

<p>1 Thursday, 26 March 2015 2 (10.30 am) 3 Submissions by MR TROWER (continued) 4 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Trower. 5 MR TROWER: My Lords, two concluding points on provability 6 and the administration of the contributory before I move 7 on to the contributory rule. 8 The first point is comparing, if you like, Nortel to 9 the present case. In Nortel the original relationship 10 was between the employer and the target companies, 11 paragraph 84 is where Lord Neuberger explains it. 12 The vulnerability did actually occur after the 13 relationship arose. You get that from paragraph 85 of 14 the judgment, because the vulnerability that 15 Lord Neuberger was particularly focusing on was the 16 vulnerability in the context of the administration. 17 The third point just to bear in mind is that the 18 liability in that case is initiated by a third party, 19 who is the pensions regulator, and the obligation to pay 20 under the contribution notice requires the debt to be 21 paid to the trustees, i.e. the underlying beneficial 22 interest or the beneficiaries. You get that from 23 paragraph 12 of the judgment of his speech as to how it 24 is that it is structured. One can immediately see that 25 the closeness between the situation in which getting</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 1</p>	<p>1 penumbra of the relevant regime. It's within the same 2 statutory envelope, which includes a scheme for the 3 distribution of its assets. 4 So, my Lords, that is what I was going to say about 5 provability unless your Lordships have any further 6 questions. 7 So far as the contributory rule is concerned, as 8 I've explained, this arises if the judge was wrong to 9 hold as he did in relation to declarations 8, 9 and 10, 10 because we accept that, if you conclude that the judge's 11 decision in relation to those were right, then the point 12 can't arise because there's a set-off in relation to the 13 claim and the cross-claim. 14 I was going to split my submissions into three 15 parts: what is the contributory rule, when and why does 16 it apply and why do we say it would apply in 17 an administration? I will deal with them, I hope, 18 relatively shortly. 19 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Yes, thank you. 20 MR TROWER: The starting point is Grissell's case. I will 21 go to it in just a moment, but Lord Chelmsford -- if 22 I can just give you the note for the purposes of this 23 first point. Lord Chelmsford says at page 534 that the 24 question depends entirely upon the construction of the 25 Companies Act. He says, slightly later on:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 3</p>
<p>1 hold of the money, if I can put it in those colloquial 2 terms, is something which is initiated through 3 a process, which is controlled by the regulator. 4 It's not the same, but there are parallels with the 5 situation in the present case where the process is 6 initiated through the liquidator and the money comes 7 into the company's assets. 8 My Lord, that's the first point. The second point 9 is, whatever may be the position in relation to 10 a contingent claim by a company pre-administration, and 11 my Lord Lord Justice Briggs made a comment right at the 12 end of my submissions yesterday about the position in 13 relation to making contingent claims where the company 14 is still subject to the control of its directors, and 15 that may be different from the position 16 post-administration. 17 Whatever the position may be there, we submit that 18 where a company has actually gone into administration it 19 is plain that that company and the liability comes 20 within what Lord Neuberger described in paragraph 85 of 21 his speech as the penumbra of the regime. We would say 22 that in any event you have a contingent liability at 23 an earlier stage, but by the stage of administration the 24 company and the liability that arises under section 74, 25 which is all part of the same structure, is within the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 2</p>	<p>1 "The primary intention of the legislature in the 2 provisions relating to the winding up of companies must 3 be regarded ..." 4 So one is dealing with a construction point, and the 5 same point has been made in subsequent cases. 6 While we of course then, therefore, agree that the 7 contributory rule is a rule of statutory construction, 8 it's also clear that it has been informed, is the way we 9 would put it, by the existence in terms of an equivalent 10 equitable right of retainer in the form of the rule in 11 Cherry v Boulton. It's a different rule but it's been 12 informed by that, and that's precisely what Lord Walker 13 made clear in Kaupthing. Can I take your Lordships 14 first to the Kaupthing case, which is 1C, tab 89. 15 (Pause). 16 Kaupthing was a case about the rule against double 17 proof and the interrelationship with the rule in 18 Cherry v Boulton. When your Lordships are reading 19 Lord Walker's speech, when he talks about the equitable 20 rule, what he's talking about is the rule in 21 Cherry v Boulton. You get that from a number of parts 22 of his judgment. 23 But I think for present purposes, because a lot of 24 the judgment is dealing with the complex -- although he 25 actually criticised Chadwick LJ for describing it as</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 4</p>

<p>1 some form of rocket science, it's nothing like that. 2 The simple point that I need to take your Lordships to 3 the judgment for at this stage is paragraphs 51 and 52, 4 where he's looking at a passage -- or he starts off in 5 51 by referring to: 6 "The line of authority dealing with the special case 7 of shareholders liable for calls on shares which are not 8 fully paid up. Some of these cases are mentioned in 9 paragraph 20 above." 10 Just flicking back to paragraph 20 above, your 11 Lordships will see reference to a series of cases, 12 including Grissell's case which appears just over the 13 page on page 817, just over the page from the beginning 14 of that paragraph. 15 He then says: 16 "Chadwick LJ sets out a fuller citation of the case 17 but I have say with respect he seems to have missed the 18 point." 19 Then he what says what that point is: 20 "The situation in this line of authority is that 21 a shareholder as a creditor of an insolvent ...(Reading 22 to the words)... not fully paid up so that he is liable 23 as a contributory. Suppose he has 10,000 £1 shares, 10p 24 paid and is owed 15,00 ...(Reading to the words)... he 25 has no right of set-off and to that extent he is</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 5</p>	<p>1 Then in paragraph 53, he goes on and explains how 2 the equitable rule, which is the rule in 3 Cherry v Boulton, may be said to fill the gap left by 4 disapplication of set-off but it doesn't work in 5 opposition to set-off; and in that sense is consistent 6 with the way the contributory rule has been considered 7 in the authorities. 8 But the important point here is -- well, for present 9 purposes he's equivalating, if you like, the 10 contributory rule to the rule in Cherry v Boulton. 11 They are similar in effect and there are obvious 12 resemblances, but one also can see from the way he puts 13 it that it's a product of the interpretation by the 14 courts of the statutory scheme but against the 15 background of this equitable principle. 16 We submit that it is a rule the development of which 17 has been influenced and informed by the existence of 18 a parallel equitable rule of similar effect. 19 The core of our point is the rule should -- and we 20 accept it's a development. It has to be development in 21 this case because the rule has only ever been applied in 22 the context of liquidations where a call has actually 23 been made, and we accept that. What we're inviting your 24 Lordships to do is develop the rule to meet the changes 25 in the insolvency procedures that are contained in the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 7</p>
<p>1 disadvantaged." 2 And then he cites Auriferous: 3 "If he seeks to prove in the liquidation the 4 liquidator can rely on the equitable rule as it applies 5 in a case of this sort." 6 So there he is actually characterises the 7 contributory rule as an equitable rule, or part of it: 8 "That is that he can receive nothing until he has 9 paid everything that he owes as a contributory, that is 10 in re Auriferous. The rule is also very clearly stated 11 by Buckley J in West Coast Gold Fields, cited in 12 paragraph 20 above." 13 So if one flicks back to page 817, where the 14 citation is: 15 "The right view is that the person liable as 16 a contributory [that's the citation at page 817 in 17 paragraph 20] must have discharged himself in that 18 character before he can set up that as a creditor he is 19 entitled to receive anything and a fortiori as it seems 20 to me before he can set up that as a contributory he is 21 entitled to receive anything." 22 Then Lord Walker goes on: 23 "Payment of the call is a condition precedent to the 24 shareholders' participation in any distribution and 25 again the shareholder is to that extent disadvantaged."</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 6</p>	<p>1 existing code. 2 Now -- 3 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Specifically you mean the 4 Enterprise Act change? 5 MR TROWER: Indeed. The introduction of distributed 6 administrations and in particular the application of the 7 code with the application of the pari passu principle. 8 Because, as I will show your Lordships in a moment, the 9 contributory rule does three things. First of all, it 10 protects the pari passu rule. Secondly, it fills the 11 gap left by the disapplication of set-off and third it 12 ensures that the statutory mechanism for making calls in 13 a liquidation is not defeated. So those three things 14 are what is going on. 15 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Does this development of the rule 16 apply irrespective of whether the contingent liability 17 is provable? 18 MR TROWER: Yes. 19 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Even if the contingent liability is 20 not provable in the administration of the 21 contributories? 22 MR TROWER: Yes. 23 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: You say the contributory rule or this 24 equitable rule applies -- 25 MR TROWER: Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 8</p>

<p>1 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: -- to preclude them from 2 participating in any distribution in the administration? 3 MR TROWER: Yes, I do say that. The answer may depend on 4 why it's not provable, but I do say that because -- 5 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Suppose it's not provable for reasons 6 encapsulated in (c) of Lord Neuberger's test. There's 7 something in the statutory scheme -- 8 MR TROWER: Yes. 9 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: -- that means that one shouldn't 10 allow it to be provable. 11 MR TROWER: Yes. 12 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: If it's not provable for reasons of 13 that kind. 14 MR TROWER: They all sort of feed off each other in this 15 sense because it would be quite surprising -- I think 16 I would have to accept that I would be quite surprising 17 if it was not provable because of the way the scheme 18 worked but I was still entitled to the protection of the 19 contributory rule, because in a sense the contributory 20 rule wouldn't be protecting anything that the scheme 21 regarded as important for protection. If the scheme 22 regards it as important for protection, one would expect 23 under the 77(c) test that there would be an ability to 24 prove. 25 So in that sense they are intimately interlinked.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 9</p>	<p>1 Lordships to cast your eyes on that and then turn to the 2 beginning of Lord Chelmsford's speech at page 533. 3 Would my Lords read the first paragraph, which sets the 4 scene. (Pause). 5 Then he goes on, on 534, to deal with the point 6 about it depending entirely upon the construction of the 7 Companies Act. 8 Then, important for present purposes, the next 9 paragraph: 10 "in considering the questions involved in these 11 applications, the primary intention of the legislature 12 in the provisions relating to the winding up of 13 companies must be regarded. That intention is expressed 14 in the 133rd section of the Act, being that the priority 15 of the company shall be applied in satisfaction of its 16 liabilities pari passu and subject thereto shall unless 17 it be otherwise provided by the regulations of the 18 company be distributed amongst the members according to 19 their rights and interests in the company." 20 So on the first point, what is relevant to note is 21 that he's referring there to the pari passu rule as 22 being the primary intention of the legislature in the 23 provisions relating to the winding up of companies. 24 That's the starting point. One can immediately see why 25 the pari passu rule is relevant. The contributory holds</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 11</p>
<p>1 But what I don't want to accept for present purposes is 2 that in all circumstances the two stand or fall together 3 because one can conceive of a situation in which 4 provability might -- there might be a problem with 5 provability, but where you still need, in order to 6 protect the statutory scheme, to ensure that the ability 7 to call on contributories is protected. 8 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes. 9 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: It may help clear one's mind if one 10 starts with a solvent contributory. 11 MR TROWER: Yes. 12 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: For the present purpose and then see 13 what difference its insolvency might make. 14 MR TROWER: Yes. Yes. 15 Yes, that may be right. I am just thinking about 16 whether to develop the submission based on the back of 17 that statement. (Pause). 18 I think it is important, having made those three 19 points about what it does, to go to Grissell's case and 20 just see where they fit in the structure of where this 21 rule started. 22 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Right, where is that? 23 MR TROWER: Which is 1A, tab 6. (Pause). 24 The headnote is very short and is on the page -- at 25 the beginning, obviously, six lines' worth. I ask your</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 10</p>	<p>1 in his own hands a part of the estate which he's liable 2 to contribute to the estate. If he paid that amount 3 into the estate so as to complete the estate, he would 4 then receive back his share of the estate pari passu 5 with the other ordinary unsecured creditors. If he 6 retains part of the estate in his hands while also 7 receiving a dividend, he gets more than his fair share 8 and that's a breach of the pari passu rule. 9 That's how Kekewich J put it in Akerman, which was 10 quoted by Lord Walker in Kaupthing. As Lord Walker 11 notes in Kaupthing, Akerman is dealing with the 12 Cherry v Boulton position but the position is the same 13 in relation to the contributory rule and 14 Cherry v Boulton. It's this concept of retaining that 15 which you ought to be contributing. 16 Now, if there is no set-off, therefore, and the 17 contributory rule does not apply, the insolvent 18 contributory gets more than his fair share because he 19 retains in his hands the contribution that's he's 20 required to put into the estate whilst additionally 21 receiving a further part of the estate by way of 22 dividend. 23 So that's the starting point. 24 Stage 2, the contributory rule fills the gap left by 25 the disapplication of set-off. That's the second part</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 12</p>

<p>1 of the stage. 2 The starting point here is that there was no 3 mandatory insolvency set-off in liquidation at the time 4 of Grissell's case. Lord Chelmsford makes this clear at 5 the bottom of page 535 and over to page 536. (Pause). 6 It starts at: 7 "The two remaining questions may be considered 8 together. It appears to me to be quite clear ..." 9 If my Lords would just read that paragraph. 10 (Pause). 11 Then also, on to the next paragraph: 12 "The case of a member of a limited company is 13 different from that of a member of a company of 14 unlimited liability." 15 I need to explain to my Lords how that fits, given 16 we're here dealing with an unlimited company in the case 17 of LBIE. (Pause). 18 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: There the contemplation must be 19 a solvent -- Lord Chelmsford must be thinking about 20 a solvent contributory. 21 MR TROWER: I think that's right. In a way the contributory 22 rule shouldn't really depend on whether the contributory 23 is solvent or insolvent, because that would be quite 24 a difficult concept to apply from a pragmatic point of 25 view and perhaps more importantly the contributory may</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 13</p>	<p>1 MR TROWER: Then if one goes on just in the same bundle as 2 Grissell's case to a case called Black's case, which is 3 behind tab 16. If my Lords would turn to page 265, 4 really just to -- this is Mellish LJ putting the point 5 about the implication derived from section 101 slightly 6 more clearly at page 265 in the paragraph starting at 7 the top of the page. (Pause). 8 Then, flicking back in the same bundle, having made 9 that, I hope, point good as to how that bit of the 10 structure works, we go back to Grissell again and just 11 carrying on at the bottom of page 536. (Pause). 12 If my Lords would read the paragraph "But" to just 13 the end of the last paragraph of the judgment, which is 14 dealing with the point that the contributory rule is 15 necessary to plug the gap left by the inapplicability of 16 set-off. (Pause). 17 That point about filling the gap was made in the 18 last paragraph of Lord Walker's speech in Kaupthing as 19 well, when he's talking about the equitable rule, but 20 what he said in paragraph 53 -- which was the paragraph 21 after the ones I invited your Lordships to look at. 22 Your Lordships may have read it, but if not I think we 23 ought to just go back to it. (Pause). 24 So you have: 25 "The equitable rule may be said to full the gap left</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 15</p>
<p>1 become insolvent at any stage. 2 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes, but the creditors would mind very 3 much if the contributory was insolvent contrary to the 4 way Lord Chelmsford sets out his observation. 5 MR TROWER: Yes. 6 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Do we have section 101 somewhere? 7 MR TROWER: Yes, I am just going to take your Lordships to 8 it. It is in bundle 3 at tab 9. It's page 811 of the 9 print. It starts at the bottom of 811 and goes over to 10 812. (Pause). 11 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: The key word is "may" in the middle of 12 the bottom line. 13 MR TROWER: Yes, indeed. 14 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Has any equivalent found its way into 15 the modern Insolvency Code? 16 MR TROWER: It is 149(3), is what we have in the modern 17 code. 18 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes. (Pause). Which we looked at 19 yesterday. 20 MR TROWER: Yes. 21 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: It is 149(2)(a). 22 MR TROWER: Yes, your Lordships is right, it is (2)(a) 23 and -- well, it's 3 really because the proviso to 101 is 24 the same as (3). 25 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 14</p>	<p>1 by disapplication of set-off, it doesn't work in 2 opposition to it. It produces a similar netting off 3 effect except where some cogent principle of law 4 requires one claim to be given strict priority to 5 another. The principle that a company's contributories 6 must stand in the queue behind its creditors is one such 7 principle. The rule against double proof is another. 8 I would accept ..." 9 Et cetera. 10 He is obviously dealing with a slightly different 11 point here in the sense that he's dealing with the 12 interrelationship between the rule against 13 Cherry v Boulton and the rule against double proof, and 14 one accepts that. But it is important to see how it is 15 that the contributory rule and the equitable rule fit 16 together with set-off, because obviously if you have 17 a mandatory set-off there isn't room for the application 18 of the contributory rule because there's a mandatory 19 entitlement under the code which entitles set-off. 20 If you don't have the set-off, for whatever reason, 21 the contributory rule fills the gap in this particular 22 case. 23 So what we primarily submit in relation to the 24 principle is that it's necessary to protect the 25 pari passu rule to ensure that the contributory doesn't</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 16</p>

<p>1 get more than his fair share in a context in which it's 2 also necessary to ensure that the statutory mechanism 3 for making calls in a liquidation is not defeated. 4 The legislature has throughout had a fairly detailed 5 statutory mechanism for the making of calls by 6 liquidators. What the courts have strived to do in 7 Grissell's case is to protect and give effect to this 8 statutory machinery and to make sure that it's not 9 defeated. That's what's going on. 10 But it may be that protection of the mechanism by 11 which calls can be made and protection of the pari passu 12 rules are just a different way of putting the same 13 point, at the end of the day, given what a call is, what 14 it is being brought in to do. 15 There's just one other bit I wanted to show my Lords 16 in Black's case, also called Paraguassu, which we looked 17 at just now. Sorry to keep darting around. It is 18 behind tab 16 in 1A, 262. It's put rather neatly by 19 Lord Selborne here. The sentence starts at the very 20 bottom of page 261 and it's the rest of that paragraph 21 to halfway down page 262. (Pause). 22 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes. 23 MR TROWER: So, in summary, what we say is the rule is 24 a rule that is concerned with the protection of the 25 pari passu rule and the statutory mechanism for the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 17</p>	<p>1 law on fraudulent preferences. It was developed by the 2 courts at the time of Lord Mansfield to protect the 3 concept of a pari passu distribution, that's what it was 4 all about. It was only codified for the first time in 5 the late 19th century. That's a slightly different 6 example because it now has been codified, so it's not 7 extant. Obviously one of the things that's happened in 8 this area is there has been greater codification as time 9 has gone on. One accepts that. But there are still 10 plenty of principles out there, and the contributory 11 rule is quite a good example of it, of cases where the 12 court has developed these sort of rules in order to 13 ensure that the legislative intent is not defeated. 14 Just so I can show my Lords where in Kaupthing 15 Lord Walker talks about the rule against double proof -- 16 just so you can see the sort of approach. If we go back 17 to Kaupthing, it's paragraph 1. It's the first very 18 paragraph of his judgment, where he also refers to the 19 anti-deprivation principle which the Supreme Court had 20 to consider in the Belmont case, The Perpetual 21 Trustee v Bank of New York. 22 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: It says it's implicit. (Pause). 23 Does he conveniently summarise the rule itself -- 24 oh, yes, paragraph 8. 25 MR TROWER: Yes, there's a section in paragraphs 8 to 12.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 19</p>
<p>1 making of calls in a liquidation in circumstances where 2 set-off is not available. It's dependent on the true 3 construction of the relevant provisions of the 4 insolvency legislation, ultimately, but it's been 5 formulated -- 6 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Not in a mechanical sense but in 7 a purposive sense. 8 MR TROWER: In a purposive sense. The way we would put it 9 it has been formulated by the courts in order to give 10 effect to the intention of the legislature. That's the 11 way it works and it's an example of the well-known 12 phenomenon of a court developing these rules in aid of 13 a statute to ensure that the intention isn't defeated. 14 There are actually a number of illustrations of 15 where one finds that in the statutory code already or 16 linked -- the rule against double proof, actually, is 17 quite a good example of it, which is described at some 18 length in Lord Walker's speech in Kaupthing. I will 19 show your Lordships it in just a moment. I was going to 20 give three examples, actually. That's the first one. 21 The second one is the anti-deprivation principle, 22 which is not to be found in any particular section of 23 the Insolvency Act but it's another example of the court 24 giving effect to the statutory scheme as a whole. The 25 last actually, although it's now been codified, is the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 18</p>	<p>1 I think, of the judgment -- I'm sorry, I should have 2 drawn your Lordships' attention to that -- which 3 describes in much more detail the way in which the rule 4 double proof actually works. 5 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes. That nice quote from Re 6 Oriental. (Pause). 7 MR TROWER: So just projecting that into the existing code, 8 first of all in the context of unlimited liability 9 companies, if once the unlimited liability company goes 10 into liquidation the contributory rule is -- the first 11 question to ask is: what is the set-off position in 12 relation to a liquidator's ability to call? That's 13 dealt with by section 149. 14 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: So he can set off separate debts owed 15 to him by the company -- 16 MR TROWER: There's an implication -- 17 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: -- but he can't set off his -- 18 MR TROWER: Unless the court gives permission, which the 19 court won't do unless everybody has -- 20 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Been paid. 21 MR TROWER: Unless everybody has been paid in full. 22 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes. 23 MR TROWER: Yes. So that's the concept in the code. Now, 24 there's nothing -- and so one sets against that 25 background the appropriateness of applying the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 20</p>

1 contributory rule at the stage prior to the application
 2 of 149, because we're in a situation, of course, where
 3 149 doesn't apply because the company is still in
 4 administration.
 5 But because of the envelope of the statutory scheme
 6 for administration, including the pari passu
 7 distribution provisions, we would submit that the
 8 protection of the contributory rule is still required
 9 for the purposes of assisting the legislative intent in
 10 relation to pari passu distributions.
 11 We accept that on the existing authorities,
 12 certainly in relation to Cherry v Boulton, and also the
 13 way in which the rule is put in Grissell's case, that
 14 the contributory rule wasn't focused on protection in
 15 respect of future calls. A lot is made by my learned
 16 friends in relation to that. One can understand why,
 17 because of the way in which the contributory rule is
 18 expressed on the authorities.
 19 But that is comprehensible in the context of
 20 a statutory scheme which doesn't include administration,
 21 where administrators are not in a position yet to make
 22 a call.
 23 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: It doesn't include a distributing
 24 administration.
 25 MR TROWER: A distributing administration, that's right. So

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1 one can see in a liquidation how it works. If the
 2 liquidator needs to make a call in order to introduce
 3 the protection of the contributory rule, he just makes
 4 a call.
 5 The administrator doesn't have that ability, which
 6 is why the protection of the contributory rule is
 7 required, notwithstanding the fact that the liability in
 8 respect of the call has not yet accrued payable.
 9 But particularly in the case of an unlimited
 10 liability company, where there is no assurance of
 11 payment of the creditors in full, it remains an asset
 12 that requires the protection of the contributory rule.
 13 That's, in a nutshell, the way we put the case.
 14 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Grissell's case seemed to suggest
 15 that where you have an unlimited company there's no need
 16 for any particular protection.
 17 MR TROWER: Yes.
 18 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: As my Lord Lord Justice Briggs said,
 19 well, that may depend on whether the contributory is or
 20 isn't solvent.
 21 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: It must.
 22 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Does your proposition apply
 23 irrespective of the solvency of the contributory or does
 24 it depend on a view being taken about the contributory's
 25 eventual ability to repay? If the government takes

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1 shares in some company, as they sometimes do, does it
 2 matter?
 3 MR TROWER: I think the way we put it is that it doesn't
 4 depend on that fact, if only because it may well be the
 5 case that -- you obviously need it much more immediately
 6 and obviously, if you can see that the contributory is
 7 insolvent, if it's subject to an insolvency process.
 8 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: I suppose what I am getting at is are
 9 you putting forward, so to speak, a rule or
 10 a discretionary power given to the court?
 11 MR TROWER: I am putting forward a rule, I think. I am
 12 basing it on the existing rule and saying it needs
 13 a little bit of extension in the context of
 14 administration.
 15 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Section 149 appears to give
 16 a discretionary power.
 17 MR TROWER: Yes.
 18 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: So you are going further than 149 in
 19 saying that there is a rule?
 20 MR TROWER: Yes, at this stage of the process.
 21 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: What's the justification for having
 22 something which is more stringent than section 149 at
 23 a time when section 149 doesn't apply?
 24 MR TROWER: Before I respond, can I just listen to what is
 25 being said behind? (Pause).

