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Submissions by MR MILES MR MILES: My Lord, if I can perhaps just introduce those with speaking roles only. I appear on behalf of LBH2, Mr Wolfson appears on behalf of LBH, Mr Isaacs at the end for LBH, Mr Trower is for the LBHE and Mr Dicker, at the far end, is for CVI. The plan is, so far as possible, to take the points, the issues, in the order that they appear in the statement of facts and issues, so the appellants will go through those, with one or two writakles, in that order, and then you will bear from the respondents. So I am dealing first of all with the issue concerning the ranking of the subordinated debt ranks before both statutory interest and non-proveable claims; secondly, that the subordinated debt ranks after both statutory interest and non-proveable claims. There are three realistic candidates: first of all, that the subordinated debt ranks after statutory interest and pro-proveable claims; and, thirdly, that the subordinated debt ranks after statutory interest and non-proveable claims; and, thirdly, that the subordinated debt ranks after statutory interest and non-proveable claims. Page 1 was wrong and argue for the first or second outcomes in that order of priority. was wrong and argue for the first or second outcomes in that order of priority. There is also a second issue I am going to deal with at this stage in my submissions, raised by an appeal by I.BHE, which is whether the sub-debt is proveable. The judge decided that LBHIZ could not prove and seek payment in respect of the sub-debt, whether by dividend or set-off, before statutory interest and non-provables have been paid in full. The Court of Appeal hot of payment in respect of the sub-debt is proveable. The judge decided that LBHIZ could not prove and seek payment in respect of the sub-debt is proveable. The judge decided that LBHIZ could not prove and seek payment in respect of the sub-debt, whether by dividend or set-off, before statunory interest and non-provables before non-proveable claims. There is also a second issu	1	Monday, 17 October 2016	1	possible for agreements of this kind to be entered into
MR MILES: My Lord, if I can perhaps just introduce those with speaking roles only. I appear on behalf of ILBH. Mr Trower is for the LBIE and Mr Dicker, at the far end, is for CVI. The plan is, so far as possible, to take the points, the statement of facts and issues, so the appeal lants will go through those, with one or two wrinkles, in that order, and then you will hear from the respondents. So I and dealing first of all with the issue concerning the ranking of the subordinated debt in relation to statutory interest and non-proveable claims; secondly, that the subordinated debt ranks after both statutory interest but before non-proveable claims; secondly, that the before non-proveable claims, and, thirdly, that the subordinated debt ranks after statutory interest but 21 before non-proveable claims, and, thirdly, that the subordinated debt ranks after both statutory interest and non-proveable claims. The judge and the Court of Appeal, of course, decided in favour of the third outcome. We submit that at this stage in my submissions, raised by an appeal by 1 at this stage in my submissions, raised by an appeal by 1 at this stage in my submissions, raised by, whether by dividend or a different view and concluded that the debt was been paid in full. The Court of Appeal to so a served that LBHI2 could not prove and seek 1 administrator would be expected to value it at in luntil such in the subordinated debt may the provable. It is more administrator would be expected to value it at in luntil such in the subordinated debt may the provable. The sub-debt is provable. The 1 provable, it is a contingent debt, and that the 2 administrator would be expected to value it at in luntil such in the sub-debt with the first of the sub-debt is susses. The judge and the Court of Appeal took 2 a different view and concluded that the debt was 5 and you will see that the administrator would be expected to value it at in luntil such in the sub-debt with the first of the debt rate. Sub-debt is sub-debt and that the 2 administrator w	2	(11.00 am)	2	by non-members and the interpretation would have to be
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6 Mr Wolfson appears on behalf of LBL, Mr Isaacs at the 7 end for LBH, Mr Trower is for the LBIE and Mr Dicker, 8 at the far end, is for CVI. 9 The plan is, so far as possible, to take the points, 10 the issues, in the order that they appear in the 11 statement of facts and issues, so the appellants will go 12 through those, with one or two wrinkles, in that order, 13 and then you will bear from the respondents. So I am 14 dealing first of all with the issue concerning the 15 ranking of the subordinated debt in relation to 16 statutory interest and non-proveable claims. 16 statutory interest and non-proveable claims. 17 There are three realistic candidates: first of all, 18 that the subordinated debt ranks before both statutory 19 interest and non-proveable claims, secondly, that the 20 subordinated debt ranks after statutory interest and non-proveable claims. 21 before non-proveable claims. 22 subordinated debt ranks after statutory interest and non-proveable claims. 23 and non-proveable claims. 24 The judge and the Court of Appeal, of course, 25 decided in favour of the third outcome. We submit that 26 that order of priority. 27 There is also a second issue I am going to deal with 28 at the far end, is for CVI. 38 There is also a second issue I am going to deal with 4 at this stage in my submissions, raised by an appeal by 5 LBIE, which is whether the sub-debt, whether by dividend or set-off, before statutory interest and non-provables 3 or set-off, before statutory interest and non-provables 4 administrator would be expected to value it at nil until 4 administrator would be expected to value it at nil until 5 subcrime as the condition, namely the payment of interest and non-provables, was met. We say that the 5 Court of Appeal was right on that question. 5 this is contingent debt, it is important, which is the ranking of the debt. It is important, which is the ranking of the debt. It is important, which is the ranking of the debt. It is important, which is the ranking of the debt. It is important, which is t	4	MR MILES: My Lord, if I can perhaps just introduce those	4	As Lord Justice Lewison said, the question here is
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trough those, with one or two wrinkles, in that order, through those, with one or two wrinkles, in that order, the third of the subordinated debt in relation to dealing first of all with the issue concerning the statutory interest and non-provable claims. There are three realistic candidates: first of all, that the subordinated debt ranks before both statutory interest and non-provable claims. Secondly, that the subordinated debt ranks after statutory interest and non-provable claims. There is also a second size I am going to deal with at this stage in my submissions, raised by an appeal by LBIE, which is whether the sub-debt, whether by dividend or set-off, before statutory interest and non-provables and on a different view and concluded that the debt was provable, it is a contingent debt, and that the subordinated debt ranks after both statutory interest and non-provables and interest and non-provables have a second size I am going to deal with a this stage in my submissions, raised by an appeal by LBIE, which is whether the sub-debt, whether by dividend or set-off, before statutory interest and non-provables had been paid in full. The Court of Appeal to the view and concluded that the debt was provable, it is a contingent debt, and that the subordinated debt ranks after both that the subordinated debt ranks after both statutory interest and non-provables and interest and non-provables, whether the sub-debt is provable. The judge decided that LBIHI 2 could not prove and seek for payment in respect of the sub-debt, whether by dividend or set-off, before statutory interest and non-provables and interest and non-provables, was met. We say that the subordinated debt and that the interest and non-provables, was met. We say that the first of the issues, which is the ranking of the debt. It is important, and the subordinated debt and that the debt was provable, it is a contingent debt, and that the first of the issues, which is the ranking of the debt. It is important, and the subordinated debt and the weak pay th	10		10	bundle D, tab 3, starting at page 539.
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going to be that, given that there is an express right to wind up or to put the company into administration, it would be very surprising if the lender could not also Paragraph 5 contains the subordination provisions,

and you will see that there are two separate paragraphs in (a) and (b), the first of them dealing with the case where an order has not been made or an effective resolution passed for the insolvency of the borrower; in other words, outside insolvency. Then (b), which is the one that we are concerned with, the borrower being "solvent" at the time of and immediately after the payment by the borrower, and, accordingly, no such amount which would otherwise fall due for payment shall be payable except to the extent that the borrower could make such payment and still be solvent.

Then a definition of what is meant by "solvent" follows, and the question is whether the borrower is able to pay its liabilities other than subordination liabilities in full, disregarding obligations which are not payable or capable of being established or determined in the insolvency of the borrower, and that is the key phrase which we are arguing about.

You will see, if you just go back to the opening words of that paragraph, that the payment under

otherwise these words would be otiose, and the question is: what are the words intended to cover?

3 LBIE's attempt at an answer as to what those words 4 are designed to cover is contained in its case at

5 paragraph 49.3, which you will find at C, tab 1, page 363. You will see that they say that the 6

7 liabilities which are not capable of being established

or determined in the insolvency --

9 LORD KERR: Which paragraph are you reading from? 10 MR MILES: I was looking at 49.3, which starts on 362 and

11 goes over the page:

> "In referring to liabilities which are not capable of being established or determined in the insolvency of the borrower, what the term contemplates are liabilities such as, in the English context, statute-barred debts or non-EU foreign revenue claims."

> They say they are to be disregarded for the purposes of the solvency test in this clause, whether the borrower is solvent or is in a formal insolvency proceeding.

We say that is placing far too narrow an interpretation on these rules because these are debts which are not payable by the company in any event. They are not payable -- you could not claim them by way of writ, for example, it is absolutely notorious that you

Page 5

paragraph 4 is expressed to be conditional upon those things being satisfied. So the way the agreement works is that there is an obligation to pay, conditional on those matters being satisfied. We say that that is a very straightforward form of contingent liability.

Now, going then to the key question, which is what is meant by the disregard of obligations which are not payable or capable of being established or determined in the insolvency of the borrower, our overarching submission is that the purpose of clause 5(2)(a) is to exclude obligations which are not provable debts of the borrower. Language, we say, is apt to capture the concept of obligations which are payable at the outset of the insolvency and those which are capable of being established or determined in the insolvency proceedings.

We say this is a commercially realistic reading -indeed, the most commercially realistic reading -- since it provides a workable mechanism for the valuation of the relevant liabilities. It is the same valuation exercise as has to take place under the insolvency rules in an insolvency.

Now, the starting point is that the contractual disregard contained in paragraph 5(2)(a) is clearly intended to exclude some liabilities of the company, the subordination, in other words, is not absolute,

Page 7

1 cannot claim foreign revenue claims, it is a matter of 2

conflict of laws. You cannot claim them in

3 an insolvency either, which is well established. Again,

4 you cannot claim an insolvency for statute-barred debts 5

any more than you can bring a writ for them.

So we say this is placing a very narrow

7 interpretation on the words because these liabilities

8 are not payable anyway, and it would be very odd to have

9 an express wording dealing with the scope of the

10 subordination which tells you that one thing that you

11 are not subordinated to are liabilities which are not

payable anyway.

LORD NEUBERGER: You say it is referred with liabilities

14 which would be regarded as liabilities in law generally,

but cannot be established or determined insolvency?

