would agree with that, wouldn't you?
A. My Lord, I am sorry, could the question be rephrased?

The reason being that "obvious" deals with the preconditions for the dispense, not with the preconditions for dispense, therefore I am not sure what --
Q. Shall I try again?
A. Yes, please.
Q. We have agreed the test is obvious. That is the test, whether something is obvious, yes? Whether or not the fulfilment of the contract performance is obvious?
A. I am sorry, my Lord, if I had spoken such, that would have been a mistake. I am not aware that I said this and $I$ would not want to say this. May I explain what I truly mean?

The test is not obvious, but the test is whether it is obvious that the requirements for the revocation will be met and, as I explained earlier in my statement, the requirements for the revocation are set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of section 323.
Q. Are you saying then that where there is a serious probability of non-performance, that would not fall within section 323(4)?

$$
\text { Page } 95
$$

A. My Lord, again, could the question be rephrased?
Q. You just told my Lord that when looking at section

323(4), you look back to section 323(2) and the things listed there. You said that, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. My next question to you was: do you not agree that a serious probability of performance, of non-performance, would fall within section 323(4) even though it is not listed above?
A. My Lord, a serious probability of non-performance would surrender the rights to revoke the contract under 323, in conjunction with paragraph (4).
Q. Where do you see that in section 323?
A. My Lord, again the preconditions for the right to revoke the contract are listed in paragraphs 1 and 2. You have to have the non-performance, that is paragraph 1 , and you have the requirement for a grace period, also, at paragraph 1. The requirement for a grace period is done away with pursuant to paragraph 2.

Paragraph 4 extends the right in case of an anticipatory breach.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: What does "obvious" mean, do you think, in the context, does it mean certain or highly probable?
A. Highly probable, yes.

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MR ALLISON: Subparagraph 2 of section 323 you would agree 1
is only dealing with the dispensation of the grace $\quad 2$
period, when you can dispense with it?
A. Yes.
Q. Can we just look in view of the difficulty we had with that question at what Judge Gruneberg says about section 323(4). If you go to tab 48 if you go to the very end of that tab, paragraph 23 , can I just ask you to read that paragraph to yourself.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: 48 --
MR ALLISON: I am so sorry, 48E, sub tab E, which is Judge Gruneberg's commentary on section 323.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Yes.
MR ALLISON: Then the very last paragraph should be a 23 in the left-hand column, beginning with a number 5 .
A. Yes.
Q. Could you just read that to yourself, please?
A. May I take a look again -- may I take a look at the German?
Q. Of course. (Pause)
A. Yes.
Q. Looking at it together, and looking at the second sentence together in the English which begins, "The cases this encapsulates ..."

Do you see that?
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A. Yes.
Q. What Judge Gruneberg tells us is:
"The cases this encapsulates are in particular those in which the obligor prior to the due date refuses seriously and conclusively to render performance, the trust in his ability to performance has ceased to exist."

And then:
"... or if it is obvious from the circumstances that the obligee is unable to render performance by the end of subsequent timeframe which will have been set after performance falling due."
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Judge Gruneberg is telling us that section 323(4) is not just looking at the exceptions to a warning notice to a reminder in section 323(1), he is telling us it also includes the case where it becomes obvious from the circumstances that the obligee is unable to render performance, isn't he?
A. Yes.
Q. You must accept now that section 323(4) is wider than just the things listed within section 323(2), the word "obvious" goes wider.
A. My Lord, may I -- again, the answer is not a simple yes Page 98
or no, but I accept that there are additional situations where an anticipatory breach may give rise to the right of revocation but Judge Gruneberg relies on, by expressly saying that the one case would be the serious and definite refusal relates to -- relies on the two situations listed in paragraph 2 , dispensing with the requirement for a grace period. But he goes on -- at least that is my reading of this sentence -- that he says even if it is necessary to have a grace period, it is you still can revoke the contract.

In that sense, "Obvious" is not expanding, it is not about the preconditions, as the preconditions are the ones listed in, set out in paragraphs 1 and 2. It is about whether the preconditions required by law are obvious, if that is highly probable or not.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Do I have it right that 2, in your opinion, relates to an actual refusal, 4 relates to a prospective refusal and the prospect of the refusal to come within 4 has, in the words of Gruneberg I think, have to be a matter of virtual certainty.
A. My Lord, that goes -- that is along the lines, except that prospective refusal is an anticipatory refusal to perform.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: It has not yet happened, but it is
obvious it is going to happen?
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## A. It is obvious that in the future you will refuse to perform. <br> MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I was quizzing you on obvious. I think you said it was not certain and you said highly likely and I think Judge Gruneberg says "virtually certain". Would you accept virtually certain?

## A. I would accept virtually certain as ...

MR ALLISON: Just let's see what one other commentator says about it behind tab 45, at tab 45D, where Ernst also makes the point that the word "obvious" in section 323, paragraph 4 is wider than a serious and definitive refusal to perform.

Do you have 45D there?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. It is paragraph 132 that I was going to look at with you.
A. Again, my Lord, may I --

MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: It says wider.
A. May I take a look at the German version?

MR ALLISON: Of course. The bit that I am interested in looking at with you, it is the first six lines, the final word is the word "performance" before article 78. MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I think the word "wider" may be causing semantic difficulty.
MR ALLISON: Maybe I will try a slightly different way of Page 100
putting it. What the commentators tell us is it is not
only a serious and definitive refusal to perform, but
also includes cases as Ernst says where for other
reasons it is evident that there will be no due
performance without the debtor having refused performance.
A. Yes.

My Lord, that is the reading but in my opinion the reading does not depend on the word "obvious", it depends on the fact that the provision sets out that these requirements can -- that under this requirement set out by paragraph 4, there is the right for the creditor to revoke the contract but it is in that sense, it is again, from my reading and, and I think from the reading also of Judge Gruneberg, obvious relates to the degree of probability that these facts will be given if they were to happen later on would give the creditor the right to revoke the contract.
Q. Professor Mülbert, that is incredibly helpful and I think we are agreeing that when one is answering the section 323(4) question, what you are looking at is the degree of probability of that occurring. That is the question.
A. Yes. There is -- you have the elements and the prospective elements and you have the probability that Page 101
they will occur, yes.
Q. There was one other commentator that I was just going to
look at who makes a very similar point. It is at tab 67.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I think that is in volume 2.
MR ALLISON: My Lord, certainly in my volume 2. I think it may be in everyone else's.

Do you have tab 67?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. This is a commentary also on section 323(4), do you see the heading at the top "Withdraw prior to the due date" paragraph 4 , that is a reference to section $323(4)$ ? What the commentator says -- if I could ask you to read the first four lines -- is that it does include a serious and definitive refusal to perform. He uses the words, "Earnest and definitive refusal to perform" but it also includes other cases and those other cases are the ones we just discussed which is when, with a certain degree of probability, you can say there will be a breach of contract.
A. Yes, I agree with that.
Q. You do agree with that?

That is section 323 and what the commentators have said in relation to the test for the word "obvious". What I was going to do now, having seen that the Page 102
language in section 286(2)(3) being very different to the language in section 323(4) is to look at the cases in commentaries on the relevant provision.

Can we now just look at some cases in commentary on section 286(2)(3), the exception you say is engaged. The first case is at tab 28 of the authorities bundle. Do you have tab 28?

## A. Yes, I do.

Q. We looked at this case a little earlier. The part that I would like to look at with you now is on page 81. The point that I am going to put to you is that the exceptions to section 286(1) should be construed narrowly; shouldn't they?
A. My Lord, could I please be taken to the specific sentence?
Q. Professor Mülbert, I am sorry, I think it actually may be a duff reference. I am so sorry, where I think I am meant to go -- I am so sorry, it is there, in the middle just below the middle of the page, in the English, it begins with the words, "In light of ...", do you see that?

Can you see the words, "In light of ..."?
A. "Protection in the right of the rights established"?
Q. Page 81 --
A. Yes.

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Q. -- we are looking not in the bottom paragraph, the paragraph above it --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and we are looking -- I think it is 10 lines up from the end of the paragraph, "In light of these clear legislative guidelines ..."

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. It is focusing on section 286, paragraph 2, which is the exceptions to the service of a warning notice, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. It says, "In light of these clear legislative guidelines, an expansive interpretation of section 286, paragraph 2 , number 1 , is out of the question."
A. Yes.
Q. You would agree that the courts have indicated that you should construe the exceptions to the service of a warning notice narrowly?
A. My Lord, I think I already answered on that previously by saying that -- may I just restate my answer?

The courts are very often, or there are several courts that have said, among them the German federal high court, that these provisions must be interpreted in a strict sense in order to prevent the creditor from easily going away, or walking away, from a contract.

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Strict in that sense is, according to my
understanding, is to be distinguished from a narrow
interpretation. It means that it must be -- it is not enough for the debtor to say that he won't pay because of -- for some reason -- it must be, as the courts have several times put it, the final word of the letter to say, no, I am not going to perform. In that sense, I prefer the expression "Strict interpretation" over the "Narrow interpretation."
Q. Thank you, that is helpful.

Picking up on what you said in relation to the final word, you would agree, then, that a serious and definitive refusal to perform requires that the debtor unambiguously gives its final word that it won't perform?
A. Yes, that is the gist of -- my Lord, that is the gist of what the German courts said on that.
Q. Would you also agree that, as well as it needing to be, as you agree, an unambiguous final word that they will not perform, it needs to be something that is communicated by the debtor to the creditor?
A. My Lord, again, the answer to this question is: more no than yes.
May I explain why I have chosen that phrase?
The communication means, implies, an element of
Page 105
a declaration from, and German courts and also some commentators have held that it is not necessary to be a declaration on the part of the debtor, but it can be what is termed a simple act implying that they will not be -- that they will not perform. In that sense, communication is, from my understanding, not the appropriate description of that fact.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Unequivocal conduct would suffice?
A. Yes.

MR ALLISON: In view of that, can we just look at what the commentators have said on the point, starting with Staudinger at tab 70.
A. Tab 70?
Q. Tab 70, yes. You should I hope find the translation of Staudinger there. There were two passages that -- three passages actually, that I was going to look at with you. The first is paragraph 91. If you could read the first three sentences.
A. My Lord, I am sorry. I can't find 91 behind --

MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: There a little bit of a break. Maybe
there is a green page or -- I have a green page in
between. That is it, and then one more over. That is the one.
A. Okay, thank you.