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1 149 of course is dealing with the discretion in
 2 relation to set-off.
 3 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes.
 4 MR TROWER: We're actually dealing with a slightly different
 5 point here.
 6 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: But if the discretion in relation to
 7 set-off is exercised by allowing a set-off --
 8 MR TROWER: Yes.
 9 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: -- that would override the
 10 contributory rule, wouldn't it?
 11 MR TROWER: Yes.
 12 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: So if it's a rule --
 13 MR TROWER: Yes.
 14 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: -- does the rule have a sort of
 15 non-statutory discretion built into it to deal with the
 16 problem that in administration section 149 discretion
 17 doesn't on its face apply? (Pause).
 18 Otherwise I think the position would be tougher for
 19 a contributory in the administration than it would in
 20 the liquidation.
 21 MR TROWER: I can see that. I can see that, my Lords.
 22 I can see that. Although of course -- yes, I mean --
 23 and one would have to work out on a fact by fact basis
 24 as to the circumstances in which the discretion might be
 25 exercised to permit it.

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<p>1 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: So you're --</p> <p>2 MR TROWER: And the justification for it would be that when</p> <p>3 you're looking at the totality of the envelope within</p> <p>4 which the dividend would otherwise be paid and the</p> <p>5 protection of the pari passu rule is required, part of</p> <p>6 that statutory envelope includes the prospective</p> <p>7 application of section 149.</p> <p>8 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: I can see the argument that the</p> <p>9 section 149 scheme, if I can call it that, should be</p> <p>10 applied by analogy. I find it difficult to suppose that</p> <p>11 something more stringent than the section 149 should be</p> <p>12 created by the courts.</p> <p>13 MR TROWER: Yes. My Lords, I see the point. Tying the two</p> <p>14 together has a structural coherence to it, if I may</p> <p>15 respectfully put it that way.</p> <p>16 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: The obvious case for applying the</p> <p>17 discretion would be if the contributory was</p> <p>18 an unquestioned solvency --</p> <p>19 MR TROWER: Indeed.</p> <p>20 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: -- and it's an unlimited company,</p> <p>21 which is exactly the situation which is contemplated by</p> <p>22 the old cases.</p> <p>23 MR TROWER: Indeed. One can see in that sort of case that</p> <p>24 it would be harsh on the contributory to retain the</p> <p>25 dividend in circumstances where it was always going to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 25</p>	<p>1 fundamentally in issue between my client and my learned</p> <p>2 friends, between --</p> <p>3 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Is the question which we have to ask</p> <p>4 ourselves whether, by converting an administration into</p> <p>5 a distributing administration, the whole spirit and</p> <p>6 purpose of the insolvency code thereby descends upon</p> <p>7 that company?</p> <p>8 MR TROWER: Yes.</p> <p>9 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: In a situation where unfortunately the</p> <p>10 draftsman, on any view, left all sorts of things out --</p> <p>11 MR TROWER: Yes.</p> <p>12 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: -- like backdating the cut-off date</p> <p>13 properly in Rule 13.12, all sorts of -- and the lacuna</p> <p>14 which you describe in relation to interest.</p> <p>15 MR TROWER: Yes.</p> <p>16 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: And didn't give the distributing</p> <p>17 administrator the power to make calls.</p> <p>18 MR TROWER: Of course, the learned judge in his judgment did</p> <p>19 focus on the fact that the reason -- you know, there was</p> <p>20 no ability to make calls in an administration was</p> <p>21 something that infected a lot of his reasoning on this</p> <p>22 area.</p> <p>23 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes.</p> <p>24 MR TROWER: I accept that, of course I accept that.</p> <p>25 In a sense the sort of big picture that we invite</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 27</p>
<p>1 be able to discharge in any event the contribution</p> <p>2 obligation under the call. I think the only caveat</p> <p>3 I add to that, but I still think it renders it a rule</p> <p>4 subject to a discretion, is that in many cases that will</p> <p>5 be difficult to establish. But that's no reason not to</p> <p>6 have it in there, I accept that.</p> <p>7 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: It's particularly interesting to note,</p> <p>8 which is why I raised this, let's look at in relation to</p> <p>9 an insolvent contributory point, that the judge's</p> <p>10 concern in his judgment in not extending the rule to</p> <p>11 administration was precisely because of his concern for</p> <p>12 solvent contributories.</p> <p>13 MR TROWER: Yes, indeed.</p> <p>14 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: He spells that out very clearly.</p> <p>15 MR TROWER: Yes.</p> <p>16 So, my Lord, it is one of those principles where,</p> <p>17 going through a lot of the old cases, we respectfully</p> <p>18 suggest doesn't really elucidate very much. Of course</p> <p>19 one has to see the juridical foundation for it and the</p> <p>20 way it has been explained at the highest level, those</p> <p>21 are important points. But if one goes digging back</p> <p>22 through all the old cases, they really aren't on the</p> <p>23 point if only because we accept that what we're trying</p> <p>24 to do here is something that is based on a new scheme,</p> <p>25 applying principles the core essence of which are not</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 26</p>	<p>1 your Lordships to think about in this context is that</p> <p>2 while a distributing administration obviously imposes</p> <p>3 the pari passu principle, which is at the core of the</p> <p>4 reasoning in relation to this, it doesn't of itself</p> <p>5 impose the ability to make effective recovery under</p> <p>6 section 74 of calls, but, for two reasons, that's not</p> <p>7 a complete answer.</p> <p>8 The first is that you are already within a process</p> <p>9 that is moving or may move in due course into</p> <p>10 liquidation where that is part of the code, but,</p> <p>11 secondly, and more importantly, you are within a process</p> <p>12 where there is a legislative scheme, the core essential</p> <p>13 of which is to distribute assets amongst the creditors.</p> <p>14 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: The stated objective is to do it</p> <p>15 better than you do it in a winding-up.</p> <p>16 MR TROWER: A winding up, indeed.</p> <p>17 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: But otherwise it is to do it in</p> <p>18 a winding-up.</p> <p>19 MR TROWER: Yes. (Pause).</p> <p>20 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: I forget which section that is, but we</p> <p>21 all remember the phraseology. I forget what section of</p> <p>22 the Act that is --</p> <p>23 MR TROWER: Sorry, my Lord?</p> <p>24 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: What section of the Insolvency Act</p> <p>25 is --</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 28</p>

<p>1 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: B1, paragraph 3 or something. 2 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes. 3 MR TROWER: So the bits of it that matter are that it is to 4 achieve a better result for the company's creditors as 5 a whole and in doing it to act at all times in the best 6 interests of the company's creditors as a whole. 7 It is page 267 of the Red Book. It's the second 8 purpose, 3.1(b); the first one being rescue as a going 9 concern. 10 And then 3.2, over the page: 11 "Subject to sub-paragraph 4 [which is dealing 12 effectively with secured creditors' interest] the 13 administrator of a company must perform his functions in 14 the interests of the company's creditors as a whole." 15 So that's the way it works conceptually. 16 So, my Lords, although on any view that's quite 17 a big question, because we are asking the court to 18 develop a rule, the submission we make in relation to it 19 is relatively short at the end of the day, which is why 20 I wasn't going to -- there's not really very much more 21 I can do by way of development of it. But I am very 22 happy obviously, to respond to any further questions 23 my Lords have on it. (Pause). 24 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Not at the moment anyway. Thank 25 you.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 29</p>	<p>1 entered into administration." 2 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: When was the bit in brackets inserted? 3 MR TROWER: 2005. So that is applicable. In the Red Book 4 we're looking at what was applicable at the relevant 5 time. 6 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes. 7 MR TROWER: Of course if we go to 13.12 in the form 8 applicable at the referral time, as my Lord 9 Lord Justice Briggs held in -- 10 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Where are we going? 11 MR TROWER: 13.12. 12 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes. (Pause). 13 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes. 14 MR TROWER: 13.12, there is no equivalent relation back at 15 that stage. What my Lord did in the decision at first 16 instance was hold that you couldn't treat the 2010 17 amendment -- which was made in order to render 13.12 18 similar to 4.93(1) in its impact. You can't treat that 19 as relating back to 2005, which is one of the arguments 20 that was developed eloquently by Mr Dicker; but it 21 wasn't accepted, that argument. 22 So the position in relation to the administration 23 and most importantly future liquidation of LBIE is that 24 we have 13.12 in the form you find it in the Red Book, 25 with no relation back in relation to proved debts -- so</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 31</p>
<p>1 MR TROWER: So, my Lords, that's the contributory rule. 2 There is then the parked issue, if I can put it that 3 way. 4 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: I am not sure that there is a problem 5 there, is there? That part of the first instance 6 judgment in Nortel, to which you helpfully referred me, 7 makes absolutely clear that although between 2005 and 8 2009, or whenever it was, the main cut-off date 9 arrangement had a terrible lacuna on it that couldn't be 10 filled by interpretation, it didn't in relation to 11 interest, which is what we're talking about in the 12 parked issues. 13 MR TROWER: Can I just explain to my Lords the reason there 14 may be an issue. 15 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Okay. 16 MR TROWER: Because I think we need to see how it all fits 17 together as a point. 18 If we just go to Rule 4.93. 19 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes. 20 MR TROWER: "Where a debt proved in the liquidation bears 21 interest, that interest is provable as part of the debt 22 except insofar as it is payable in respect of any period 23 after the company went into liquidation or if the 24 liquidation was immediately preceded by 25 an administration any period after that date the company</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 30</p>	<p>1 you don't have the cut-off date going back in relation 2 to proved debts -- but you do have relation back in 3 relation to the interest. 4 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: So you can't prove for contractual 5 interest if you're in a liquidation after the precedent 6 onset of administration. 7 MR TROWER: Administration. But the issue then which 8 arises, which is what we're concerned with here, is 9 a situation in which LBIE goes from administration into 10 liquidation at some stage in the future. A surplus has 11 arisen in the administration of LBIE, but interest has 12 not actually been paid to the creditors in respect of 13 the administration period, but the proved debts have all 14 been paid because everyone has got 100p in the pound. 15 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: So you're postulating there is 16 a surplus or it can be ascertained that there was 17 a surplus in the administration? 18 MR TROWER: Yes. When you get to the end of the 19 administration -- 20 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes. 21 MR TROWER: -- the proved debts have been paid at 100p in 22 the pound, nobody has got any interest, but there is 23 a surplus. 24 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes. 25 MR TROWER: The company goes into liquidation.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 32</p>

<p>1 Now, in that situation the application of 4.93 2 arises. 3 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: A whole lot more creditors turn up, 4 saying, "Ah, I have provable debts that weren't provable 5 at the onset of the administration". 6 MR TROWER: That's one thing that needs to be injected into 7 the equation. There's another point which gives rise to 8 the issue that may still be out there, which is this, 9 people whose debts have not been interest liabilities 10 have not been paid. Do they have a right to prove in 11 the liquidation in respect of their interest claims? 12 Because the debts have actually been paid. So at the 13 liquidation stage there is no longer a debt proved in 14 the liquidation bearing interest. There may be 15 an entitlement to prove in respect of interest which is 16 quite independent from the debt proved in the 17 liquidation. That's the issue that may arise. 18 In other words, because all the debts in the 19 administration have been paid in full, the entitlement 20 to interest is no longer the interest that is borne on 21 a debt proved in the liquidation. 22 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: I still don't quite understand why 23 Rule 2.88 doesn't apply. 24 MR TROWER: That's the lacuna point. Our principal argumen 25 is that Rule 2.88 continues to operate in the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 33</p>	<p>1 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: -- pre-application statutory 2 liability. 3 MR TROWER: Correct. And that point was not argued before 4 the judge. That was what caused a certain amount of 5 flurrying behind -- well, it is both, actually. My 6 learned friend Mr Snowden rightly points out there are 7 two possibilities. The first is that there's 8 a contractual liability arising only out of the 9 antecedent contractual entitlement, which was antecedent 10 to all of the insolvency proceedings. The second 11 possibility is that you can prove in respect of the 12 statutory right to interest under 2.88. That's the 13 second possibility. 14 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: If it was an antecedent contractual 15 liability -- 16 MR TROWER: Yes. 17 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: -- you would have proved for it in 18 the administration, would you not? 19 MR TROWER: No, you wouldn't because it's 20 post-administration interest. 21 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: I'm sorry, I thought when you said 22 "antecedent" you meant preceding the administration. 23 But you don't mean that, you mean contractual 24 interest -- 25 MR TROWER: Yes, I don't.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 35</p>
<p>1 liquidation. 2 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes. 3 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes. 4 MR TROWER: My concern about this point -- 5 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: If there's a surplus in the 6 administration, Rule 2.88 says, before you do anything 7 else with the surplus, you have to pay interest. 8 MR TROWER: Yes. 9 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Why can't you say to the liquidator 10 "Before you do anything else with any assets under your 11 control, you have to pay the interest because that's 12 what Rule 2.88 says"?" 13 MR TROWER: My Lord, that is our argument in relation to why 14 there isn't a lacuna. My concern is that if that's 15 wrong -- where the judge went on this point is that 16 there's a non-provable liability. Okay. So if my 17 argument is wrong on lacuna and your Lordships' response 18 on lacuna, if I may respectfully say so, was wrong, 19 where we went to was not-provable liability. 20 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Non-contractual provable liability. 21 MR TROWER: Indeed. Now where it is possible we should have 22 gone, and this is the point which wasn't argued in front 23 of the learned judge -- 24 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: They were provable -- 25 MR TROWER: -- was that --</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 34</p>	<p>1 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: -- that would have accrued but for 2 the administration. 3 MR TROWER: Yes, I'm terribly sorry, yes that's exactly what 4 I meant. Yes. 5 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes. 6 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: So you say this particular bit -- 7 MR TROWER: This particular point -- 8 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: -- as an alternative to your revived 9 contractual interest argument -- 10 MR TROWER: Yes. 11 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: -- has never been argued? 12 MR TROWER: Yes. So the question that -- they may have. 13 Obviously if my Lord Lord Justice Lewison's point or 14 our lacuna argument is that the scheme of the statute is 15 that the interest just continues to flow through into 16 the administration, and that's the way it works, in 17 a sense this becomes less of an issue. 18 What we are very concerned about, though, is that 19 this point doesn't get argued, if you like, on a false 20 premise now that's it's actually emerged. I can only 21 apologise for the fact that we hadn't quite lit on it in 22 the way that we should have done and we responded to it 23 in the light actually ultimately of a question from my 24 Lord Lord Justice Moore-Bick which caused a certain 25 amount of flurrying when we suddenly focused on it.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 36</p>

1 My Lords, my slight hesitation about this is we are
 2 still not quite sure that we have got to the bottom of
 3 how the arguments work in relation to this point. We
 4 are a little bit concerned, insofar as it is relevant,
 5 in inviting your Lordships to decide it without being
 6 absolutely sure that we understand how the arguments
 7 work and perhaps more importantly who may have
 8 an interest in making them.
 9 Having said that, we can deal with the lacuna
 10 arguments and such arguments as there are in relation to
 11 non-provable debts so that my Lords can see the shape of
 12 them and the way they work, and there are a number of
 13 possible solutions as to how the parties could present
 14 to the court any further arguments that needed to be
 15 made in relation to the possible application of 4.93.
 16 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: The provable debt argument depends on
 17 the cut-off date under the transitional provisions
 18 remaining the date of the liquidation?
 19 MR TROWER: Yes.
 20 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: And that wasn't resurrected in the
 21 Court of Appeal, was it?
 22 MR TROWER: No. So what has happened is in this liquidation
 23 there is a determination by my Lord Lord Justice Briggs
 24 sitting at first instance which has not been appealed,
 25 it applies -- I think Mr Dicker made the argument so he

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1 can explain a little more if necessary. It was
 2 an argument that required the court to adopt a very wide
 3 approach --
 4 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: I understand that. I am just
 5 thinking what, if any, knock-on effects does it have.
 6 I think you're saying it doesn't have any knock-on
 7 effects in the regime as it currently stands.
 8 MR TROWER: No.
 9 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: There may be other transitional
 10 insolvency processes to which it would apply.
 11 MR TROWER: Yes.
 12 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Presumably most of them are over by
 13 now.
 14 MR TROWER: Yes. I think it's unlikely that it will affect
 15 others because we're now -- what are we? We're
 16 five years on from 2010, so it is unlikely.
 17 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: It will affect all the English Lehman
 18 insolvencies.
 19 MR TROWER: Yes, it has a big -- there are three
 20 possibilities here of course, on the way the thing has
 21 now developed.
 22 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: You're not yet in liquidation.
 23 MR TROWER: No, we're not.
 24 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: So if you were to go into liquidation
 25 now, wouldn't you be under the new version of 13.12?

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1 MR TROWER: No, that's what your Lordship decided.
 2 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Oh, I see. You never are because --
 3 MR TROWER: Because we went into administration in 2008.
 4 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: -- you went into administration. Yes
 5 of course.
 6 MR TROWER: That was your construction --
 7 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Absolutely right.
 8 MR TROWER: -- of the transitional provisions.
 9 So there are three possibilities. Possibility one
 10 is that you simply seamlessly transfer all the interest
 11 obligations from administration into liquidation, and
 12 that's why we say the judge got it wrong on the lacuna.
 13 The second possibility, which is what we won on in
 14 front of the judge, is it's a non-provable liability.
 15 The third possibility --
 16 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: "It", you mean the contractual
 17 interest?
 18 MR TROWER: Yes, sorry, the contractual interest is
 19 a non-provable liability. The third possibility, which
 20 was not argued before the judge and which this point
 21 gives rise to, is that it's a provable liability.
 22 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: It's a 13.12(1)(a) debt or liability.
 23 MR TROWER: That's correct.
 24 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes.
 25 MR TROWER: Yes. The concern that we have about this is

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1 that actually, as is always the case in relation to the
 2 Lehman companies, really quite enormous sums of money
 3 might turn on which of those three pots it falls into,
 4 because it affects the waterfall within the Lehman
 5 estate, if it goes into liquidation, as to where these
 6 liabilities fall.
 7 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Not least, presumably, because some of
 8 those with an interest claim have rates lower than the
 9 judgment rate.
 10 MR TROWER: Yes.
 11 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Or no rates.
 12 MR TROWER: Yes.
 13 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: And some may have contractual rates
 14 above the judgment rate.
 15 MR TROWER: Indeed. So you have to identify the source of
 16 the liability in order to work out how it fits in
 17 the ...
 18 Now, as your Lordships might imagine, as the parties
 19 began to think about this overnight a bit more and get
 20 into it a bit more, it became apparent to everyone that
 21 there was perhaps a little bit more complexity in
 22 relation to this than we had originally thought there
 23 might be, both commercially and legally. Where I was
 24 going to go in the first instance was invite your
 25 Lordships, having -- I can finish off my argument on the

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1 lacuna, if your Lordships would find that helpful, or we
 2 could just push the whole thing off to tomorrow, when
 3 people may have a more coherent position as to what they
 4 want to argue.
 5 The problem is that it's not actually clear at the
 6 moment --
 7 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Who benefits.
 8 MR TROWER: -- who benefits and who doesn't, and who might
 9 want to argue, if anyone, it is in fact provable.
 10 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: From the court's point of view it
 11 is quite important that we hear all the arguments on
 12 this point.
 13 MR TROWER: I think your Lordships should.
 14 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: And --
 15 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: It isn't much of a lacuna, at least in
 16 relation to a company with a surplus, if you can just
 17 prove it in the liquidation.
 18 MR TROWER: Obviously, the impact of the lacuna becomes very
 19 different, that's right.
 20 What goes into the estate by way of provable claims
 21 also affects, on any view, what may go up to the
 22 contributories.
 23 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: It may have a knock-on consequence in
 24 terms of the deemed proof, your proof in the
 25 administration is deemed to be proof in the subsequent

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1 liquidation, but it shouldn't rule you out from
 2 a further proof if you have a postponed cut-off date.
 3 MR TROWER: That may be one of the arguments, because you
 4 have the deemed proof point which at first blush looks
 5 like as if it may be an answer to the 4.93 point, but it
 6 may not be.
 7 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: No.
 8 MR TROWER: My Lords, so far as the administrators of the
 9 LBIE estate are concerned, they are, for I hope obvious
 10 reasons, very keen that your Lordships should be aware
 11 of both the argument and should be able to deal with it
 12 in the most effective way possible. We are a little bit
 13 concerned now that we're still only -- we'll less than
 14 24 hours away from when this point first emerged in the
 15 form in which it has emerged, and it requires proper
 16 consideration. There are a number of ways we could deal
 17 with it. It is possible that we could deal with it in
 18 writing, if we couldn't deal with it before the end of
 19 week. We could perhaps come back to it tomorrow when
 20 we're a bit more formulated on, but I am a little bit
 21 concerned about doing the argument simply like --
 22 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: I see that, but speaking for
 23 myself I think to have it dealt with orally is likely to
 24 be quite helpful because it gives the court a chance --
 25 MR TROWER: I understand that, my Lord.

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1 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: -- to engage in some discussion.
 2 MR TROWER: It was a developing feast right up to the moment
 3 in time at which your Lordships came into court as to
 4 precisely where the parties were on this, but can I take
 5 it that my Lords' position is that -- and we would urge
 6 this on you -- you do need to understand the way the
 7 arguments work in order to resolve declarations 4 and 5?
 8 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Yes.
 9 MR TROWER: Yes. We respectfully agree with that. Can
 10 I say no more on it at the moment until anyway after the
 11 mid-morning break and we can decide whether -- or would
 12 it possible to take the mid-morning break a few moments
 13 early?
 14 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Would that be a convenient moment?
 15 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: You're otherwise at the end of your
 16 submissions?
 17 MR TROWER: Yes, I am finished now apart from that.
 18 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: I don't quite know how this might
 19 go, normally we say five minutes and we mean
 20 five minutes; but we could stretch it if that would
 21 really be of assistance.
 22 MR TROWER: It might be easier if it was ten minutes and we
 23 could then all agree. If we said quarter to, would that
 24 be all right?
 25 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: We will sit again at quarter to.

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1 (11.38 am)
 2 (A short break)
 3 (11.48 am)
 4 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Trower. Have you
 5 clarified the position?
 6 MR TROWER: Yes, can I explain what the position is. Before
 7 I do that, can I just say Mr Dicker and I had agreed
 8 that I would, as I anticipated, by finished by the
 9 mid-morning break, which I'm not actually, so we're
 10 a little bit behind. He did think he needed about --
 11 from now until the end of today to do his submissions.
 12 So we may run a little bit over, but I hope it won't be
 13 too long over based on what I'm about to say.
 14 So far as the position on these two declarations is
 15 concerned, the argument that we put in relation to
 16 the -- and what I wanted to do was just to explain what
 17 the three arguments are. The way we put it is that,
 18 first of all, it is the construction point which we say
 19 the judge got wrong.
 20 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: 2.88.
 21 MR TROWER: 2.88, and if it's not either it is either
 22 non-provable or provable. We'll explain -- it has to be
 23 one of the two.
 24 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Provable would be the statutory
 25 interest, would it?