16 MR MILES: Yes.

17 LORD NEUBERGER: I have the point, thank you.

18 MR MILES: Now --

LORD NEUBERGER: You say their definition extends to things

20 that wouldn't be effective liabilities in any event.

21 MR MILES: In any event, whether in an insolvency or not.

22 LORD NEUBERGER: I see, yes.

23 MR MILES: Now, we do say that it is also relevant,

24 obviously, when looking at this definition of solvency

25 in this agreement, which is an English law agreement

Page 6

Page 8

2 (Pages 5 to 8)

1	concerning an English registered borrower, to look at	1	statutory regime works, and the best place to find this
2	the English insolvency law background.	2	is in bundle F3 at tab 74.
3	Now, one of the aims of the 1986 legislation was to	3	Now, this tab contains a number of relevant
4	bring as much as possible within the definition of	4	provisions of the insolvency rules in the form
5	provable debts and deal with their discharge through	5	applicable to this administration. There are
6	payments in the insolvency. A good place to find that	6	transitional provisions, there have been some changes
7	point is going back to Lord Justice Lewison's judgment,	7	later and in tab 75 you have got
8	paragraphs 15 and 16, which you will find at page 535.	8	LORD NEUBERGER: Do the changes matter for present purposes?
9	LORD NEUBERGER: Thank you very much. Yes.	9	MR MILES: No, they don't, but it is worth just knowing
10	MR MILES: You may also recall that Lord Neuberger quoted	10	that.
11	that same paragraph of the Cork Report in Nortel and	11	LORD NEUBERGER: I understand.
12	made much the same point.	12	MR MILES: The way this is printed, for some reason, says
13	So one of the aims of the 1986 legislation was to	13	"Part 2, part 10, distribution to creditors", you will
14	bring as much as possible within the scope of what is	14	see. In fact, in the original statute it is called
15	provable, and also to deal, as I say, with discharge	15	chapter 10 and then section A.
16	through payment. Over the years, the scope of what is	16	This is dealing with the position in
17	provable has been broadened so that it includes not only	17	an administration. There are similar rules, of course,
18	obvious pre-liquidation and claimed(?) debts, but also	18	in liquidation and in personal bankruptcy, but these are
19	unliquidated claims, future claims, contingent claims.	19	the rules concerning administration, which are the ones
20	You will have seen in the cases reference to the	20	we are most directly concerned with.
21	case of T&N, which was a case where, after the 1986	21	Now, you are aware of course (Inaudible) in the
22	legislation, there were tort claims which were brought	22	original 1986 legislation, there could not be
23	against the company in liquidation, or at least this was	23	distributions in administrations. There were then
24	the situation that was being addressed in that case, it	24	changes in the law so that it was possible, with the
25	was actually in the context of a scheme for arrangement,	25	leave of the court, for distributions to be made in
	Page 9		Page 11
1	but the question was if in a company in liquidation	1	administrations, and these rules were brought in in
2	there was a tort claim where the damage was suffered	2	order to effectively bring the law into line with the
3	after the date of the liquidation, under the 1986	3	law on winding up.
4	legislation, as it was first formulated, that wouldn't	4	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes, okay.
5	have been provable because the cause of action would not	5	MR MILES: So you start at rule 2.68, which is a general
6	have been complete until the damage was suffered. Very	6	description of chapter 10. I think you only need to
7	quickly after that decision, the legislature intervened	7	look at rule 1.
8	and changed the rules on what was meant by provable	8	LORD NEUBERGER: All right.
9	debts to include a tort claim where all the elements of	9	MR MILES: Sub-rule 1. Going on to 1990
10	the tort occur before the cut-off date except for	10	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
11	damage.	11	MR MILES: you will see that the debts of an insolvent
12	So what one can see is the legislature seeking to	12	company are to rank equally, and they will be paid in
13	bring as much as possible within the concept of what is	13	full after preferential debts, unless the assets are
14	provable, and we say that is important because what the	14	insufficient for meeting it. So the whole point of this
15	contractual disregard in this case, in paragraph 5(2)(a)	15	part of the rules is to deal with the payment of debts
16	is doing is mirroring the treatment of provable debts.	16	through the insolvency process.
17	Provable debts are those debts which are either payable	17	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
18	or capable of being established or determined in the	18	MR MILES: 2.72, which is at 1994, tells us what proving
19	insolvency of the borrower.	19	a debt is. Now, this is something that comes up under
20	The statutory scheme has a number of provisions	20	a number of the arguments, so it is possibly just worth
21	which provide for establishing or determining the amount	21	looking at sub (1) and (2).
22	of provable debt in an insolvency, and it is helpful to	22	LORD NEUBERGER: Sorry, 2.72
23	look at these now. You will be seeing some of these	23	MR MILES: Page 1994, rule 2.72 sub-rules (1) and (2).
24	provisions in the context of other issues as well, so it	24	LORD NEUBERGER: Right.
25	is helpful, I suggest, just to see how this part of the	25	MR MILES: Pausing on that just for the moment, if you want
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1	to recover your debt in an administration, you have to	1	LORD NEUBERGER: Basically you discount for early payment.
2	submit a claim, and the creditor who claims is referred	2	MR MILES: That's right.
3	to in these rules as proving his debt and the document	3	LORD NEUBERGER: Okay.
4	by which he seeks to establish his claim is a proof.	4	MR MILES: And there are also rules about how you deal with
5	One can get a bit caught up with the terminology of	5	security.
6	proving, and we will see this in a number of the	6	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
7	arguments during the appeal. What proving is is	7	MR MILES: What you have here in this section of the statute
8	claiming to recover the debt through the administration.	8	is a series of mandatory rules about the valuation of
9	There are provisions, then, about the method of	9	liabilities for the purpose of seeking payment in
10	proof. At page 2000, you will see under rule 2.77 there	10	an administration. As I say, you will find much the
11	is provision for the proof to be admitted for dividend,	11	same rules, materially the same rules, in relation to
12	either for the whole amount claimed by the creditor or	12	a liquidation. These are based on the liquidation
13	in part, and if the administrator rejects it in whole or	13	rules.
14	in part, he will prepare a written statement and so on.	14	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes, administrators originally didn't have
15	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	15	the power to distribute. When they were given that
16	MR MILES: And then on the next page at 2001, 2.78	16	power, they had to have mirror-image provisions.
17	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	17	MR MILES: And it effectively mirrors the position in
18	MR MILES: (Inaudible), so then, if that happens, the	18	liquidation.
19	matter is determined through this process; it is	19	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
20	determined by the court as part of the administration.	20	MR MILES: Now, we say that against that background, it
21	LORD NEUBERGER: Right.	21	makes real sense for the subordination clause that we
22	MR MILES: If you then go on to the page 2004, you will see	22	are looking at in this case to be drafted on the basis
23	that we move from section B, which is the machinery of	23	that the administrator, or the liquidator, as the case
24	proving a debt, to section C, which is quantification	24	may be, would use the same values, the same processes of
25	claims.	25	valuation resulting from that process to determine
	Page 13		Page 15
1	2.81 deals with essentially contingent debts.	1	whether or not the borrower meets the solvency
2	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	2	condition. We suggest that is all in the end that
3	MR MILES: And what happens is the administrator places	3	clause 5(2)(a) is doing.
4	an estimate on the value of the debt.	4	So if you then return to the contractual words,
5	At 2.85, which is at page 2008, you will find the	5	which are in D3, page 540
6	rule on	6	LORD NEUBERGER: Back to paragraph 36 of the judgment, yes.
7	LORD NEUBERGER: Mutual credit set-off.	7	MR MILES: That's right. And the provision at
8	MR MILES: set off, which is a well known rule which we	8	paragraph 5(2)(a), what that is talking about is the
9	will have to come back to, but the effect of that is	9	obligations which are not provable debts. They are not
10	that an account is taken of the mutual(?) claims and	10	payable in the insolvency and they are not capable of
11	only the net balance is then provable.	11	being established or determined in the insolvency of
12	2.86, which is at 2011, deals with debts in	12	a borrower. That is the short way we put the point, and
13	a foreign currency, and we will be looking at that in	13	we say it is practical and commercially workable because
14	detail in relation to currency conversion claims.	14	the liquidator or administrator can value the provable
15	LORD NEUBERGER: Of course.	15	debts of the company according to the rules, which are
16	MR MILES: There is an important provision concerning	16	there for insolvency.
17	interest, which is all part of this same section, at	17	If those can be paid and there is still some for the
18	2013, that is rule 2.88. There are also, at 2.89 on	18	sub-debt to be paid, then it will be paid. If the
19	page 2015, a rule about debts payable at a future time,	19	sub-debt cannot be paid and all of those debts still be
20	and the way they work is that you prove for the full	20	paid, then the sub-debt to that extent cannot be paid.
21	amount of the future debt, but in relation to	21	That is how the subordination works. So our overarching
22	LORD NEUBERGER: Subject to rule 2105.	22	submission is that it means provable debts.
23	MR MILES: That is at 2015.	23	It is also, though, helpful indeed, we suggest
24	LORD NEUBERGER: Which is on 2032 yes.	24	necessary to look at the two elements that we are
25	MR MILES: And the yes, so	25	concerned with separately, that is to say non-provable
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	Page 14		Page 16