MR ALLISON: Professor Mülbert, I am sorry, do you have it
now?
A. Yes, I have it now.
Q. First in relation to paragraph 91, you see that Staudinger says that you can only speak of a refusal of performance if the obligor denies performance in a certain manner as a final act, do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you agree with that?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you see he goes on to say, in the second sentence,
"The horizon of the obligee, the recipient is the decisive factor".

Then:
"Such refusal must be considered as the last word of the obligor so that a change of the decision appears to be ruled out."

Do you agree with that?
A. Yes.
Q. Then, skipping over the cases, he refers for that proposition, he says that "Strict requirements should be imposed on the assumption that the obligor denies performance as a final act, do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Then the next passage is just below it, at paragraph 93, and he says:

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"The refusal to perform is to be classified as
a commercial type action."
Then going down three lines he starts to explain
this and he says:
"The statement must issue from the creditor or
a representative."
Do you agree with that? That you have to have
a statement from the creditor or its representative?
A. My Lord, I do not agree with the requirement of
an explicit statement by the creditor if he conducts
himself in a way that can be understood to be a definite
refusal, I would submit that this is enough to qualify
as such an act.
Q. You would disagree with Staudinger when he says that the
refusal must be declared to the creditor or the person
authorised by the creditor?
A. Yes, I do disagree with him.
Q. Let's just see what another commentator says in those
circumstances, tab 59A --
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Can I just ask you about B94, sorry.
Is that a different point, or the point you were on,
"The refusal to perform can be implied and be concluded
from external circumstances"?
A. My Lord, this is the point I wanted to make.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Yes.
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A. Also may I draw your Honour's attention to the first sentence of paragraph B93, where the author in
Staudinger says and explicitly acknowledges that the
German federal high court took a different position regarding the requirement of a declaration on a transaction like act.

The abbreviation, it starts, in brackets, it starts
by saying compare, and then the AA is the German expression not translated into English, I think, of saying, "of a different opinion".
MR ALLISON: Thank you. We saw earlier and Staudinger goes on at paragraph 95 expressly to consider what does not constitute a refusal to perform. Doesn't he?
A. Yes.
Q. He says that one thing that is not a last word is
an application to open insolvency proceedings?
A. Yes, my Lord we saw that. He simply stated that without
giving any explanation, simply by referring to a -- by reference to a core decision of the Munich court of appeals.
Q. Finally, let's just see what Judge Gruneberg says on the provision as well, behind tab 48 at letter B.
A. B?
Q. Yes, absolutely. It is the third page, it is
paragraph 24C. Do you have a page headed, "Refusal to Page 109
perform"?
A. I do.

MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: 48?
MR ALLISON: My Lord, yes, 48, sub tab B and it is the third page of that section, headed "Refusal to perform", where the judge is considering section 286(2)(3).
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: After a green page again. MR ALLISON: Yes.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Yes.
MR ALLISON: You will see that what the judge says in the last two sentences, that:
"Strict requirements must be placed on determining the existence of an earnest and conclusive refusal to perform, the refusal must be able to be deemed the last word."

That is Judge Gruneberg's position.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you agree with that?
A. I think it reflects the general German position on that.
Q. We saw earlier that the section in section 323, that has its parallel in the default exception, is section 323(2)(1), would you like to see that again?
A. Yes, please.
Q. It is tab 83S.

Do you have that section 323 ?
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> A. Yes.
> Q. We have already looked at section $323(4)$ and established
> that it includes when something is likely on the probabilities from the circumstances. We are now though
> looking at section $323(2)(1)$, which is the debtor seriously and definitively refuses to perform.
> Would you agree that the German courts and the German commentators take the same view in relation to this provision as they do in relation to the exception to section 286 that we have just looked at?

## A. Yes, I do.

Q. In other words, you would agree that the courts and the commentators have emphasised the strict requirements, including that it be the last word of the debtor?
A. Yes, may I add, for the benefit of your Honour, that is because it is the very same wording, it is not in similar language, it is the same language used in the two provisions. That is why they used the same ...
Q. The courts have used phrases such as, "The debtor unambiguously and with certainty expressed his will as his last word". Do you agree with that?
A. My Lord, I can't remember whether any court has said this in exactly these words but it sounds about right.
Q. If you would like to see it, the case is in bundle 5, if you would like to see it, where I took the quote from.

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The expression is required as the last word of the debtor.

Maybe in fairness I should show it to you. It is bundle 5, tab 11. If you feel you would like longer to answer on this case, it is one of the ones that we discussed this morning.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Is this --
MR ALLISON: It is to show the question. I am going to just show the passage so the witness can see, in fairness, the formulation I just put.
MR DICKER: My Lord, it is not an entirely satisfactory process. We left it I think this morning expecting to receive a list of propositions for which these cases were said to stand as authority. We have not had it. The most we have had is a table indicating which paragraphs in the various authorities my learned friend would like to refer to.

We have no idea what Judge Fischer's own views in relation to these cases are. I do not know what proposition my learned friend intends to put to Professor Mülbert, I have no idea whether Judge Fischer --
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I take your general point, but on the particular point, I think all that is confirming that the same approach is taken to the same words and

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1

Mr Allison has focused on the word "expression", and I
have a feeling I know what the witness will want to say about that.

Ie, that expression by conduct as well as by
words -- I think I have got the hang of this.
MR DICKER: My Lord, I am confident as always your Lordship has.

Can we perhaps leave it on this basis and see how it goes.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: All right.
Mr Allison, do I have wrong the two points you wanted? The second one, I think you have your answer. The first one, I think the witness was perfectly prepared to sort of accept that that may have been said by a German court, if it has been said, well so be it. Would you like to see the words to satisfy yourself?
A. Yes, and again, I had a look at the German original and the German original probably can be translated by using the word "expression", but expression conveys the meaning of some communicative act which is lacking from the German wording, because the German wording -according to my reading of the German -- simply says that if somebody had looked at the behaviour of the debtor, it would have been obvious for him that the debtor would not perform.

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MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I think we have the same general approach under our law, which is that you can make clear something by conduct, as you can by words, but sometimes it is more difficult by conduct, since conduct is often more equivocal than words -- or sometimes more equivocal than words.

Beyond that, Mr Allison, do you want to bring out more than that?
MR ALLISON: My Lord, the authorities for provision, having
been raised by Professor Mülbert, all talk about the need for an expression of the last word by the debtor.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I think you can take it he does not
agree with that but Mr Fischer may say otherwise,
I don't know.
MR ALLISON: Just to maybe take the answer that was given,
what Professor Mülbert says is you may not need a communicative act.

Just picking that up --
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Right.
MR ALLISON: I have done you a disservice,
Professor Mülbert, what you say is:
"It can be expressed in words but 'expression' conveys the meaning of some communicative act."

That was your answer.
A. The answer I -- I think it was not -- my Lord, I think

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> it was not the answer but I think the answer was that you could translate it into English by using the word
> "expression" but that would convey a communicative act,
> which is not meant at least according to my
> understanding of German, which is obviously somewhat limited, because others would read it different but my reading would be that it is not implies a communicative act. That is all I want to say on that.
> Q. When you say that though, do you mean it doesn't need to be an oral statement by someone or do you say it is something they don't actually need to be aware of? Which is it?
> A. My Lord, it is not an oral statement to be made, it can be -- can be an act and it must not be an act meant to be directed to the creditor. That is what I wanted to say.
> MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Presumably, would it have to be known to the creditor?
A. My Lord, at the end of the day, yes, because without the creditor getting knowledge of the fact, he would never be, would know, about the right ... but let me make up an example, this isn't a top example so I know that it might be difficult but if, according to my understanding, if somebody who has entered into a sales contract takes the good and burns the good, that, apart

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from all other legal remedies, derived from sales law, that I think would qualify as a serious and definitive refusal to perform. That is the general idea I wanted to convey.
MR ALLISON: That is very helpful but you agree that, in that context, also it has to be the final word of the debtor, there has to be no chance of them changing their mind?
A. Yes. My Lord, if I may add, in a case where you burn a piece of furniture -- of whatever, it is only once, there is no way of changing your mind afterwards and performing.
Q. Putting it another way, a degree of probability is not enough. It has to be the final word of the debtor?
A. Yes, it has to be the final word of the debtor, yes. Q. Thank you.

You rely on only one case in support of your argument there does not need to be an actual communication across the line from the debtor to the creditor to trigger the provision. That case can be found at tab 12 of the authorities bundle. It is the case footnoted for the proposition at paragraph 119 of your third report that you don't need to communicate the intention seriously and definitively not to perform.