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<p>1 MR TROWER: Yes, there are two things that could be 2 provable; one is statutory and the other is the 3 underlying contractual. 4 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: So it is provable contractual. Does 5 the non-provable argument really survive if the cut-off 6 date is only the date of the onset of LBIE's 7 liquidation, winding up? The only reason why it was 8 non-provable was because there was an assumed cut-off 9 date that had passed. 10 MR TROWER: That begs the question as to how else it is 11 going to be dealt with. 12 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Okay. 13 MR TROWER: So far as the continuation of the obligation is 14 concerned, i.e. the lacuna point, we simply say that the 15 effect of Rule 2.88(7) is limited to those creditors who 16 have actually lodged a proof in the administration. 17 Rule 2.88(7) applies to such creditors and 18 section 189(2) applies to those creditors who actually 19 prove during the winding up, if they didn't prove in the 20 administration. 21 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Or to the same creditors who had any 22 extra proof in the winding up? 23 MR TROWER: Yes, that would be the case too because it 24 relates to the proof not the creditor. 25 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: By that you mean proofs actually</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 45</p>	<p>1 premise that a creditor must actually have proved in 2 a preceding administration in order that the entitlement 3 is engaged under 2.88(7), which then imposes the 4 liability on LBIE to pay statutory interest during the 5 period -- which accrued during the period of the 6 administration. It's as simple as that. 7 So we respectfully submit that that is the short 8 answer on the lacuna point. There isn't actually 9 a lacuna there. Everything that infected the judge's 10 reasoning flowed from the idea that 2.88(7) had 11 a limited life, that everything within 2.88(7) is 12 capable of continuing through notwithstanding the 13 liquidation. 14 My Lords, that was the lacuna point. 15 The next stage in the argument, and I think 16 I logically need to take it this way round, is if we're 17 wrong on that there's a provable debt. I think it 18 logically has to come before non-provable debt and if 19 I could just explain how the argument works. 20 We dealt with it, anyway in outline, just before we 21 rose for the short mid-morning break, but it requires 22 one to start with 13.12: 23 "Debt in relation to the winding up of the company 24 means (a) any debt or liability to which the company is 25 subject on the date on which it goes into liquidation."</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 47</p>
<p>1 rather than deemed made? 2 MR TROWER: Yes. So if a creditor proves during the 3 administration, his right to interest during the period 4 of administration arises under 2.88(7) and is not lost 5 upon the conversion of the administration to 6 a winding-up, which was the points I was making to my 7 Lords before I stopped on this argument yesterday. 8 Whereas if a creditor doesn't prove until the subsequent 9 winding-up, then he doesn't accrue a right to interest 10 under 2.88(7). The right of the creditor proving in the 11 administration continues to fix to the surplus, even 12 though it's moved into the hands of the liquidator. 13 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Like a sort of Quistclose trust. It's 14 a taxable fund? 15 MR TROWER: Sort of, yes, but there's a statutory scheme 16 overall here and the scheme provides for the surplus to 17 be used for a purpose. So, yes, purpose in a Quistclose 18 sense. 19 The principal argument against us, as we understand 20 it, is that it is based on the premise that in some way 21 2.88(7) can't have a life after the conclusion of the 22 administration and that in a subsequent winding-up there 23 will be two separate and distinct rules for the regimes 24 for the payment of interest. But, with respect, is not 25 an objection because the argument is simply based on the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 46</p>	<p>1 We would simply say it is a debt to which the 2 company was subject at the time at which it went into 3 liquidation. 4 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Or if it's not a debt at least 5 a liability. 6 MR TROWER: A liability. We then go to -- 7 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: "It", you mean the statutory interest? 8 MR TROWER: Yes. Yes, I need to develop that. What we mean 9 by the liability is either the underlying contractual 10 entitlement, which does not disappear merely by reason 11 of the existence of the administration code, or the 12 liability to pay which arises under Rule 2.88(7). 13 I think I probably need to put those and/or the 14 other way round. It's the statutory one that comes 15 first. For the sort of reasons that I was submitting to 16 your Lordships in relation to 2.88(7) liability 17 yesterday, there isn't a problem with that. It's 18 a liability of the company's. 19 The question which then arises is -- 20 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: The consequences will be very 21 different because not least under the statutory 22 obligation, if it is one, you get at least Judgments Act 23 rate which in the current market is a pretty high rate. 24 MR TROWER: Yes. 25 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: And if you didn't stipulate for</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 48</p>

<p>1 interest, you still get it.</p> <p>2 MR TROWER: Yes. That's right.</p> <p>3 Quite a lot of creditors do actually assert claims</p> <p>4 for rates which are above the statutory interest rate,</p> <p>5 based on derivatives contracts.</p> <p>6 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Right.</p> <p>7 MR TROWER: We then go to 4.93 to see whether that takes it</p> <p>8 out of what would otherwise be the provability under</p> <p>9 13.12(1)(a). (Pause).</p> <p>10 We would say it does not because we're not here</p> <p>11 talking about interest borne on a debt proved in the</p> <p>12 liquidation, we're talking about a debt in its own</p> <p>13 right. Because on this hypothesis -- well, what we're</p> <p>14 talking about --</p> <p>15 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: I don't understand what you mean by</p> <p>16 "a debt in its own right".</p> <p>17 MR TROWER: Perhaps I should have set the scene a little</p> <p>18 more clearly in relation to this. This presupposes</p> <p>19 that -- which is in fact the position -- that 100p in</p> <p>20 the pound has been paid on the proved debts, which is</p> <p>21 the situation.</p> <p>22 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Oh, I see, so there is no longer duty</p> <p>23 to prove in the liquidation.</p> <p>24 MR TROWER: In the liquidation. This is a debt in its own</p> <p>25 right. (Pause).</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 49</p>	<p>1 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: On the hindsight principle, it means</p> <p>2 there's nothing to prove in the liquidation.</p> <p>3 MR TROWER: There's nothing left to prove. So 4.73(8) is of</p> <p>4 nothing, as is 4.93 as of nothing, on this point.</p> <p>5 (Pause).</p> <p>6 So, my Lords, that's the analysis in relation to why</p> <p>7 it is provable debt. We then move on to the question</p> <p>8 of, well, if we're wrong on that, why might it be</p> <p>9 a non-provable debt?</p> <p>10 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Which is the rule that provides for</p> <p>11 the statutory interest in the liquidation?</p> <p>12 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Section 189.</p> <p>13 MR TROWER: 189.</p> <p>14 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Section 189, yes.</p> <p>15 MR TROWER: In section 189.</p> <p>16 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes. Can we just look at that first?</p> <p>17 I think you're going to say that that's not a problem</p> <p>18 because the debt you're now contending for is part of</p> <p>19 that which must be paid before there's any relevant</p> <p>20 surplus.</p> <p>21 MR TROWER: Indeed. So you simply have to prove it in the</p> <p>22 liquidation.</p> <p>23 So what the creditors concerned will be doing is</p> <p>24 they will be lodging a fresh proof in the liquidation in</p> <p>25 respect of this new debt.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 51</p>
<p>1 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Even though it's deemed to be also</p> <p>2 proved in the liquidation?</p> <p>3 MR TROWER: That's what I will just come on to next. That</p> <p>4 is 4.73(8) and we need to see what the impact of that</p> <p>5 is.</p> <p>6 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: 4.73?</p> <p>7 MR TROWER: Yes, sub-rule eight, page 783.</p> <p>8 What that does is give protection to the creditors,</p> <p>9 is the way we characterise this, to ensure that they</p> <p>10 don't have to prove again. It doesn't mean that for all</p> <p>11 purposes, including in particular this purpose, you have</p> <p>12 to treat a creditor who has proved in the administration</p> <p>13 as having had its debt proved in the liquidation,</p> <p>14 particularly where that debt has been paid 100p in the</p> <p>15 pound before the company goes into liquidation.</p> <p>16 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Wouldn't Wight v Eckhardt Marine, as</p> <p>17 it were, come to rescue? There isn't a debt any more.</p> <p>18 MR TROWER: That may well be right. That's another way of</p> <p>19 analysing it, yes.</p> <p>20 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: The factual predicate for all this is</p> <p>21 that the debts have been paid 100p in the pound.</p> <p>22 MR TROWER: Indeed.</p> <p>23 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: So the debt has been discharged,</p> <p>24 there isn't one anymore.</p> <p>25 MR TROWER: Yes, I think that must be right.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 50</p>	<p>1 If we're wrong on that, we go to this claim being</p> <p>2 a non-provable debt. There is the Wight v Eckhardt</p> <p>3 Marine analysis that my Lords have already seen. So far</p> <p>4 as the non-provable liability is concerned, the effect</p> <p>5 of the winding up when the liquidation intervenes is</p> <p>6 that the underlying debt is then left untouched by the</p> <p>7 statutory code, to the extent that it is not</p> <p>8 vindicated -- vindicated, discharged or otherwise dealt</p> <p>9 with under the statutory code -- it survives. It</p> <p>10 survives as a liability which doesn't get discharged in</p> <p>11 the course of the distribution of dividends to creditors</p> <p>12 or the application of the surplus under section 189,</p> <p>13 because we're now dealing with the liquidation --</p> <p>14 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: You're talking now about contractual</p> <p>15 interest only?</p> <p>16 MR TROWER: I think it has to be, because we're in</p> <p>17 a situation here where there has been -- we're assuming</p> <p>18 that the lacuna argument doesn't work, we're assuming</p> <p>19 that it is not a provable debt. So we can only be in</p> <p>20 the realm of contractual liability. I think that must</p> <p>21 be right.</p> <p>22 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: That's the judge's solution?</p> <p>23 MR TROWER: And that's the judge's solution, yes. (Pause).</p> <p>24 I am conscious of the time, so I don't want to spend</p> <p>25 a lot of time on this. The judge's analysis in relation</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 52</p>

1 to that is something that we respectfully adopt. It
 2 does take you right back to the Humber Ironworks type of
 3 characterisation of a non-provable claim because it was
 4 remission to contractual rights, where the scheme didn't
 5 affect the contractual rights, which underpinned the
 6 concept in Humber Ironworks of discharging people's
 7 contractual entitlement to interest out of the surplus.
 8 That was the juridical basis of Humber Ironworks.
 9 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: You say there's no conversion issue in
 10 relation to interest?
 11 MR TROWER: No.
 12 This argument is predicated, obviously, on the
 13 assumption the lacuna is there. So one has a situation
 14 where the scheme just simply does not address people's
 15 rights to interest during the period of the
 16 administration where the company goes into liquidation.
 17 (Pause).
 18 One of the ways --
 19 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Your provable debt argument assumes
 20 that there is a conversion, does it not?
 21 MR TROWER: A conversion --
 22 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: That is to say, your right to
 23 interest is derived now from the statutory code --
 24 MR TROWER: Yes.
 25 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: -- and not from anything else?

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1 MR TROWER: Yes, it does, in respect of the statutory
 2 element of the proof. (Pause).
 3 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: I am not sure you have to get into the
 4 issue about whether it's a conversion, do you? You
 5 either have the statutory right or you have not.
 6 MR TROWER: Or you have not, yes.
 7 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: If you do not have it, you say you
 8 revert to your contractual right. If you do have it,
 9 you just use it.
 10 MR TROWER: Yes. Will your Lordships just give me a moment?
 11 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes.
 12 MR TROWER: Of course one accepts that can't have double
 13 recovery -- you either have the statutory right or the
 14 contractual right.
 15 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: No, of course, no double proving.
 16 MR TROWER: You will inevitably be looking at Lines Bros in
 17 relation to currency conversion claims, but the concept
 18 that one gets in relation to the non-provable claim is
 19 whether or not the statutory scheme compels the
 20 conclusion that the existing contractual right has been
 21 replaced. That's what you have to ask yourself.
 22 If the totality of the scheme or the particular
 23 provision you're looking at on its true construction
 24 replaces the contractual right, well, then obviously the
 25 contractual rights disappear.

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1 But if doesn't on its true construction and it's not
 2 vindicated at all, it's not either discharged or
 3 replaced, it's a question of construction of the scheme,
 4 well, it survives. One accepts that, we accept that for
 5 this purpose.
 6 There may be wider arguments that will be addressed
 7 in relation to currency conversion, but on this point
 8 all we say is the statutory scheme just does not engage,
 9 on this hypothesis, with the position in relation to
 10 interest during that period.
 11 The only other point -- and I can deal with this
 12 very quickly, because I don't think any submissions have
 13 been made upon it. I just need to deal quickly with
 14 a submission in relation to the supposed consequences of
 15 the judge's conclusion in relation to bankruptcy. Your
 16 Lordships haven't heard anything about this, but I just
 17 need to briefly explain what the position is in
 18 bankruptcy because a point is made on the back of. And
 19 we haven't looked that yet.
 20 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Is this covered in your skeleton?
 21 MR TROWER: Is it? No, I'm afraid it's not. Submissions
 22 were made on it in the other side's skeleton. I am very
 23 happy to deal with it in writing, actually, given we're
 24 quite short on time because the points can be made very
 25 shortly.

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1 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: I think if they can be made
 2 shortly orally that would be the best of both worlds.
 3 MR TROWER: Let me do that it way, then, my Lord. If we
 4 just pick up the Red Book and go to section -- the
 5 argument was that if you had a liability of this sort,
 6 if you applied the same principles in a bankruptcy it
 7 would survive the bankruptcy and therefore the bankrupt
 8 would not get his discharge.
 9 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: And he would be made bankrupt al
 10 over again.
 11 MR TROWER: That's the argument. We suggest respectfully
 12 that's not right. If you go to section 382, which is
 13 page 211, that contains the definition of "bankruptcy
 14 debts". My Lords will immediately see a similarity with
 15 the way 13.12 is drafted.
 16 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes. (Pause).
 17 MR TROWER: Would my Lords also note, just in passing, that
 18 there's a wider definition in the legislation in
 19 relation to claims in tort still retained in bankruptcy
 20 that has been cut down by the amendments to Rule 13.12
 21 in relation to liquidation. That's 38.2(2).
 22 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes.
 23 MR TROWER: We say that a contractual liability for interest
 24 is therefore a bankruptcy debt and prima facie provable
 25 as such.

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<p>1 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: That's 38.2(1)(d), is it? 2 MR TROWER: 38 -- 3 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: That's the statutory interest -- 4 MR TROWER: And the contractual interest. We're talking 5 about the non-provable claim here. The argument that is 6 put against us is that there will be a problem in 7 bankruptcy if you allow a non-provable claim because the 8 non-provable claim will not be discharged by the 9 bankruptcy. 10 But also a bankruptcy debt and therefore prima facie 11 provable, post-insolvency interest is taken out of the 12 provability regime by section 322(2) of the 13 Insolvency Act. 14 We then need to go to the discharge provisions, 15 which are in section 281. The effect of the discharge 16 provisions in 281 is that -- 281(1) which is on 17 page 158: 18 "Subject as follows, where a bankrupt is discharged 19 the discharge releases him from all the bankruptcy debts 20 but has no effect on the functions so far as they remain 21 to be carried out of the trustee of his estate on the 22 operation for the purposes of carrying out of those 23 functions for the provisions of this part." 24 So you're discharged from bankruptcy debts whether 25 or not they're provable, because what you get your Page 57</p>	<p>1 may have to be discharged out of the surplus is interest 2 and non-provable claims. 3 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Because you say in that section the 4 reference to "with interest" doesn't just mean provable 5 interest? 6 MR TROWER: No. Yes. 7 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: You have to make that good. 8 MR TROWER: And liabilities because the -- hang on, sorry, 9 I should have gone back to that. 330. (Pause). 10 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: "Payment in full and with interest of 11 all ..." 12 MR TROWER: "All the bankrupt's creditors and the payment of 13 the expenses ..." 14 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: So it is not talking, you say, about 15 bankruptcy debts? 16 MR TROWER: It is not talking about bankruptcy debts there, 17 it is talking about anybody who has a claim against the 18 bankrupt. 19 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes. 20 MR TROWER: So, in other words, people have a claim on the 21 surplus which can still be administered by the trustee 22 whether or not their claim arises out of a bankruptcy 23 debt. The bankruptcy debt provisions are what lead to 24 the discharge. So anything that constitutes 25 a bankruptcy debt will be discharged. Page 59</p>
<p>1 discharge from is the bankruptcy debt. The whether or 2 not you're provable is because the non-provable element 3 is taken out of what would otherwise be a bankruptcy 4 debt. But the discharge, of course, doesn't and the way 5 it works is a discharge does not have any effect on the 6 trustee's functions. One of the trustee's functions is 7 to deal with the surplus under section 330(5). 8 (Pause). 9 "If a surplus remains after payment in full and with 10 interest of all the bankrupt's creditors and the payment 11 of the expenses of the bankruptcy the bankrupt is 12 entitled to the surplus." 13 So if there is a surplus it can only be returned to 14 the debtor after payment in full and with interest of 15 all the bankrupt's creditors and of the expenses of the 16 bankruptcy. 17 So our position is that post-insolvency interest and 18 any other non-provable claims must therefore be 19 satisfied in order for there to have been payment in 20 full, which must mean payment of all liabilities. The 21 net effect of this is that the bankrupt gets his 22 discharge in respect of the bankruptcy debts. If 23 there's a surplus in the hands of the trustee, that's 24 still administered, notwithstanding the discharge in 25 respect of the bankruptcy debts. One of the things that Page 58</p>	<p>1 So, my Lords, unless I can help any further, 2 those -- and I am sorry they will a little bit speedy, 3 those last submissions. 4 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: That's all right. Thank you very 5 much indeed, Mr Trower. 6 Yes, Mr Dicker. 7 Submissions by MR DICKER 8 MR DICKER: My Lords, as your Lordships know my submissions 9 are concerned solely with currency conversion claims. 10 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Yes. 11 MR DICKER: The learned judge's conclusion on this, 12 paragraph 110 of his judgment, was that it would be 13 contrary to principle and justice that the debtor or the 14 shareholders receiving the surplus should be able to 15 deny the foreign currency claimants their full 16 contractual rights. We say he was correct. 17 A creditor whose claim is denominated in a foreign 18 currency has bargained for that currency and only that 19 currency and he's entitled to receive no less than he 20 bargained for. Shareholders can be in no better 21 position than the debtor. Put another way, members come 22 last. 23 It would be contrary to principle for the assets of 24 a company to be distributed to shareholders if these 25 would leave creditors with an existing debt not paid in Page 60</p>

<p>1 full and which would result in distributions going to 2 shareholders with the consequence that it would never be 3 paid in full.</p> <p>4 We say that your Lordships will see there is nothing 5 in the statutory insolvency process, properly 6 understood, that produces a result contrary to those 7 principles, neither before 1986 or after 1986.</p> <p>8 We also say there's nothing remotely unjust or 9 unreasonable in this. It was LBIE which resolved to go 10 into administration and to bring the statutory process 11 into existence. The immediate consequence of that was 12 to introduce a regime which required LBIE's assets to be 13 distributed pari passu amongst its creditors in respect 14 of their proved debts. One part of that was to require 15 foreign currency claims to be converted into sterling 16 for the purposes of proof, in other words, to ensure 17 pari passu distribution. The scheme also required 18 dividends to be paid in sterling.</p> <p>19 One possibility, of course, is that sterling might 20 have appreciated during this period. If that happened, 21 the consequence would be that LBIE would end up paying 22 more than it would otherwise have paid to creditors had 23 it not gone into administration.</p> <p>24 Now, that's plainly not something which LBIE or its 25 shareholders can complain about. That's simply a price</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 61</p>	<p>1 that the real source of the complaint is not the 2 creditor coming along and asking to be paid in full, 3 it's the fact that the statutory process which LBIE has 4 invoked required, to ensure pari passu distribution, the 5 conversion of currency claims into sterling for the 6 purposes of proof. That, one might say, is the source 7 of the problem. That's not something which LBIE or its 8 shareholders are entitled to complain about. As I said, 9 that's simply the price of the statutory process it has 10 invoked.</p> <p>11 My learned friends say, well, that can't be right 12 because that would give rise to a one-way bet, 13 a situation permanently to the advantage of the foreign 14 currency claimant and to the disadvantage of the 15 company. My Lords, ignoring the obvious point, this is 16 not a bet which the foreign currency creditor ever 17 agreed to enter into.</p> <p>18 One needs to look at this argument in the wider 19 context. You only get to the so-called one-way bet 20 after all creditors have been paid 100p in the pound, 21 plus statutory interest.</p> <p>22 One needs to bear in mind that, so far as LBIE is 23 concerned, for the first four years, I think, of its 24 administration no one anticipated that there would be 25 a surplus. Everyone was proceeding on the basis that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 63</p>
<p>1 of the statutory scheme which it has invoked. It's no 2 different in principle from various other consequences 3 of going into liquidation or a distributing 4 administration; for example, the obligation to pay 5 interest on debts which otherwise don't carry interest 6 or to pay interest at the Judgments Act rate.</p> <p>7 That's the first stage of the process, pari passu 8 distribution.</p> <p>9 What if there turns out to be a surplus and sterling 10 has depreciated? Why in that situation is it unjust or 11 unreasonable for a creditor, who has not been paid in 12 full, to say, "Please pay me the rest that I am owed and 13 pay that before distributing any assets to 14 shareholders"? It's now plain that the premise on which 15 we've been working for the last four years was 16 incorrect. This company is in fact solvent. "You are 17 able to pay me what you owe, please do so."</p> <p>18 My learned friends submissions I think give the 19 impression that the problem is essentially being caused 20 by the creditor who comes along seeking to assert his 21 non-provable claim. We do question that 22 characterisation. All the creditor is doing is saying, 23 "I haven't been paid in full and I should before any 24 assets are returned to shareholders". There's another 25 way of looking at this, we respectfully submit, which is</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 62</p>	<p>1 the administrators' reports indicated that there was 2 likely to be a substantial deficiency.</p> <p>3 In that situation, if sterling had depreciated, the 4 consequence was that foreign currency creditors would 5 suffer disproportionately compared to other creditors. 6 Your Lordships may have noted that in Lines Bros, 7 whereas the sterling creditors received 100p in the 8 pound on their sterling claims, the net position was 9 that the bank, with its Swiss franc claim, only ended up 10 receiving some 58p in the pound.</p> <p>11 If one takes into account that, in other words for 12 so long as and to the extent that LBIE was insolvent, 13 there was no possible one-way bet. Everyone was going 14 to suffer a loss. The only question was how big the 15 loss would be. As I said, if sterling depreciated, that 16 loss was going to be even bigger for the foreign 17 currency claimants.</p> <p>18 We say it would effectively be adding insult to 19 injury if, when it came to the position of a surplus, 20 foreign currency creditors couldn't even at that stage 21 say, "I have suffered. I haven't received the same 22 percentage as every other creditor has received in the 23 liquidation", if the position was they couldn't even 24 receive the balance at that stage when the money was 25 paid to shareholders.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 64</p>

<p>1 One could hypothesise in perhaps slightly extreme 2 circumstances in which the result, we say, would be 3 truly extraordinary. Imagine an English company 4 solvent, but who's only liabilities are in US dollars. 5 The directors of the company decide they're not 6 comfortable with the exchange rate risk that they face. 7 They put the company into a members' voluntary 8 liquidation. At that stage foreign currency claims are 9 converted into sterling and in the course of the next 10 year, or however long it takes, those foreign currency 11 claimants receive sterling payments. The directors' 12 concern proves to be real. Sterling does depreciate and 13 the consequence is that the company manages effectively 14 to avoid the foreign currency risk which it agreed to 15 accept, to impose it instead on the foreign currency 16 claimants, and for the shareholders to receive 17 a surplus, distributions, which they would never have 18 received had the company not gone into a members' 19 voluntary liquidation. We do respectfully say that 20 cannot possibly be the right result. 21 With those preliminary remarks, I want now to 22 develop our submissions. I was proposing to do so in 23 four parts. 24 First of all, I wanted to say a few words about the 25 position as between creditor and debtor outside of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 65</p>	<p>1 Lordships' attention to the relevance in the context of 2 this. 3 The other thing I was proposing to do is -- one 4 point just concerning the hearing that's recently taken 5 place in front of David Richards J in Waterfall II. 6 A number of the topics on which submissions are being 7 addressed to your Lordships were the subject of further 8 submissions in front of the learned judge as part of 9 Waterfall II. Now obviously your Lordships need to 10 decide the issues on the appeal in the light of the 11 submissions that are made. What I was, however, 12 proposing to do is just point out to your Lordships from 13 time to time particular areas which were the subject of 14 further submissions, just so your Lordships know that 15 those, as it were, are live as part of Waterfall II. 16 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Is this just for our understanding 17 or is there some implication attached to that? 18 MR DICKER: My Lord, no. There are differences, for 19 example, in the position of various of the parties on 20 some of the underlying points. I think we would simply 21 be concerned if your Lordships were to, as it were, to 22 say something in the judgment, not intending, as it 23 were, to finally determine that issue which the learned 24 judge below spent two weeks hearing if it wasn't 25 necessary as part of this appeal.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 67</p>
<p>1 an insolvency. Just to pick up a point my learned 2 friend made. His contention was that in the context of 3 ordinary execution, there's nothing exceptional or 4 surprising in there being currency conversion losses 5 which are not compensated for. That's the first topic. 6 The second, I want to deal with the effects of the 7 statutory regime both in relation to insolvent and 8 solvent companies and in that context to explain how 9 non-provable claims, including foreign currency claims, 10 currency conversion losses, are dealt with. 11 Thirdly, I want to deal with the rules relating to 12 contingent and future debts and set-off; and essentially 13 my learned friends' argument that those have substantive 14 effect and therefore Rule 2.86, 4.93 in relation to 15 currency conversion claims, also has substantive effect. 16 Fourthly, to deal with my learned friend's argument 17 that it would be unfair if creditors with foreign 18 currency claims were entitled to have their claims paid 19 in full, the one-way bet argument. 20 I am conscious my learned friend Mr Trower dealt 21 with some of the areas which I need to cover and I will 22 certainly try and avoid unnecessary duplication. But 23 your Lordships will bear in mind, I am sure, that he was 24 deploying the authorities and the points in the context 25 of different arguments and I obviously need to draw your</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 66</p>	<p>1 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: All right. 2 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: So line 1 of the judgment says, "This 3 is not a statute". 4 MR DICKER: My Lord, can I start with the position as 5 between creditor and debtor outside of an insolvency; in 6 other words, with the effect of the House of Lords 7 judgment in Miliangos. 8 I emphasise four points made by their Lordships. 9 The first is, as your Lordships know, and as 10 Lord Wilberforce said, the creditors' contract has 11 nothing to do with sterling. He bargained for foreign 12 currency and that is what he is entitled to, he has no 13 concern with sterling. 14 He also said that justice therefore demands that the 15 creditor should not suffer from fluctuations in the 16 value of sterling and it must be wrong in principle to 17 allow procedure to affect detrimentally the substance of 18 the creditors' rights. 19 The third point, however, is this. The creditor is 20 therefore entitled to a judgment in the foreign currency 21 sum or the sterling equivalent at the date of payment. 22 Your Lordships can see that most clearly from 23 Lord Edmund-Davies' speech. If your Lordships just -- 24 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: This isn't really controversial, 25 is it?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 68</p>