1	claims on the one hand and statutory interest on the	1	Yes, there is, in the case of proved debts; no, there is
2	other hand. If I could just deal with non-provable	2	not, in the case of non-provable debts. That is really
3	claims first.	3	the point.
4	Our submission is that non-provable claims are	4	LORD NEUBERGER: I see.
5	neither payable nor capable of being established or	5	MR MILES: So it emphasises a point we have already made.
6	determined in the insolvency, which is what the contract	6	Now, in the case where you have a non-provable
7	is concerned with.	7	claim, there is very little law on how that would be
8	If such claims are payable at all, they are payable	8	dealt with, notwithstanding the existence of the
9	despite or notwithstanding the insolvency, not in it,	9	insolvency. The officeholder has no statutory remit to
10	and the clause is concerned with payment within the	10	pay claims other than the expenses of the insolvency and
11	insolvency or being established or determined within the	11	the proved claims. It is true that you will find some
12	insolvency.	12	old cases in particular which say, well, if there is
13	They are not capable of being established or	13	something which has been established as a non-provable
14	determined in the insolvency, as there is no mechanism	14	claim you will see this in old cases on interest, for
15	within the insolvency procedure for the determination or	15	example the liquidator should pay that indeed,
16	establishment of non-provable claims at all.	16	must pay that before the surplus goes to the members.
17	We have just seen all of those provisions about the	17	But we suggest all that is being said in those cases
18	determination and quantification of claims in	18	is that because he is the person in charge of the
19	an insolvency, and they are all concerned with provable	19	company, he should do that. What those cases do not say
20	debts. None of those are concerned with non-provable	20	is that that is happening as part of the insolvency
21	claims at all.	21	process.
22	LORD NEUBERGER: The word "payable", that is not governed,	22	LORD CLARKE: What is it part of?
23	or do you say it is, by the words "in the insolvency of	23	MR MILES: It is just a claim against the company. I will
24	the borrower"?	24	just show you how it has been dealt with in a couple of
25	MR MILES: Well, we say that it is really a question of	25	cases.
	Page 17		Page 19
1	manding the vehale thing on a vehale	,	Dedenos do los terromoles - TON - hom
1	reading the whole thing as a whole.	1	Perhaps the best example is T&N, where
2	LORD NEUBERGER: "Capable of being established or	2	Mr Justice David Richards had deal with this question:
2 3	LORD NEUBERGER: "Capable of being established or determined" are clearly words governed by the insolvency	2 3	Mr Justice David Richards had deal with this question: how then are they dealt with? You will find that in
2 3 4	LORD NEUBERGER: "Capable of being established or determined" are clearly words governed by the insolvency of the borrower. I am just checking what you are saying	2 3 4	Mr Justice David Richards had deal with this question: how then are they dealt with? You will find that in bundle F1, tab 21. To answer Lord Clarke's question, if
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2 3 4 5 6	LORD NEUBERGER: "Capable of being established or determined" are clearly words governed by the insolvency of the borrower. I am just checking what you are saying about the word "payable". Is that governed by the words "in the insolvency of the borrower"?	2 3 4 5 6	Mr Justice David Richards had deal with this question: how then are they dealt with? You will find that in bundle F1, tab 21. To answer Lord Clarke's question, if these claims are payable, they will be payable notwithstanding the insolvency, and the mechanism is
2 3 4 5 6 7	LORD NEUBERGER: "Capable of being established or determined" are clearly words governed by the insolvency of the borrower. I am just checking what you are saying about the word "payable". Is that governed by the words "in the insolvency of the borrower"? MR MILES: It is.	2 3 4 5 6 7	Mr Justice David Richards had deal with this question: how then are they dealt with? You will find that in bundle F1, tab 21. To answer Lord Clarke's question, if these claims are payable, they will be payable notwithstanding the insolvency, and the mechanism is that the court may lift any stay on the bringing of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	LORD NEUBERGER: "Capable of being established or determined" are clearly words governed by the insolvency of the borrower. I am just checking what you are saying about the word "payable". Is that governed by the words "in the insolvency of the borrower"? MR MILES: It is. LORD NEUBERGER: I see.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Mr Justice David Richards had deal with this question: how then are they dealt with? You will find that in bundle F1, tab 21. To answer Lord Clarke's question, if these claims are payable, they will be payable notwithstanding the insolvency, and the mechanism is that the court may lift any stay on the bringing of claims so that the claim is then allowed to proceed by
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1	(Inaudible) could be, as it were, required to be	1	were not good grounds for it.
2	distributed to shareholders without paying tort claims	2	LORD SUMPTION: Yes, but if he made an agreement, a purely
3	which accrued since the liquidation date or other claims	3	passive stance would not be available, if he wants to
4	not provable in the liquidation, such as costs incurred	4	agree an undisputed claim.
5	in litigation against the company before the liquidation	5	MR MILES: It may be that he has no power to do that.
6	date but not then the subject of an order."	6	LORD SUMPTION: Okay.
7	Then he says that is not the position.	7	MR MILES: It may just be that the right course would be to
8	If I could just invite you to read the rest of that	8	not defend the claim which is brought.
9	paragraph, I will then make a submission on it.	9	LORD KERR: I thought you said that because he was for the
10	(Pause).	10	time being in charge of the company, so to speak, it
11	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	11	would be in that capacity rather than his capacity as
12	MR MILES: We say the solution that Mr Justice David	12	liquidator that he would
13	Richards came to in that case is to say that, in the	13	MR MILES: No, it would be qua liquidator, I have to accept
14	case of a non-provable claim, the way it would be dealt	14	that, but it may be that the answer is that he would do
15	with, as I say, is to either lift the statutory stay or	15	it simply by not opposing the claim. As I say, there is
16	not impose the normal stay that you would find in	16	very little learning on how non-provable claims are to
17	a voluntary winding up, and allow the creditors simply	17	be dealt with at all, but such as there is suggests it
18	to bring writ claims against the company,	18	is a process that takes place outside the insolvency
19	notwithstanding the liquidation, and then follow the	19	process and notwithstanding it, rather than through it.
20	ordinary process of execution of claims against the	20	That view is also, we suggest, supported by a decision
21	company.	21	of the Court of Appeal, which you will find in bundle F5
22	Now, we say that that shows that the process is not	22	at tab 8. This is a decision called Levy v Legal
23	happening within the liquidation, it is not happening	23	Services Commission.
24	through the liquidation, or in the words of the clause,	24	This is a bankruptcy case. There was a bankruptcy
25	"in the liquidation"; it is happening notwithstanding	25	petition based on the costs of ancillary relief
	Page 21		Page 23
1	the liquidation, despite the liquidation, outside the	1	proceedings, and under the relevant insolvency rules,
2	liquidation, and in our case outside the administration.	2	claims which arose under an order made in family
3	LORD SUMPTION: What happens if there is agreement that the	3	proceedings were not a provable debt. The respondent to
4	amount is due? You still have to go through the form of	4	the petition argued that, since the debt which was being
5	litigating, do you, simply to convert it from	5	claimed was not a provable debt, there could not be
6	a non-provable to a provable debt?	6	a bankruptcy petition based on it, and that argument
7	MR MILES: Yes.	7	succeeded.
8	LORD SUMPTION: It seems a rather unnecessary and burdensome	8	There were two issues in the case: first of all, the
9	way of achieving a very straightforward result.	9	question of whether it was indeed a non-provable debt,
10	MR MILES: That may be right, my Lord, but it doesn't affect	10	and the Court of Appeal concluded that it was
11	the nature of the claim which is being made. What we	11	non-provable, and then what they called the timing
12	say is that, in that case, if it was possible to do it	12	question, which was whether the petition could be based
13	by way of agreement rather than litigating the thing the	13	on the non-provable debt in any case. If you go to
14	whole think through, nonetheless it is still a process	14	page 2739 at paragraph 34, this is in the judgment of
15	that is happening outside the liquidation.	15	Lord Justice Jonathan Parker. For some reason, in this
16	LORD SUMPTION: The agreement would have to be made by the	16	report, they have been demoted to first instance judges,
17	administrator or the liquidator, wouldn't it?	17	but it was in the Court of Appeal and they were both
18	MR MILES: Yes.	18	Lords Justice.
19	LORD SUMPTION: From what would he derive his power to make	19	In paragraph 34, you will see that what
20	such an agreement?	20	Lord Justice Jonathan Parker said was:
21	MR MILES: I think it would have to be essentially his	21	"On any footing, a bankruptcy order made on a
22	general power of administration of the company. We say	22	petition which is based on a non-provable debt is
23	what would effectively be happening there is that	23	an anomaly(Reading to the words) bankruptcy and
24	the claim would be brought I mean, it may be that he	24	the trustee will owe no duties towards him."
25	would simply not oppose the claim being brought if there	25	The Court of Appeal did go on to conclude that, in
	Page 22		Page 24