This was not a case concerning section 286(2)(3),

| 1 | the serious and definitive refusal exception, was it? | 1 | if remedying it is impossible or if it is refused by the |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | A. It was not a case. | 2 | contractor |
| 3 | Q. I am so sorry? | 3 | A. Yes. |
| 4 | A. It was not a case. | 4 | Q. In those circumstances you don't need to set a time |
| 5 | Q. It was not a case concerning one of the other exceptions | 5 | period to remedy the defect, do you? |
| 6 | he German civil code that also uses the language | 6 | A. Yes. |
| 7 | ious and definitive refusal to perform; was it? | 7 | Q. Let's just have a look at the decision together. |
| 8 | A. My Lord, may the question be - | 8 | Bundle 1, tab 12. Could we start by looking at the |
| 9 | Q. Of course, let me try. You said it is not a case | 9 | ind in paragraphs 2A and |
| 10 | concerning section 286(2)(3)? | 10 | 2B. I am on the first full page of the report, page 2 |
| 11 | A. Yes. | 11 | 3, in 2A and 2B. Would you like to have a moment to |
| 12 | Q. Serious and definitive refusal to perform? | 12 | mind yourself? |
| 13 | A. Yes. | 13 | A. I would like to take a look at the German version, |
| 14 | Q. It is also not a case on the equivalent provision in | 14 | ea |
| 15 | s | 15 | Q. Of course. (Pause) |
| 16 | A. No, it is not a case on section 3 -- | 16 | A. Yes, I have refamiliarised myself with that. |
| 17 | Q. It is not actually a case that considers a provision | 17 | Q. Thank you. Let's just try and summarise the key facts. |
| 18 | German code that has the words "Serious and | 18 | initially refused to remedy the defect, |
| 19 | definitive refusal to perform", is it? | 19 | , |
| 20 | A. My Lord, it is a case on a provision that no longer, | 20 | A. $\mathbf{H m m}$. |
| 21 | current version of the German civil code, exists. | 21 | Q. I don't think -- the transcript was just catching up. |
| 22 | Therefore it was a form | 22 | The creditor did not though elect one remedy or the |
| 23 | Q. It is a case on the old section 634, isn't it | 23 | other at that point, did it |
| 24 | A. Yes. | 24 | A. No. |
| 25 | Q. That was not in the authorities bundle, what we have Page 117 | 25 | Q. The debtor then said that he would remedy the defect, Page 119 |
| 1 | done to help you look at this case is we now have that | 1 | didn't he? |
| 2 | the further authorities bundle. You can see the | 2 | A. Yes. |
| 3 | wording of the provision, it is behind tab 9B | 3 | Q. And the creditor then tried to claim compensation? |
| 4 | I just propose to give you a minute | 4 | A. Yes. |
| 5 | Professor Mülbert just to remind yourself of th | 5 | Q. Just looking at paragraph 2C together, the reasoning of |
| 6 | provision first. | 6 | the court. It says: |
| 7 | A. Yes. (Pause) | 7 | he Court of Appeal ruled correctly the setting of |
| 8 | Q. Have you had a chance to have a look at that | 8 | a deadline was not dispensable because the debtor |
| 9 | A. Yes. | 9 | initially refused to provide the subseque |
| 10 | Q. Thank you | 10 | improvement." |
| 11 | Let's just see if we can agree on the role of 634 | 11 | Even though the debtor originally said no, that was |
| 12 | fore we look at the case you rely on. The provision | 12 | not enough: |
| 13 | bout defective works, isn't it? That is what it is | 13 | "... if the contractor is not willing to provide |
| 14 | there for? | 14 | subsequent improvement, this initially results only in |
| 15 | A. Yes. | 15 | the option for the client to assert a claim for |
| 16 | Q. It gives the creditor a right to elect either (1), to | 16 | compensation of damages without setting a deadline." |
| 17 | have the defect remedies or, (2), to get a reduction of | 17 | Then it says: |
| 18 | the price? | 18 | "The refusal does not result in any further |
| 19 | A. Yes. | 19 | consequences for that moment." |
| 20 | Q. You agree with that | 20 | Dropping down a paragraph, the court then addresses |
| 21 | A. Yes. | 21 | the limited refusal and it says: |
| 22 | Q. The remedies require a grace period to be set, don't | 22 | "The limited effect of the refusal means, among |
| 23 | they? | 23 | her things, that the option to demand compensation of |
| 24 | A. Yes. | 24 | damages without setting a deadline can be suspended |
| 25 | Q. There is though an exception at subsection 2, you see, Page 118 | 25 | again." Page 120 |


| 1 | There was not the option for the creditor to elect | 1 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: No, I think I was wondering about |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | either remedy there? | 2 | a question but think that is fine. |
| 3 | A. Yes. | 3 | MR ALLISON: My Lord I will do my very best to finish today. |
| 4 | Q. Thank you. Then it goes on to say | 4 | We have gone a little bit more slowly after lunch than |
| 5 | 'The refusal is not a legal declaration that | 5 | I had hoped, but we may well get there. |
| 6 | modifies the contractual relationship to which the | 6 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Within reason and subject to |
| 7 | contractor can be bound, it merely constitutes | 7 | veryone's, including the witness's endurance, I will |
| 8 | a behaviour which makes it easier to not set | 8 | sit a little bit late in order to finish it off if that |
| 9 | an otherwise required deadline." | 9 | would assist you. |
| 10 | You rely on this case, don't you, to say that you | 10 | MR DICKER: My Lord, that may deal with that. |
| 11 | don't need to communicate a serious and definitive | 11 | was just going to raise this, if we were to run |
| 12 | refusal. | 12 | over till tomorrow with Professor Mülbert, obviously |
| 13 | A. Yes, my Lord, I rely on that case in line with other | 13 | Judge Fischer requires a translator -- that is probably |
| 14 | German commentators. Opinions are divided on that. | 14 | fair, we require a translator. It does mean that |
| 15 | Q. This is the only case you cite in your expert reports in | 15 | cording to the chancery guide, that takes somewhere |
| 16 | support of the proposition. Would you agree that the | 16 | between three and four times as long as it might |
| 17 | German court here did not even consider whether | 17 | otherwise do. We may be slightly pushed on timing as |
| 18 | a refusal had to be communicated? | 18 | far as he is concerned, certainly if we were to overrun |
| 19 | A. My Lord, if the refusal is not a declaration on the part | 19 | and potentially in any event. |
| 20 | on, | 20 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: What if you do overrun? What would be |
| 21 | there was no need for the courts to go into the question | 21 | your response, as it were, to that? Would you be asking |
| 22 | of whether the communication is necessary or not. | 22 | for us to continue with it on Monday, or what? |
| 23 | Q. That is a yes to my question. The court didn't consider | 23 | MR DICKER: My Lord, I think that may be a question for |
| 24 | it? | 24 | review tomorrow. As I understand it, Judge Fischer can |
| 25 | A. That is a qualified yes. Namely that the court did not Page 121 | 25 | be available on Monday. <br> Page 123 |
| 1 | consider it, but that the court had no reason to | 1 | MR ALLISON: He can. |
| 2 | consider it. | 2 | MR DICKER: Sorry, Professor Mülbert said it was |
| 3 | Q. Actually, in this case it was communicated, wasn't it, | 3 | Herr Fischer but, regardless, as I understand it, |
| 4 | by the debtor? There was a communication | 4 | Judge Fischer can be available on Monday. That may not |
| 5 | originally said it wasn't willing to do the works, | 5 | be ideal because those two days had been scheduled for |
| 6 | didn't it? | 6 | closing submissions. I wonder if we might just see how |
| 7 | A. As far as -- my Lord, as far as I remember the case, | 7 | we get on tomorrow. |
| 8 | ye | 8 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Are you indicating to me that it is |
| 9 | Q. There is nothing in this case which deals with whether | 9 | not beyond the realms of fantasy that you may need the |
| 10 | one needs to communicate a serious and definitive | 10 | Wednesday? |
| 11 | refusal to perform? | 11 | The various moving parts, it is obviously wrong for |
| 12 | A. My Lord, there is nothing on the facts of the case, | 12 | Professor Mülbert not to be here when Professor Fischer |
| 13 | is just the statement of the court in the decision | 13 | is being cross-examined, so I think they need both to be |
| 14 | saying that it is not a declaration on the part of the | 14 | available. I can accommodate you till 5.00 tomorrow and |
| 15 | debtor. | 15 | 5.00 today, but quite often it is very, very tiring for |
| 16 | Q. As we saw earlier, you correctly acknowledge in your | 16 | the witness and for counsel, and in some cases even for |
| 17 | report that Schwarze and Staudinger actually does | 17 | the judge. |
| 18 | address the question and says that you do need to | 18 | I don't want an excessively long day for fear of |
| 19 | communicate. | 19 | focus vanishing. |
| 20 | A. My Lord, as I stated before, there is disagreement as to | 20 | From my own point of view, and notwithstanding the |
| 21 | the requirements. | 21 | clarity of the injunction that fixed-end trials must end |
| 22 | MR ALLISON: My Lord, unless my Lord had any questions on | 22 | on the fixed day, I would not necessarily hold to that |
| 23 | that particular point, I don't know whether this migh | 23 | under all circumstances if that were what you would |
| 24 | be a convenient moment. I think I have rather gone over | 24 | prefer. I will let you think about that. |
| 25 | the halfway point. | 25 | MR DICKER: My Lord, I am very grateful. |
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MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Five minutes.
(3.24 pm)
    (A short adjournment)
(3.29 pm)
MR ALLISON: We just finished looking at the only authority
    you relied on for not needing to communicate a serious
    and definitive refusal not to perform. We also looked
    earlier at the commentator saying that there would be no
    refusal of performance in the case of a filing of
    an insolvency application.
        Could we look at Judge Fischer's report together,
        please. In the volume that has the expert reports,
        behind tab 12.
        A. Thank you.
        Q. His third report, and it is page 325, paragraph 49.
        Could I just ask you to read that. (Pause)
        A. Yes.
        Q. I think you acknowledged earlier, there is no case or
        commentator to support your view that the provision is
        engaged on the filing of an application for insolvency,
        is there?
    A. My Lord, I acknowledge that in line with my report.
    Q. Thank you.
        Even if section 323(4) was relevant to the question
        of default, and we have already explored the reasons why
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        we say it is not, it doesn't actually help you, does it?
        Let's have a look at tab 45 together.
    MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Of the authorities?
    MR ALLISON: I am so sorry, yes, of the authorities.
        Tab 45, it should be in your volume 1 ,
        Professor Mülbert. It is behind sub tab D, which we
        looked at earlier in the context of section 323(4).
        The paragraph that I would like to look at with you
        now is what the author says in relation to insolvency.
        You will find that at the penultimate page of the tab,
        paragraph 140.
            Perhaps --
    A. Excuse me, page 140 ?
    Q. No, paragraph 140. Can I just check we are at the same
        place. It is tab 45, letter D --
    A. Yes.
    Q. -- and if you turn right to the back of that tab, and
        then if you turn in one more page, you should find
        paragraph 140. Do you see it?
    A. Starting with, "Additional problems"?
    Q. Absolutely, yes.
        Would you mind just reading that paragraph to
        yourself. (Pause)
    A. Yes -- may I see the German version ...
    Q. Also if you could have a look at the text for footnote
        Page 126
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244 on the last page. (Pause)
A. My Lord, I am asked to take a look at the question at
    footnote 242?
Q. If you turn to the very last page of the -- do you see
    one up from the bottom, number 244?
A. Oh, I understood 242.
Q. Thank you, if you could just read that as well. (Pause)
A. Yes.
Q. You would agree that even section 323, paragraph 4,
which is not based on a serious and definitive refusal
to perform would not on the author's view be triggered
by an application for insolvency proceedings?
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## A. Yes.