<p>1 MR DICKER: No, it's not. 2 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: This has been, dare one say, old 3 hat for quite a long time. 4 MR DICKER: And reflected in the practice direction, a copy 5 of which your Lordships have in the bundles. My Lord, 6 I won't take your Lordship to that. 7 The fourth point is there is then a separate 8 question of practicality. 9 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Yes. 10 MR DICKER: What happens if the debtor does not pay and the 11 creditor has to take steps to enforce payment? 12 If the judgment has to be enforced in this country, 13 practicalities require it to be converted prior to 14 enforcement and this should occur on the last practical 15 date. The House of Lords suggested that in the case of 16 a writ of fi. fa. This should be done by converting the 17 relevant sum when the court authorised enforcement, 18 namely the date of the affidavit leading to execution. 19 My Lords, that is simply a matter of practicalities. 20 It doesn't affect the judgment to which the creditor is 21 entitled. 22 The argument that is then made by the other side is 23 that you should not assume that there can't be 24 uncompensated currency conversion losses as a result of 25 the process of enforcement because there may be currency</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 69</p>	<p>1 What happened was that the claimant obtained 2 judgment against the defendant for some US\$1.4 million 3 which the defendant failed to pay. The master made 4 a charging order expressed in US dollars, and the 5 question was whether he had jurisdiction to do so and 6 the Court of Appeal held that he did. 7 Your Lordship will see from the judgment of 8 Carnwath LJ, paragraph 12, his comment in the second 9 sentence that: 10 "The common principle underlying all the speeches 11 [that is in Miliangos] is that the conversion should be 12 made as close as practical to the date of payment having 13 regard to the realities of enforcement procedures." 14 Then he deals with the various practice directions 15 at paragraphs 15 to 22 and concludes, at the top of 16 page 2517, halfway through paragraph 22: 17 "The House of Lords was not laying down binding 18 rules applicable regardless of the enforcement 19 procedure. It was stating a general principle, the 20 detail of which would have to be worked out in 21 procedural rules." 22 In 31, line 3, the conclusion: 23 "For present purposes it is enough in my view to 24 hold the master clearly had jurisdiction to make 25 a charging order in the form he did."</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 71</p>
<p>1 movements between the date of the affidavit and the date 2 of the payment. 3 My Lords, ignoring the point in that most cases this 4 is unlikely to be a practical problem given the short 5 period involved, we say that's wrong. It's wrong simply 6 because, if one goes back to the judgment to which the 7 creditor is entitled, the judgment is a judgment for the 8 foreign currency sum or the sterling equivalent at the 9 date of payment. If, when the sum is finally paid to 10 the creditor in sterling, it is not sufficient to 11 discharge the judgment sum, then that judgment has not 12 been satisfied. In principle, though no doubt in 13 practice it will be extremely rare, one suspects, for 14 this to occur, a further writ of execution could be 15 issued. 16 My Lords, nothing at all surprising at that. 17 Entirely consistent, we say, with the approach of the 18 House of Lords in Miliangos, who were keen to ensure, so 19 far as practical, the creditor got precisely what he had 20 bargained for. 21 We have included two authorities in the bundles just 22 to illustrate this. Can I just draw your Lordships' 23 attention to both of them. The first is a case called 24 Carnegie v Giessen. It's in bundle 5 and it's tab 11. 25 (Pause).</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 70</p>	<p>1 Ultimately, where it is practicable, one can in fact 2 issue an order for execution in the relevant foreign 3 currency. 4 The second case is tab 10, if your Lordships go back 5 one tab, again a decision of the Court of Appeal in 6 a case called Choice Investments. 7 This case is essentially the reverse of the issue 8 we've just been discussing. What happened here was that 9 the currency markets moved in favour of the creditor 10 after execution had commenced. The Court of Appeal held 11 he only was entitled to receive the amount necessary to 12 discharge the amount in respect of which he had obtained 13 his judgment. 14 In practice, what happened was this, that judgment 15 was in sterling, the creditor sought to garnishee a debt 16 owed by the debtor's bank which was in US dollars. He 17 got an order nisi. Between the date of the order nisi 18 and the order absolute sterling depreciated. So the 19 amount of US dollars blocked was now greater than the 20 amount of the sterling judgment. The Court of Appeal 21 held the bank must release the balance and provide it to 22 the debtor. 23 Your Lordships will see at page 156, from the 24 judgment of the Master of the Rolls, between letters G 25 and H, the comment, just above G:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 72</p>

<p>1 "But, if and when the garnishee order is made 2 absolute, the bank should exchange that stopped amount 3 from dollars into sterling so far as is necessary to 4 meet the sterling judgment debt and pay over that amount 5 to the judgment creditor. But if insofar as the stopped 6 amount, owing to exchange fluctuations, is more than 7 enough to meet the judgment debt, the bank must release 8 the balance from the stop and have it available for its 9 customer on demand." 10 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: These cases are simply 11 illustrations of the general principle of the 12 distinction between the money of account and the money 13 of payment, aren't they? This was a sterling judgment 14 which the judgment creditor could satisfy by execution 15 on non-sterling assets and he could only execute as to 16 the extent necessary to meet his sterling debt. 17 MR DICKER: Your Lordship is absolute rightly in relation to 18 this. We say, similarly, if it were the other way round 19 and the judgment was in a foreign currency and the order 20 nisi effectively blocked funds in a US dollars account 21 and the same thing happened, again what would be 22 required was sufficient to pay off the judgment amount 23 only and, if the sterling had appreciated in the 24 meantime, no more than that. 25 So we say when one comes to the process of Page 73</p>	<p>1 wonder if it was established. 2 MR DICKER: We say in principle it's simply another reason 3 why the process of execution has resulted in less than 4 is required to discharge the judgment debt. It doesn't 5 matter what the reason is. If there's a shortfall, that 6 process of execution has not sufficed, one is entitled 7 to try again. 8 That's all I was going to say in relation to that. 9 So turning to the second part of my submissions, 10 which concern the effect of insolvency proceedings in 11 relation to insolvent and solvent companies. 12 We say it's important to consider the treatment of 13 non-provable claims, including foreign currency claims, 14 in the context of the operation of the statutory scheme 15 as a whole. 16 My learned friend Mr Trower made the point that the 17 essence of a liquidation at its most basic is that the 18 liquidator is to secure the assets of the company are 19 got in, realised and distributed to the company's 20 creditors or, if there is a surplus, to the persons 21 entitled to it. The schedule is section 143 and 22 section 107. 23 Your Lordships know similar provisions have existed 24 in similar terms right back to the origins of corporate 25 insolvency and bankruptcy, going as far back I think as Page 75</p>
<p>1 enforcement, one starts with the fact that one is 2 entitled to judgment in the foreign currency or the 3 equivalent at the date of payment, and the court will do 4 whatever it can to ensure that this is in fact what 5 happens. There isn't, as it were, a bargain struck to 6 which both parties then effectively take the risk. It's 7 worked out as and when necessary to ensure that, as 8 I say, the creditor gets what he's entitled to get. 9 My Lords, it's a small point but I just wanted to 10 answer the submission made by my learned friends that 11 your Lordships shouldn't be surprised if there are 12 uncompensated for currency conversion losses in the 13 context of an enforcement process, because that's 14 something which may happen in the context of ordinary 15 enforcement. 16 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Is there any case that actually shows 17 a sort of double execution where you convert under the 18 practice direction for your first execution to sterling, 19 sterling then depreciates before payment? You say in 20 principle you should be able to go and have another bite 21 of the cherry. 22 MR DICKER: My Lord, yes. 23 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Is there any illustration of that? 24 MR DICKER: We weren't able to find one. 25 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: I understand what you say, but I just Page 74</p>	<p>1 1542. 2 The first part of the regime concerns the analysis 3 which applies if the company is insolvent. The first 4 point is it's described, as your Lordships know, as 5 a process of collective enforcement in respect of proved 6 debts. We say that reflects the fact, as with any 7 ordinary enforcement, the scheme is that the creditors' 8 underlying claims are discharged only to the extent they 9 are actually paid or one needs to add, for reasons 10 I will explain, or treated as having been paid. This 11 has been consistently confirmed by authorities at the 12 highest level. 13 My learned friend Mr Snowden showed you 14 Lord Hoffmann's speech in Wight v Eckhardt. Can I just 15 remind your Lordships of the terms of the relevant 16 paragraphs. It is in bundle 1C, tab 75. My Lords, it 17 is paragraph 26 and 27. (Pause). 18 My learned friend's submission was that all 19 Lord Hoffmann was doing in Wight v Eckhardt was saying 20 the winding-up order does not on its own convert any 21 claims, have any effect on claims. But in our 22 submission Lord Hoffmann, in paragraph 27, is going 23 further than that. He is describing the scheme as 24 a whole. He says in 27: 25 "The winding-up leaves the debts of the creditors Page 76</p>

<p>1 untouched. It only affects the way in which they can be 2 enforced. When the order is made, ordinary proceedings 3 against the company are stayed ... the creditors are 4 confined to a collective enforcement procedure that 5 results in pari passu distribution of the company's 6 assets. The winding-up does not either create new 7 substantive rights in the creditors or destroy the old 8 ones. Their debts, if they're owing, remain debts 9 throughout. They are discharged by the winding up only 10 to the extent that they are paid out of dividends. But 11 when the process of distribution is complete, there are 12 no further assets against which they can be enforced. 13 When the company is dissolved, there is no longer 14 an entity which the creditor can sue. But even then, 15 discovery of an asset can result in a company being 16 restored for the process to continue." 17 So what we say he is doing is providing a general 18 description of the regime as a whole and it is 19 a description which is consistent with the regime which 20 has existed, as I say, since the origins of corporate 21 insolvency and bankruptcy. 22 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: But it's not a comprehensive 23 description. 24 MR DICKER: No, and there is one aspect which is obviously 25 critical for the purposes of this case which I need to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 77</p>	<p>1 MR DICKER: One needs to, before drilling down to that level 2 of detail, be clear as to what the process of collective 3 execution in respect of proved debts is, how that 4 analysis applies and the extent to which it applies, 5 what then happens if there is a surplus, what's the 6 analysis in relation to that, and see how the specific 7 rules operate in that context. 8 One parallel I am going to refer your Lordships to, 9 which we say is a very helpful parallel, is between the 10 approach which the statute now takes and the cases 11 previously took in relation to post-insolvency interest, 12 on the one hand, and currency conversion claims, on the 13 other, because we say there is a close relationship 14 between them, both in substance and as a matter of how 15 they have been analysed in the authorities. 16 My Lords, I won't weary your Lordships with taking 17 you to other recitations of Lord Hoffmann's comments in 18 Wight v Eckhardt. There are three further examples in 19 the bundles, including two further Privy Council cases, 20 Cambridge Gas and Parmalat. 21 Again, just taking the analysis further, how does 22 this collective process of enforcement work? Again, as 23 my learned friend says, the basic requirement is that 24 the debtors' assets are distributed pari passu amongst 25 the creditors in respect of their proved debts. I'm not</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 79</p>
<p>1 come back to. That is Lord Hoffmann's comment that: 2 "They are discharged by the winding up only to the 3 extent that they are paid out of dividends." 4 There's obviously an issue as to what constitutes 5 payment and in what circumstance the statutory scheme 6 treats one as having been paid. 7 My Lords, that part of the issue I was going to deal 8 with when I come on to dealing with the rules relating 9 to contingent and future debts and set-off and obviously 10 also the purpose of the rule relating to the conversion 11 of foreign currency claims for the purposes of proof. 12 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: All right. 13 MR DICKER: What I am trying to do at the moment is, as it 14 were, set the scene before one gets to that stage of the 15 argument. 16 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Right. That's the critical point, 17 isn't it? 18 MR DICKER: Yes. 19 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: One can accept what Lord Hoffmann 20 says as a generality but then there are exceptions, of 21 which we know about many. The question is: is currency 22 conversion one of them? 23 MR DICKER: Absolutely. Your Lordship is absolutely right 24 and we say one needs to approach it in stages. 25 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 78</p>	<p>1 sure he mentioned, just so your Lordships have it, 2 pari passu treatment in a compulsory, as he observed, 3 isn't expressly dealt with in section 143, but it is 4 dealt in the rules. Just so your Lordships know, it is 5 Rule 4.181. 6 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: 4.1 -- 7 MR DICKER: 4.181, which provides that: 8 "Debts other than preferential debts rank equally 9 between themselves in the winding up, and after the 10 preferential debts, shall be paid in full unless the 11 assets are insufficient for meeting them, in which case 12 they abate in equal proportions between themselves." 13 (Pause). 14 This necessarily requires, again as your Lordships 15 know, the existence of a cut-off date. There has to be 16 a cut-off date to determine the class of creditors who 17 are entitled to participate in the distribution of the 18 company's available assets pari passu. Lord Neuberger 19 makes that point in Nortel at paragraph 35. In other 20 words, the debts have to exist as at the relevant date. 21 Conversely, any debts that don't exist at that relevant 22 date are not provable and are not entitled to 23 participate in the collective process. 24 The next stage we say it is obviously important to 25 appreciate what a non-provable claim is. All the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 80</p>

<p>1 creditor is doing is saying to the debtor, "You have 2 a debt or liability which has not been satisfied by the 3 process of collective enforcement. Please pay me." 4 It's not a claim for damages for loss caused by the 5 statutory scheme. The creditor is not saying that the 6 scheme has caused him loss, for which he has some 7 entitlement to compensation. Nor is it something that's 8 created for the first time by the statutory scheme or 9 a byproduct of the statutory scheme. It's simply 10 a claim which has not been paid in whole or in part as 11 part of the pari passu distribution of the assets. 12 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: But the foreign currency debt does 13 exist, on this assumption that the date of liquidation 14 or administration, and can be proved for, and the scheme 15 tells one how it is to be proved for, doesn't it -- 16 MR DICKER: And -- 17 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: -- and what its value is? 18 MR DICKER: For the purposes of proof. 19 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Yes. 20 MR DICKER: Again, the next stage of the argument, as your 21 Lordships will see, is how matters are dealt with for 22 the purposes of proof, but we say only for the purposes 23 of proof. 24 My Lords, my learned friend Mr Snowden sought to 25 suggest that non-provable claims are in some way strange</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 81</p>	<p>1 There are still non-provable claims. One obvious 2 example, following the decision of the Supreme Court in 3 Nortel, are statutory claims which don't satisfy 4 Lord Neuberger's requirements in paragraph 77 of his 5 speech. 6 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: And which don't create expenses? 7 MR DICKER: And which don't create expenses. 8 It may not necessarily be easy to determine the 9 dividing line between the two, as I think a discussion 10 between my Lords Lord Justice Moore-Bick and 11 Lord Justice Briggs yesterday illustrated. 12 There are two non-provable claims which are 13 obviously particularly important in this context. The 14 first is in relation to interest and the second, 15 obviously, foreign currency claims. Both, we say, are 16 non-provable for exactly the same reason. They are both 17 non-provable as a direct consequence of the need for 18 a cut-off date and the requirement that claims are 19 ascertained as at that date. 20 The consequence of that in relation to interest is 21 that you can prove for interest accrued prior to the 22 relevant date; you can't in respect of interest in the 23 period after that date. In relation to foreign currency 24 claims, you can prove only for your debt ascertained as 25 at the relevant date, i.e. the sterling equivalent on</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 83</p>
<p>1 and elusive things no draftsman would have contemplated. 2 We say that's not right. 3 It is obviously true that the category of proved and 4 provable claims has progressively been enlarged, and the 5 category of non-provable claims has been correspondingly 6 reduced. David Richards J summarised it in T&N and your 7 Lordships have been referred to that. 8 That's obviously not always been the case. It 9 wasn't until the mid-19th century that contingent 10 claims, for example, were admissible to proof. More 11 importantly, again as your Lordships know, the concept 12 of non-provable claims is still a very familiar one. In 13 the period leading up to the introduction of the 1986 14 Act, unliquidated claims for damages were not provable. 15 There were a series of cases -- two of which your 16 Lordships will see in due course -- in the period 17 leading up to 1986 which dealt precisely with those 18 claims, and they were only admitted to proof for the 19 first time in 1986. Again, as my learned friend 20 Mr Trower said, admitted to proof initially only if the 21 cause of action was complete at the relevant date. That 22 was then addressed by David Richards J in T&N and the 23 rules were subsequently amended to provide admissible to 24 proof provided the cause of action was complete, save 25 only for damage.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 82</p>	<p>1 the same date. 2 Both of those consequences were originally 3 judge-made law. The position in relation to 4 post-insolvency interest in fact originated in 5 a decision of Lord Hardwicke in a case called 6 Bromley v Goodere back in 1743. It was subsequently 7 codified in bankruptcy in 1824. Matters in relation to 8 corporate insolvency took a little longer to catch up. 9 It was determined as a matter of authority, as your 10 Lordships know, in Humber Ironworks and it was finally 11 codified by statute only in 1986. 12 In relation to foreign currency claims, the same 13 thing occurred. It was first established by authorities 14 by Oliver J in In re Dynamics, upheld by the Court of 15 Appeal in Lines Bros, and then subject to codification 16 in 1986. 17 We say it is critical for the purposes of this 18 appeal to appreciate that the need for a cut-off date 19 and the need to ascertain claims as at the relevant date 20 is solely to ensure that the assets of the debtor are 21 distributed pari passu amongst its creditors in respect 22 of their proved debts. My Lords, it is again something 23 which appears from Lord Hoffmann's speech in 24 Wight v Eckhardt, if I can just ask your Lordships to 25 turn back to that, which is in bundle 1C, tab 75.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 84</p>

<p>1 (Pause). 2 It is paragraph 28 and 29. In paragraph 28 he 3 refers to Oliver J's judgment in Dynamics: 4 "The purpose of the rule that debts are valued at 5 the date of winding up is to give effect to the 6 principle of pari passu distribution. It is a principle 7 of fairness between creditors." 8 Then quoting: 9 "It is only in this way that a rateable or 10 pari passu distribution of the available property can be 11 achieved." 12 Then in 29: 13 "The image of collecting and uno flatu distributing 14 the assets of the company on the day of the winding-up 15 order is a vivid one. The courts apply it to give 16 effect to the underlying purpose of fair distribution 17 between creditors pari passu and not as a rigid rule." 18 Then the last sentence: 19 "It would be pure conceptualism to apply it so as to 20 require payment of a dividend to someone who, at the 21 time of the distribution, is not a creditor at all." 22 That's obviously its application in 23 <i>Wight v Eckhardt</i>. 24 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Is there not another purpose of the 25 cut-off date? And that is to enable the company to wind</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 85</p>	<p>1 the basis it's necessary to ensure winding up within 2 a reasonable period. 3 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: But the notion of collecting and 4 uno flatu distributing the assets, if applied to foreign 5 currency debts, means there would never be an exchange 6 loss. 7 MR DICKER: Yes. 8 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: That's quite an important point 9 isn't it? Because you are then getting full credit for 10 your debt at the date of winding-up and interest for 11 thereafter being kept out of it? 12 MR DICKER: My Lord, just three points in response. 13 Firstly, Lord Hoffmann's comment that it's not a sort of 14 rigid rule, it's an image. 15 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: No, no. 16 MR DICKER: Secondly, in a sense you could make exactly the 17 same point in relation to post-insolvency interest. 18 Your debt is valued as at the date of the winding up -- 19 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Then you get -- 20 MR DICKER: On that basis one should have, in a sense -- if 21 one is going to imagine a situation that all the assets 22 are realised and distributed on one day and treat that 23 not that merely as an image but as something which then 24 dictates what happens, logically you wouldn't pay 25 post-insolvency interest at all.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 87</p>
<p>1 itself up within a reasonable period of time. 2 MR DICKER: Your Lordship is right and that is the reason 3 why the rules include provisions for estimating, 4 discounting future debts and things of that sort. 5 Your Lordship is absolutely right. I was going to come 6 on to those. There are two distinctions between those 7 rules and foreign currency rules. 8 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: There may well be. I was just 9 questioning your proposition that the only reason for 10 the cut-off date is for the purpose of pari passu 11 distribution. 12 MR DICKER: My Lord, in our submission, that is the purpose 13 of valuing all claims as at the relevant date. Plainly, 14 the process as a whole has to ensure that claims can be 15 valued as at that date. So to that extent these rules 16 are therefore required and are relevant. But the 17 concern there is simply to ensure that the company can 18 wind up its affairs within a reasonable period. We say 19 obviously that rationale, providing the justification 20 for discounting, estimation, et cetera, has nothing to 21 do with foreign currency claims because, by the time the 22 surplus comes to be distributed, it's perfectly clear 23 whether or not the creditor has suffered a shortfall. 24 There is no part of the conversion into sterling that 25 therefore requires or is capable of being justified on</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 86</p>	<p>1 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: I am not sure about that, because 2 it's the date of valuation that counts for this purpose 3 and whether you're credited with full value at the date 4 of the winding up and then simply paid interest for 5 being kept out of that money. 6 MR DICKER: My Lord, the third point is when your Lordship 7 said "credited with full value", one thing that's 8 obviously plain is you are not in fact receiving full 9 value on that date. If exchange rates move, obviously, 10 after the relevant date and distributions are only made 11 subsequently, it may well turn out that you don't 12 receive full value. 13 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: So, subject to hedging, you're locked 14 out your currency of choice -- 15 MR DICKER: Yes. 16 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: -- by the fact that you don't in fact 17 get paid on the winding-up date? 18 MR DICKER: It was a point I think my learned friend 19 Mr Wolfson sought to address by saying, "This isn't 20 a practical problem; you can simply hedge", to which we 21 say, firstly, hedging inevitably involves a cost which 22 the creditor then has to bear; but secondly, and in 23 a sense more importantly, you only get to this issue if 24 the company is solvent. 25 LBIE wasn't initially thought to be solvent. It was</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 88</p>