1	very unusual circumstances, it would nonetheless be	1	have already seen rule 2.88. Statutory interest is not
2	possible to base a petition on a non-provable debt, but	2	contractual interest. If we just go back to rule 2.88,
3	they concluded it was difficult to see what those	3	which you will find
4	circumstances would be and it was not appropriate for	4	LORD NEUBERGER: 2013 of F3, yes.
5	this case. But the point of general application which	5	MR MILES: Yes, exactly.
6	is made is that the non-provable debts are outside the	6	LORD NEUBERGER: F3/2013, yes.
7	statutory scheme, and Lord Justice Peter Gibson picked	7	MR MILES: The way that the statutory interest works is
8	up the same point at paragraph 58.	8	that, first of all, you will see that under
9	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes, saying the same thing.	9	sub-rule (1), it is possible to prove for the bit of
10	MR MILES: Saying the same thing.	10	interest which has accrued before the cut-off date, and
11	It may be said this is a personal bankruptcy and not	11	then there are provisions from (2) down to (6)
12	corporate insolvency, but we say that the same reasoning	12	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
13	applies. The corporate insolvency, as we have seen, is	13	MR MILES: which essentially say that, where interest is
14	concerned with, in this regard, payment to the creditors	14	payable by contract, the creditor can claim the higher
15	of the company, just as in the case of a bankruptcy it	15	of contractual rate and the judgment rate, which, as we
16	is concerned with payment to the bankruptcy creditors,	16	know, is 8 per cent and it has been 8 per cent
17	who are essentially the proving creditors. The point	17	throughout this period.
18	that is being made in this case, which we commend, is	18	LORD NEUBERGER: And extraordinarily has never been reduced,
19	that non-provable debts are just outside the statutory	19	yes.
20	scheme, they are something different.	20	MR MILES: But also this allows for claims for interest
21	There is something of a minor dispute between the	21	where it is not payable under the contract, so for
22	parties in how you deal with a case called	22	non-contractual interest, and you will see that in
23	R-R Realisations. I am not going to go to it now, but	23	paragraph (2).
24	LBIE have suggested that that is another case about	24	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
25	non-provable debts. It was a decision of	25	MR MILES: Then in (7), and this is really the bit we are
	non provide debts. It was a decision of		(,), ,
	Page 25		Page 27
1	MIT I M I C I	1	1 24 1 11 1 12 24
1	Mr Justice Megarry. In fact, as we point out in our	1	concerned with because we are really dealing with
2	case at paragraph 57, it is a case where, under the then	2	post-administration interest:
2 3	case at paragraph 57, it is a case where, under the then rules, the debts in question were provable debts	2 3	post-administration interest: "Any surplus remaining after payment of the debts
2 3 4	case at paragraph 57, it is a case where, under the then rules, the debts in question were provable debts because, under the then law, it was possible to bring	2 3 4	post-administration interest: "Any surplus remaining after payment of the debts proved shall, before being applied for any purpose, be
2 3 4 5	case at paragraph 57, it is a case where, under the then rules, the debts in question were provable debts because, under the then law, it was possible to bring a claim for late tort claims, and indeed any other	2 3 4 5	post-administration interest: "Any surplus remaining after payment of the debts proved shall, before being applied for any purpose, be applied in paying interest on those debts"
2 3 4 5 6	case at paragraph 57, it is a case where, under the then rules, the debts in question were provable debts because, under the then law, it was possible to bring a claim for late tort claims, and indeed any other claim, that there was a solvent liquidation. So it is	2 3 4 5 6	post-administration interest: "Any surplus remaining after payment of the debts proved shall, before being applied for any purpose, be applied in paying interest on those debts" Which means all of the proved debts in respect of
2 3 4 5 6 7	case at paragraph 57, it is a case where, under the then rules, the debts in question were provable debts because, under the then law, it was possible to bring a claim for late tort claims, and indeed any other claim, that there was a solvent liquidation. So it is not a case of non-provable debts.	2 3 4 5 6 7	post-administration interest: "Any surplus remaining after payment of the debts proved shall, before being applied for any purpose, be applied in paying interest on those debts" Which means all of the proved debts in respect of the periods during which they have been outstanding
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	case at paragraph 57, it is a case where, under the then rules, the debts in question were provable debts because, under the then law, it was possible to bring a claim for late tort claims, and indeed any other claim, that there was a solvent liquidation. So it is not a case of non-provable debts. So we say that, looking at the matter as a matter of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	post-administration interest: "Any surplus remaining after payment of the debts proved shall, before being applied for any purpose, be applied in paying interest on those debts" Which means all of the proved debts in respect of the periods during which they have been outstanding since the company entered into administration. In other
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1	administrator to pay interest, it is not a debt or	1	company, and yet money that is "the company's" is being
2	liability of the company itself.	2	used to pay money which is not a liability of the
3	LORD REED: Is it not an obligation?	3	company. It is a bit odd.
4	MR MILES: It is an obligation placed on the administrator	4	MR MILES: There is nothing particularly odd about that, it
5	to apply any surplus, but we say it is not an obligation	5	is saying that this is how interest is going to be dealt
6	of the company for the purposes of the contractual rule.	6	with. I don't accept that there is anything peculiar
7	So there is an obligation, statutory duty, placed on the	7	about saying that, on the one hand, it is something that
8	administrator to make the payment if there is a surplus,	8	the administrator needs to do in respect of the surplus,
9	but it is not an obligation of the company for the	9	but at the same time saying that it is not to be treated
10	purposes of the contract.	10	as a liability of the company.
11	LORD SUMPTION: Is that a real dichotomy? I mean, it is the	11	LORD KERR: Is it not incidental to the debt owed by the
12	duty of the officeholder to pay liabilities of the	12	company to the creditor?
13	company. On what basis do you say that this is not	13	MR MILES: Well, no, because it is a form of compensation to
14	a liability of the company? I understand that is your	14	all proved creditors, effectively, in respect of
15	submission, but how do you get it out of this provision?	15	a period since the beginning of the administration. It
16	MR MILES: We say that it is not something for which	16	is saying they have all been harmed, if you like, by the
17	a creditor could bring a separate claim. You cannot	17	fact of the administration, they have all been kept out
18	prove for it, by definition. The way that you claim in	18	of the money, but it is important that it is not just
19	the administration, as we have seen, is by putting in	19	based on whether they have a right outside the
20	a proof. What he can do is enforce the obligations of	20	administration because the rule says that they get this
21	the administrator through an action, as it were, court	21	whether they have a right outside the administration or
22	proceedings against the administrator requiring him to	22	not. So even if the underlying debt carries no right to
23	perform his statutory duty. But it is a bit like the	23	interest, they get their full share of the surplus under
24	situation of a claimant in an unadministered estate,	24	this provision.
25	where he doesn't have a claim to the asset, he cannot	25	LORD NEUBERGER: I understand conceptually entirely how you
	Page 29		Page 31
1	say that is his asset, but he is able to enforce the	1	put it, but the comparison with a will is not really
2	obligations of the administrator. We say that is the	2	a good one, is it, because here you are concerned with
3	right way of looking at it. It is a specific statutory	3	almost exclusively otherwise enforceable claims against
4	requirement placed on the administrator to distribute	4	the company, whereas in a will, of course, that is not
5	the assets, if any, amongst all proved creditors.	5	the territory you are really in, where somebody chooses
6	We say it is not a separate liability of the company	6	to leave their money in a certain way. You could invent
7	to the creditors. This ultimately goes back to the		
· ′		7	a claim, but it is a slightly dangerous analogy
8		7 8	a claim, but it is a slightly dangerous analogy, although Louite accept that, conceptually, if you are
8	question the word "obligation" is used in the	8	although I quite accept that, conceptually, if you are
9	question the word "obligation" is used in the agreement. We say it is not an obligation of the	8 9	although I quite accept that, conceptually, if you are right, it is entirely like a claim against trustees of
9 10	question the word "obligation" is used in the agreement. We say it is not an obligation of the company at all; this is a statutory direction to the	8 9 10	although I quite accept that, conceptually, if you are right, it is entirely like a claim against trustees of the estate to get on with distribution rather than
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1	a liability of the company, it is still an amount which	1	LORD CLARKE: Did the Court of Appeal grapple with this
2	has to be paid before the surplus remaining after	2	particular point?
3	payment of debts proved is applied for any other	3	MR MILES: Yes, they dealt with it and they said they
4	purpose. Reading paragraph (7).	4	concluded it was to be treated as a liability of the
5	MR MILES: Yes, but that is within the statutory scheme.	5	company.
6	I mean, the question we are faced with here, the first	6	LORD NEUBERGER: You say, I come back to the point, it is
7	question that we are looking at, is: where does the	7	not what it says. It involves implying words. You
8	subordinated debt lie? Now, if we are right, and this	8	don't need to imply words, and anyway you don't imply
9	is not an obligation statutory interest, for example,	9	words into a statutory or legislative provision unless
10	it is not an obligation of the company, therefore it	10	you have to.
11	cannot be part of the obligations to which we	11	MR MILES: Yes.
12	subordinated, it means that we would come out before,	12	Now, I am going to come on to the question of
13	because we would be a provable debt assuming we are	13	whether the subordinated debt is provable at all.
14	right on that point, which I will come back to and we	14	LORD NEUBERGER: Right.
15	would share with all the other creditors in the surplus	15	MR MILES: In relation to that, the judge held that it is
16	before anything else then happens to the surplus. So	16	not provable. The Court of Appeal held that it was
17	the question ultimately goes back to the question of	17	LORD NEUBERGER: They agreed with almost all his reasoning
18	where we lie in the rankings.	18	but not quite all, didn't they?
19	LORD NEUBERGER: But if you are not a provable debt, then do	19	MR MILES: Not quite all, and they disagreed with him on
20	the words Lord Reed has identified present you with	20	this point. Lord Justice Lewison dealt with this at
21	a problem, saying you rank ahead of interest?	21	paragraphs 38 to 41.
22	MR MILES: If we are not a provable debt then so this is	22	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
23	on the assumption that we are not provable. In that	23	MR MILES: That is at page 541 and 542. We make six fairly
24	circumstance, I think we would have to accept that, if	24	short points in relation to this.
25	we are not provable at all, then perhaps I can think	25	First of all, we say that the subordinated debt,
	Page 33		Page 35
,	about that.	,	
1			
		1	which is just an agreement to pay a sum of money, albeit
2	LORD NEUBERGER: Okay.	2	conditionally, falls clearly within the definition of
3	LORD NEUBERGER: Okay. MR MILES: I have not got an immediate answer to that	2 3	conditionally, falls clearly within the definition of "debt" within rule 13.12 of the rules and "provable
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1	(Inaudible), it is a debt which arises under to which	1	The fourth point is if you then look at paragraph 7
2	a company is subject at the date on which it goes into	2	of the agreement, which is set out in paragraph 37 of
3	liquidation, or is a debt or liability to which	3	the judgment.
4	a company may become subject after that date by reason	4	LORD NEUBERGER: You just referred to that, yes.
5	of any obligation incurred before that date. Payment is	5	MR MILES: These are the parts which are particularly relied
6	conditional on the condition being satisfied, and that	6	upon by LBIE and were relied upon by the judge for
7	is a classic contingent liability. So that is the	7	saying that the claim is not provable.
8	starting point.	8	LORD NEUBERGER: This is your third point, it was also part
9	Secondly, it would, we submit, be very surprising if	9	of your third point, saying there is nothing there that
10	the subordinated debt holder could not prove, given that	10	prevents proving.
11	it expressly has the right to institute proceedings for	11	MR MILES: You would expect it to be here if you find it at
12	the insolvency of the borrower. That is the clause we	12	all. If you look at what it does actually say this
13	looked at earlier on page 540 of bundle D, paragraph 34	13	is the fourth point in 7(d), first of all, there is
14	of Lord Justice Lewison's judgment.	14	an agreement not to attempt to obtain repayment of any
15	LORD NEUBERGER: Paragraph 540, yes.	15	of the subordinated liabilities otherwise than in
16	MR MILES: Page 540, paragraph 34 of the judgment. It says	16	accordance with the terms of this agreement.
17	in terms that the lender might enforce payment by	17	Now, we say that since winding up or administration
18	instituting proceedings for the insolvency of the	18	is allowed as a means of enforcing payment under the
19	borrower, and it is important to note there that it is	19	agreement, then participating in the winding up by
20	described as "enforcing payment". So the way that you	20	proving is clearly not something outside the terms of
21	enforce payment is through taking winding up proceedings	21	the agreement, or otherwise than in accordance with the
22	or insolvency proceedings, and proving is simply what	22	terms of the agreement.
23	follows from that. The point of winding up as	23	Additionally, if you put in a proof of a claim which
24	a creditor is to seek to take part in the collective	24	is contingent, that is to say conditional on the
25	process of recovery of amounts owing.	25	satisfaction of some condition set out in the agreement,
	Page 37		Page 39
1	Third there is nothing in personant 7 or anywhere	1	and that is seem aloins seem and applies a servent
1	Third, there is nothing in paragraph 7 or anywhere	1	and that is your claim, you are not seeking payment
2	else of the agreement we will look at paragraph 7 in	2	otherwise than in accordance with the terms of the
2 3	else of the agreement we will look at paragraph 7 in a minute which expressly prohibits proving. As	2 3	otherwise than in accordance with the terms of the agreement because you are simply saying, "I will be paid
2 3 4	else of the agreement we will look at paragraph 7 in a minute which expressly prohibits proving. As I say, the fact that you can take the proceedings in the	2 3 4	otherwise than in accordance with the terms of the agreement because you are simply saying, "I will be paid according to my rights, ie when the condition is
2 3 4 5	else of the agreement we will look at paragraph 7 in a minute which expressly prohibits proving. As I say, the fact that you can take the proceedings in the first place leads to the expectation that you would be	2 3 4 5	otherwise than in accordance with the terms of the agreement because you are simply saying, "I will be paid according to my rights, ie when the condition is fulfilled".
2 3 4 5 6	else of the agreement we will look at paragraph 7 in a minute which expressly prohibits proving. As I say, the fact that you can take the proceedings in the first place leads to the expectation that you would be able to prove and, therefore, if it was going to be	2 3 4 5 6	otherwise than in accordance with the terms of the agreement because you are simply saying, "I will be paid according to my rights, ie when the condition is fulfilled". LORD NEUBERGER: Lord Justice Lewison said so.
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10 (Pages 37 to 40)