Yes, my Lord may I qualify that "yes"? The commentator at the end of the day does not take a definite stance, but indicates that he would probably in favour of that. He does not -- it is not as comes across I think also from the English translation, it is not a definite statement.
Q. That, though, makes sense, I would suggest, in view of the author's view that to allow it to be relied on would infringe the insolvency administrator's right to choose which contracts to continue and which contracts not to continue?
A. This -- my Lord, this is indeed the problem or the Page 127
concern the commentator is dealing with in paragraph 140, that this right only arises upon the commencement of a German insolvency proceeding, so, prior to that, it is open to debate whether that concern should also extend to anything that happens prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings.
Q. Thank you, Professor Mülbert, just pausing there to see where we have reached on the default and insolvency issues before we look at the damages points and the assignment points. We have seen that your first argument, that a proof of debt in LBIE's insolvency may constitute a warning notice is not something that is supported by any authorities, haven't we?
A. My Lord, it is indeed not supported by any authorities, but for the fact that no authority ever dealt with the question of whether -- as far as $I$ am aware of -- the proof of debt in a foreign insolvency application qualifies as such.
Q. You acknowledge that to the extent the courts and the writers have looked at proof of debt in a German insolvency proceeding, they all say it does not constitute a warning notice?
A. Yes.
Q. We have also just looked at your alternative case based on section 286(2)(3), namely that the administration Page 128

|  | application was a serious and definitive refusal to | 1 | A. I am not an expert in insolvency law as compared to |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | perform. | 2 | Dr Fischer. |
| 3 | I think you fairly acknowledged again then, when we | 3 | Q. Thank you, Professor Mülbert, I would like to move away |
| 4 | were looking at the materials, there is no support for | 4 | from the insolvency and default issues now on to the |
| 5 | that argument in the authorities or the textbooks, is | 5 | pic of damages and under section 288(4), in particular |
| 6 | there? | 6 | w the German courts analyse a claim for further |
| 7 | A. Yes, I acknowledge that much. | 7 | damage. |
| 8 | Q. We looked together at Judge Fischer's careful | 8 | I think I can put one point out of the way very |
| 9 | explanation between the interrelationship on the one | 9 | uickly. There is a disagreement between you and |
| 10 | hand of default and the other of insolvency. He | 10 | Judge Fischer in relation to how one characteries |
| 11 | explained why there was no default prior to | 11 | section 288(1), isn't there? |
| 12 | administration order, didn't he? We saw that together. | 12 | A. Yes, my Lord, there is a disagreement on that. |
| 13 | A. My Lord, we looked at Judge Fischer's explanation and, | 13 | Q. Judge Fischer says that it is not part of the law of |
| 14 | , he explained it according to his interpretation of | 14 | ed basic rate claim, |
| 15 | reading of the facts and interpretation of German | 15 | ereas you say it is part of the law of damages. Is |
| 16 | law, there was no default. | 16 | that a fair characterisation? |
| 17 | Q. He said as a matter of German law, the issue of | 17 | A. Yes. Yes, my Lord, that is a fair characterisation. |
| 18 | an insolvency application would not trigger the | 18 | Q. Perhaps being able to save time, I think you agree and |
| 19 | exception to the need to serve a warning notice, didn't | 19 | hink Judge Fischer also agrees that whether it is |
| 20 | he? | 20 | t of the law of damages or whether it is not, is not |
| 21 | A. That is in addition what he said, yes. What | 21 | actually necessary for part of the questions that need |
| 22 | yes. | 22 | to be determined by the court here? |
| 23 | Q. He said that because of the parallels between the way | 23 | A. My Lord, we didn't say so in our joint statement. We |
| 24 | one proves in a German insolvency and the way one p | 24 | said that the -- may I go -- |
| 25 | in an English insolvency, that the same conclusions Page 129 | 25 | Q. Would you like to see the joint statement? Would that Page 131 |
| 1 | should follow in relation to an English insolvency. We | 1 | help? |
| 2 | saw that as well, didn't we? | 2 | A. Yes. |
| 3 | A. Yes, my Lord, he said as much. | 3 | Q. Of course. It is in the bundle with the authorities and |
| 4 | Q. Can you just help me in relation to Judge Fischer | 4 | is behind tab 13 |
| 5 | is my understanding that he sat as a judge in Germany's | 5 | A. I guess that would be the one. |
| 6 | highest court for around 12 years. That is right, isn't | 6 | Q. Do you have tab 13, Professor Mülbert? |
| 7 | it? | 7 | A. Yes. |
| 8 | A. My Lord, I haven't closely followed Judge Fischer's | 8 | Q. Page 352, that is what I was thinking of. Number 5 at |
| 9 | career within the judiciary but that might be about | 9 | page 352. |
| 10 | right | 10 | A. What we agreed upon is stated very clearly, and I think |
| 11 | Q. Are you aware that he was the presiding judge of the 9th | 11 | ry accurately, in the last part of the sentence, |
| 12 | senate, which is responsible for insolvency law? | 12 | mber 5, namely that the characterisation or nature of |
| 13 | A. My Lord, I am fully aware of that fact. | 13 | the claim has no bearing on the prerequisites for the |
| 14 | Q. He was the presiding judge of that senate for some | 14 | claim to be made by the creditor. |
| 15 | five years. | 15 | Q. Because if you have the relevant default under |
| 16 | A. My Lord, I don't know the exact term of office as | 16 | ction 286, whether it is damages or not, you still get |
| 17 | a presiding -- but . | 17 | the basic rate? |
| 18 | Q. Professor Mülbert, you very helpfully produced | 18 | A. Yes. |
| 19 | a detailed CV for the purpose of these proceedings, | 19 | Q. Thank you. |
| 20 | ing your areas of expertise. You don't mention | 20 | Let's then -- because I think nothing will turn on |
| 21 | insolvency in that, do you? | 21 | it -- move on to section 252, and the way in which |
| 22 | A. My Lord, I did limited work on insolvency law. | 22 | damages are assessed by the German courts. |
| 23 | Q. I think you very fairly volunteered the point earlier | 23 | As a general proposition, you and Judge Fischer both |
| 24 | today that you are not an expert in insolvency law. | 24 | agree that the normal way for calculating damages is to |
| 25 | That is right, isn't it? | 25 | demonstrate and prove what you would have done with the |
|  | Page 130 |  | Page 132 |