<p>1 insolvent. That remained the state of affairs for at 2 least four years. So if one wanted a hedge, what one 3 would effectively be doing is going out to 4 a counterparty and saying, "I want to hedge an uncertain 5 amount for an uncertain period, which may only arise in 6 certain circumstances." 7 My Lords, it's simply not a practical proposition. 8 It's not an answer to this. Even if it's available, it 9 would only impose additional costs on creditors. 10 My Lords, I don't know whether that would be 11 a convenient moment. 12 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: A convenient moment? Thank you. 13 We'll sit again at 2 o'clock. 14 (1.03 pm) 15 (The short adjournment) 16 (2.00 pm) 17 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Dicker. 18 MR DICKER: My Lords, we were discussing the image of 19 notional collection distribution on Day 1. 20 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: We were, yes. 21 MR DICKER: Your Lordships know our submission is that one 22 applies that image to give effect to the pari passu 23 distribution amongst proved debts. As Lord Hoffmann 24 says, even in that context it's not an absolute or rigid 25 rule.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 89</p>	<p>1 briefly with what happens where there is a surplus, 2 again in general terms, before going down a level and 3 looking at issues in more detail. 4 So we've essentially finished the first stage. 5 We've finished the process of proof pari passu 6 distribution amongst creditors; and we're now in 7 a situation where it turns out there is a surplus, the 8 company is solvent. 9 The issue then is: how are such non-provable claims 10 dealt with? As your Lordships know, the position has 11 always been those non-provable claims rank in priority 12 to any distributions from shareholders. One sees that 13 reflected most recently in Lord Neuberger's speech in 14 Nortel. 15 My Lords, just a small point in relation to that. 16 My Lord Lord Justice Briggs asked whether the Supreme 17 Court was addressed on the distinction between provable 18 and non-provable claims. 19 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Yes. 20 MR DICKER: The short answer is, yes, at very considerable 21 length, if Mr Phillips and Mr Robins will forgive me for 22 saying so. Their written case included about 30 pages 23 of history, dealing with every move in the boundary 24 between provable and non-provable claims, essentially in 25 support of a submission that this was a matter on which</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 91</p>
<p>1 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: No. 2 MR DICKER: We also say it loses any analytical relevance 3 when one has finished the proof process and moves to 4 dealing with any surplus which may exist. 5 We say one can see that quite neatly from two cases; 6 both from Humber Ironworks, where Selwyn LJ starts by 7 dealing -- or rather deals with the position if the 8 company is insolvent and applies the notional 9 distribution on day one as a reason for saying there 10 must be a cut-off for interest as at the date of the 11 winding-up order. 12 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Yes. 13 MR DICKER: He then says, with no sense of there being any 14 inconsistency, that in the event of a surplus 15 post-insolvency interest is payable. We also say, 16 similarly, Brightman LJ in Lines Bros effectively did 17 the same. The main issue in that case obviously was at 18 what date for the purposes of proof do foreign currency 19 claims need to be converted? He dealt with that and 20 part of his reasoning again depended on the notional 21 distribution ascertainment on day one point, and then 22 moved on to say, well, that's not determinative, in 23 effect, in the event of a surplus. 24 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Right. 25 MR DICKER: What I want to do now is turn and deal very</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 90</p>	<p>1 Parliament acted every time it wished to act. 2 Parliament had not acted in relation to the discretion 3 cases and therefore it would be inappropriate for the 4 Supreme Court to do so, they should leave it to the 5 legislature. That submission obviously ultimately was 6 rejected, but reflected in the report of the argument in 7 the reported decision on Nortel is a summary of 8 Mr Phillips' and Mr Robins' submissions on that. 9 How, then, are such claims dealt with by the 10 statutory scheme? It's fair to say, with considerably 11 more brevity than the scheme deals with the first stage, 12 process of proof. But the effect of the scheme has 13 always been held to be that the relevant office holder 14 has to pay such liabilities before returning the surplus 15 to shareholders. 16 One can in fact trace that right back to a case 17 I mentioned earlier, a decision of Lord Hardwicke in 18 Bromley v Goodere in 1743. At that stage -- 19 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: How is this relevant? If you have 20 a non-provable claim, of course you get paid before the 21 members. But the question is, do you have one? 22 MR DICKER: My Lord, absolutely right, and if -- the 23 argument effectively goes like this. One has to 24 understand what the nature of a non-provable claim is. 25 The effect of stage one, the proof process, on that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 92</p>

<p>1 claim, answer it has an effect for the purposes of proof 2 but no further, the treatment of that claim in the event 3 of a surplus. Having seen that structure, we say it's 4 then very clear how those claims should be dealt with, 5 in other words in the way that Brightman LJ dealt with 6 it In re Lines Bros. We also say it's very clear, when 7 one looks at the way the draftsman codified the position 8 in the 1986 Act that he was essentially exactly what 9 Brightman LJ suggested was the solution. The critical 10 words, as your Lordships knows, are the words at the 11 start of the relevant rule, for the purposes of proof, 12 i.e. for the purposes of stage one rather than stage 13 two.</p> <p>14 My Lord, I am dealing with it partly in this way to 15 pick up submissions my learned friend made along the 16 way. One of the submissions he made was there are no 17 detailed rules governing non-provable claims. I think 18 he sought to pray that in aid of his submission that 19 therefore there can't be a currency conversion claim, 20 because if there was you would expect detailed rules to 21 deal with it.</p> <p>22 One answer to that is simply that there had never 23 been detailed rules in the statutory scheme, all the way 24 back to 1542, dealing with non-provable claims, despite 25 the fact the further one goes back the bigger percentage</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 93</p>	<p>1 parallels in the reasoning between the two that we rely 2 on.</p> <p>3 If I can start, and again dealing with this 4 relatively briefly, with the cases dealing with 5 post-insolvency interest. I am going to deal with the 6 cases dealing with the position in relation to corporate 7 insolvency rather than bankruptcy, and there are three 8 cases. The first is Humber Ironworks, the second is 9 a case called WW Duncan, the third is Fine Industrial 10 Commodities.</p> <p>11 Just at this point I should pause to say the precise 12 scope of one's right to post-insolvency interest, in 13 particular under the 1986 Act, is obviously one of the 14 issues currently being considered by David Richards J as 15 part of Waterfall II.</p> <p>16 My Lords, Humber Ironworks. This decision has been 17 repeatedly cited at the highest levels ever since. Your 18 Lordships will have seen it's referred to indeed by 19 Lord Hoffmann in Wight v Eckhardt. It essentially did 20 two things. If your Lordships turn up the decision, 21 it's in bundle 1A, tab 12. (Pause).</p> <p>22 It dealt with, firstly, the position in the event 23 the company was insolvent and, secondly, in the event it 24 was solvent, although the order was obviously reversed 25 in Selwyn LJ's judgment.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 95</p>
<p>1 of claims are non-provable claims. They have always, 2 with one exception, prior to the 1986 Act been left to 3 the courts to deal with. The one exception was that 4 there was an express provision dealing with 5 post-insolvency interest in bankruptcy. I mentioned 6 that. It was brought in originally in 1842.</p> <p>7 The reason why specific statutory provision needed 8 to be made was because up to that point creditors only 9 got post-insolvency interest if they were entitled to 10 it, and the regime had worked perfectly satisfactorily 11 so far as such interest was concerned. In 1842 the 12 legislature added a provision that creditors were 13 entitled, at that stage after contractual interest had 14 been paid, to interest at the prescribed rate.</p> <p>15 Obviously, that was a new additional right, given by 16 statute and thus needed to be embodied in the statutory 17 code. But until then it was always a matter for judges 18 to deal with.</p> <p>19 I said there are two strains of authorities before 20 the 1986 Act which we say throw light on the correct 21 construction of the 1986 Act and the rule governing 22 conversion and foreign currency claims. Those are, as 23 your Lordships know, firstly cases dealing with 24 post-insolvency interest and, secondly, obviously, 25 Re Dynamics and Lines Bros. It's essentially the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 94</p>	<p>1 If your Lordships go to Selwyn LJ at 646, in the 2 main paragraph on 646 he deals with the position in the 3 event a company is insolvent. The point he makes there 4 is essentially to say that:</p> <p>5 "Though it may be difficult to conceive, save in 6 a very simple case, of a situation in which the assets 7 of a company could be immediately realised and 8 distributed, nevertheless that's the approach that has 9 to be taken."</p> <p>10 Just at the marked passage, just above the second 11 hole punch, he says:</p> <p>12 "Justice I think requires that that course of 13 proceedings should be followed. No person should be 14 prejudiced by the accidental delay and that, in 15 consequence, the necessary forms and proceedings of the 16 court actually takes place in realising the assets, but 17 that in a case of an insolvent estate all the money 18 being realised as speedily as possible should be applied 19 equally and rateably in payment of the debts as they 20 existed at the date of the winding up."</p> <p>21 He uses, at the top of 647, the well-known image 22 that the tree must lie as it falls.</p> <p>23 That's the approach in the event that the company is 24 insolvent.</p> <p>25 In the event there is a surplus, the company is</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 96</p>

<p>1 solvent, the position is different. He deals with that 2 at 645. Again, I think your Lordships have seen the 3 paragraph at the bottom of the page, four lines down. 4 He says: 5 "In the first place it appears to me we must 6 consider the case under two aspects. The first whether 7 is ..." 8 And notes where there is not a surplus. Then: 9 "I apprehend in whatever manner the payments may 10 have been made, whether originally they made have been 11 made in respect of capital or in respect of interest, 12 still in as much as they have all been paid in process 13 of law without any contract or agreement between the 14 parties, the account must, in the event of there being 15 an ultimate surplus, be taken as between the company and 16 the creditors in the ordinary way." 17 Effectively, you are entitled to get whatever amount 18 of interest you would have received under your contract. 19 The specific point he was addressing when he talks about 20 "in the ordinary way", that is in the manner pointed out 21 in Bower v Marris, that point he was holding entitled 22 the creditor to be able to say that the dividends he 23 received he could in this situation notionally treat as 24 having been payments of interest, rather than principal, 25 because that's reflects his underlying contractual</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 97</p>	<p>1 on the record of the argument, the reference to Warrant 2 Finance Company's case is another name for 3 Re Humber Ironworks (1880) LR 4 Ch 643. 4 At 313 Buckley J says, six lines down: 5 "Happily the result of the winding up is there has 6 been enough to pay the creditors 20 shillings in the 7 pound. The only question I have to determine is whether 8 the customers are in addition entitled to interest from 9 the date of the winding up until the date of the payment 10 of the principal sums due to them. In my opinion they 11 are." 12 There is then an argument which essentially involved 13 the opposing party saying, "Well, creditors signed 14 receipts saying they had taken their 20 shillings in the 15 pound in full and final settlement of their claim 16 against the company" and Buckley J deals with that at 17 315. He says, at the break by the first hole punch: 18 "With regard to class F, this further point is made 19 on behalf of the contributories. The people of that 20 class sent in their proofs. The liquidator rejected 21 their proofs altogether. The matter was then brought 22 before the court. The decision of the liquidator 23 rejecting the proofs was reversed and they were admitted 24 to dividend. Now, what do you admit to proof for 25 dividend in the winding up of a company? The amount of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 99</p>
<p>1 rights, although obviously for the purposes of 2 pari passu distribution dividends are paid in respect of 3 principal. 4 So the regime in respect in the event of a surplus 5 is different. 6 It's often referred to in the cases as involving 7 a remission to contractual rights. That obviously made 8 sense in a context in which the relevant rights, 9 underlying rights, were contractual. But another way of 10 looking at it, we say, is simply this reflects the fact 11 that members come last; the creditors should be paid all 12 they are entitled to be paid before the shareholders 13 receive anything. 14 In the case of a contract one way of achieving that 15 to say remission to contractual rights, you get whatever 16 you're entitled to as a matter of contract. 17 The case didn't discuss the mechanism for 18 determining such claims to interest. In practice, that 19 never seems to have been a problem. None of the cases, 20 following this route, whether in bankruptcy or corporate 21 insolvency, address that. 22 The two other cases to similar effect and which 23 I can take very briefly, as I said, are WW Duncan at 24 tab 32 of the same bundle. (Pause). 25 Just noting from page 310 at the bottom of the page,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 98</p>	<p>1 the debt at the commencement of the winding up, that has 2 nothing whatever to do with the payment of interest 3 accruing due after the winding up if the company turns 4 out to be solvent. There could not until the fact of 5 solvency was ascertained be a right to claim that 6 interest." 7 He then says in the next paragraph: 8 "The compromise in respect of that right of proof. 9 There is no compromise of the right to have interest if 10 the company turns out, as it has in this case, to be 11 solvent." 12 So although the creditors had actually signed 13 a receipt saying they had received 20 shillings in the 14 pound in full and final settlement of their claim 15 against the company, Buckley J held there was no 16 restriction on them because that was effectively all in 17 the context of proof. 18 The other decision is a decision of Vaisey J, Fine 19 Industrial Commodities which is at tab 46. His judgment 20 starts at page 260. He says in the first paragraph, 21 line 2: 22 "The strange feature of the case is that a company 23 in the process of being wound up on the footing it was 24 an insolvent company now finds itself in the position, 25 in the person of its liquidator, of being in possession</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 100</p>

<p>1 of a substantial surplus." 2 Then two short passages at 262, picking it up 3 six lines down from for the first full paragraph. The 4 sentence in the middle beginning "Although". He says: 5 "Although for some purposes during the winding-up 6 proceedings this company must have been deemed to have 7 been insolvent, it seems to me when the time comes with 8 dealing with surplus it must no longer be deemed to be 9 an insolvent company. It has to be treated as a company 10 which is and was and always has been solvent." 11 He repeats that in four lines just above the second 12 hole punch, if your Lordships see that: 13 "But I should have thought that as soon as it is 14 found there is a surplus, the court must be deemed to be 15 no longer winding up an insolvent company but to be 16 winding-up a company which is solvent." 17 Over the page, supports the view he has taken by 18 referring not surprisingly to Re Humber Ironworks. 19 That's at the top of 263. 20 So that's how post-insolvency interest is dealt with 21 in the event of a surplus. The notional distribution on 22 day one ceases to have any analytical force and the 23 basic underlying idea is -- 24 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: I am not quite sure what we get out 25 of Fine Industrial Commodities. Vaisey J was</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 101</p>	<p>1 how you approach a company, i.e. your approach it on the 2 basis it is solvent and always treated as having been 3 solvent. 4 One thing that that does indicate is that we're no 5 longer encumbered by the baggage which came along with 6 proved debts -- 7 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: I see. 8 MR DICKER: -- on that analysis. 9 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: So you extract a general principle 10 that, if a company turns out to have a surplus, it's 11 treated as though it was never insolvent? 12 MR DICKER: No, I don't go so far. What I submitted was 13 what one ultimately gets from these cases is the idea 14 that in the event of a surplus the creditors are 15 entitled effectively to payment in full. 16 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Right. 17 MR DICKER: Everything that they would have received had the 18 company not gone into insolvent liquidation. Put 19 another way, there was an earlier process of 20 distributing the assets pari passu amongst the creditors 21 and various rules were required to ensure that that 22 resulted in a pari passu distribution. 23 In a sense, with hindsight, it turns out that was 24 unnecessary, the company is solvent. When one gets to 25 that situation one is back to, essentially, straight</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 103</p>
<p>1 considering whether the bankruptcy rule applied and the 2 Companies Act only applied that in the winding-up of 3 an insolvent company. So he had to decide: did the 4 bankruptcy rule apply? That's what he is actually 5 deciding. 6 MR DICKER: Your Lordship is right because -- I didn't think 7 it was necessary to go into the complexities for the 8 purposes of our submissions. Your Lordship is 9 absolutely right. One of the issues, and the issue in 10 Fine Industrial and also in Vice-Chancellor Pennycuick's 11 subsequent judgment in Rolls-Royce was: are creditors 12 entitled to interest effectively at the Judgments Act 13 rate? Now, as I mentioned, there was express provision 14 to that effect in the bankruptcy rules -- 15 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Then there was a crossover whereby 16 the bankruptcy rule was brought into the winding up of 17 an insolvent company and these cases discuss what 18 happens if the company stops being insolvent. 19 MR DICKER: Your Lordship is right. The reason why 20 section 33.8 did not apply was because the crossover 21 only applied in the event the company was insolvent. 22 Obviously, that issue isn't relevant for these 23 purposes. 24 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: No. 25 MR DICKER: What is, we say, is Vaisey J's comments about</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 102</p>	<p>1 competition between creditors and shareholders. Should 2 creditors be paid in full or are shareholders entitled 3 to receive the sums leaving creditors unpaid? 4 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes. 5 MR DICKER: My Lords, the second category of cases, again 6 dealing with these briefly, concerned post-insolvency 7 claims in tort. Your Lordships know the basic position 8 in relation to this. 9 The three cases are: firstly, a decision of Harman J 10 in Islington Metal; secondly, R-R Realisations; and, 11 thirdly, T&N. 12 The first case, Islington Metal, your Lordship will 13 find in bundle 1B, tab 58. (Pause). 14 Just before turning to the detail of the judgment, 15 your Lordships should know there are two judgments 16 behind tab 58. The first starts at page 17 and the 17 second starts at page 22. 18 The first judgment concerned whether unliquidated 19 claims for damages in tort were provable in an insolvent 20 liquidation. The reason why that issue arose was 21 because Vinelott J had given a judgment in a case called 22 Barclays Securities. He held, contrary to the 23 understanding I think of most people at the time, that 24 unliquidated claims for damages in tort were provable, 25 provided that you obtained a judgment during the course</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 104</p>

<p>1 of the winding up. 2 The first issue Harman J dealt with was whether or 3 not that was right. He said it wasn't. 4 If your Lordships just go to page 19, I am picking 5 it up at letter D, he says: 6 "I have said the decision in the Barclay case was 7 surprising to practitioners in company law. It's not 8 easy to reconcile with terms of section 30 of the 9 Bankruptcy Act 1914 and I turn to consider the basic 10 framework to the winding up of an insolvent company, 11 whether by court or voluntarily." 12 Your Lordships see he then refers to 13 Humber Ironworks and Oliver J in Dynamics Corporation. 14 Picking it up just above G, he says: 15 "All debts are to be computed as at that date, as 16 the Court of Appeal held In re Lines Bros Ltd. Foreign 17 claims are converted into sterling at that date. 18 Brightman LJ at pages 17 to 20 analyses the authorities 19 in detail." 20 Then I don't think your Lordships need the rest of 21 that paragraph. His conclusion in the last paragraph at 22 the bottom of the page is: 23 "In my judgment, this basic scheme is wholly 24 inconsistent with the approach adopted by Vinelott J in 25 the Barclay case." Page 105</p>	<p>1 in the concept that a company in liquidation starts, 2 subject to section 317, but can then move to 3 section 316. The test for admission to proof are 4 different in the two sections. The fact that this shift 5 of position may occur demonstrates in my judgment that 6 the theory of simultaneous dealing has to be modified to 7 this limited extent." 8 Just so your Lordships know, 316 and 317 are 9 effectively the precursors of the rules that Mr Trower 10 referred you to, namely 12.3 and 13.12. 11 The second case I want to show your Lordships -- 12 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: So he decides that the tort claims 13 are provable, does he? Once the company is solvent. 14 Admission to proof, he says. 15 MR DICKER: Yes, and there is a wider category of claims 16 admissible to -- 17 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: He's not dealing with non-provable 18 claims. He's saying the rules for admission to proof 19 are different in the two cases. 20 MR DICKER: My Lord, in our respectful submission, it's the 21 same point. 22 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Right. 23 MR DICKER: In the sense that they were non-provable so far 24 as an insolvent company is concerned. They become, if 25 one wants to call it, provable in a solvent liquidation. Page 107</p>
<p>1 So, as everyone thought, unliquidated claims for 2 damages in tort were not provable and you weren't 3 assisted merely by getting a judgment post-winding-up. 4 The second judgment raised a different issue. It 5 raised the issue whether, once all proved debts had been 6 paid, any surplus should go to the tort claimants or to 7 the shareholders. Perhaps not surprisingly, Harman J 8 held that it should go to the non-provable tort 9 claimants. Your Lordships should note the argument by 10 the contributories is dealt with by Harman J at 11 page 23H. (Pause). 12 He says at 23H: 13 "When Mr Kennedy for the contributories argued this 14 part of the summons, he argued that once claimants such 15 as the tort claimants here were prevented from proving 16 by section 317 they were so prevented for all time. In 17 particular, the propositions which I found compelling on 18 question 1 of this summons, that is to say the 19 liquidation has to be treated as if liquidation and 20 distribution were simultaneous ... show that one cannot 21 have claimants who are not admitted at the date of 22 liquidation but come in thereafter." 23 The key to his answer he gives at page 24E to F on 24 the next page, where he says: 25 "In my judgment, the key to the whole problem lies Page 106</p>	<p>1 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: I am only using Harman J's language 2 MR DICKER: No, they are provable in the sense that they are 3 entitled to be paid and entitled to be paid before any 4 distributions are made to shareholders. 5 So it's essentially the mirror of the point my 6 learned friend Mr Trower made, the distinction between 7 12.3 and 13.12. 13.12 limits you to debts, provable 8 debts, with all the restrictions that that involves, and 9 the position when one comes to a surplus is different. 10 That's the first -- 11 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: In fact the two sections are set out 12 on page 18. 13 MR DICKER: Yes. The second authority, R-R Realisations, is 14 in bundle 5, tab 9. (Pause). 15 Again, before turning to the parts of the judgment 16 of Vice-Chancellor Megarry that I wanted to show you, 17 just briefly so far as the facts are concerned, this is 18 a company which went into insolvent liquidation in 1971. 19 The liquidator had already made a substantial 20 distribution to shareholders. In the facts on 805, 21 letter G, you can see: 22 "On 8 October 1979 it was announced that a final 23 distribution of some 5.5 million be made to ordinary 24 stockholders." 25 Then: Page 108</p>

<p>1 "Meanwhile, following the publication on 2 September 22, 1978 of the results of an enquiry into 3 an accident at Bombay Airport, 1976, involving 4 an aircraft powered by the company's engines writs 5 against the company were issued." 6 So five years after the company went into 7 liquidation, an aircraft crashed which was powered by 8 Rolls-Royce engines. Four lines from the end, on that 9 page: 10 "A summons by the joint liquidators asked the 11 Companies Court for leave to distribute the company's 12 assets remaining in their hands amongst creditors and 13 stockholders without providing for the payment from 14 those assets of any debt, claim or liability which might 15 be owing by the company arising from the Bombay 16 accident, and the registrar dismissed the summons." 17 The Vice-Chancellor's response was essentially to 18 refuse that application. Your Lordships will see that 19 and the reason why at page 814. Just picking it up 20 below letter C, the last three lines of that paragraph. 21 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Which page? I am sorry. 22 MR DICKER: 814. 23 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes. 24 MR DICKER: The last three lines of the first paragraph, he 25 says:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 109</p>	<p>1 since the liquidation date. 2 So, again, we say the same approach as has existed 3 all the way back to 1542, before any assets are 4 distributed by way of surplus to a bankrupt or to 5 shareholders, all claims existing as at that date have 6 to have been paid. 7 The next stage is to turn to foreign currency claims 8 and again to deal briefly with how they were approached 9 before 1986. The short answer, we say, is effectively 10 the same, although the authorities are much more sparse, 11 no doubt in large part because until the decision of the 12 House of Lords in Miliangos the issue didn't arise. 13 The first decision your Lordships obviously are 14 concerned with is Re Dynamics, which is in bundle 1B, 15 tab 55. (Pause). 16 As your Lordships know, the issue here was when 17 foreign currency claims should be converted for the 18 purposes of a liquidation. There was, again as your 19 Lordships know, at this stage no provision in the Act or 20 Rules dealing with this, so Oliver J had to deal with it 21 as a matter of principle. 22 The case involved a company which was insolvent, so 23 it didn't concern the position if the company was 24 solvent. The question was whether the claims should be 25 converted at the date of winding up or some other date.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 111</p>
<p>1 "Where the order is sought in order to facilitate 2 a distribution among members, the court will be more 3 reluctant to grant it than if the distribution is to be 4 made to creditors. If I apply those conclusions to the 5 present case, it becomes plain the application must be 6 refused. I do not think that it would be just to make 7 the order and so shut out the plaintiffs from making any 8 effective claim against the company, particularly as the 9 proposed distribution is to members and not creditors. 10 I can well appreciate highly inconvenient to have the 11 postponed distribution halted in mid-course and 12 postponed for an indefinite period with the attendant 13 wasted additional cost. I do not say that inconvenience 14 and expense will not be of such a degree as to amount to 15 an injustice, but when this is weighed against the 16 proposed extinction of the plaintiffs' claims against 17 the company's assets I have no doubt where the balance 18 of justice lies." 19 So he refuses that. 20 The third case, I don't think your Lordships need to 21 turn it up because you've seen it, is the decision of 22 David Richards J in T&N. Your Lordships have seen that, 23 to similar effect, he said it would be extraordinary if 24 the company's assets could be and were required to be 25 distributed without paying tort claims which had accrued</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 110</p>	<p>1 The short conclusion was, applying basic principle 2 and by analogy with the treatment of other claims, it's 3 the date of the winding-up order as this was required to 4 ensure pari passu treatment. 5 I am just showing your Lordship the relevant points 6 from the judgment. If I can pick it up at page 761, 7 Oliver J starts at the bottom, between -- I'm sorry, 8 I should probably pick it up in fact between C and D, 9 the first marked passage, where he says in the second 10 sentence: 11 "It is of course necessary in a liquidation, if 12 a proportionate distribution among creditors of the 13 available assets is to be achieved, claims of all 14 creditors be reduced at some stage to a common unit of 15 account. The point of time at which that should be done 16 has been concluded by a series of cases which establish 17 the conversion must be made at the date when payment 18 became due so that the sterling amount of any claim was 19 ascertainable either before or at the latest upon the 20 commencement of the winding up." 21 Then he refers to Miliangos between E and F. 22 Then at G: 23 "What now is the position when such a debt in 24 respect of which no judgment has been obtained, or 25 indeed of such a debt where judgment has been obtained</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 112</p>