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1	Justice Lewison did, rely on this to show that it is	1	I now want to turn, if I may, to the question of
2	well known that that is something you can do if you wish	2	currency conversion claims, which is perhaps the most
3	to do so, but another form of subordination is to allow	3	involved point in this appeal.
4	proof to take place, and that is what we have got here.	4	It is helpful to start here, we suggest, with an
5		5	
	This deals with the point that Lord Neuberger		anatomy of what exactly the claim being brought is. One
6	raised LORD NEUBERGER: Can we take this as read for the moment?	6	place to find it is in the statement of facts and issues
7		7	which is in bundle A, page 175 and it is in footnote 4.
8	MR MILES: Yes.	8	LORD NEUBERGER: What paragraph?
9	LORD NEUBERGER: You say it is right and it helps to support	9	MR MILES: Sorry, it is in footnote 4, so it is at the
10	your points 4, 5 and 6 indeed, 3, yes, I understand.	11	bottom of the page.
11 12	MR MILES: This deals with the point you raised which is	12	LORD CLARKE: Where is the footnote referred to in the text?
13	whether it is valid at all.	13	MR MILES: Sorry, 26.2.
14	LORD NEUBERGER: Okay.	14	LORD CLARKE: Yes, I see, thank you.
	MR MILES: This suggests that it is valid.	15	MR MILES: This is an attempt to provide an anatomy of what
15	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.		the claim is, and it is useful to start with this,
16	MR MILES: That is to say where the creditor agrees not even	16 17	I suggest: " a claim that arises if a creditor had a claim
17	to prove.		
18	LORD NEUBERGER: Very well, thank you.	18	enforceable against the company denominated in a foreign
19	MR MILES: We say the Court of Appeal was right on the	19	currency"
20	question of whether the debt was provable and that is	20	Pausing there, that means a provable claim. So you
21	all we have to say about	21	start with the idea that the underlying debt is
22	LORD NEUBERGER: It is fair to say, while we are on this	22	a provable claim.
23	passage perhaps I encouraged you to pass over it too	23	" that claim is converted into sterling at the
24	quickly there was some support for the next	24	prevailing rate at the date of the administration under
25	proposition, the Court of Appeal having agreed with you	25	the rule. Between that date and the date or dates of
	Page 41		Page 43
1	on this point, that you then take it away by saying it	1	the dividends, sterling depreciates against the foreign
2	is worth nil. That	2	currency with the result that dividends paid to the
3	MR MILES: Yes. It is worth nil until they said that	3	creditor in respect of their proved claim are, when
4	because they said it ranked after the statutory interest	4	converted into foreign currency at the respective dates
5	and the non-provable claims. If we are right about the	5	of payment, in aggregate lower than the claim
6	ranking, it would not be worth nil, it would be worth	6	denominated in the foreign currency"
7	the full amount.	7	Now, the hypothesis, therefore, is that the
8	LORD KERR: This is your anterior point, is it?	8	underlying debt itself is a provable claim. Secondly,
9	MR MILES: Yes, this is an anterior point.	9	in the circumstances we are looking at here, it is being
10	LORD NEUBERGER: All I am putting to you is might it be said	10	paid in full. This point only arises if it is paid in
11	that part of what is said in this passage in Goode is	11	full, according to the valuation given by the rules.
12	unhelpful to you on that point?	12	In relation to this part of the case, the key rule
13	MR MILES: No, we suggest not, because it seems right that	13	is obviously rule 2.86. That was based on the rule in
14	if the ranking is against us, as it were, then you would	14	winding up, which is rule 4.91, and 4.91 is in
15	indeed value the claim at nil, but that just means that	15	materially the same terms. 4.91 was introduced for the
16	it is a contingent claim like any other.	16	first time in the 1986 insolvency legislation. It
17	LORD NEUBERGER: I see.	17	doesn't appear in any predecessor legislation at all.
18	MR MILES: It is a contingent claim which is provable.	18	As we have seen, it appears as part of a group of rules
19	The mistake that the judge made, and which we	19	concerning the valuation of claims.
20	suggest LBIE is perpetuating, is the idea that we cannot	20	Another rule that was made for the first time in the
21	even prove until the conditions have been fulfilled, and	21	1986 legislation is rule 2.88, almost adjacent to
22	there is nothing in the agreement or anywhere else which	22	rule 2.86. The group of rules that you find there, not
23	suggests that that is right. We can prove that the	23	all of them but some of them were new in the 1986
24	valuation of the claim is another matter.	24	legislation.
25	That is what I wanted to say about the first issue.	25	Now we submit that the scheme of the statute here is
I			
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claim satisfied? 1 very simple and very straightforward. To bring a claim 1 2 LORD NEUBERGER: You say, read that way, I think, 2 for payment in the insolvency, the creditor has to claim 3 3 in writing, that is to say prove. Where the claim is Lord Hoffmann's dictum, which Lord Justice Moore-Bick played so much part on, actually works in your favour. 4 for a debt denominated in a foreign currency, it is 4 5 automatically converted for the purpose of valuation 5 MR MILES: Exactly. 6 into sterling, once and for all, as at the 6 LORD NEUBERGER: Yes, I see. 7 MR MILES: We also say that the rule on currency conversion, 7 administration date. 8 8 there is obviously a general rule which is intended to Equally, looking at the other rules about things 9 9 like contingencies and so on, they are all valued as at strike a fair balance between the various stakeholders 10 the administration date. It is coming up with a uniform 10 of the company being at various ranks of the creditors and, indeed, ultimately its members, and inevitably, 11 11 cut-off date. Dividends are then paid in sterling. We 12 12 say that to the extent that payments are made to when you have these general rules in an insolvency, 13 13 there are going to be winners and losers in particular creditors, the claims of those creditors are satisfied. 14 LORD NEUBERGER: I understand. 14 situations when measured against the parties' 15 15 MR MILES: The hypothesis, as we have seen, is that contractual rights. But those are general rules of general application 16 dividends of 100 per cent paid are evidence(?) of proved 16 17 17 across an insolvency, and, again, we say that where the 18 Court of Appeal went wrong and where CVI's arguments go 18 If there is a surplus of assets after paying the 19 claims of the proved creditors through the proving 19 wrong is making a sort of abstract appeal to what they 20 say is just or fair outcome without having proper regard 20 process, that surplus is then to be divided amongst the 21 proved creditors as statutory interest under rule 2.88, 21 to the general rules and the fact that there will be, as 22 22 I say, winners and losers in any given situation. That because that is what the statute tells you. But once 23 23 the creditor, including the foreign currency creditor, is something that is a theme of their arguments but we 24 has been paid 100 per cent of the proof as valued by the 24 say doesn't really meet the question that we are having 25 rules, plus statutory interest, he then has no further 25 to deal with. Page 45 Page 47 1 claims against the assets of the company, whether under 1 Now, it is helpful also to bear in mind, just as 2 some theory of remission to contract or otherwise. 2 a general preliminary point, that as far as we are 3 3 There is just nothing in the statute that allows it. We aware, there is no case where something which arises out 4 say, in other words, that payment in full, in accordance 4 of a provable claim, or could be seen as part of 5 with the statutory scheme discharges that claim. 5 a provable claim, is also bringable as a non-provable 6 6 Now, there is a suggestion, and we will look at it 7 in a bit of detail in a moment, that insolvency doesn't 7 As we have seen from the way the claim is described 8 8 affect the claim for creditors at all. That is in the agreed statement of facts, this is a claim which 9 9 itself is a provable claim. What happens is that you really --10 10 LORD NEUBERGER: Underlying contractual rights. have a foreign currency claim for X. It is proved, it 11 MR MILES: Yes. 11 is valued, dividends are paid for it in accordance with 12 12 that valuation, but if you then convert the dividends LORD NEUBERGER: Against the company. 13 MR MILES: And then it is said: and what is more, the 13 back into something else, what is there? Well, 14 14 insolvency does not convert those claims into some other ultimately, there is just a shortfall in payment of the 15 legal thing, some other legal res, but what that is 15 proved claim, but it is a shortfall that arises under 16 16 ignoring is the fact of payment in accordance with the and by reason of the statute itself. 17 17 statutory scheme. Now, it is different from something like 18 If you like, the fault line in the arguments between 18 post-liquidation interest. Post-liquidation interest is 19 19 the parties is not does the mere fact of the insolvency never provable. If there is then a rule which says, in 20 convert the claim into something else, is that what has 20 certain circumstances, if there is a surplus left, 21 the substantial effect? The fault line between the 21 post-liquidation interest may be payable, that is not 22 22 parties is, looking at the rules, where there is a claim then saying that you are getting a further claim arising 23 23 out of the pre-liquidation bit of the interest. It is in insolvency, it is valued in accordance with the 24 insolvency statute and there is payment in full of the 24 something different. 25 25 What we will find here when we look at it is there claims so valued in accordance with the statute, is the