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money that has been withheld, that is right, isn't it?
    Sorry, I am referring to the concrete mode.
A. My Lord, there are different ways to -- for different
        persons there are different ways to calculate and to
        claim damages. If you refer to the concrete mode of
        claiming damages, then you would have to prove, but
        depending on the type of damage you are claiming, you
        would have to prove how you have spent the money, it
        depends on the damage you are claiming compensation for,
        what you have to prove.
Q. I think by that you mean that, for example, there is
        a different way of looking at things when one is looking
        at lost profits under section 252 of the civil code?
A. My Lord, not only that, but if you claim damages for
        a damage suffered because your car was hit, then you
        would have to demonstrate very different facts.
        Therefore, it depends on the kind of damage you are
        going to claim compensation for, what is required by
        you.
Q. Thank you. I think the main issue in relation to
        damages is going to be lost profits and when the burden
        of proof can be relaxed, which we will come to in
        a moment, because that is where you and Judge Fischer
        part company.
            It is correct, isn't it, that the way that the
```

            Page 133
        courts assess damages is addressed by section 287 of the
        German civil procedure code?
    
## A. That is correct. That is the basis for assessing

 damages.Q. Can we just have a look at that together. It is behind tab 85, sub tab B.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have it? A couple of quick questions. This provision applies to damages claimed generally, doesn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. What it tells you is that the assessment of damages is in the discretion of the court, doesn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Section 286, which you will find at the previous tab, tells you again what the court will look at when exercising its discretion.
A. Yes.
Q. Because of that discretion, because damages are assessed by the court in the exercise of their discretion, there is a limited power to interfere with a trial judge's assessment of damages, isn't there?
A. Yes, there is.
Q. If we can just frame where you and Judge Fischer part company by going to section 252 , which you should find

Page 134
behind letter H , do you have that? Tab 83, letter H .
It should be section 252, "Lost profits".

## A. Yes, I have it.

Q. Thank you.

Just looking at it in general first, you would agree that a claimant still to get lost profits -- apart from the special rule which we will look at in a moment -has to plead and prove the type of investment that it would have made in the usual course?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. Can we just look at one decision, to make that clear, tab 19 of bundle 1. (Pause)

> Do you have that?

## A. Yes.

Q. If you go to the third page of the report, under (ii), you see a reference to section 252 in the second paragraph after (ii). You also see the court making clear that normally you would have to demonstrate and prove -- I am seven lines down -- referring to section 287 of the civil procedure code that we have just looked at:
"According to which the latter needs only to demonstrate and prove the circumstances within the context of section 287 of the civil procedure code, which would in the normal course of things or under the Page 135
special circumstances of the case likely result in profits being made."

That is the normal rule, isn't it, you have to prove the investment that you would have made?
A. My Lord, I take that as a question that as a normal rule without section 252?
Q. Do you say that, under section 252 , you don't need to demonstrate and prove, unless one is in the simplified method, what would happen in the ordinary course?
A. My Lord, could the question please be rephrased.
Q. Of course. Let me try again. Would you agree that under section 252 a claimant still needs to plead and prove the type of investment they would make in the normal course?

## A. Yes, I would agree to that.

Q. Thank you.

You suggest in your third report that a non-negligible probability of profit may be enough. Would you like to look at that? It is paragraph 53 of your third report. So behind tab 11, paragraph 53.
A. Yes.
Q. You refer to the fact a non-negligible probability may suffice, but then you say:
"Other decisions however stipulate far stricter requirements action. For example, it has been held that Page 136
the creditor has to detail the specific investment he
would have undertaken if he had received the funds on the due date."

> Do you see that?
A. Yes, I see that.
Q. Would it be accurate to say that the majority view, both of the commentators and the courts, is that you need to prove those matters on the balance of probabilities?
A. My Lord, according to my reading, the question of -- the term "probability" hardly ever shows up and in the decisions I cited, the term probability, especially in the second decision, was not used. I stand to be corrected but as I seem to remember, it was not used. It is not, at least, according to my understanding, German courts and commentators do not apply a strict probability threshold.
MR ALLISON: My Lord, without wishing to descend into the debate once more, I would like to show Professor Mülbert one of the cases in the further bundle in which the highest German court does actually speak expressly in terms of probability.

It goes to the answer that was just given, where the court does use, in the paragraph we identified, the word "probability".
MR DICKER: My Lord, I must, I am afraid, again record our
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objection. We still have not had an explanation of when these documents were provided to the translator, although we have now asked I think on four or five occasions.

My Lord, it is not a matter entirely without significance because the agreed procedure was that authorities to which either party wanted to refer would be sent to the translator and each side would then have an opportunity to comment to the translator before the final version was produced.

Although these apparently have been produced by the translator, it was done without our knowledge and without the practice which had been agreed between the parties, namely comments to the translator to ensure that the final version was indeed one everyone regarded as accurate. That has not been done and your Lordship has not been provided with an explanation as to why or when.
MR ALLISON: My Lord, they were provided on Tuesday by the agreed translator, the normal practice has been then people then notify any issues with the translation.

No issues with the translation have been notified since they were provided with on Tuesday. The reason why I wanted to go to a very short decision was just to address that point. I have missed most of the other

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$\square$
cases in bundle 5 actually as my Lord will have noted during cross-examination for that reason.

The only reason I think I should put, in fairness this one, is because the Bundesgerichtshof does speak expressly in terms of probability and then allow Professor Mülbert the opportunity to see if he wishes to change his answer.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Mr Allison, Mr Dicker, this is unsatisfactory and I do think that you should have, by now, have made good your indication, that you would explain the reasons for the late entry of this evidence.

That would have forestalled debate, or at least reduced it.

Mr Dicker, the problem I see here is that it would
be -- this may be an important point to the standard of proof required. I don't see that I can in all conscience, shut my eyes.
MR DICKER: I am making it plain I was not ultimately inviting your Lordship to do that. What we do say is we must have an equal opportunity to respond and at the moment I don't know how long that will take.

My Lord, I do respectfully repeat -- your Lordship I am sure will have noted Mr Allison has still not answered when these documents were given to the translator.

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MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: No. I think, Mr Allison, your point
as to whether there were any complaints about their product has rather missed the point as to when they were first alerted that they had a job to do. Mr Dicker's point there, as I understand it, is that before you gave them the job, or at the same time that you gave them the job, you should have notified Mr Dicker and his clients that you had found these additional authorities.

> I am anxious that we should not sort of lose a lot of time but I shall want you to explain to me when this was as a matter of fairness and good order, but I do want to see this -- I do think it is fair to the witness and to me to see this and if Mr Dicker feels that some qualification or some further case needs to be put in order that I should have a full picture, we will have to work out some opportunity for him to do so.

I cannot tell, this may -- to coin a phrase from the early afternoon -- for all I know not be the last word.
MR ALLISON: We hope, due to the matters we have covered already, may not even be a point that comes into play for your Lordship when deciding whether or not this can be a rate applicable to the debt, but --
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I don't know.
MR ALLISON: What I can say is I will make sure I get precise instructions --

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## Page 142

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A. Yes.
    Q. If you could kindly read from there, all the way through
        to just above number }3\mathrm{ on page 7 of 9. (Pause)
    A. Yes. (Pause)
        Yes, I see that a lot may be directed to the
        exact --
    MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I think we have been given our
        homework --
    MR ALLISON: In fairness to you, Professor Mülbert, rather
        than reading far too much to you, I was just asking you
        to remind yourself of the case before I ask you some
        questions.
            You would agree that what the court says is that you
        look at what the typical business of the bank is? I am
        thinking in particular on page 6 of 9, the second
        paragraph:
            "If the bank only primarily executes one [I think
        that should be] type of lending transaction, eg issuing
        mortgages, loans at purely mortgage banks, this is the
        typical business of the company."
    A. Yes.
    Q. Then you see in the next paragraph:
        "In contrast, universal banks and most special banks
        to which the claimant belongs work with their freely
        available funds in a different matter."
            Page 145
        Essentially the court goes on to say they have
        a broader book of business.
    A. Yes.
    Q. Then it says that in relation to those banks:
        "Therefore one cannot assume [with those banks] that
        there is a typical course of business with typical
        profit perspectives. It is also prohibited to single
        out a certain type of transaction for instance current
        account credit and use them as the basis for the
        measurement of the loss of profit."
            Do you see that?
    A. Yes.
    Q. It has to be an average of all of the business?
    A. My Lord, it even has to be a weighted average, depending
        on the relative importance of the different lines of
        business.
    Q. Then you see at the bottom of the page, the comment
        that, when you are looking at loss of profits, apart
        from the simplified method, you have to prove them:
            "The damaged party must present and prove such
        concrete circumstances upon which the abstract
        calculation depends. Therefore abstract calculation
        also requires substantiation. In addition the
        application of [the rule we looked at earlier] does not
        relieve the damaged party from the requirement of
            Page 146
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presenting the documents necessary for determining the truth, without which a judicial estimate would be up in the air."

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Therefore the court goes on, without wanting to read too much to you, that:
"The bank demanding compensation of damages must therefore demonstrate the circumstances relevant for the calculation of the average profit, in particular the standard earnings of all types of transactions it executes and the particularities of its business structure at the time in question. Particularly high demands must be placed on the burden of proof with regard to special banks."

Then the court says why the bank in this case has not managed to discharge the burden of proof:
"This burden of proof is not fulfilled by the claimant with the submission she would have generated a profit of 7.5 per cent of the capital during [the years that are stated] had she been able to utilise the owed sum in a profitable manner. The average interest earned during this period of time was at times ..."

Then the court looks at all of the different sorts of loans that were made available at that time, doesn't Page 147
A. Yes.
Q. It does it by looking at the German federal bank reports, doesn't it?
A. May I add --
Q. Of course, please.
A. The court, what he did, according to my understanding of the case, he thought that it was improbable and at the end of that paragraph just read out to you, the court says that that he thinks, based on the publicly available figures that:
"The claimant had based its calculations on damages on the most lucrative transactions."
He in a way said that because of that he thought that the claimant had not fulfilled its burden of proof for that reason.

It was a kind of $I$ think he exerted a kind of control based on publicly available statistics.
Q. It was done on the basis of publicly available
statistics, you just said?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes.

If we can look at a slightly more recent case of the
Bundesgerichtshof on the same issue, behind tab 11.
Just if you could remind yourself of number 1 at the top
Page 148
of the page, the key point that we are looking at the case for. (Pause)

Have you seen that?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you.

Then if we can turn to page 5 of 9 , where the court starts to address the claim for loss of profits. If we could look at the bottom of the page, and pick up where the court says:
"The bank shall be compensated for the benefits it would have received had it otherwise invested in the outstanding funds upon timely repayment."