<p>1 but has not yet been enforced, is owed by a company 2 which is wound up in England?" 3 Then he starts with the basic purpose of the scheme: 4 "I take it to be well established the purpose of 5 both Bankruptcy Act 1914 and its predecessors, and of 6 the winding-up provisions of the Companies Act 1948 and 7 its predecessors, must ascertain the liabilities of the 8 bankrupt or of the company, as the case may be, as at 9 the date of the bankruptcy or liquidation and to secure 10 the division of the debtor's property amongst the 11 claimants pro rata according to the value of their 12 claims as at that date." 13 He develops that over the page at 672. Firstly by 14 citing two lengthy extracts from Selwyn LJ and 15 Giffard LJ's judgments in Humber Ironworks at 762 at C 16 to the top of 763; and refers to various other cases, 17 including, at the bottom of 763, British American 18 Continental Bank, where Lawrence J says: 19 "In a winding-up this court has to ascertain all the 20 liabilities of the company for the purpose of effecting 21 the proper distribution of its assets amongst its 22 creditors. The date has necessarily to be fixed on 23 which all debts and other liabilities are to be treated as 24 definitely ascertained both for the purpose of placing 25 all creditors on an equality and for the purpose of Page 113</p>	<p>1 an insolvency. 2 That's the purpose Oliver J says, with the 3 provisions with regard to the submission of proof. 4 Obviously, given the terms of the rule dealing with 5 currency conversion claims, that has, we say, some 6 resonance. 7 The argument for the foreign currency creditors was 8 that their claim should be converted at the date of 9 proof, essentially picking up comments made by their 10 Lordships in Miliangos. This was rejected, essentially 11 for the same reasons. Your Lordships will see 769 12 between A and B -- 13 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: May I ask you about 768? 14 MR DICKER: Yes. 15 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Between D and F, the judge says 16 "There is, as I see it, no doubt about what the 17 obligation of the company is at the date of the winding 18 up. It is not an obligation to pay to the dollar 19 creditor whatever may be the sterling equivalent of his 20 debt at some time ... it is an obligation to pay 21 whatever is the sterling equivalent at that date." 22 MR DICKER: And that -- 23 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Isn't that a substituted obligation? 24 MR DICKER: We say no. We say what that's referring to -- 25 it has to be read in context. Oliver J was dealing with Page 115</p>
<p>1 properly conducting a winding-up of the affairs of the 2 company." 3 His conclusion at 764, as to the effect of those 4 authorities, is between letters E and G. My Lords, it's 5 a familiar paragraph. Three lines below D, he says: 6 "The provisions of both the Companies Act and the 7 Bankruptcy Act with regard to the submission of proof 8 are, I think, all directed to this end, that is to say 9 to entertaining what at the relevant date were the 10 liabilities of the company or the bankrupt, as the case 11 may be, in order to determine what at that date is the 12 denominator in the fraction of which the numerator will 13 be the net realised value of the property available for 14 distribution. It is only in this way that a rateable or 15 pari passu distribution of the available property can be 16 achieved and it is, as I see it, axiomatic that the 17 claims of the creditors amongst whom the division is to 18 be effected must all be crystallised at the same date, 19 even though the actual ascertainment may not be possible 20 at that date, for otherwise one is not comparing like 21 with like." 22 So the entire reasoning is based on the need to 23 ascertain claims as at the date of the winding-up order, 24 to value them as at that date, so as to ensure 25 pari passu distribution of the assets in the event of Page 114</p>	<p>1 proof and what he was effectively saying was that, for 2 the purposes of proof, the only obligation which the 3 creditor is in a position to enforce or claim, i.e. at 4 this stage, is the sterling equivalent. 5 My Lords, I will come on to some of the issues. 6 They may be described as practical, or otherwise, if 7 there was a mandatory conversion for all times as at the 8 date of winding-up order, but I am sure your Lordships 9 can imagine some of the difficulties. One example 10 I will come to concerns third party rights against 11 insurers, for example, and the potential consequence 12 that might have in that context. Another would be the 13 position of co-obligors. 14 If that was the position, in other words if it 15 wasn't limited simply for the purposes of proof, then 16 the consequence wouldn't merely be that the creditor 17 wouldn't end up being paid his full amount from the 18 debtor before the surplus was distributed to 19 shareholders, it could also have consequences so far as 20 that creditor's claims against third parties are 21 concerned. Again that cannot, we respectfully say, have 22 been the intention of the process of collective 23 enforcement, which is just dividing up the available 24 assets amongst the creditors. 25 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes. Page 116</p>

<p>1 MR DICKER: But your Lordship I think is absolutely right to 2 refer to that, if I may say. But we do say it needs to 3 be read in context. 4 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: You say the context is, what, 5 a single-minded focus on an insolvent company as 6 revealed by the fact he quotes from the insolvency part 7 of Humber Ironworks? 8 MR DICKER: Yes. Oliver J's entire approach -- I think 9 Mr Mann in an article referred to it as an astonishingly 10 brave judgment, given the discussions in the 11 House of Lords suggested that the date of proof might be 12 the right judgment. He described it as certainly 13 correct. But the entire driving force of the analysis 14 was: look at the rules governing proof, look at the 15 rules required to ensure a pari passu distribution of 16 creditors. That's what he had in mind and everything, 17 we say, has to be read in that context. 18 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: The other unbelievably impressive 19 thing about it is it's an unreserved judgment. 20 MR DICKER: I had forgotten that. Even more -- 21 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: He might have had overnight to think 22 about it or he may just have given it at the end of 23 slightly more than a day's hearing. It's quite 24 remarkable. 25 MR DICKER: So we say essentially this is Oliver J applying Page 117</p>	<p>1 currency debts owing to the bank and one Deutschmark 2 creditor, the dividends received by those two being 3 insufficient to discharge that foreign currency 4 indebtedness. The competition therefore is between 5 those creditors in respect of foreign currency 6 shortfalls on the one hand and the claims for 7 contractual post-liquidation interest on the other." 8 So it wasn't a case which involved a surplus, in the 9 sense of a potential return to shareholders. 10 Your Lordships need to understand the argument being 11 advanced by the bank by Mr Stubbs, which becomes 12 relevant when one looks later at the Law Commission 13 reports. You can pick that up going back to page 5, 14 starting between C and D. He says: 15 "A winding-up does not alter either the substantive 16 rights of the creditor in respect of a pre-liquidation 17 non-sterling debt or the substantive rights of 18 a creditor in respect of a sterling pre-liquidation debt 19 except in so far as necessary to give evidence effect to 20 the requirement of section 302, the property of 21 a company shall on its winding up be applied in 22 satisfaction of its liabilities." 23 What he then says is, "Ah, yes, but you have to 24 understand what pari passu means". His argument was 25 that pari passu should be construed to mean effectively Page 119</p>
<p>1 what one might call stage one of Selwyn LJ's analysis in 2 Humber Ironworks: I am dealing with an insolvent 3 company. How does that work? I look at the seminal 4 case on that, Humber Ironworks, and I will apply the 5 analysis in the same way to foreign currency claims. 6 As your Lordships know, the issue arose again in 7 Lines Bros. Just so we're clear about this, the case 8 did not involve a dispute between creditors and 9 shareholders. Essentially the contest was between 10 creditors entitled to post-insolvency interest on the 11 one hand and foreign currency claims on the other. 12 One can see that from the argument at page 8 at 13 letter H. 14 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: We're looking at the Court of Appeal 15 now? 16 MR DICKER: Yes, I'm sorry, it's the same bundle, tab 57. 17 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes. (Pause). 18 MR DICKER: Where Mr Stubbs says at 8, between G and H: 19 "In the present case the liquidators have paid in 20 full ..." 21 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Sorry, which page are you on? 22 MR DICKER: I am sorry, page 8, between G and H. Just 23 picking it up at G: 24 "In the present case the liquidators have paid in 25 full all pre-liquidation indebtedness except the foreign Page 118</p>	<p>1 a payment of an equal percentage on the amount of your 2 claim where you had a foreign currency claim determined 3 as at the date of payment. He said if you're going to 4 make a pari passu distribution, that's really the best 5 way of doing that. 6 He says, therefore, at F, or the submission at F is: 7 "Contrary to what was held in Re Dynamics 8 corporation a notional conversion of the Swiss franc 9 debt into sterling at the date of the winding-up order 10 or resolution does not give effect to the pari passu 11 principle." 12 So starting from the same premise, namely winding 13 up, doesn't mandatorily convert but what you need to 14 understand is what's meant by "pari passu distribution". 15 Lawton LJ's judgment is at page 9. He doesn't, 16 save, I think it is fair to say, in passing, suggest any 17 view about what you do if the company is solvent. In 18 13, at B, just above letter B, he says: 19 "Mr Graham and Mr Potts provided an answer [that is 20 to Mr Stubbs' submissions] in the way they put the 21 liquidator's case. They submitted, liquidation whether 22 compulsory or voluntary was a form of collective 23 enforcement under the law." 24 Dropping down to letter D: 25 "Being a form of collective enforcement, the Page 120</p>

<p>1 beginning of a winding-up was in its legal nature the 2 equivalent of a court giving leave to enforce 3 a judgment. Just as a judgment in a foreign currency 4 could not be enforced until it was converted into 5 sterling, so a liquidator could not apply property of 6 a company in satisfaction of its liabilities pari passu 7 until he had put a value in sterling on any claim made 8 in a foreign currency. The liquidator has to compare 9 like with like and a Swiss franc cannot be compared with 10 a pound until the sterling value is known." 11 Then your Lordships will see at letter F: 12 "The assets realised should be applied equally and 13 rateably to the payment of the debts as they existed at 14 the date of the winding up ..." 15 With a reference to Humber Ironworks. 16 Lawton LJ effectively agreed with that. He did so 17 at page 14. At the first full paragraph he says: 18 "At the end of Mr Stubbs' opening I thought his 19 submission was right. Mr Graham and Mr Potts, however, 20 persuaded me that it ignores the juridical nature of 21 liquidation and is fallacious. As I have already said, 22 liquidation is a form of collective enforcement of 23 liabilities. Liabilities are what the court will 24 enforce. It will not enforce judgments for debts in 25 Swiss francs but their equivalents in sterling as at the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 121</p>	<p>1 to answer its full contractual indebtedness." 2 Then: 3 "Much argument has resolved around the precise 4 wording of section 302 ..." 5 That's the pari passu section. 6 He says between E and F: 7 "The accounts can only be expressed in a single 8 currency ..." 9 I.e. to achieve pari passu distribution. And at F: 10 "Conversion is inevitable. The question is: at what 11 date or dates is that conversion to be effected?" 12 His conclusion is at 17, between A and B: 13 "If a single conversion date has to be chosen, all 14 parties are agreed that the only candidate in the 15 present case is the date when the company was placed 16 into liquidation, i.e. the date of the resolution to 17 wind up." 18 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: May I just ask you about the previous 19 page, please? 20 MR DICKER: Yes, I was going to come back to it. 21 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: You will come back to it, right. 22 MR DICKER: Yes, forgive me. 23 He refers to Humber Ironworks, over the page, 24 page 18, Buckley J in WW Duncan. That's in the middle 25 of the page. At 19, he says:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 123</p>
<p>1 date when leave to enforce is given. Liquidation 2 affects the contractual relationship between debtor and 3 creditor and the liquidation starts no further 4 liabilities under contract become payable until such 5 time as it is clear that pre-liquidation liabilities 6 have been satisfied in full: see Re Humber Ironworks." 7 I say the only indication he gave as to the position 8 in the event of a solvent liquidation was in passing. 9 I say that simply because the phrase he uses at C is "no 10 further liabilities become payable until" and he refers 11 to Humber Ironworks, which obviously dealt with both. 12 Brightman LJ deals both, obviously, with insolvent 13 situation and obiter solvent situation. 14 He starts at 14, right at the bottom of the page, 15 saying he will deal separately with: 16 "The position which arises in relation to the 17 surplus assets of the company remaining after its 18 indebtedness so calculated has been discharged in full." 19 He then deals with the position if the company is 20 insolvent. That's page 15, the same page, just starting 21 between C and D, where he says, concern with 22 a creditor's voluntary winding up: 23 "It would be unrealistic to describe the fact the 24 identical issue can arise in the liquidation of 25 a prosperous company which has more than enough assets</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 122</p>	<p>1 "I am accordingly of the opinion the liquidator's 2 submission, that a foreign currency debt should be 3 proved or claimed according to its value as at the date 4 upon which the company was placed in liquidation, aside 5 answering the justice of the case is entirely in 6 accordance with the general rule for the valuation of 7 winding up of the claims of creditors." 8 So far, that's again, we would say, simply the 9 application of stage one of Selwyn LJ's approach in 10 Humber Ironworks. He gives some additional reasons, as 11 my Lord Lord Justice Lewison said, at 16. What he does 12 at D is identify the policy underlying the decision in 13 Miliangos, which was that the foreign currency debtor 14 should not be entitled to impose on the foreign currency 15 creditor the risk of a fall in the value of sterling. 16 Justice demands the risk should be borne by the debtor 17 who is the party in default. That's as between debtor 18 and creditor. Then at 16E onwards, he effectively says 19 well, that can't apply in the context of a company which 20 is insolvent because you can't make a similar point 21 about the other creditors with whom you are in 22 competition. It is one thing to say that the debtor is 23 not entitled to impose the currency conversion risk on 24 the creditor. That's not something the creditor is 25 entitled to say about any other creditors.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 124</p>

<p>1 He says, just at E: 2 "If the statement of the reasoning behind Miliangos 3 is correct, clearly it has no role to play in the 4 distribution of the assets of an insolvent company. 5 Sterling creditors are not in default vis-à-vis the 6 foreign currency creditors." 7 Dropping three lines: 8 "The company is the wrongdoer towards both the 9 sterling creditors and the foreign currency creditors 10 ...no particular reason in the field of abstract justice 11 why the currency risk should be borne by one description 12 of creditor rather than by another description of 13 creditor and they are all directed to rank pari passu. 14 The do not rank pari passu if the sterling creditors are 15 required to underwrite the exchange rate of the pound 16 for the benefit of the foreign currency creditors. The 17 just course, as it seems to me, is to value the foreign 18 debt once and for all at an appropriate rate and to keep 19 that rate of conversion throughout the liquidation until 20 all debts have been paid in full." 21 Can I just pause on the phrase "is to value the 22 foreign debt once and for all". It's a phrase that you 23 may have noticed comes up in the Law Commission report. 24 It's a phrase that Brightman LJ uses. It's interesting 25 because, obviously, he didn't regard this phrase as in Page 125</p>	<p>1 possibilities was that you start with a conversion date 2 when the company is insolvent and the conversion date is 3 the date of the winding-up order. One possibility is, 4 if the company becomes solvent, you realise it's 5 solvent, you effectively throw away the original 6 conversion date. 7 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: That would be entirely contrary to 8 what he's just said. 9 MR DICKER: Absolutely. What we say is that that 10 essentially was what he was rejecting here. He was 11 rejecting the idea that, in the event the company turns 12 out to be solvent, you effectively have a completely new 13 regime, which is a new conversion date for everyone, and 14 you then apply that conversion rate. 15 He can't have meant "once and for all" in the sense 16 that your claim has been converted into sterling and you 17 can never, in any circumstances, rely on the fact that 18 you had a foreign currency claim because it's gone. He 19 can't have meant that, we respectfully say, because when 20 he comes on to deal with the solvent situation that's 21 precisely what he envisages is the solution in the event 22 of a solvent company. 23 When one reads the Law Commission reports, 24 particularly the first working paper, which was before 25 obviously the judgment of Brightman LJ, when they talk Page 127</p>
<p>1 any way inconsistent with his analysis of what should 2 happen if the company turned out to be solvent. 3 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Well, I wonder about that. What he 4 says in the passage you've just shown us is the just 5 course is to value a foreign debt once and for all, at 6 an appropriate date, to keep that rate of conversion 7 throughout the liquidation, not until dividends have 8 been paid, but until all debts have been paid in full. 9 He then says: 10 "The loss and the benefit from changes in exchange 11 rates will then [that is when debts have been paid in 12 full] lie where they fall." 13 MR DICKER: My Lord, again, with respect -- 14 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: That seems to me to be pretty clear. 15 MR DICKER: Well, again, with respect, we submit not so. 16 It's essentially the same point as arose out of 17 Oliver J's judgment. In this context -- 18 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Except that Brightman LJ is 19 contemplating the payment of all debts in full. 20 MR DICKER: And he is dealing at this stage with 21 an insolvent company -- 22 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Well he can't be if it pays all its 23 debts in full. 24 MR DICKER: My Lord, there's then a different point. There 25 are various ways of approaching this. One of the Page 126</p>	<p>1 about "conversion once for all", what we submit they 2 were talking about was effectively that idea that when 3 you become solvent we'll switch to an entirely new 4 regime for everyone, which is obviously a different 5 solution to the one that Brightman LJ had in mind. 6 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: I have to say I am a little 7 unhappy with this notion of becoming solvent. The fact 8 is if it's later discovered that the company is solvent, 9 it has always been solvent, hasn't it? No? 10 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: It might have been cash flow 11 insolvent but balance sheet solvent, I suppose. 12 MR DICKER: Where a company has gone into insolvent 13 liquidation, in a sense it doesn't matter. My 14 submission is simply that at that stage one, the proof 15 stage, one has a regime which is pari passu distribution 16 and various rules are required for that purpose. 17 If you finish that regime and find out you have 18 money left, whether one says, "It turns out I have money 19 left", or, "I effectively always had it and never 20 realised it", in a sense doesn't matter. The issue 21 changes at that stage. It becomes, as your Lordships 22 know, we say an issue between creditor and debtor. At 23 that point what's been necessary to distribute the 24 assets fairly amongst the creditors can't determine what 25 the outcome should be between the creditor and the Page 128</p>

<p>1 debtor. As the judge says, at that stage essentially 2 the justice of Miliangos resurfaces. 3 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: The passage Lines Bros at page 16 4 G to H, does suggest that Brightman LJ thought that 5 questions of appreciation and depreciation subsequent to 6 the date of the liquidation simply didn't come into 7 play. I suppose you say, well, that's only for the 8 limited purposes, do you? 9 MR DICKER: And they do come into play. If one thinks what 10 happened to the bank in Lines Bros, it is in a sense -- 11 at the end of stage one what had happened was sterling 12 creditors had received 100p in the pound, they had been 13 paid in full. The Swiss franc creditor, because 14 sterling had depreciated, had received 100p in the pound 15 on their converted claim, which turned only to be worth 16 58 per cent of their Swiss franc claim. So they had 17 suffered once already. That loss was a loss which they 18 have to bear. There was no way round it. That was 19 simply a requirement of pari passu distribution. 20 What we say underlies Brightman LJ -- 21 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Was there any claim by the Swiss 22 franc creditor for the currency loss? 23 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes. 24 MR DICKER: Well, the argument -- 25 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: They were a claim in the currency</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 129</p>	<p>1 process, we converted your claim for the purposes of 2 proof, we've done the proof exercise, we've ensured 3 everyone has been paid pari passu, but nevertheless it's 4 a permanent conversion and what's left is paid to the 5 shareholders". 6 On that basis, the bank has suffered twice. It's 7 suffered in the sense it has had to bear the conversion 8 loss, when the company was insolvent it got in 9 percentage terms less than everyone else, and it sees 10 the shareholders walking away with the balance with no 11 opportunity ... 12 That we say is the force of the point that 13 Brightman LJ was addressing when he dealt with what's 14 the solution in the event the company is solvent. 15 He dealt with this, as your Lordships know, page 20, 16 beginning at letter H. 17 My Lord, I am reminded, figures may not in the end 18 matter enormously in a court of law. But the figures 19 involved, as your Lordships knows, in this case are 20 enormous. The estimate is that we're talking about 21 1.3 billion which may turn on this. That's the extent 22 to which creditors, if -- they don't have a non-provable 23 claim will lose out and the extent to which the 24 shareholders will benefit from a currency risk which, 25 for Miliangos, they were never entitled as between them</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 131</p>
<p>1 loss but they were trumped by the statutory interest. 2 MR DICKER: Yes. There were a whole series of arguments by 3 Mr Stubbs, some very, if I may say, elegant and 4 interesting and arguments to try and avoid it, one of 5 which, as I've said, pari passu really means, although 6 no one knew it until then, in his submission an equal 7 percentage amongst everyone, which obviously would have 8 avoid the problem. Another argument was, well, if it 9 becomes solvent, let's have a complete new set of 10 exchange rates; not the approach Brightman LJ took. 11 If one just goes back just to the bank in 12 Lines Bros, at the end of stage one it only has 13 58 per cent of its claim. So it has had to bear the 14 currency conversion loss. Statutory interest is then 15 payable. It is payable equally to both of them but on 16 their sterling claim. So if the Swiss bank had 17 an underlying contractual claim to interest in the 18 foreign currency, that probably was a further loss which 19 it incurred. 20 One then gets to the end of the day with the bank 21 effectively having received, at least in percentage 22 terms, much less than as between it and the debtor it 23 was entitled to receive. We do say it would effectively 24 have been adding insult to injury to then say to the 25 bank, "Oh, and by the way, we've got to the end of this</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 130</p>	<p>1 and the creditor to force the creditor to bear. 2 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Or the shareholders or the deferred 3 debtors -- the deferred creditors? 4 MR DICKER: And -- 5 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: It depends where they come in the 6 order. 7 MR DICKER: I am not seeking, as it were, to achieve any 8 unfair advantage by referring to the shareholders. Your 9 Lordships should take it implicit in my submission is 10 that my learned friend Mr Trower is ultimately right on 11 the construction of the subordinated agreement, on which 12 I am not instructed to make any submissions and don't. 13 They effectively rank for these purposes along with the 14 shareholders. 15 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes. 16 MR DICKER: If that's the case, then the same merits points 17 can be made against them just as much as they can be 18 against the shareholders. 19 At page 20 a much prescient argument by the bank 20 with the injustice. This is at letter H: 21 "The injustice which might arise on the liquidator's 22 submission in the case of a wholly solvent company." 23 Just moving in the first instance to page 21, D to E 24 and F, what we say at this stage in a nutshell 25 Brightman LJ is doing is saying, "Well, Humber Ironworks</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 132</p>