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1	is a basic incoherence at the heart of the argument.	1	with these provisions and paid, the effect is to satisfy
2	What they are trying to do is bring in an approved claim	2	the claims.
3	twice.	3	Can I remind you, again and it is useful,
4	Now, we make	4	perhaps, to see it again in this context of
5	LORD NEUBERGER: The interest may be contingent, as it were,	5	paragraph 15 of the Court of Appeal's judgment.
6	on the proved debt, but it is not part of the proved	6	LORD NEUBERGER: That principle about assuming every debt
7	debt, whereas here you say you are getting	7	yes.
8	MR MILES: It is just part of the original debt.	8	MR MILES: Not just that, it is to include in it as much as
9	LORD NEUBERGER: You have a hybrid	9	possible, but you will also see the passage goes on to
10	MR MILES: It is an unpaid portion of the original debt.	10	say:
11	LORD NEUBERGER: I understand. Unpaid portion of	11	" and in one way or another discharge all such
12	an original debt which, under the scheme, has been paid	12	debts and liabilities."
13	in full, repaid in full.	13	And Lord Justice Lewison summaries that we say
14	MR MILES: Under the scheme itself, exactly.	14	accurately:
15	LORD NEUBERGER: I see.	15	"Thus one of the aims of the law of insolvency is
16	MR MILES: After those preliminary remarks, our first	16	for discharge of debts by proof and payment."
17	principal submission and I am afraid to say my	17	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
18	submissions are to some extent going to overlap. It is	18	MR MILES: You, Lord Neuberger, also quoted that same
19	inevitably one of those areas where the points do	19	passage in Nortel.
20	overlap with one another, but I am going to try, if	20	LORD REED: Mr Miles, you say, do you, that payment of
21	I may, to organise my submissions under a number of	21	a proved debt in full by a 100 per cent dividend
22	heads. The first of those is that, where provable	22	operates to discharge the underlying liability?
23	claims are valued under the (Inaudible) of the 1986	23	MR MILES: Yes, subject to a possible right to statutory
24	legislation, and paid in full according to that	24	interest, which is a separate statutory
25	valuation, the creditor's only remaining claim in	25	LORD NEUBERGER: That doesn't give you any difficulty; you
	Page 49		Page 51
1	magnest of the courts of the comment is a mosaible alsim	1	and it is amonificably doubt with
1	respect of the assets of the company is a possible claim	2	say it is specifically dealt with.
2 3	to statutory interest from any surplus. LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	3	MR MILES: Yes, exactly. More than that LORD NEUBERGER: And it is not part of the debt.
4		4	MR MILES: And more than that, as we will see, it is the one
5	MR MILES: If we go back to rule 2.86 in F3, page 2011, as we have already seen, it is part of a collection of	5	place that tells you how surplus is dealt with, because
6	rules in part 2, chapter 10 dealing with the	6	it expressly deals with that. I will come back to that.
7	valuation	7	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
8	LORD NEUBERGER: Part of the mandatory scheme, yes.	8	MR MILES: Again, the passage which Lord Neuberger referred
_	MR MILES: Part of the mandatory scheme called the		to earlier, from Wight v Eckhardt, and I will come back
10	quantification of claims.	10	
10	qualitification of claims.		to that as well also refers to the discharge of debts
11	LODD MELIDEDGED: Voc		to that as well, also refers to the discharge of debts
11	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	11	through payment.
12	MR MILES: What it says is:	11 12	through payment. Now, there are examples of this in the rules, apart
12 13	MR MILES: What it says is: "For the purpose of proofing a debt which has	11 12 13	through payment. Now, there are examples of this in the rules, apart from 2.86, so in 2.85, which is the rule on set-off,
12 13 14	MR MILES: What it says is: "For the purpose of proofing a debt which has occurred or payable in a currency other than sterling,	11 12 13 14	through payment. Now, there are examples of this in the rules, apart from 2.86, so in 2.85, which is the rule on set-off, which you will find at 2008, where there are mutual
12 13 14 15	MR MILES: What it says is: "For the purpose of proofing a debt which has occurred or payable in a currency other than sterling, the amount of the debt shall be converted into sterling	11 12 13 14 15	through payment. Now, there are examples of this in the rules, apart from 2.86, so in 2.85, which is the rule on set-off, which you will find at 2008, where there are mutual claims, the rules on set-off operate by way of payment,
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1	in the administration.	1	rule.
2	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes, the rest, as you say, is paid in full,	2	LORD NEUBERGER: I am just wondering how it would work if
3	yes.	3	the set-off was in relation to debts and counter-debts
4	MR MILES: Yes, that is because he has been paid.	4	in different currencies and the currencies then moved in
5	LORD NEUBERGER: Quite.	5	different directions.
6	MR MILES: Above that, you will also see that the rules on	6	MR MILES: That is an important point, which is not
7	how you deal with contingent debts and future debts are	7	necessarily just to do with set-off. It is something
8	incorporated by reference into this rule. You will see	8	I will come back to in due course, you could have also
9	that at 5 and 6.	9	a case where there is a contract which has a number of
10	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	10	payment obligations in different currencies.
11	MR MILES: So a valuation process takes place. For the	11	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
12	purposes of set-off, the same rule as applies in	12	MR MILES: One of the questions which arises is how does
13	contingent debts is applied here, the same rule as	13	that work in a case where one of the currencies
14	applies in relation to future debts is applied here, and	14	appreciates against sterling and the other depreciates.
15	you end up with a number at the end of it which is then	15	LORD NEUBERGER: You say all these problems disappear if you
16	described as the balance which is provable in the	16	are right.
17	administration.	17	MR MILES: Yes.
18	Lord Hoffmann	18	LORD NEUBERGER: But it doesn't mean that you are therefore
19	LORD REED: 6 deals also expressly with foreign currency	19	right.
20	debts.	20	MR MILES: No, I am not going to jump to that conclusion,
21	MR MILES: It does, I should have pointed that out. That is	21	but it is a factor which you should take into account.
22	incorporated again into the rule and it operates by way	22	LORD NEUBERGER: I see.
23	of payment.	23	MR MILES: And I will come back to that.
24	It has been famously said by Lord Hoffmann in a case	24	Again, in relation to future debt, we have seen the
25	called Stein v Blake that the rule has substantive	25	rules on future debts. You prove for the full amount in
	Page 53	<u> </u>	Page 55
1	effect. I am not going to turn it up now, it is in F1,	1	relation to future debt. If the debt is still future at
2	tab 20, and the passage you want is at page 1508 at D	2	the time when the payment by the administrator is to be
3	to F.	3	made, it is discounted at a statutory rate of 5 per cent
4	LORD NEUBERGER: Thank you.	4	back to the date of administration and paid.
5	MR MILES: As I said a bit earlier, it is important not to	5	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
6	get too hung up on the precise language of substantive	6	MR MILES: Now, both Mr Justice David Richards and
7	effect as opposed to procedural effect. There seems to	7	Lord Justice Lewison in this case said that, where there
8	have been a bit of debate about that, what is	8	is then payment of the discounted amount, that operates
9	substantive and what is not. We say the important thing	9	by way of discharge of the debt, of the full proved
10	is if there is payment in accordance with the rules, it	10	amount. That you will find in Mr Justice David
11	operates by way of discharge of the debt, and that is	11	Richards's decision at paragraph 77, page 625, and
12	the really important thing.	12	Lord Justice Lewison at paragraph 94.
13	In other words, the insolvency regime does not	13	LORD NEUBERGER: You get interest, don't you? You may
14	operate merely by way of a procedural stay, which is how	14	discount back and then if (overspeaking)
15	CVI argues it, it operates to affect the rights of the	15	MR MILES: There may be, yes.
16	creditors substantively.	16	LORD NEUBERGER: you get interest.
17	LORD NEUBERGER: 6(a), relating as it does to currency other	17	MR MILES: It may be a complication involving interest, but
18	than sterling, does not take the present case any	18	the point of substance is that if you get paid the
19	further, does it, because both the debt and the	19	discounted amount, that operates by way of discharge of
20	counter-debt are valued at the same date, at the same	20	the claim.
21	exchange rate, as it were. I suppose you could have	21	LORD NEUBERGER: I see, yes.
22	a case where the claim is in euros and the counterclaim	22	MR MILES: You don't, as it were, come
23	is in dollars, and there could be a	23	LORD NEUBERGER: No, you can't then
24	MR MILES: As it has turned out, there is no separate point,	24	MR MILES: You cannot then come back and say, "Ah, well,
25	as it were, arising from the operation of the set-off	25	there are now some assets left at the end of this
		1	
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1	insolvency, I want a top up".	1	our submission that payment of the claim operates by way
2	LORD NEUBERGER: But it could be said you get	2	of discharge.
3	a compensation, you will be double counting, because you	3	Now, if you then go back to rule 2.86, we say that
4	get the discounted rate back to the date of the	4	it does have substantive effect, at least to the extent
5	administration order, but you get interest, whereas	5	of payment being made in accordance with it. Indeed, it
6	there is no compensating feature for the currency	6	must be common ground that it has some effect as regards
7	appreciation, is there?	7	payment because you have to ask what happens when
8	MR MILES: That's right.	8	sterling appreciates against the foreign currency.
9	There is another point to note in relation to the	9	Now, in those circumstances, the creditor gets more
10	rule on future debts, and this is something that runs	10	than he would have done outside the insolvency. But he
11	through these rules also. The rule on future debts	11	is entitled to keep that amount, there is no provision
12	itself changes the rights of creditors to this extent,	12	under the statute for saying, oh, he has to give some
13	that is to say a creditor would not otherwise be able to	13	back.
14	claim the money if it is a future debt. He would not	14	LORD NEUBERGER: I understand.
15	have been outside the administration able to issue	15	MR MILES: Lord Justice Lewison made this point in
16	a writ or execute for it. Nonetheless, under the	16	paragraph 100, and he also made a further point which is
17	insolvency regime, he is able to prove for it in full.	17	worth looking at. It is at page 548(?). Sorry, it is
18	He gets a discounted payment on it, but it is another	18	a long paragraph, but if you can go down to 6
19	example of how the insolvency regime affects creditors'	19	LORD NEUBERGER: This is his 10 points?
20	rights. It is just completely wrong to say that this	20	MR MILES: Yes, but it is worth bearing in mind that these
21	regime does not have any effect on underlying factual	21	are not his only 10 points, these are 10 points on, as
22	rights, which is the broad submission which is made	22	it were, his third point. It is sometimes suggested
23	against us.	23	that these are his only 10 points. They are not his
24	Again, in relation to contingent claims, we say that	24	only 10 points.
25	where claims are valued under the rules and paid, it	25	LORD NEUBERGER: Anyway, we are looking at the sixth of his
	Page 57		Page 59
1	an anotas human of discharge. Name there is a disht	1	non archaire 10 maints
1	operates by way of discharge. Now, there is a slight	1	non-exclusive 10 points.
2	wrinkle here in that, as Lord Justice Lewison described	2	MR MILES: Exactly.
2 3	wrinkle here in that, as Lord Justice Lewison described at paragraph 95 of his judgment, it is possible to bring	2 3	MR MILES: Exactly. Now, that is about halfway down the paragraph, and
2 3 4	wrinkle here in that, as Lord Justice Lewison described at paragraph 95 of his judgment, it is possible to bring us to seek to review or amend your proof if the	2 3 4	MR MILES: Exactly. Now, that is about halfway down the paragraph, and he makes a point about where it appreciates, which is
2 3 4 5	wrinkle here in that, as Lord Justice Lewison described at paragraph 95 of his judgment, it is possible to bring us to seek to review or amend your proof if the contingency then occurs after you have been paid, but	2 3 4 5	MR MILES: Exactly. Now, that is about halfway down the paragraph, and he makes a point about where it appreciates, which is the point I have just made.
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22 MR MILES: This was a case about a seller of a boat, a 23 vessel, to a buyer in Bangladesh and the price was to be 24 paid by a letter of credit and also for the buyer to 25 provide a deposit as a guarantee in a Bangladesh branch Page 61 1 of the bank, which happened to be BCCI. 2 BCCI itself is incorporated in the Cayman Islands. 3 The buyer procured the letter of guarantee from the bank 4 but then all of the branches of the bank were closed by 5 the banking regulators and the buyer didn't then open 6 the letter of credit, so the company claimed under the 9 guarantee. 8 Then the dates are important. In January 1992 the 9 bank in Cayman was wound up, the company lodged a proof 10 in the winding up in Cayman and then in August 1992, so 11 after the commencement of the winding up, there was 12 a scheme established under Bangladeshi law divesting all 13 of the assets and liabilities of the branches in 14 Bangladesh in a new bank, and as the Privy Council in 15 this case decided, that had the effect of discharging 16 the original liabilities and replacing them with a new 17 liability owed by a new bank in Bangladesh. 18 The liquidators in Cayman then rejected the proof in 19 the Cayman liquidation and the company claimant, or 19 applicant, raqued that it had – this was its 20 argument – that it had a vested right to prove in the 21 Cayman liquidation which had a risen as a matter of law 22 because of the winding up, and that replaced the 23 underlying contract, and therefore that the right to 24 prove, as they put it, was unaffected by the Bangladeshi 25 underlying contract, and therefore that the right to 26 prove, as they put it, was unaffected by the Bangladeshi 27 prove, as they put it, was unaffected by the Bangladeshi 28 marked a submission on 29 read that paragraph 27. If I could perhaps just invite you to 29 read that paragraph and then I will make a submission on 29 it. 20 LORD NEUBERGER: Yes. 3 MR MILES: Also, if we just look at the other part his 24 reasoning, which is in 31 and 32, essentially wha	20	that. That is in F1, tab 23.	20	real nature of the claim was transformed by the winding
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1 1 called somewhere, in some places, remission to contract except in the sentence where he then goes on to say they 2 2 are discharged by the winding up only to the extent that or reversion to contract --3 3 they are paid out of dividends. LORD NEUBERGER: Yes. 4 So we say that is exactly the point we are making. 4 MR MILES: -- which you find in a series of cases, the most 5 They are affected, they are discharged here to the 5 famous of which is called Humber Ironworks. 6 extent that they are paid out of dividends, and since 6 LORD NEUBERGER: Yes. 7 7 MR MILES: That was concerned with interest and the decision the statute tells you who you to value the debt for the 8 8 in the case was that post-liquidation interest was not purpose of payment, if it tells you the debt is worth 9 9 £100 and £100 is paid, the debt is discharged. a provable debt, but where there was a surplus after the 10 So we say that the Court of Appeal was rather sort 10 payment of provable debts, creditors with contractual 11 rights to interest, only those with contractual rights 11 of beguiled by this case into thinking that there is 12 some general principle that the insolvency has no effect 12 to interest, should be able then to rely on an old rule 13 13 on contractual rights. That is just entirely wrong. Of that, where payments were made, dividends are 14 course, as with any judge and judge's comments, they 14 attributable first to interest and then to principle. 15 always have to be read in the context of the case and we 15 It is a rule which in this context is known as a rule in Bower v Marris, but derives from a general principle 16 suggest they have been ripped from their proper context. 16 17 Now, it is also instructive in this regard perhaps 17 that a creditor can appropriate payments to interest. 18 LORD NEUBERGER: (Inaudible) particular applications of that 18 to see how CVI seeks to frame the issue in this case. 19 If you look at the core volume C, tab 2, page 456 at 19 rule of appropriation. 20 MR MILES: And it is found also in the administration of 20 paragraph 6, the way they seek to frame the issue is to 21 say that the issue is whether, in such circumstances, 2.1 estates more generally, but that was the decision in 22 22 that case. that surplus is to be applied in discharging the unpaid 23 23 balance of the creditors' foreign currency claims which Now, there are a number of things to note about 24 have not been satisfied as a result of the payment of 24 that. First, the line of authority was concerned with 25 25 post-insolvency interest payable under contracts, not dividends in sterling, pursuant to the proof process, or Page 65 Page 67 is instead to be distributed to the shareholders of the 1 more general, and on the recommendations of the Cork 1 2 2 Committee, the 1986 legislation of course made new 3 3 Now, that way of putting it, there is a very provision for statutory interest. That is rule 2.88, 4 important assumption. The assumption is that payment in 4 which we have looked at. 5 sterling of claims converted into sterling by the 5 For complete accuracy, I should say that is the 6 6 equivalent of the winding up rule which was then statute does not discharge the debt, the claim against 7 the company in the insolvency. In other words, the 7 introduced when --8 LORD NEUBERGER: Yes, you have told us. really important point in this case is actually buried. 8 q 9 MR MILES: The act was changed later, but I am going to keep They don't (Inaudible), no doubt, because this way of 10 putting it is a helpful framing of the issue for them, 10 putting it that way, if I may. Under that, as we have seen, that changed the law 11 but if one reads all of this in another way and says, 11 12 well, the payment of £100 for the debt which has been 12 very significantly. 13 converted into £100 and 100 has been paid, what is there 13 LORD NEUBERGER: Yes. 14 14 MR MILES: First, in relation to pre-insolvency interest, it left then? What is this unpaid balance? What is the 15 unpaid balance of the creditors' foreign currency claim? 15 is now possible to prove not merely if there was 16 16 a contractual right to it, but also if there isn't. So It is also worth looking at paragraph 10 while we 17 17 creditors who did not have a contractual right can now are at this, looking at this document, because there 18 they put the matter in terms of a windfall to the 18 claim for that 19 19 LORD NEUBERGER: Secondly, if you have a contractual right, members but, again, that is, with respect, to assume the 20 very thing that this argument is about. If they have 20 you can opt for the higher rate if you want. 21 been paid in full for claims that they make and they get 21 MR MILES: There is a higher rate. 22 Secondly, where there is a surplus, as we have seen, 22 statutory interest, then there is no question of 23 windfall to anyone else. They have been paid in 23 after the payment approved debts, it is to be divided 24 accordance with the statutory scheme. 24 amongst the proved claims at the higher of the 25 25 Now, they also rely on the concept which has been contractual rate or judgment rate, and that is whether Page 66 Page 68