Then it says:
"The bank is not required to concretely demonstrate and prove this option in accordance with the federal court's ruling. Like other salespersons the bank is entitled to calculate its damages abstractly."

That is the abstract method under 252 that we discussed earlier, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Then, what it goes on to say though is that it is assumed that a credit bank would have utilised withheld funds in a profitable manner in the framework of its business operations, namely by concluding new loan agreements and with borrowers at standard bank interest Page 149
rates during the time in question."
Then:
"The debtor must compensate the nominal interest rates as default damages if the debtor pays on time that would have been earned in this manner, but which were lost due to the default."

The next key point, it is saying it is okay in relation to nominal interest rates but:
"If the bank executes different kinds of credit transactions for which different standard nominal bank interest rates apply, it can only calculate its damages based on an average rate which is based on its special business structure and on the proportion of different types of credit in its total credit transaction volume."

In other words, the court is saying that you cannot just pick the most profitable part of your business, you have to look at all of it, isn't it?
A. Yes, that is what the court said in this earlier ruling and what he reiterates in this ruling.
Q. Two more passages to look at when the court then develops the point. If we go to page 7 of 9 , at number 3, it says:
"The objection cannot be made against the default interest calculation method of the ruling from the federal court of justice claiming that it forces the
bank in an unreasonable manner to disclose internal operational data. If it demands the standard nominal market interest rate as part of the abstract calculation of damages, a bank does not need to disclose which interest rates it calculates for the different types of loans, how it refinances its loans and what proportion of refinancing costs, administrative expenses and profit comprise the nominal interest it charges."

It goes on to say that the average interest rate of the standard nominal market interest rates can then be calculated based on the interest statistics of the German federal bank."

Again, it is looking to the published German federal bank statistics to work out what can be claimed without having to demonstrate it. That is right, isn't it?

## A. Yes, that is -- that is right. May I clarify that point

 somewhat further?Q. Of course, please do.
A. If the bank wants to avoid disclosing its business operational structure then it can rely on the publicly available data. That is what was said here.
Q. If the bank does not want to rely on publicly available data but wants to claim more than that for its loss of profits, if we go down to number 3 , the court tells us what they have to do then:

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"If the bank does not wish to demand interest based on an abstract calculation of damages, hence at an average interest rate of the standard nominal market interest rates appropriate for the composition of its lending business, but instead demands a higher interest rate, it must concretely demonstrate and prove, while waiving all easements on the burden of proof, of the abstract calculation of damages that is based on the peculiarities of its business structure or the circumstances of the individual case, it could have invested the withheld funds at a higher interest rate had it been paid back on time."

In other words, if the bank says, "Well the market average rates published by the German federal bank are not enough, we want more", they actually have to prove that loss, don't they?
A. My Lord, from my understanding of the case, the court did not talk about the abstract calculation but said, if the bank wants to apply a concrete calculation of its damages, then the requirements set out in this subparagraph (3) apply.

If I just may introduce my understanding of the German translation. The sentence starts, according to my understanding, that by the court saying: if the bank does not want to rely on an abstract calculation, then

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Q. In those circumstances it would need to prove the higher losses that it has sustained?
A. In line with what we established previously, that the concrete way of calculating the damages, you have to demonstrate and prove the pertinent facts.
Q. It is right that if you are looking at the standard rate, if you are trying to rely on the standard rate, that is the standard market interest rate for the investment type that generates the lowest interest earnings. You see that in the middle of the page in the second paragraph of number 3.
A. Yes, I see that.
Q. You agree the court is saying that if you want to rely on market rates, it is the lowest standard market rates for the type of investment business? (Pause)
A. My Lord, I disagree with that statement that it must apply the lowest market rates. According to my reading, it must apply the market rates for the different lines of business, or different types of business it operates, not one lowest market rate. That follows from the bank -- may I take your Lordship to the second but last sentence of this first paragraph, starting with:
"The bank must merely demonstrate what proportion of the total volume of the transactions dealed with what Page 153
types of loan represent ..."
Then it goes on to say that to these different types of loans, the market rates will be applied.
Q. That is in circumstances though where a bank does not want to itemise its business, isn't it? That is what the paragraph tells us.
A. My Lord, yes, within the abstract way of calculating damages.
Q. Thank you.

Can we just see what Judge Gruneberg says in relation to the simplified method at tab 48. Tab 48C, I am now moving on to the divergence between you and Judge Fischer. We have seen the cases, the only cases refer to banks being able to claim this rate. The cases we have just looked at are both bank cases, aren't they?
A. My Lord, again, the answer is not a simple yes or no. The answer is, the cases were about banks but the court said that banks, like any other merchants -- I seem to recall that this was read to you aloud -- can apply the abstract method of calculating basis.

Again, may I take you to my report in section --
Q. Of course, I think it is paragraph 56 of your report.
A. Yes, paragraph 56.
Q. I was going to show you what Judge Gruneberg says in relation to who can benefit from it.
A. Yes, but I wanted to -- my Lord, I wanted to point out that the wording of the decisions and the wording of the decision we just talked about is different and also the earlier decision, namely the decision cited in footnote 23, also said that banks, something along the lines of, "Banks, like other merchants, can apply that abstract way of calculating but there are difference because of the specificities of the banking business ..."
Q. There is no case, for example, that says that a hedge fund can use this method. Is there?
A. There is no case saying that a hedge fund can ...
Q. There is no case saying that a financial institution other than a bank can use this method; is there?
A. My Lord, again, there is no case dealing with the hedge fund or with other financial institutions. I stand to be corrected, there might be one other -- there is no case at the level of the German federal high court dealing with a hedge fund or with another financial institution.

The language used by the federal High Court, the German federal high court, both in its decisions in -the decision cited in footnote 23 and the decision cited in footnote $\mathbf{2 4}$ are much broader than simply dealing with banks.
Q. It was only a bank's claim being considered in those Page 155

> cases, wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. You properly mention in your report that the German court has considered and rejected the idea that an insurance company could benefit from this method of proof?
A. My Lord, there is one decision by a court of first instance and you find this slide in my report in paragraph 56, footnote 30, it is the court of first instance and the subsequent court, the subsequent appellate court.

But these decisions were rendered prior to the decision -- as far as I remember -- rendered by the German federal high court in 1974, which would be the decision in cited in footnote 23.
Q. You acknowledge that company said it is only banks, and insurance companies cannot benefit from the method of proof.
A. I acknowledge that, my Lord, these decisions, that insurance companies cannot benefit from that, yes.
Q. I think we had a detour, we were going to look at what one of the judges of the banking senate in the Bundesgerichtshof thinks of the issue. It was tab 48, sub tab C. The first part of the paragraph addresses the point that we were looking at in the other cases,

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| 1 | which is that the average calculation takes the typical | 1 | they wanted to do it? |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | market interest rates into account. The point that | 2 | A. Yes. |
| 3 | I was going to look at with you begins, do you see the | 3 | Q. That is everything I wanted to ask you in relation to |
| 4 | BB, about seven lines up from the bottom? | 4 | mages. |
| 5 | A. Yes. | 5 | I am mindful of the time. I did have a few |
| 6 | Q. What Judge Gruneberg says is that | 6 | estions in relation to assignment as my last area. |
| 7 | "All other creditors must show and prove the | 7 | am very much in my Lord's and Professor Mülbert's |
| 8 | interest lost specifically. The creditor may not invok | 8 | hands as to whether we should try and finish this |
| 9 | prima facie evidence because the default interest is | 9 | ning or not. |
| 10 | considerably higher than the yield received on a typical | 10 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: As a guesstimate, how long do you |
| 11 | average investment in funds." | 11 | think? |
| 12 | Judge Gruneberg says in contrast to his discussion | 12 | MR ALLISON: I would be very surprised if we are not |
| 13 | about banks above, that all other creditors must show | 13 | finished by 5.00, but it depends on the answers. The |
| 14 | and prove the interest lost specifically, doesn't he? | 14 | rly part of this afternoon took a little longer than |
| 15 | A. My Lord, he does and paragraph 56 of my report says | 15 | it did this morning. |
| 16 | exactly that. Indeed paragraph 56 ends with that quote. | 16 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: First of all, how are you feeling, it |
| 17 | Q. One of the reasons for that is likely to be that, how | 17 | ways a strain having to give evidence, even more so |
| 18 | does one work out what the typical market interest rate | 18 | language which |
| 19 | is for people other than banks? The courts look at the | 19 | A. Thank you, my Lord. If I could just get up, my back |
| 20 | published federal rates for banks, don't they? | 20 | starts hurting. |
| 21 | A. My Lord, may the question be repeated? | 21 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Would you like to have a five-minute |
| 22 | Q. Of course. We established earlier when looking at the | 22 | wo or we could come back in the morning, which |
| 23 | two bank cases that the court looks at the published | 23 | u -- |
| 24 | rates by the German federal bank for the type of | 24 | A. I prefer to have a five-minute break now. |
| 25 | business of the bank? | 25 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: A five-minute break now? |
|  | Page 157 |  | Page 159 |
|  | A. Yes, we did. | 1 | MR ALLISON: |
| 2 | Q. The short point for you is that there are no | 2 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I have a problem which I had not |
| 3 | publicly available published rates in relation to other | 3 | remembered on the Wednesday, because, though apparently |
| 4 | investors, are there? | 4 | m promised judgment writing time, it seems to have |
| 5 | A. There are not, yes, | 5 | been filled up by another matter. I could make some |
| 6 | Q. Thank | 6 | rangements but the sooner I know whether I will need |
| 7 | A. But -- but -- I agree but may I, my Lord, add something. | 7 | to, the more likely I am in being successful. |
| 8 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Sure | 8 | MR DICKER: I understand that. |
| 9 | A. These publicly statistics or publicly made available | 9 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I mean it does -- putting my cards on |
| 10 | statistics are used, are referred | 10 | e table, I am concerned that today has been a long day |
| 11 | order to alleviate the burden on the bank to disclose | 11 | everybody and translation does increase the time in |
| 12 | its business, its different lines of business and the | 12 | getting to the same place. |
| 13 | details on its line of business. It is for that reason | 13 | MR DICKER: The difficulty always is one never knows quite |
| 14 | that it allows the banks to rely on these public | 14 | how long it is going to increase it by, which is -- |
| 15 | statistics. | 15 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Yes, against that and although harsh |
| 16 | If a bank, while using the abstract method of | 16 | I have simply followed the timetable recommended to me, |
| 17 | calculation, would want to disclose that part of this | 17 | by which I do not mean to sound excessively pious. |
| 18 | business, then there would be no need to rely on the | 18 | I just mean to remind you that that is the position. |
| 19 | publicly available statistics. The same holds true for | 19 | If you do need further time and if you do think that |
| 20 | every other business entity. If they wish to, they | 20 | that will have a knock-on effect, because you must have |
| 21 | could satisfy that stricter standard and so there is no | 21 | proper time to consider your submissions, because then |
| 22 | need for other business operations to rely on public | 22 | they will be a lot more useful to me and you think that |
| 23 | statistics, it just makes it more difficult for them. | 23 | the matter could be met by at least a half day on the |
| 24 | Q. Professor Mülbert, thank you. | 24 | Wednesday, for example, then the sooner I know that, the |
| 25 | They would be subject to the stricter standard if | 25 | more leverage I have with listings. |
|  | Page 158 |  | Page 160 |

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MR DICKER: My Lord, can I indicate for our part on this
    side that I think that may be necessary. My learned
    friend is going to take, he thinks, until 5.00. There
    is then re-examination and there are a few points on