<p>1 also provides the answer in this situation." We're now 2 at stage two. The proof process has finished, we've 3 talking about a surplus, and the Court of Appeal in 4 Humber Ironworks tells me what I need to do in this 5 situation as well. 6 Just noting at 21F, Brightman LJ saying: 7 "It is on that principle that a creditor may claim 8 post-liquidation interest. He does this on the basis 9 that obligations under the contract are not necessarily 10 discharged, despite the fact that all provable debts 11 have been paid at 100p in the pound." 12 That's the general principle under Humber Ironworks. 13 My Lords, we would say it equally applied to 14 Brightman LJ's analysis In re Lines Bros. There wasn't 15 a rule at this stage. So if one is talking about 16 foreign currency claims being extinguished, being 17 converted into sterling as at the date of a winding-up 18 order for good, that's not something which Brightman LJ, 19 we say, intended to achieve nor perhaps could have 20 achieved. It would have to be an entirely novel thing, 21 introduced by the 1986 Act. 22 Again, the only other point, a small one, but in the 23 context of how one deals with non-provable claims, at 24 21D, again in the context of interest, Brightman LJ 25 says, just below D, that:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 133</p>	<p>1 well be found in the way suggested in the judgment of 2 Brightman LJ." 3 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: He makes three points, doesn't he? 4 The first is that liability is what you can be compelled 5 to pay. The second point is that the statutory scheme 6 sometimes does result in creditors getting less than 7 their full contractual entitlement, even in a fully 8 solvent situation. The third point is that 9 Brightman LJ's solution might be right. 10 MR DICKER: My Lord, and I also have to deal with those. 11 House Property and Investment Company Ltd, I think my 12 learned friend Mr Isaacs referred your Lordships to 13 this, is a case referred to in either Stanhope or Danka 14 and I was going to come to that. 15 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes. 16 MR DICKER: Again, your Lordship is absolutely right, it is 17 still a point I need to deal with. But the basic 18 architecture, we say, is perfectly plain. One has this 19 distinction between the process of proving on the one 20 hand and what happens in the event of a surplus, and 21 a very clear regime as to what happens within each. As 22 your Lordship says, ultimately, one has to look at the 23 relevant rules and decide how they apply in the context 24 of those two stages. 25 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes, absolutely.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 135</p>
<p>1 "The duty of the liquidator is to discharge the 2 contractual indebtedness of a company in respect of such 3 debts to the extent the contractual indebtedness exceeds 4 the provable indebtedness." 5 It's all part of the statutory scheme. 6 My Lords, we say nothing surprising in that. We 7 are, in a solvent situation, back to, as 8 David Richards J said, the underlying justice of the 9 situation as identified by their Lordships in Miliangos. 10 Just to finish this before the break, if I may, at 11 page 22, just between letters A and E, Brightman LJ's 12 conclusion between A and B: 13 "I do not think, therefore, that a foreign currency 14 creditor can base a claim on the depreciation in trust 15 rate between sterling and the foreign currency until the 16 liquidator has assets in his hands which will otherwise 17 go to the shareholders. At that stage, but not earlier, 18 as it seems to me, it would be entirely just to allow 19 the foreign currency creditor to recover the same amount 20 as he would have been able to recover if no liquidation 21 had ever taken place." 22 As your Lordships know, Oliver J at 26, letter F 23 says that: 24 "Certainly for my part I do not dissent from the 25 proposition. The answer to Mr Stubbs' criticism may</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 134</p>	<p>1 MR DICKER: My Lord, I wonder if that would be a convenient 2 moment? 3 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Would that be a good time? All 4 right, we will rise for five minutes. 5 (3.18 pm) 6 (A short break) 7 (3.25 pm) 8 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Dicker. 9 MR DICKER: There's one other point on Lines Bros and it's 10 my learned friend Mr Wolfson's reliance on page 21, A to 11 C. The submission, as we understood it, was that 12 Lightman J decided or expressed the view he did because 13 he considered that the liquidator could always discharge 14 the foreign currency claim by payment of the relevant 15 foreign currency amount. 16 We say not so. If your Lordships just note 21 17 between B and C, it is simply recorded as: 18 "Per contra, if the sterling had been revalued 19 upwards it would, it is said, be open to 20 a liquidator ..." 21 In fact, in our submission, that would not have been 22 possible for the simple reason that it would have been 23 contrary to the pari passu principle. 24 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Yes. 25 MR DICKER: Creditors aren't entitled to insist on having</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 136</p>

<p>1 their claims paid in a foreign currency as part of the 2 collective process of enforcement in respect of proved 3 debts. Equally they can't be forced to take foreign 4 currency. 5 So that in fact wasn't an option. We also say that 6 when one comes on to the views that Brightman LJ 7 expresses from 21, D, onwards, it is no part of his 8 reasoning or his justification that this option would 9 have been open to a liquidator. 10 Lines Bros has been repeatedly cited with approval, 11 both before and after 1986. There are six examples in 12 the bundles before your Lordships, just to mention which 13 they are, Islington Metal, Kentish Homes, 14 Wight v Eckhardt, Re Telewest, FS Compensation 15 v Larnell, another decision of the Court of Appeal, and 16 Cambridge Gas, obviously the Privy Council. 17 I can't put too much weight on this, because none of 18 them were considering the position if a company was 19 solvent. But what I can say is that none of them 20 suggest or mention even if in passing that there might 21 be a problem with the approach suggested by 22 Brightman LJ. For our part, we're not aware of any 23 academic commentary since that decision which suggests 24 that that is for one reason or another not an option, 25 whether before 1986 or after 1986.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 137</p>	<p>1 payment out of the sterling sum. 2 I made the point right at the start, if sterling 3 depreciated during the period, that the regime is that 4 the valuation is fixed on day one. The company is not, 5 in that situation, entitled to complain on the basis 6 that, had it not gone into insolvency, by the time it 7 ended up paying these debts through dividends sterling 8 had been depreciated and it would have been cheaper to 9 pay it at that stage. That's simply a consequence of 10 the pari passu distribution. It is, in loose terms, 11 a price which has to be paid. 12 Now, part of the difficulty here is actually 13 achieving perfect symmetry. My learned friends, and 14 I'll come on to this in due course, when they refer to 15 the one-way bet are very keen essentially that you only 16 look at it from the date that it becomes apparent that 17 the company is solvent. Their basic argument -- this is 18 from that point on. This looks unfair because creditors 19 seem to win either way. If sterling appreciates or 20 depreciates, they get paid the most valuable currency. 21 We say you can't look at it in isolation in that way. 22 Part of the reason you can't look at it in isolation 23 is, as in this case, LBIE was insolvent -- 24 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Thought to be insolvent. 25 MR DICKER: Always thought to be and could well have turned</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 139</p>
<p>1 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: So your position then is that the 2 foreign currency creditor whose currency has appreciated 3 against sterling has a claim as an unprovable creditor. 4 But what if it's the other way round? What if his 5 currency has depreciated against sterling? Does the 6 company have a claim to recover any part of the proof 7 and if not why not? 8 MR DICKER: No, they don't for the simple -- 9 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Why not? 10 MR DICKER: Because that is simply the price of the 11 statutory process which the company has gone into. 12 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: There's not much symmetry about 13 that. The essence of your argument is that your 14 creditor should get what he has contracted for and no 15 less. But the company might say, "All right, and no 16 more either". Why should you -- 17 MR DICKER: Well, we say the company effectively, firstly, 18 lost that right when it went into insolvency. 19 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Why? 20 MR DICKER: Well, obviously it ultimately depends on the 21 effect of the rules. 22 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Yes. 23 MR DICKER: But if I may put it this way, one price which is 24 paid if you go into a liquidation is a mandatory 25 conversion of foreign currency claims into sterling and</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 138</p>	<p>1 out that way. If one was asking, as at the date of 2 administration, what the likely outcome was, the 3 administrators' reports for a number of years indicated 4 the likely outcome was insolvency. 5 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Would you accept that, for 6 whatever reason, the effect of your argument is that the 7 foreign currency creditor does have the best of both 8 worlds? 9 MR DICKER: No, not overall, because -- go back to the poor 10 old bank in Lines Bros. It received, on any commercial 11 basis, considerably less than the sterling creditors. 12 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: That's because the assets weren't 13 actually sufficient for all the claims that were being 14 made, isn't it? 15 MR DICKER: So it took a currency hit, essentially, in that 16 situation. 17 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: But in principle I think your 18 argument is that if the funds are there, it would not 19 take the currency hit. 20 MR DICKER: Yes. 21 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: So, as you put it, you would get 22 the strongest currency. 23 MR DICKER: That's the effect. The reason why one gets 24 there, we say, is because -- it's back to this two-stage 25 process. When the company is insolvent, that's the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 140</p>

<p>1 regime that applies. You may, like the bank in 2 Lloyds Bank, end up suffering compared to everyone else. 3 They receive everything they're contractually entitled 4 to, but you don't, you're not allowed to complain. 5 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: What if you receive more? That's 6 really underlying my Lord's question. You have foreign 7 currency creditors, one is denominated in euros and the 8 other is denominated in dollars. You do a conversion, 9 the pound appreciates against the euro and depreciates 10 against the dollar, as it has done in the last few 11 weeks. So the euro creditors when they are paid get 12 110 per cent of their contractual entitlement and the 13 dollar creditors get 80 per cent, let's say. Then what? 14 MR DICKER: Because we have these two stages, the first of 15 which is pari passu distribution. Now that may mean 16 that some creditors end up getting more than their full 17 contractual entitlement, but that is simply 18 a consequence of pari passu distribution. It can cut 19 both ways, as I said. In Lines Bros you may get more, 20 you may get less. That's the first stage. 21 The second stage is we're back in a different world. 22 We are dealing with the position as between the company 23 and its creditor. Obviously in that situation any 24 creditor who has received more, apart from stage one, as 25 a result of the operation of the pari passu scheme,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 141</p>	<p>1 argument as to how priorities work in this situation. 2 My Lord, we say that's not an issue, frankly, your 3 Lordships need to grapple with on this appeal because 4 essentially the starting point for our submissions is 5 that the subordinated creditors are to be treated 6 effectively as if they were equity and will rank 7 afterwards anyway. 8 But your Lordship is right, there is potentially 9 some further working out to be done, in the same way 10 there was some working out to be done in Lines Bros when 11 the conflict between post-insolvency interest creditors 12 and currency conversion claims arose. 13 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Part of the working out may test your 14 thesis in the sense that -- let's suppose there's 15 a surplus after payment of provable debts and statutory 16 interest and there are two groups of non-provable 17 claimants. One group is a currency conversion group and 18 the other is, let's say, an aeroplane load of people who 19 were killed when their engine failed after the cut-off 20 date. They are coming in as non-provable claimants as 21 well. Assume there isn't a sufficient surplus to pay 22 all the non-provable claimants in full. How do you 23 value the currency conversion claim for the purpose -- 24 let's assume there's no reason to give one parity over 25 the other. So they are both queueing for another</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 143</p>
<p>1 fine, he -- there's nothing you can do about that. 2 Everyone accepts it can't be recovered because that's 3 just the price of equal distribution. 4 When one comes to the second stage, one is therefore 5 concerned only with the person who is left, who is 6 saying, very simply, "It now turns out you're solvent, 7 whether we treat you as always having been solvent 8 doesn't matter -- 9 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: If you get more than your claim 10 you're getting more at someone else's expense, aren't 11 you, necessarily? It could be at the expense of the 12 members, which you would say doesn't matter. But it 13 might be at the expense of other unprovable creditors, 14 mightn't it? 15 MR DICKER: My Lord, absolutely. That does raise 16 potentially a further issue, which is not a live issue 17 on this appeal or not an issue which anyone has sought 18 to grapple with. It's the point made by 19 David Richards J in T&N. If you have a collection of 20 different types of non-provable claims, is there 21 a ranking? One knows, if one goes back in history, that 22 issue arose for the judges to decide so far as interest 23 and currency conversion claims were concerned, and in 24 Lines Bros they held interest comes first. 25 Conceivably there might have to be a similar</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 142</p>	<p>1 sub-stage pari passu distribution of an insufficient 2 fund. How do you value the currency conversion claims 3 at that stage? They still haven't been paid. So the 4 quantification of the currency conversion claimants' 5 loss, if there is one, is still uncertain. 6 MR DICKER: I think there are two separate issues, one of 7 which is: if they are all to rank pari passu, how do you 8 value them? 9 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes. 10 MR DICKER: The second is do they actually all rank -- 11 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: I accept that. But assume for the 12 moment that they do and there's no way in which one can 13 be treated as superior to the other. So you come to the 14 conclusion that equality is open to you and they are all 15 going to rank pari passu. Then how do you value -- I am 16 looking at the first question. Do you have to have 17 another conversion date at the beginning of this second 18 stage of pari passu distribution or do you then adopt, 19 contrary to the Law Commission and everybody else's 20 view, the payment date? 21 MR DICKER: My Lord, and there may be arguments both ways in 22 relation to those. Your Lordship observed yesterday 23 that it's possible that the policy may be different in 24 a situation where you have various types of non-provable 25 claims competing against each other.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 144</p>

1 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Which there may be in this case.
 2 I don't know anything about the Waterfall II and the
 3 judgment is reserved, I think.
 4 MR DICKER: Yes. My learned friends tried -- I don't know
 5 whether it was intended to be in *terrorem*, but
 6 a reference to a whole home shopping list of the
 7 non-provable claims. Just so your Lordships know
 8 effectively how most of those arise, one of the issues
 9 before David Richards J is how much statutory interest
 10 you get under 2.88(7). 2.88(7) says you get the greater
 11 of Judgments Act rate and the rate applicable to the
 12 contract apart from the administration. One of the
 13 arguments run by LBHI2 was when you look at the phrase
 14 "rate applicable apart from the administration" what
 15 "rate" means is simply the percentage rate. In other
 16 words, it doesn't include concepts like compounding or
 17 anything of that sort.
 18 Our response was that's not right. Alternatively,
 19 if it was right, the consequence of that is that we
 20 don't end up getting the full contractual amount to
 21 which we're entitled and the residue must be
 22 a non-provable claim.
 23 That issue, I can tell your Lordship, is a dead
 24 issue for the simple reason that it was ultimately
 25 conceded that "rate" does include compounding. So that

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1 shortfall can't give rise to a non-provable claim.
 2 There are still issues being debated which were
 3 debated before David Richards J, one of which is what
 4 Selwyn LJ referred to as the ordinary approach in
 5 *Bower v Marris*. In other words, can you treat dividends
 6 paid in respect of your proved debt as, first, a payment
 7 in respect of interest and then principal, as you would
 8 have been entitled to do outside and as the cases held
 9 you were entitled to do for the last 250/300 years. We
 10 say yes, the other side said no --
 11 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: For my part I am not looking to delve
 12 into all the issues in Waterfall II, save to say --
 13 assume you have several groups of currency conversion
 14 claimants claiming in different currencies but all of
 15 which have appreciated against sterling at different
 16 rates.
 17 MR DICKER: And there are two ways. The most simple, we
 18 say, even assuming, as it were, the policy factors
 19 continue to apply against the foreign currency creditor,
 20 if you get to a stage at which you have paid out to
 21 victims of the aircraft crash or whatever --
 22 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes.
 23 MR DICKER: -- we're back in exactly the same situation. Do
 24 you pay what's left to the foreign currency creditor or
 25 do you pay it to its shareholders? In a sense that, for

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1 present purposes, may be good enough for me --
 2 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: That doesn't answer my Lord's
 3 question. If you have foreign currency creditors who
 4 are entitled to claim yen and dollars and renminbi and
 5 euros, and all the rest of it, you have to achieve
 6 equality between them in some way.
 7 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: If there's a shortfall.
 8 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Well, perhaps even if there isn't.
 9 You can't discriminate between them. So what date do
 10 you choose? Do you say it's the date of payment if
 11 there is enough money to satisfy each creditor?
 12 MR DICKER: Our primary argument would be that it would be
 13 in that situation the date of payment.
 14 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: And if there isn't enough money to
 15 satisfy every single one of them in full, having paid
 16 out the aircraft victims?
 17 MR DICKER: Then you get the issue as to whether or not
 18 there ought to be some ranking between them.
 19 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: No, no, no. You have paid the
 20 aircraft victims, you have some money left and now
 21 a competition is between creditors in a variety of
 22 different foreign currencies, on the one hand, and the
 23 subordinated creditors and/or members on the other.
 24 What do you do about the different foreign currency
 25 creditors? When do you convert or do you not convert?

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1 MR DICKER: I'm sorry, I was slow and didn't appreciate
 2 your Lordship's question. The short answer to that is
 3 you take the date of payment.
 4 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: The date of payment. Right.
 5 MR DICKER: That is what gives creditors, each of them in
 6 their own currency, the full amount to which they are
 7 entitled. Neither the debtor nor its shareholders can
 8 sensibly complain, in our submission, if that's what
 9 occurs and anything that's left goes to the
 10 shareholders.
 11 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Right. If there is enough to pay the
 12 aircraft victims but not quite enough to pay the foreign
 13 currency creditors in full in their foreign currencies,
 14 then what do you do?
 15 MR DICKER: My Lord, again we would say that as between each
 16 of them, each of them effectively being foreign currency
 17 creditors, they can effectively say to each other -- or
 18 rather none of them can say to any other of them, "We
 19 didn't agree, as it were, to bear a currency risk.
 20 We're all in the same basket so far as this is
 21 concerned." So again one would take the date of
 22 payment.
 23 We fully accept that --
 24 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: But how do you actually carry out
 25 a *pari passu* calculation by reference to a date of

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1 payment? Don't you have to do that before you get to
 2 the stage of payment?
 3 MR DICKER: You will no doubt strike a date, like the --
 4 maybe this is one of the practical problems the
 5 House of Lords adverted to but said might need to be
 6 decide in due course.
 7 You have to strike a date. You would no doubt do it
 8 as soon before --
 9 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: It is going to be an artificial
 10 date ahead of the date of payment, isn't it, so you can
 11 actually work out the entitlements?
 12 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: I suppose if you have a big enough
 13 computer it might just be very early in the morning.
 14 MR DICKER: My Lord, it's a little like the point Selwyn LJ
 15 made in his dissent in Miliangos. It's not logical, in
 16 the sense it's not the payment date, but it's as near as
 17 you can practically get. It's as fair as it can be.
 18 I freely accept that the rules do not deal in
 19 detail, and one can barely say they deal with them at
 20 all with how one treats non-provable claims. But this
 21 has been the position since 1542. From time to time
 22 issues have arisen where post-insolvency interest,
 23 foreign currency claims, non-provable tort claims of the
 24 sort David Richards J identified and dealt with in
 25 T&N -- and answers have to be found.

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1 None of those practical problems, in our submission,
 2 are a reason why -- or justify the shareholders
 3 effectively saying, "It's all too difficult, a simple
 4 solution is let us keep the money and leave creditors
 5 unpaid". That can't be a justification for that
 6 outcome.
 7 My Lords, can I deal with two other potential
 8 consequences if my learned friend's submissions are
 9 right and that the effect of the currency conversion is
 10 to convert the claim into sterling once and for all,
 11 whatever happens thereafter.
 12 The first is so far as third party rights against
 13 insurers are concerned. Imagine a creditor has claim
 14 against a company in US dollars. The company is
 15 insolvent. The creditor is in liquidation. The
 16 creditor needs to get judgment against the company to be
 17 able to have the benefit of third party rights against
 18 insurers. If his US dollar claim has been converted
 19 into sterling once and for all, is he therefore forced
 20 to obtain a judgment in sterling, converted as at the
 21 date of the winding-up order? Is it therefore that
 22 judgment which he has to enforce against the insurer?
 23 In other words, does the insurer also get effectively
 24 the benefit of any depreciation in the value of
 25 sterling?

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1 One might say bad enough if members do, very odd if
 2 a third party in the position of an insurer can.
 3 There are other examples like that. One can imagine
 4 a situation in which you have two co-obligors, each of
 5 whom owe 10 million US dollars. One of the co-obligors
 6 goes into liquidation in England. The creditors claim
 7 against him, converted into sterling, as at the date of
 8 the winding up. What then happens? Two possible
 9 approaches, neither of which seem terribly satisfactory.
 10 The first of which is that the insolvent co-obligor
 11 effectively is entitled to say, "I only have to pay you
 12 the sterling equivalent. Even if it turns out I am
 13 solvent, I can pay the rest to my shareholder", but his
 14 co-obligor is still subject to the full US dollar
 15 liability. That seems a slightly odd result, one
 16 co-obligor getting off the hook and the other
 17 effectively have to bear on his own currency risk. Is
 18 the co-obligor entitled to a bite of the contribution or
 19 indemnity and if so how does that work? That's one
 20 possibility.
 21 The other possibility is that, given their two
 22 liabilities are co-extensive, in the ordinary way again
 23 the solvent co-obligor can say, "I am only liable to the
 24 extent that my co-obligor is also liable. He's also
 25 liable for the sterling equivalent therefore I am only

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1 liable for the sterling equivalent." Again have you
 2 provided a benefit to a third party who has no
 3 conceivable entitlement?
 4 My Lords, can I move on now and deal finally with
 5 the 1986 Act. I say "finally" in the sense this is the
 6 last part of part two of my submissions.
 7 What, then, was the effect of the 1986 Act? The
 8 most important point we say is no changes were made to
 9 the basic structure of the statutory scheme. Whether
 10 one is talking about section 143, 107, it's equivalent
 11 involuntary, Rule 4.481, pari passu distribution,
 12 et cetera, no change at that level.
 13 Three specific changes were made, one of which
 14 obviously is the critical one here. Firstly, the
 15 boundary between provable and non-provable claims was
 16 adjusted again, as your Lordship knows, in relation to
 17 unliquidated claims for damages in tort. Secondly, the
 18 position in relation to post-insolvency interest was
 19 codified for the first time in relation to corporate
 20 insolvency. Nothing, we say, material there. All that
 21 the rules did, in our submission, was effectively codify
 22 Humber Ironworks, in the sense you were entitled to
 23 whatever interest you would have received under
 24 contract, and bring in the bankruptcy provision which
 25 had existed since 1824 for interest at the Judgments Act

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<p>1 rate. 2 Your Lordships may or may not have noted at the end 3 of Giffard LJ's judgment in Humber Ironworks he refers 4 to the unfairness, essentially, of some creditors 5 getting interest because they're contractually entitled 6 and others getting none at all. That anomaly, referred 7 to in the Cork Report, was corrected in relation to 8 corporate insolvency in 1986. As I say, it had been 9 corrected in bankruptcy in 1824. 10 So far as foreign currency claims are concerned, we 11 say the effect of the approach taken by Brightman LJ was 12 effectively also codified in Rule 4.9(1). 13 It's not a point that bears much repetition. We do 14 rely on the terms of 4.91, if your Lordships have it. 15 Obviously 4.91 is the equivalent of 2.86 in 16 administration, as it was subsequently introduced. 17 What we stress are the opening words of 4.91(1): 18 "For the purpose of proving a debt incurred or 19 payable in a currency other than sterling." 20 I have spent some time drawing a distinction between 21 the two stages, first of all the process of proving 22 pari passu distribution in respect of proved debts on 23 the one hand and what happens in the event of a surplus. 24 We say that's a clear indication that this was meant to 25 form part of, and only part of, the collective process Page 153</p>	<p>1 They are identified in paragraph 2, line 2, of the 2 Vice-Chancellor's judgment: 3 "The first class, comprised the holders of 4 150 million floating capital rate notes in US dollars." 5 One issue was how the trustee of those notes would 6 be entitled to vote at such meeting. You'll see that 7 issue identified in paragraph 8. It is point 3 of the 8 issues identified by the Vice-Chancellor. He says: 9 "Accordingly the issues are (1), (2) and then (3), 10 how much would the 1986 trustee have been entitled to 11 vote at such meeting?" 12 If your Lordships then go on, paragraph 35, and this 13 I say not discussed in detail and that may be 14 overstating it. What consideration of this there is is 15 in paragraph 35, 36 and 37. 16 This is 35: 17 "In addition the 1986 trustee seeks in one way or 18 another to vote in respect of post-liquidation interest 19 of 34.5 million and post-liquidation exchange rate 20 losses of 19.4 million. I say in one way or another 21 because the submission is that either the 1986 trustee 22 is entitled to prove for those amounts or they must be 23 paid before the perpetual trustee [i.e. a subordinated 24 trustee] is paid anything. They must be deducted from 25 the amount if any in respect of which the perpetual Page 155</p>
<p>1 of enforcement in respect of proved debts. 2 It would have been an extraordinarily inapt phrase 3 for the draftsman to have used, given the distinction 4 between stage one and stage two, reflected in 5 Humber Ironworks and Lines Bros, if he had intended it 6 to operate not merely for the purposes of proving 7 a debt, but once and for all forever. (Pause). 8 I have mentioned Lines Bros continued to be cited 9 with approval after 1986. There's one post-1986 case in 10 which the specific point arose, although it's not 11 subject to detailed discussion. I thought I ought at 12 least to draw to your Lordships' attention. It's 13 a decision in Barings, which arises in a slightly 14 different context. It is 1B, tab 72. 15 (Pause). 16 Rather than take your Lordships through the facts, 17 it will be, I think, easier if I try and summarise them. 18 It didn't concern distributions, it concerned an attempt 19 by a creditor to requisition a meeting of creditors to 20 vote on the removal of the liquidators. So one has 21 a request for a meeting of creditors to vote and one 22 issue obviously arose, how do you ascertain the value 23 for which creditors can vote? 24 One of the creditors was a claim by the holders of 25 some 150 million US dollar floating capital rate notes. Page 154</p>	<p>1 trustee is entitled to vote. While not abandoning the 2 first submission, counsel for the 1986 trustee didn't 3 pursue it. Equally I did not understand counsel for the 4 perpetual trustee contend the amounts in question did 5 not have to be paid to the 1986 trustee before the 6 perpetual trustee was paid anything." 7 Obviously that concession wouldn't have been 8 properly made if there had been a mandatory conversion 9 once and for all. 10 Then 36: 11 "In each case the amounts are due under the 12 provision of a trust deed. The exchange rate losses 13 arise from the discrepancy between the requirement to 14 convert the non-sterling debt into sterling for the 15 purpose of proof under 4.91 and the contractual 16 entitlement to payment in US dollars." 17 Then the Vice-Chancellor says in 37: 18 "In my view, the alternative submission for the 1986 19 trustee is correct. The consequence is that if and to 20 the extent the perpetual trustee is entitled to vote in 21 respect of any amount, the sum of 53.9 million should be 22 deducted therefrom." 23 In other words, the subordinated creditor has to 24 reduce the amount for which he can vote by the amount of 25 currency conversion loss which the senior creditor has Page 156</p>