17 (Pages 65 to 68)

1	or not the debt is interest bearing. That is	1	MR MILES: I have but I want to just draw your attention to
2	a completely new rule which you will find in any of	2	the last set, which I have not looked at yet.
3	the it does not come out of any of the previous case	3	"I do not therefore consider that reversion to
4	law. It is an entire different regime, in other words,	4	contract theory applies to provable claims."
5	from remission to contract.	5	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
6	Lord Justice Lewison dealt with this point at	6	MR MILES: The point that is being made here is that, where
7	paragraph 92, page 555.	7	there was a reversion to contract theory, it was dealing
8	LORD NEUBERGER: He really makes your point. It might be	8	with something which itself was not provable. That is
9	said that this is against you, the legislature or the	9	to say the treatment of post-liquidation interest,
10	executive has dealt with the reversion to contract in	10	effectively. That was not a provable claim, never has
11	relation to interest but it has not said anything about	11	been, never was at the time of Humber Ironworks, or any
12	that in relation to currency or other things.	12	of the cases on reversion to contract, and this is
13	MR MILES: But the only place where this was ever found in	13	a important point, although it is only expressed very
14	the case law was in relation to interest.	14	briefly by Lord Justice Lewison. There is no room, we
15	LORD NEUBERGER: I understand that.	15	say, for the reversion to contract theory in any case in
16	MR MILES: It is a point which was considered essentially	16	relation to claims which themselves are provable.
17	with the appropriation of payments, a rule in	17	LORD NEUBERGER: Are you saying that invents a new concept
18	Bower v Marris, and the idea was that, if there is	18	of hybrid claims?
19	a surplus, it was possible then to revert the contract.	19	MR MILES: Exactly.
20	LORD NEUBERGER: I understand.	20	LORD NEUBERGER: I see your point. Thank you.
21	MR MILES: There is nothing in any of the cases, with the	21	Is that a convenient moment?
22	exception of one obiter comment, which we will come on	22	MR MILES: It is a good moment.
23	to, which was an obiter comment of	23	LORD NEUBERGER: We will resume again at 2.00. Thank you
24	Lord Justice Brightman to suggest that there was	24	very much, Mr Miles.
25	a non-provable claim in relation to currency conversion.	25	Court is now adjourned.
	Page 69		Page 71
		1	
1	I will some healt to that comment in due course but the	1	(1.01 mm)
1	I will come back to that comment in due course, but the	1	(1.01 pm)
2	bigger answer to the point is that it makes sense to	2	(The Luncheon Adjournment)
2 3	bigger answer to the point is that it makes sense to read all of these provisions together as part of	2 3	(The Luncheon Adjournment) (2.00 pm)
2 3 4	bigger answer to the point is that it makes sense to read all of these provisions together as part of a collection of provisions to do with the valuation of	2 3 4	(The Luncheon Adjournment) (2.00 pm) LORD NEUBERGER: Mr Miles.
2 3 4 5	bigger answer to the point is that it makes sense to read all of these provisions together as part of a collection of provisions to do with the valuation of claims in an insolvency.	2 3 4 5	(The Luncheon Adjournment) (2.00 pm) LORD NEUBERGER: Mr Miles. MR MILES: My Lords, the next point I was going to make was
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question. So by participating in the administration, they have benefited overall, even leaving aside their current claims, so even leaving aside this currency conversion claim which is brought.