    which I would obviously wish to --
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Yes.
MR DICKER: We are going to start --
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Professor Mülbert may have to come
    back tomorrow anyway. Does that effect your
    preference -- I am perfectly happy you should have 5 or
    10 minutes now and than we go on until 5.10. I quite
    understand it is a very long day and I don't want you to
    feel that you were not at your tip top best at the end
    of the day, because that happens to us all.
        Which would you prefer --
A. Thank you, my Lord. I would prefer to continue the
    cross-examination --
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD:Try and get that done and then
    re-examination tomorrow.
        Let us have a generous five minutes so people can
        stretch their legs and then we will go on until 5.10 or
        5.15.
(4.36 pm)
    (A short adjournment)
(4.42 pm)
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    MR ALLISON: Professor Mülbert, the final area of my
questions is looking at the issue of assignment of
a claim under the German master agreement.
Two different things to look at, first the higher
claim point, I think you understand what I mean by that.
Just start by outlying what is agreed, you and
Judge Fischer agree that after a claim is assigned, the
further damage is to be assessed by reference to the
claims of the assignee --
A. Yes.
Q. -- but before the assignment, the further damage is to be assessed by reference to the claims of the assigner?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you.

Where you part company is whether there is a limitation placed on the amount of recovery that the assignee can make. That is right, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Can we look at what Judge Fischer says in relation to this in his very first report, which you will find behind tab 8 of volume 4 . What I would like you to have a look at is paragraphs 104 to 106, pages 153 and 154. Just to remind yourself of the way Judge Fischer puts the point. (Pause)
A. Yes.

## Q. Do you see that? <br> A. Yes, I see that. <br> Q. He essentially says that in order to protect the interests of the assignor, there needs to be a limitation so the assignment cannot disadvantage the creditor, that is right, isn't it? <br> A. That is -- <br> Q. I misspoke, I am so sorry. <br> He says in order to protect the interests of the debtor, there must be a limitation so that the assignment cannot place them in a worse position. That is right, isn't it? <br> A. My Lord, the answer is I think he says that the assignee -- the debtor, cannot be put in a worse position with respect to any legal objections.

Q. He says at paragraph 105, in view with the case that we will look at in a moment, that there is a general principle that contracts cannot be made that impose obligations on third parties and that supports the view that the change of creditor cannot entail greater obligations for the debtor, including in the sphere of damages. Do you see that?
A. My Lord, I see that but these he refers -- referring to sections 404, 406 and 407 BGB he refers to provisions that protect the debtor against any deterioration of his

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position with respect to legal objections he may have.
Q. Thank you. Can we just look at paragraph 125 of your report to see how you put the point.

Page 272, sorry I didn't give you a page reference. You say that provided it is included in the transfer, it would be calculated by reference to the assignor's losses for the period prior and by reference to the assignee's losses to the period to follow. Then you say:
"That is the case even if the effect is that the debtor may have to pay more as a consequence for the assignment."

You footnote at footnote 98 a decision of the Bundesgerichtshof, don't you?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Can we just, before we look at that --
A. I do, but may I just add that there is a bracket after that slide saying, "Not taking a stand" and in order to clarify that bracket I wanted to indicate -- I am sorry, my Lord, if that does not come across that clearly as it should have been -- that this indicates that the German federal high court left that question open.
Q. That is very helpful, Professor Mülbert, because that is where I was going to go with you next, because Judge Fischer tells us the court left the point open.
A. I misunderstood. I thought it was tab 40.
Q. I am so sorry, 1-4.
A. Yes.
Q. This is case in which the default took place after the assignment had been made, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. I think we now agree there is no suggestion by the Bundesgerichtshof that an assignee could claim more than the assignor, is there?
A. My Lord, there is no suggestion to that but there is no suggestion to the contrary. It just says -- the court just says that it doesn't have to take a stand on the question.
Q. Because they -- just to pick up the key words, when talking about whether, at the bottom of the page, in cases where the assignee's damages are higher than they would have been if he were the individual assignor, they say that can be left open?

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| A. Yes. | 1 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Q. They expressly leave the point open, but they do cite | 2 |
| a text, Peters, that is Judge Peters, isn't it? | 3 |
| A. My Lord, I am not aware whether Peters was a judge or | 4 |
| not, according to my understanding he was a Professor of | 5 |
| law at a German university and maybe he was a judge. | 6 |
| I simply would not know and I cannot see why the | 7 |
| question whether he was a judge or not would make his -- | 8 |
| with all due respect. | 9 |
| MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I am not a Professor. | 10 |
| A. That helps. In German it would carry more weight. | 11 |
| MR ALLISON: Can we just have a look together at what Peters | 12 |
| says, bundle 2, tab 81. | 13 |
| This is an except from the commentary that was cited | 14 |
| in the Bundesgerichtshof, by the court that we have just | 15 |
| seen the reference to. The passage that I would like to | 16 |
| show to you is under the heading "Summary", on the | 17 |
| right-hand side, do you see that? | 18 |
| A. Yes. | 19 |
| Q. "If the debtor of an assigned claim becomes liable for | 20 |
| damages because of impossibility of performance or | 21 |
| default, he must only pay compensation for the | 22 |
| assignee's loss up to the amount that the assignor too | 23 |
| would have suffered had the assignment not taken place. | 24 |
| The corresponding burden of presentation and proof falls | 25 |

A. Yes.
Q. They expressly leave the point open, but they do cite a text, Peters, that is Judge Peters, isn't it?
A. My Lord, I am not aware whether Peters was a judge or not, according to my understanding he was a Professor of law at a German university and maybe he was a judge. I simply would not know and I cannot see why the question whether he was a judge or not would make his -with all due respect.
MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I am not a Professor.
A. That helps. In German it would carry more weight.

MR ALLISON: Can we just have a look together at what Peters
on the assignee."
You will see that the view expressed by Peters is consistent with Judge Fischer, that you should not be able to have a higher claim for further damage by an assignee.
A. Yes, my Lord, but there are some who support that proposition and some German authors who support the contrary proposition. If I may take my Lord again back to the decision of the German federal high court, I just mentioned, he lists all those supporters and those who do not agree that the assignee should be entitled to claim higher damages, or, put differently, whether there is a cap on the claim or not.
Q. I am just showing you the ones which support the view of Judge Fischer. You have referenced others in your report. The next one I wanted just to look at with you is at tab 80, which is a piece by Professor Junker?

There are two key passages I think that we can pick up to save having to read all of it. If you go to page 10, top left-hand number page 10, do you have that?
A. Yes.
Q. Page 10, reading in the second paragraph, the second sentence, it says:
"The fact that the debtor always had to expect a change in creditor by assignment is beyond doubt in Page 167
view of the provisions which allow assignment in the civil code. However the question remains as to whether this change in creditors without its consent is allowed to be disadvantageous for the debtor. The application of the principle of the freedom of contracts and its concrete expression in sections 404, 406 and following [the sections referenced by Judge Fischer] answer this question in the negative. While the debtors should not have relied on the person of the assignor because it should not have assumed that ultimately the assignor would be the recipient of the payment owed by it, it had every right to rely on the assignor to the extent that it was allowed to base its assessment of the financial risk associated with entering into its contractual obligations on the assignor. This also creates the basis for the protection for reliance on existing law postulated by Seetzen in favour of the assignee.
"This protection can be based only on the fact that the debtor had every right to assume that it would not be burdened with higher risks than those found in the person of its contract partner, with this the debtor is protected ultimately by freedom of contract."

What is said by Professor Junker is that contractual freedom means that the debtor should not be subject to any higher risks. That is right, isn't it?

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|  | A. My Lord, this is what my esteemed colleague says and | 1 | that is the evidence you have to deal with. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | that I do not agree with him. May I explain why I d | 2 | MR ALLISON: Let's look at the Bundesgerichtshof decision |
| 3 | not agree with him? | 3 | Judge Fischer cites as an example of debtor |
| 4 | Thank you, my Lord | 4 | tection being applied outside the strict requirements |
| 5 | The freedom of contract applies in that context to | 5 | of the civil code. |
| 6 | both parties, the debtor but also the creditor who, as | 6 | That is at tab 25 of the bundle. |
| 7 | a part of the freedom of contract, is allowed to | 7 | JUSTICE HILDYARD: Can I just clarify for my own mind or |
| 8 | transfer that claim. You have both parties and they can | 8 | sorry, but as regards what you have |
| 9 | both rely on the debt principle. What the law actually | 9 | ed the factual result, are you saying anymore than |
| 10 | does is, by providing for sections 404, 406 and 407 to | 10 | nent, the assignee might |
| 11 | offer a certain degree of protection to the debtor. | 11 | son than the assignor -- |
| 12 | In my reading of the law, of the German provisions, | 12 | A. Yes. |
| 13 | and the reading of others, this is the extent of | 13 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: -- and there is nothing much one can |
| 14 | protection offered to the debtor. | 14 | about that if you have allowed assignment? |
| 15 | Likewise, if you would want to protect the debtor | 15 | A. Yes. |
| 16 | against the change in the person any stronger than that, | 16 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Thank you. |
| 17 | then you would -- then in the case of the credit | 17 | MR ALLISON: This is a decision in relation to a debtor's |
| 18 | ssing away and the heir being a very different person | 18 | , Where I was going to take you is |
| 19 | from the creditor, you would have also to protect him | 19 | pages 342 and 343. Section 366 is concerned with the |
| 20 | ainst not the legal effects from that but also from | 20 | Paus |
| 21 | the financial effects from that. | 21 | A. I am sorry, my attention was diverted. |
| 22 | As I understand German law, there is no protection | 22 | Q. Of course, I will start again. It is a decision of the |
| 23 | against that. This has led me to the conclusion that | 23 | undesgerichtshof on a debtor's right to appropriate |
| 24 | sections 404, 406 and 407 of the BGB protects against | 24 | yments. |
| 25 | certain deteriorations of that, a legal position of the Page 169 | 25 | A. Yes. $\quad$ Page 171 |
| 1 | debtor. That s | 1 | Q. There had been a partial assignment which was only |
| 2 | against that but not against a factual deterioration | 2 | sclosed to the debtor after he had made a paymen |
| 3 | his pos | 3 | e question was, could the right of appropriation be |
| 4 | Q. That is very help | 4 | ercised afterwards? The passage I would like to show |
| 5 | materials we looked at do not draw that distinctio | 5 | you, page 342 gives the facts that I have just |
| 6 | between | 6 | ntioned, the fact that there was a partial assignment |
| 7 | they? | 7 | and it was considered with the right to appropriation. |
| 8 | A. My Lord, the materials we have looked so far at | 8 | A. Yes. |
| 9 | w that distinction but that distinction can be | 9 | Q. Over the page, it was said that: |
| 10 | inferred from the materials and from in particular, what | 10 | "Once the partial assignment had been notifie |
| 11 | I think is even more important, from the law. As it | 11 | as said there was no justification to stop the debtor |
| 12 | stands in sections 398 and | 12 | from subsequently exercising his performance |
| 13 | Q. Although you agree that Judge Fischer relies on those | 13 | determination right in analogous application of |
| 14 | sections in particular sections 404, 405 and 406 to say | 14 | ection 366, only the notification provided him with the |
| 15 | that there is a general principle of debtor protection? | 15 | opportunity to exercise his option as guaranteed by the |
| 16 | MR DICKER: My Lord, I don't want my learned friend to b | 16 | provision allowing the right to appropriation." |
| 17 | putting a false case. Paragraph 104 of Judge Fischer's | 17 | It is the next paragraph which is the key one, which |
| 18 | report say | 18 | discusses the principle of debtor protection. Could |
| 19 | "In established case law, the German federal court | 19 | I just ask you to read that. (Pause) |
| 20 | of justice interprets the provision as stating the lega | 20 | Paragraph number 2. |
| 21 | position of the debtor should not be made worse by | 21 | A. Yes. (Pause) |
| 22 | a transfer of the claim to the new creditor." | 22 | Q. You will see that what the court did is engaged the |
| 23 | MR ALLISON: Mr Dicker can ask Judge Fischer about th | 23 | nciple of debtor protection to allow the debtor to |
| 24 | he wishe | 24 | rely on a right of appropriation which was not otherwise |