<p>1 suffered because the senior creditor would get paid out 2 first -- 3 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Just a minute. (Pause). 4 Thank you. 5 MR DICKER: In other words, you have to deduct from the 6 amount for which the subordinated creditor can vote the 7 exchange rate losses suffered by the senior creditor on 8 the basis that they would have to be paid out first. 9 I thought it right to draw your Lordships' attention 10 to this decision. I can't put it any higher than that 11 if there was a mandatory conversion once and for all the 12 point was missed by those involved in this case, 13 although perhaps that would be more forgivable by the 14 Vice-Chancellor. 15 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Is the perpetual trustee described as 16 the litigating perpetuals at page 160, letter G? 17 MR DICKER: There are two. I think the answer to that is 18 yes. 19 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: I am just trying to see who made the 20 concession. 21 MR DICKER: My Lords, then the materials leading up to the 22 1986 Act. This is the Law Commission, the Cork Report 23 and the eventual paper. We say they don't assist my 24 learned friends. 25 Working backwards and taking the latest statutory</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 157</p>	<p>1 wouldn't have been addressed somewhere. This is, after 2 all, some time after the decision of the Court of 3 Appeal. 4 The second working back in time is the final report 5 of the Law Commission. I have this in both tabs 10 and 6 11. 7 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Yes. 8 MR DICKER: Again, your Lordships, I think, have seen this 9 so I can deal with it very quickly. 2.23, which I at 10 least have behind tab 10, is a reference to the obiter 11 solution of Brightman LJ in Lines Bros. You can see in 12 footnote 72 a reference to his judgment, page 21. 13 (Pause). 14 So the Law Commission was aware not only of the 15 existence of the decision of the Court of Appeal but 16 also of this specific obiter view of Brightman LJ. 17 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Somewhere in their report, and 18 I don't think it's in these two extracts, they note that 19 the Cork Committee endorsed their view in the working 20 paper that there should be a single conversion, even if 21 the company turns out to be solvent, and then they said, 22 "We adhere to the view we expressed in the working 23 paper". 24 MR DICKER: Yes. I will show your Lordships that. 25 If your Lordships then go to tab 11, paragraph</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 159</p>
<p>1 materials first, the latest in time is the Revised 2 Framework for Insolvency Law, which your Lordships have 3 in bundle 4 at tab 12. (Pause). 4 It's dated February 1984, your Lordships can see 5 from the front page. I can deal with his very shortly 6 because there is, as far as we can see, nothing that's 7 relevant in this document unless -- 8 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: You're not going to take us 9 through all it to show us there is nothing in it, are 10 you? 11 MR DICKER: I am not. I am going to take that as read. My 12 learned friend can find something. The only thing 13 I would refer your Lordships to that could conceivably 14 cover it is paragraph 70. 15 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: 70? 16 MR DICKER: 70, 7-0. 17 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes. (Pause). 18 MR DICKER: The only submission I think I can make in 19 relation to this is that if it was intended that foreign 20 currency claims would be extinguished once and for all, 21 and if the legislature had effectively intended to 22 depart from the solution proposed by Brightman LJ and 23 envisaged the possibility of the surplus being returned 24 to members, contrary to the general rule members come 25 last, we say it's absolutely inconceivable that it</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 158</p>	<p>1 3.34 -- 2 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: I think it's the preceding page. 3 MR DICKER: I think your Lordship had in mind footnote 207. 4 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Do we have that? I have only 5 page 38. 6 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS: Yes. 7 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: I think it's the preceding page. 8 MR DICKER: My Lord, I am sorry. I think it is my fault 9 because a revised clip was handed up. 10 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: I think we're being told it might be 11 in bundle 5. 12 MR DICKER: Tab 17. 13 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Yes, that was it. Paragraph 3.34 to 14 3.36. 15 MR DICKER: Yes. Essentially this is once and for all 16 point. We say what the Law Commission were talking 17 about previously and what they're referring to here is 18 the idea -- is not a solution proposed by Brightman LJ. 19 What they're talking about is, effectively, an entirely 20 new currency conversion date which you adopt for 21 everyone if and in the event that the company turns out 22 to be solvent. 23 That obviously isn't what we contend is the effect 24 of the rules. That's what we say they were expressing 25 agreement with. They weren't, as it were, saying</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 160</p>

<p>1 Brightman LJ's obiter suggestion is wrong and shouldn't 2 be applied. 3 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: I just find it odd that for a reason 4 there must have been a reason, they say in footnote 207: 5 "The committee endorsed our view that conversion 6 should continue to apply even if the debtor was 7 subsequently found to be solvent ..." 8 So that that was their view in the working paper, 9 the Cork Committee agreed with it. At the end of 3.36: 10 "We remain of the view which we expressed in the 11 working paper." 12 MR DICKER: It's not as clear as it might be, but we do say 13 it is vital to distinguish between two possible 14 solutions. 15 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Right. 16 MR DICKER: The first solution, as I said, is where the 17 company becomes solvent and you just change the 18 conversion date for everyone. That was rejected by the 19 initial working paper of the Law Commission and they 20 held to that view, and that's not the effect of the 21 1986 Act. 22 The 1986 Act provides that essentially the 23 conversion remains, in the sense you don't have 24 a completely new conversion date for everyone. There is 25 that solution and there's the solution proposed by</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 161</p>	<p>1 currency debt on the winding up, both solvent and 2 insolvent companies." 3 I have made the point that's the same phrase used by 4 Brightman LJ, so can't exclude his proposed solution. 5 Then they say: 6 "We would welcome comments on this conclusion and on 7 our view that development of this area of the law could 8 be left to judicial decision." 9 That's the first point. 10 The second point is the obvious one, they weren't 11 able to express a view on Brightman LJ's solution 12 because he hadn't delivered judgment by this stage. 13 My Lords, so far as the Cork Report is concerned, 14 it's not entirely clear whether the authors of the 15 report were aware of the decision of the Court of 16 Appeal. Can I just explain what I mean by that. 17 The only indication, as your Lordships know from the 18 Cork Report, extracts of which you have at tab 9, is 19 that they refer in paragraph 13.08 to two subsequent 20 cases. One knows that must have been Dynamics and at 21 least Lines Bros at first instance. 22 David Graham QC, who was counsel involved in 23 Lines Bros (No 2) and (No 1), was a co-opted member of 24 the Cork Committee. So the question is whether the 25 cut-off date, as it were, by the consideration of the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 163</p>
<p>1 Brightman LJ which is essentially, "Yes, but if you end 2 up with someone who hasn't been paid in full, he should 3 be paid before members are". 4 They certainly disagreed with first and we take no 5 issue in relation to that. 6 So far as the second, Brightman LJ's approach is 7 concerned, we say you don't get any further than their 8 reference to his obiter comment in 2.23, save that in 9 3.37 they say: 10 "The present law relating to the conversion into 11 sterling of foreign currency claims in relation to 12 solvent and insolvent companies and to bankruptcy is 13 satisfactory." 14 My Lord, we do say again if what they had meant by 15 that was Brightman LJ's solution is no solution at all, 16 again it's a very odd way to express it. 17 So far as the two earlier documents were concerned, 18 the first is the Law Commission working paper which is 19 bundle 4, tab 8. (Pause). 20 In our submission, one can't read too much into this 21 for two reasons. First of all, their ultimate 22 conclusion at 3.47 is they support the view of Oliver J 23 in Dynamics: 24 "The date of the winding-up order is the appropriate 25 once for all date of the conversion of every foreign</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 162</p>	<p>1 committee was April 1981 when the report was delivered 2 to the Secretary of State -- 3 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: One would have thought so. 4 MR DICKER: My Lord, there are three references. We have 5 copies in court, and I can hand them up, of parts of the 6 Cork Report which on any basis post-date that. 7 LORD JUSTICE LEWISON: Right. 8 MR DICKER: I will hand your Lordships a clip, just so your 9 Lordships have them. Just so you know, paragraph 15.86 10 refers to a judgment in a case called Re Armagh Shoes. 11 The judgment was only given on 4 December 1981. 12 Paragraph 17.91 refers to a section 332 in terms which 13 suggest it's in force, although it only came into 14 operation on 22 December 1981. Paragraph 19.18 refers 15 to a report of the House of Lords Select Committee dated 16 22 October 1981. So it does appear at least some 17 amendments were made after April and before the report 18 was finally published. 19 That doesn't answer the question whether they were 20 aware of and in a position to comment on the judgment 21 before the report was finally published. Certainly 22 I think one can say David Graham obviously did. Whether 23 he relayed it again we're just in the realm of 24 speculation. 25 So ultimately, however one reads the Cork Report,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 164</p>

<p>1 either they were aware of the decision of Brightman LJ 2 but didn't comment on it, which would be understandable 3 if either they agreed with it or were content to leave 4 it for judicial development, or they simply weren't 5 aware of it; in which case, in a sense, it's been 6 overtaken by events. 7 What ultimately matters, obviously, for your 8 Lordships is the meaning and effect of the 1986 Act and 9 Rules and on that we do come back to the words at the 10 start of Rule 4.86 "for the purpose of proving a debt". 11 If the draftsman, as he no doubt would have been, was 12 familiar with the structure of insolvency and the 13 distinction between on the one hand proving for the 14 purposes of pari passu distribution and on the other 15 hand the different regime, however one defines it and 16 whatever precise form it takes, in the event of 17 a surplus, he couldn't conceivably have intended to 18 effect a mandatory once and for all conversion by using 19 the words "for the purpose of proving a debt". 20 My Lords -- 21 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: How are we doing? 22 MR DICKER: I was proceeding roughly at the pace I had 23 expected, until I think some stage during the course of 24 this afternoon. I had expected to run over slightly 25 into the morning. I have, I would estimate, by my usual</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 165</p>	<p>1 perhaps. 2 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Since you've budgeted for a court 3 day, it wouldn't be unreasonable to expect you all to 4 complete your submissions within that day, would it? So 5 if we were to hear Mr Dicker for another quarter of 6 an hour now and we sat at 10 o'clock tomorrow to give 7 him his half an hour before the court day would 8 ordinarily start, no one wouldn't have any grounds to 9 feel hard done by; is that fair? 10 MR SNOWDEN: Yes. 11 MR DICKER: It is perfectly fair. 12 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: All right. Thank you all very 13 much. 14 Go on, then, Mr Dicker. 15 MR DICKER: My Lord, the third part of my submissions is to 16 deal with the effect of the rules dealing with 17 contingent and future debts and set-off. The argument 18 by my learned friends is essentially those rules have 19 substantive effect, why not 4.86? The substantive 20 effect for which they contend, of course, is mandatory 21 conversion once and for all. I should be careful about 22 using that phrase, given the way Brightman LJ used it, 23 but your Lordships know what I mean. 24 Before I deal with the detail, two general points 25 just to distinguish the purpose of these rules from the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 167</p>
<p>1 rate of progress, about another -- somewhere between 2 half an hour and three-quarters of an hour, no more than 3 that. (Pause). 4 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: If we said we'll sit until 4.30 5 and you -- 6 MR DICKER: If your Lordships are happy to hear me for 7 longer, I am very happy to continue speaking. 8 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: That would give you half an hour 9 in the morning, wouldn't it? 10 MR DICKER: My Lord, I will endeavour to live within that. 11 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Before we firm up on that, can 12 I ask other counsel, who are expecting to be on their 13 feet tomorrow, can you get your submissions through in 14 the course of a day, less half an hour? It is reply, 15 bear in mind, so we're not inviting you to re-argue the 16 case. 17 MR SNOWDEN: My Lord, it's not exclusively reply. 18 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: It's not exclusively reply. But, 19 nonetheless, the question is you had budgeted for a day, 20 I know that. 21 MR SNOWDEN: We did. I anticipate that it might be -- it is 22 difficult to tell but it might be tight, shall we say. 23 There was a little bit left for Mr Trower at the end of 24 the day in genuine and only reply, which we might have 25 to cramp if we were not to start a little early,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 166</p>	<p>1 currency conversion provisions. They are all necessary 2 to ensure that a company is able to wind up its affairs 3 within a reasonable period. In other words, to have 4 a liquidation rather than merely a run-off. 5 Secondly, they can all be said to result in 6 a creditor being paid in full, or fairly having been 7 treated as having been paid in full, at the date of 8 payment. They don't go any further than that. 9 Neither of these points, we say, is relevant to or 10 applicable to conversion of foreign currency claims. 11 You don't have to convert a foreign currency claim to 12 enable a liquidation rather than a run-off to take 13 place. Obviously, by the time you get to making your 14 final dividend, you will have crystallised what the 15 foreign currency loss is by definition before the 16 conclusion of the liquidation. Nor, we say, can the 17 conversion be fairly regarded as resulting in payment of 18 a creditor in full. In commercial terms, as those 19 sitting behind me repeatedly explain, it doesn't; we're 20 short 1.3 billion. 21 Conversely, we say my learned friends can't identify 22 any situation in which these rules knowingly result in 23 a sum being paid to shareholders at a time when it's 24 clear there is a creditor who has a claim who has not 25 been paid in full.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 168</p>

<p>1 All of the rules envisage the courts doing and 2 liquidators doing their very best to ensure, right up 3 and even beyond the last possible moment, the creditors 4 get paid in full or at least paid the best estimate of 5 what their claim is at the relevant date.</p> <p>6 Dealing first with contingent claims, we say these 7 rules do not involve extinguishing underlying claims to 8 which creditors are otherwise entitled. In other words, 9 giving them a right solely to the estimate, such that, 10 if the estimated amount of their claim is paid in full, 11 that effectively is a compromise, settlement, a payment 12 of everything to which they're entitled.</p> <p>13 If your Lordships turn to 4.86, of which the 14 equivalent in administration is Rule 2.81: 15 "The liquidator shall estimate the value of any 16 claim by reason of its being subject to any contingency 17 and he may revise any estimate previously made if he 18 thinks fit by reference to any change of circumstances 19 or to information becoming available to him."</p> <p>20 And then, where that occurs, the revised estimate is 21 the amount provable. That's 4.86(2).</p> <p>22 As your Lordships I think have seen and as 23 Lord Hoffmann said in <i>Wight v Eckhardt</i>, the situation 24 does not freeze at the date of the winding-up order. 25 What is important, however, is to note the circumstances</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 169</p>	<p>1 has not provided for, then it would obviously be open to 2 the creditor (absent agreement) to lodge an additional 3 proof out of time which in a solvent liquidation 4 a liquidator would have to deal with."</p> <p>5 So after final dividends had been paid, after 6 everyone has received whatever their final dividend on 7 their estimated proof was, nevertheless, if the 8 liquidator then takes six months before he gets round to 9 distributing the surplus, the creditors have a further 10 opportunity to come in and ask for their proof to be 11 revised. Again, the court doing absolutely everything 12 it can to ensure that, before the assets are finally 13 paid away, creditors have been paid in full or at least 14 at that date there aren't any creditors of which the 15 court is aware who will be left unpaid.</p> <p>16 It goes further than that. Your Lordships will see 17 this from a decision of Hoffmann J in <i>Stanhope</i>. Just 18 showing your Lordships that in bundle 1B, tab 65. 19 (Pause).</p> <p>20 The short point here is, even if you get to the 21 stage whereby the liquidation is complete, in the sense 22 that proved debts have been paid in full and 23 a distribution has been made to shareholders, so the 24 winding-up has happened, everything has been done, and 25 the company is subsequently dissolved, nevertheless</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 171</p>
<p>1 and how far matters can go in creditors having their 2 contingent claims revised.</p> <p>3 Your Lordships have already seen R-R Realisations, 4 the aircraft crash five or six years after the date of 5 liquidation. One can go further than that. Two 6 decisions. Firstly, <i>Danka Business Systems Ltd</i>, which 7 my learned friend referred your Lordships to, is 8 bundle 1C, tab 91. (Pause).</p> <p>9 The relevant paragraphs were those my learned friend 10 showed you from Patten LJ's judgment, paragraphs 37 and 11 38. (Pause).</p> <p>12 Obviously, the application for a reserve failed 13 because that's inconsistent with a liquidation and 14 consistent only with a run-off. But so far as 15 re-estimating a contingent claim is concerned, in 38, 16 Patten LJ says:</p> <p>17 "The effect of the 1986 Rules is to allow the 18 liquidator to distribute the assets of the company free 19 from any further claims by creditors. Mr Arden was, 20 I think, minded to accept the liquidator could properly 21 stay his hand if (post-valuation but pre-distribution) 22 the contingency was about to occur. I am by no means 23 certain about that, although if the contingency does 24 occur pre-distribution to members and so creates 25 an actual liability of the company which the liquidator</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 170</p>	<p>1 creditors can come back, if it is worthwhile them doing 2 so, because an asset has been discovered, or any other 3 reason, and say, "I would like to revise my estimate."</p> <p>4 Just noting the facts in <i>Stanhope</i>, on page 628, 5 Forte was dissolved in February 1992 following 6 a members' voluntary winding-up. So that's the company 7 went into MVL:</p> <p>8 "The applicants were lessors under two registered 9 under leases, by which premises were let to Forte for 10 a term of 42 years. Forte then assigned those, firstly 11 to Post and Post subsequently to Properties. Properties 12 assigned it to BCCI, which was ordered to be wound up in 13 January 1992, and the liquidators disclaimed the lease. 14 The applicants applied to have Forte restored to the 15 register. Post and Properties applied to be joined as 16 parties under RSC Order 15 so they could object. 17 Although Forte did not have assets, the applicants 18 claimed the restoration of Forte to the register would 19 bring into being a new asset, namely its right of 20 indemnity under section 24(1)(b) of the Land 21 Registration Act 1925, which it had against Post, 22 a solvent company."</p> <p>23 The application was opposed on the basis it would be 24 inconsistent with the right to wind up one's affairs 25 within a reasonable period. Your Lordships will see</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 172</p>

<p>1 that at 634 between C and D. (Pause).</p> <p>2 The argument between C and D:</p> <p>3 "Mr Etherton said that an English company has</p> <p>4 an inalienable right to wind itself up and dissolve</p> <p>5 whatever might be its outstanding liabilities ...</p> <p>6 entitled to have its assets distributed to creditors and</p> <p>7 shareholders in accordance with the rules of</p> <p>8 liquidation, paying contingent creditors the value of</p> <p>9 their claims at the date of liquidation and no more.</p> <p>10 Furthermore, there is a strong policy which required</p> <p>11 such distribution to be final and undisturbed.</p> <p>12 "In my judgment, there are elements of truth in each</p> <p>13 of Mr Etherton's propositions but they are qualified in</p> <p>14 various ways which do not allow such board brush strokes</p> <p>15 to present an adequate picture of the law. A company is</p> <p>16 certainly entitled to initiate and complete the process</p> <p>17 of winding up, notwithstanding that it will thereby</p> <p>18 become unable to fulfil future or contingent</p> <p>19 obligations."</p> <p>20 So Hoffmann J obviously at that stage expressing</p> <p>21 a view which is effectively a precursor to the view he</p> <p>22 expressed in <i>Wight v Eckhardt</i>, "notwithstanding that it</p> <p>23 will thereby become unable to fulfil future or</p> <p>24 contingent obligations." They don't cease to exist.</p> <p>25 They're not compromised or anything of that sort.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 173</p>	<p>1 follows that an order under section 651 may enable the</p> <p>2 company to meet a liability which would otherwise remain</p> <p>3 unpaid. This seems to me a sufficient ground for</p> <p>4 exercising the discretion and I would do so."</p> <p>5 Just for your Lordships' notes, at 630 Lord Hoffmann</p> <p>6 records, between D and E:</p> <p>7 "This is a company in which the final account and</p> <p>8 return was registered on 8 November 1991. The company</p> <p>9 was therefore deemed to have been dissolved on</p> <p>10 8 February 1992."</p> <p>11 So if one follows this through, we say one can have</p> <p>12 a contingent claim. It can be estimated. You can</p> <p>13 receive the full amount of your estimated claim and the</p> <p>14 assets can be returned to shareholders, and the company</p> <p>15 dissolved.</p> <p>16 If that was a compromise and settlement of the</p> <p>17 underlying claim, it would not be open to the creditor</p> <p>18 to come back later and say, "Actually, my contingency</p> <p>19 turned out to be worse than I thought and it's</p> <p>20 worthwhile getting a declaration that the dissolution</p> <p>21 is -- restoring the company to the register because</p> <p>22 there's another asset I am aware of and I ought to have</p> <p>23 that as well."</p> <p>24 So the rules in relation to contingent claims do not</p> <p>25 involve the extinguishment of the underlying claim on</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 175</p>
<p>1 He then says, between E and F:</p> <p>2 "You cannot be required to set aside a fund and the</p> <p>3 liquidator is entitled to distribute the assets in</p> <p>4 accordance with the rules. Such distributions cannot</p> <p>5 afterwards be disturbed."</p> <p>6 But then he says:</p> <p>7 "On the other hand, it is also a rule of winding up</p> <p>8 that the creditor may submit a proof or amend</p> <p>9 an existing proof at any time during the liquidation.</p> <p>10 The rule that prior distributions cannot be disturbed</p> <p>11 means it may not do him such good, but in principle he</p> <p>12 is entitled to make his claim. Another principle of</p> <p>13 liquidation is that contingent claims are valued in the</p> <p>14 light of subsequent events so that a proof may be</p> <p>15 increased.</p> <p>16 "Furthermore, it is possible that a creditor may be</p> <p>17 entitled to prove for an accrued debt when a contingency</p> <p>18 had occurred after the winding-up. I express no opinion</p> <p>19 on this point but, whatever the form of the proof, there</p> <p>20 is no principle which excludes new or increased claims."</p> <p>21 His conclusion is at 635G. He says it's sufficient</p> <p>22 that -- and the right of recovery is not merely shadowy,</p> <p>23 i.e. against the assignee. He says:</p> <p>24 "I think the possibility that assets may become</p> <p>25 available under the indemnity is far from shadowy. It</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 174</p>	<p>1 payment in full, even in full, of the estimated amount.</p> <p>2 You can conclude the liquidation, but the underlying</p> <p>3 claims, Lord Hoffmann said in <i>Wight v Eckhardt</i>, remain.</p> <p>4 If it turns out that the court and liquidator, despite</p> <p>5 their best efforts, came up with an estimate that proved</p> <p>6 inadequate, the creditor can come back.</p> <p>7 We do say that the use of the hindsight rule in</p> <p>8 relation to contingent debts provides a very useful</p> <p>9 analogy with foreign currency claims. Indeed, one might</p> <p>10 say foreign currency claims are a fortiori a Stanhope</p> <p>11 situation because one only needs hindsight to the date</p> <p>12 of payment of the final dividend, because that's when</p> <p>13 the foreign currency loss is crystallised. You don't</p> <p>14 need hindsight for any extended period. You certainly</p> <p>15 don't need hindsight after the company has been</p> <p>16 dissolved, potentially many years later.</p> <p>17 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Would that be a good point at</p> <p>18 which to stop for the day?</p> <p>19 MR DICKER: Yes, it would.</p> <p>20 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Mr Dicker and others, we will sit</p> <p>21 at 10 o'clock.</p> <p>22 MR DICKER: Can I just ask, I offered your Lordships copies</p> <p>23 of the paragraphs in the Cork Report referring to more</p> <p>24 recent materials. I wonder if first thing tomorrow if</p> <p>25 we just handed them up --</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 176</p>

1 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: Yes. We will sit at 10.00 am.
 2 You can make whatever you think is the best use of the
 3 first half an hour of the day.
 4 MR DICKER: I anticipate that I will finish my submissions,
 5 as planned, within that half an hour.
 6 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: I think you have to do that
 7 because at 10.30 am I shall be calling on Mr Snowden.
 8 Thank you all very much.
 9 (4.34 pm)
 10 (The court adjourned until 10.00 am
 11 on Friday, 27 March 2015)
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