| 25 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I think he is just reminding you that | 25 | available under the statute. |
|  | Page 170 |  | Page 172 |

A. Yes.
Q. It is not a case that can be distinguished by saying that it doesn't protect against factual detriments, is it?
A. It offers an additional -- my Lord, sorry, it entitles the debtor to say after the transfer had been effected that payment is directed in a different way and in that sense he offers, based on the idea of a legal protection of the debtor, it offers an additional -- it entitles the -- it offers an additional right to the creditor -to the debtor.

In that sense it is -- from my understanding, it is about the protection of the legal situation of the creditor -- of the debtor. Excuse me. Not about the protection against anything purely factual.
Q. The court expressly says that invoking the principle of debtor protection, that the assignment should not place the debtor in a worse position than he would be in without it, doesn't it?
A. Yes, the court explicitly says that.
Q. There is no suggestion that they are only talking about legal detriments, rather than factual detriments, is there?
A. My Lord, the court makes no such explicit suggestion but
he relies -- at the beginning of that paragraph he
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relies on sections 404 and following and thus these provisions protect against the deterioration in the legal position of the debtor, there is no need for the court to make that qualification, because it follows from the statute.
Q. One last question, maybe you have a different reading, the court was not protecting, from what it says, against the imposition of an additional obligation, was it, an extra legal burden?
A. The protection -- my Lord, the protection offered to the debtor in legal terms is not only with respect to the imposition of additional rights or anything like that, but also against the loss of defences or objections he might have, which is the basic, the starting principle in section 404. You are protected against the loss of objections you could raise, or defences you could raise against the creditor because of the transfer.

Against the loss of those objections, you would have been able to raise against the original creditor of the claim. Therefore the legal position is not to be understood solely in the terms that there are additional legal obligations in play but also against the loss of legal remedies or legal defence objections that the debtor might have had without the transfer taking place.
Q. Thank you, Professor Mülbert.

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Just one more series of short questions on assignment. Could you please go to Judge Fischer's second report, which you will find behind tab 10. The bit that I would like you to look at is at page 222. (Pause)

You will see Judge Fischer is addressing the damages claims of the assignee. At B he says, "There are no future damages claims of the assignee that could be transferred. Whether damage is incurred after the assignment must be determined solely from the position of the assignee."

That is an accurate statement, isn't it?
A. My Lord, I am sorry, I don't want to be seen as inattentive but I understood 220?
Q. Do you have Judge Fischer's second report there?
A. It starts on page 209 ?
Q. It does.
A. Yes.
Q. It is page 222. It is paragraph 46, where he is dealing with the damages claims of the assignee. He says:
"There are no future damages claims of the assignee that could be transferred. Whether damages occurred after the assignment must be determined solely from the position of the assignee."

I think the first line is meant to say "assignor",
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but he can be asked about that.
Do you agree that after -- I am so sorry, he is correct.

Do you agree that any damages after the assignment have to be determined solely from the position of the assignee?
A. Yes, I agree.
Q. Therefore you would agree that that is a claim of the assignee and not one that is transferred by the assignor?
A. My Lord, I would not agree, simply because any claim for damages that is based on any event that happened prior to the transfer, in my opinion cannot arise independently from that event after the transfer had taken place. It would be, from my perspective, odd to say that the transferee has, because of the, for example, breach of contract that happened prior to the transfer, has a separate right, a separate claim on the debtor, just because of that.

Therefore I think that the claim, the claim that the assignee is entitled to make is rooted in the claims transferred. Therefore I refer to the idea of the future claims be transferred by -- in transferring claims.
Q. What about a situation in which the assignor has not

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| 1 | sustained any damages, so it doesn't have any claim for | 1 | expert evidence before, that obviously he is stil |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | further damage. It cannot be sensible, can it, to speak | 2 | ing evidence and he shall not discuss the case wit |
| 3 | about the assignor transferring a claim for furthe | 3 | anyone |
| 4 | damage that the assignee can assert at a later date? | 4 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: That is quite right, under our |
| 5 | A. My Lord, my understanding of the working of German law | 5 | les -- I don't know whether the same applies in your |
| 6 | in that respect differs from that. I cannot imagine | 6 | once you are in the witness box, you are not |
| 7 | that the assignee should have an independent whatever, | 7 | allowed to discuss the case with anyone, which will be |
| 8 | separate claim for damages for anything that happened | 8 | merciful relief I think |
| 9 | before the transfer taking place, since he only -- he | 9 | eservation I have as regards that is lest |
| 10 | derives his position from the transferor, there must be | 10 | ou need to confer on a strictly controlled basis with |
| 11 | some element of transfer in that transfer. | 11 | regard to the single case that I allowed to be put. |
| 12 | Otherwise, at least from my understanding, it would | 12 | Do you see what I mean |
| 13 | be odd to say that the transferee is entitled to | 13 | MR DICKER: Yes, I do. |
| 14 | damages, even though he has no relationship with the | 14 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I think Mr Allison is going to agree |
| 15 | debtor | 15 | with me that you fully understand the rules and will not |
| 16 | Q. | 16 | go beyond them, so I am content to rely on that. |
| 17 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: For the period prior to the | 17 | uddenly spot that |
| 18 | assignment? | 18 | son brought out late was subject to |
| 19 | A. Yes. | 19 | some refinement or review, well then you must, I think |
| 20 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Yes. | 20 | be able |
| 21 | MR ALLISON: Let's see if we can agree on this. The | 21 | ccur to me. I mean, |
| 22 | assignment affects the change in legal responsibility, | 22 | possibly being of a pessimistic frame of mind I cannot |
| 23 | do | 23 | e us finishing the expert eviden |
| 24 | A. My Lord, may the question be rephrased? | 24 | just one of those things that is not going to happen, |
| 25 | Q. Yes, maybe it is quickest, let's look at tab 14 | 25 | I think, unless I have completely misunderstood your |
|  | Page 177 |  | $\text { Page } 179$ |
| 1 | toget | 1 | tack with the witness. |
| 2 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Can I just ask, Mr Allison -- I mean speaking for myself, entirely personally, I feel that my focus is not as sharp as I would like it to be. | 2 | I think I will try and make efforts to extend into |
| 3 |  | 3 | ednesday and defer my matter on Wednesday, at least |
| 4 |  | 4 | til 2.00. Do you think that that will give you |
| 5 | I apologise for that, but how much longer do you have? | 5 | sufficient time? |
| 6 | I am just wondering, as there is to be | 6 | MR DICKER: I would hope so, yes. |
| 7 | re-examination tomorrow, and with all deference to the | 7 | e presently have, until your Lordship just spoke |
| 8 | witness, I am just wondering whether it would be better | 8 | tended to have Monday and Tuesday for closing |
| 9 | to finish this tomorrow and give everyone a chance to | 9 | submissions. |
| 10 | sharpen up, certainly in my case. | 10 | rd, I would have thought the parties can do it |
| 11 | MR ALLISON: My Lord, of course. We have one more case to | 11 | in substantially less time than that. |
| 12 | look at and then a few more questions after that. Of | 12 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Right. Okay, so we may gain time |
| 13 | course, if my Lord thinks that is the best course. | 13 | ere we have lost. Yes. |
| 14 | Housekeeping | 14 | Right, well let me know, if you want me to block out |
| 15 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I am so sorry about this, but I just | 15 | Wednesday morning, I shall do so and I think you are |
| 16 | feel it has been a very long day and if I felt that you | 16 | saying do as a matter of being a boy scout? |
| 17 | could be freed at the end of the day, I would soldier on | 17 | MR ALLISON: My Lord, I think that may be prudent because |
| 18 | but as you are still to return tomorrow, and we will not | 18 | art from anything else we will not know until close |
| 19 | liberate you until then, I think it would be better for | 19 | lay tomorrow just how much of Judge Fischer's evidence |
| 20 | me at any rate if we were to return to the fray | 20 | is left to be given. |
| 21 | tomorrow. I am sorry not to be able to complete you, | 21 | MR DICKER: I am hoping we may make up some. Not |
| 22 | but I just feel I am not focusing as well as I should. | 22 | guaranteeing -- |
| 23 | So tomorrow -- | 23 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: You want a bit more time. I will |
| 24 | MR DICKER: I am sure your Lordship will, but just to remind | 24 | confirm that through my clerk. |
| 25 | perhaps Professor Mülbert, because he has not given | 25 | Another matter, and I am sorry to raise it now, but |
|  | Page 17 |  | Page 180 |


| 1 | we discussed very quickly -- in particular between me | 1 | place particular reliance upon, but that will be |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | and Mr Trower -- the relationship with the earlier | 2 | a matter for my Lord. |
| 3 | judgment of Mr Justice David Richards and the question | 3 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Anyway, that is that, is it? You are |
| 4 | of whether I would need, if I were to do that, further | 4 | not going to try any further -- |
| 5 | guidance in that regard. The relationship seems to me | 5 | MR ALLISON: In view of quite how loudly the objection was |
| 6 | stronger than I originally thought, on the one hand, but | 6 | made I have sought to limit myself to as few of those as |
| 7 | less clearly defined in my mind than I would dearly | 7 | is necessary. |
| 8 | love. | 8 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: If you are going to try on reflection |
| 9 | MR DICKER: Yes. | 9 | to get in more -- the more you try and get in, the more |
| 10 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Also I think I indicated that if that | 10 | I will expect by way of justification. I think that |
| 11 | matter had to be taken forward, I thought that York | 11 | Mr Dicker should be entitled to some explanation which |
| 12 | should be given an opportunity to have their penny | 12 | means that he is not taken by surprise. |
| 13 | worth. When would that be accommodated? | 13 | Are you content with that? |
| 14 | MR DICKER: My Lord, speaking for our part, both for the | 14 | MR DICKER: My Lord, on the assumption given that something |
| 15 | reasons your Lordship gave and also our inability to | 15 | has gone in, some explanation at least is required at |
| 16 | deal with that in practice in this hearing, not before | 16 | this stage, yes. |
| 17 | we finish on Wednesday. | 17 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Yes, I mean I think that you, as I, |
| 18 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: No, so we will have to have an extra | 18 | pretty much know why that was put in but do you need any |
| 19 | time to deal with that? | 19 | further explanation? |
| 20 | MR TROWER: My Lord, I think what we had anticipated was | 20 | MR DICKER: I would like to have the proposition stated. |
| 21 | that when we get to the end of this, in other words once | 21 | The other thing obviously, we respectfully invited |
| 22 | the evidence and the submissions on German law are out | 22 | was an answer from my learned friend perhaps only as |
| 23 | of the way, we would just circle back and have a further | 23 | a matter of courtesy as to why they were not provided to |
| 24 | discussion with your Lordship about the timetable for | 24 | us at an earlier stage. |
| 25 | that. | 25 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: It is, but that is forensic rather |
|  | Page 181 |  | Page 183 |
| 1 | I think the parties had in mind that written | 1 | than substantive. |
| 2 | submissions may be able to deal with it, but your | 2 | 10.30 tomorrow? Have a good evening. |
| 3 | Lordship will have a more rounded view once you have | 3 | ( 5.27 pm ) |
| 4 | heard the whole of this on whether that is in fact the | 4 | (The hearing adjourned until 10.30 am the following day) |
| 5 | case. | 5 |  |
| 6 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: I think I may take a leaf out of | 6 |  |
| 7 | Lord Justice David Richards's book, which is to say | 7 |  |
| 8 | written submissions in the first place but if I need | 8 |  |
| 9 | some guidance, then I will call you in for oral -- | 9 |  |
| 10 | unless any of you wishes to have oral submissions, in | 10 |  |
| 11 | which case of course I would allow that. | 11 |  |
| 12 | MR TROWER: Yes, that seems most convenient. | 12 |  |
| 13 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: Anyway, we don't have to fit that in. | 13 |  |
| 14 | Mr Allison, I don't wish you to be sort of -- to | 14 |  |
| 15 | some extent this is collateral, but I think you should | 15 |  |
| 16 | explain to me the basis on which there was a delay and | 16 |  |
| 17 | I think you should provide -- | 17 |  |
| 18 | MR ALLISON: My Lord, of course. | 18 |  |
| 19 | MR JUSTICE HILDYARD: It may be that it can be very short | 19 |  |
| 20 | because you have only in the event relied on one and | 20 |  |
| 21 | a half, you have had a half go, I don't know whether you | 21 |  |
| 22 | are going to return to it, and you have had a one | 22 |  |
| 23 | allowed in because I wanted it. | 23 |  |
| 24 | MR ALLISON: It may be because of Professor Mülbert's | 24 |  |
| 25 | ultimate answer is not an authority my Lord needs to | 25 |  |
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