So they are not seeking, as it were, an adjustment of rights to bring them into line with where they would have been outside the administration, they are asking for something more. One can easily postulate other examples.

As we have seen, if sterling appreciates against the given currency, the creditor who proves stands to benefit, so you could easily take a case where a creditor has more than one claim even under the same contract but in different currencies. There is no suggestion that he would have to, as it were, give credit for some benefit he had had under the statutory

What they are saying is that they should be able to bring this claim without bringing into account the various benefits from it, and the Court of Appeal accepted that argument. What they are not trying to do is actually be remitted to the contractual position they would have been in.

Now, this leads on to our second main submission, which is that our interpretation of rule 2.86 and the

First, there are a number of possible stakeholders who are affected by the currency conversion rule. There are sterling creditors, who are also able to prove; there are genuine, what you might call non-provable debt debts; there are then those claimants whose claims are subordinated by statute under rule 12(3)(ii)(a). There are contractually subordinated creditors, there are preferential shareholders, and, ultimately, equity shareholders, ordinary shareholders. All of those have a potential interest in the assets of the company, and to the extent assets are extracted at a higher level before it gets to them, they obviously lose out.

Now, to appeal in these circumstances to some sort of concept of abstract fairness detached from the rules we say is actually apt to mislead. We are dealing here with an overall statutory scheme which inevitably proceeds on the basis of general rules.

But take one example of those various stakeholders I mentioned. Suppose you have a group of non-preferential claimants, so perhaps the easiest case to think of is the one in the T&N case that Mr Justice David Richards looked at before the change in the rules. So these are tort claimants who would have a claim but the damage only occurred after the insolvency date. We now know that the rules have been

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other valuation rules in chapter 10, section C of the 1986 rules is an attempt by the legislature, we suggest, to strike a fair balance between the interests of foreign currency, creditors, as against the interests of other creditors and members, and there are inevitably where you have general rules of that kind going to be winners and losers in any given concrete situation, but the general rule is what embodies the legislature's view of what is fair. These rules are also intended to promote the aims of simplicity and expeditious insolvencies, which is a point Lord Justice Lewison made in his judgment.

Now, CVI -- again, rather like their reliance on Wight v Eckhardt -- rely on this incredibly broad argument that because generally members come after members, it is self-evidently just, they say there, that the foreign currency creditor should have another slug of money before any surplus is returned to the members. As I say, they present this as an overwhelming point and, indeed, the majority of the Court of Appeal appears to have been impressed by this point. But the general proposition that members come after creditors, though correct as far as it goes, does very little, we suggest, to inform the debate on this point, and there are a number of points here.

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changed so they have been brought in as provable 1 2 claimants, but before that change they were non-provable 3 debt debts.

> Now, take them for example. We say that an appeal to some sort of idea of abstract justice does not take you very far. Take the competition between them and the foreign currency claims. If currency conversion claims exist, the foreign currency claimants will, under the hypothesis we are looking at, have been paid 100 per cent of their claims as valued by the statute and they will have been paid full statutory interest on the proved claims. But, it is being said, they should then compete with non-provable claimants.

Now, if you start appealing to abstract concepts of justice, you might very well say that is a highly contentious position. You might even think it is wrong. There doesn't seem to be any obvious reason why other kinds of non-provable claimant should only come into competition with these foreign currency claimants. Indeed, we suggest that if you are going to make appeals to abstract justice, it actually points the other way.

Lord Justice Lewison made essentially this point at paragraph 96 of the judgment, at page 557, and we say that he is right. He says at the end of that paragraph: "Nor is there any reason to impose the risk of

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19 (Pages 73 to 76)

1	currency fluctuations on creditors with non-provable	1	a commercial relationship.
2	claims."	2	So we say that Lord Justice Briggs gave far too much
3	He must be right as a matter of policy.	3	weight in this particular context to the principle of
4	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	4	party autonomy and ignored the very important point that
5	MR MILES: Now, we also make the point that this is not just	5	the company is in administration.
6	a point that is restricted to the position of other	6	CVI also relies on, as did the Court of Appeal, on
7	non-provable claimants. Indeed, we say that even as	7	the passage which no doubt you have seen from
8	regards members, so the people who are last, as it were,	8	Lines Brothers, which was in the Court of Appeal and it
9	they too have a legitimate interest in the assets of the	9	is the obiter passage
10	company and they are affected by the operation of the	10	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
11	rules as well. CVI says that they come last, so somehow	11	MR MILES: in Lord Justice Brightman. That is in F1,
12	it is self-evidently just that, if there are claims,	12	tab 15.
13	they should be met, but one then asks the question, and	13	LORD NEUBERGER: Are the relevant passages quoted in the
14	I go back to the example: what happens when sterling	14	judgment or not? Okay, take us to the
15	appreciates? Sterling appreciates, the creditors with	15	MR MILES: Do you mind if I take you to the judgment? I'm
16	foreign currency claims do better than they would have	16	not sure that they're
17	done had there not been an administration, in other	17	LORD NEUBERGER: Where do we go?
18	words had the conversion not taken place. They stand to	18	MR MILES: It is F1, tab 15.
19	get more money.	19	LORD NEUBERGER: Thank you. Yes.
20	Now, take that example. Not only are the other	20	MR MILES: And the passage is at 1370/1371. It is important
21	provable claimants affected, the sterling claimants,	21	to bear in mind this is all pre-1986, so it is before
22	affected by that, they get less of the dividend, but if	22	the 1986 legislative changes, and it is before,
23	dividends are paid 100p in the pound and statutory	23	therefore, any statutory rule on currency conversion.
24	interest is paid on top of that, the members too lose	24	There was no rule.
25	out from that. That is one of the consequences of	25	It was a creditors voluntary liquidation and the
	Page 77		Page 79
	1 age //		1 age //
1	rules.	1	company owed 18.5 million Swiss Francs to a bank. The
2	The members have got, if you like, a contingent	2	liquidators, following a practice which had been
3	interest in the assets of the company, just as	3	followed for about 100 years before then, converted all
4	subordinated creditors have, and there is no reason, we	4	the foreign currency claims to sterling at the date of
5	say, in abstract justice, why, if they get more when the	5	the winding up and paid dividends in sterling. Sterling
6	currency appreciates, they should not also be affected	6	then depreciated and, after the payment of provable
7	when the currency depreciates. It is simply the affect	7	debts, there remained a surplus.
8	of the application of general rules to creditors'	8	The question that the Court of Appeal dealt with was
9	claims.	9	whether that surplus should go to pay post-liquidation
10	Lord Justice Briggs seemed to think that there was	10	interest to creditors under the principles in
			interest to creations under the principles in
11	an important point in favour of the foreign currency	11	Humber Ironworks or whether it should be paid to the
11 12	an important point in favour of the foreign currency claimants, namely that they bargained for payment in the	11 12	
			Humber Ironworks or whether it should be paid to the bank in respect of the fluctuations in currency, and the Court of Appeal held that the surplus should be paid to
12	claimants, namely that they bargained for payment in the	12	Humber Ironworks or whether it should be paid to the bank in respect of the fluctuations in currency, and the
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12 13 14	claimants, namely that they bargained for payment in the foreign currency. But while that is a fair point to make outside an insolvency, it just does not accommodate the problems which arise once the statutory insolvency regime comes into application. One can meet the point	12 13 14	Humber Ironworks or whether it should be paid to the bank in respect of the fluctuations in currency, and the Court of Appeal held that the surplus should be paid to creditors for post-liquidation interest. So that was the decision in the case, and indeed it appears from the argument that the liquidators didn't
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1	(Pause).	1	an officeholder to manipulate exchange rates to the
2	LORD NEUBERGER: In the end he sets out the argument and	2	detriment of the foreign currency creditor in the way
3	expresses his conclusion between F and G.	3	that was submitted to the Court of Appeal in
4	MR MILES: That's right.	4	Lines Brothers. The officeholder must pay foreign
5	LORD NEUBERGER: You say it is tentative and obiter?	5	currency debts in sterling at the rate of exchange
6	MR MILES: We say that and we make another point, and this	6	prevailing at the date of conversion whether the
7	is really the reason I have taken you to the passage.	7	exchange rate moves for or against the foreign
8	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	8	currency."
9	MR MILES: If you look at the point which was being pressed	9	So we say that that passage, which is much relied
10	by Mr Stubbs on behalf of the bank and you can see	10	upon by the Court of Appeal in this case, really doesn't
11	this between B and C on page 1371 he deals with the	11	provide any great assistance when one is dealing with
12	case where sterling falls against the Swiss currency,	12	the 1986 legislation.
13	but then he says:	13	The next point I wanted to make is if, having seen
14	"Per contra, if sterling had been revalued upwards,	14	all of that, you then look at the text and context of
15	it would, it is said, be open to the liquidator, like	15	rule 2.86, that supports the conclusion that there is no
16	any other foreign currency debtor, to discharge the	16	room for a further claim once the sterling amount
17	company's obligation in the currency of the contract, so	17	required to be paid has been paid in full.
18	in the end the foreign currency creditor will get the	18	Now, the starting point when considering the
19	worst of both worlds. He will gain nothing if the	19	interpretation of the 1986 legislation is that it is to
20	exchange rate moves against the currency of the contract	20	be read as a new departure and not as if the previous
21	and he will lose if it moves in favour of the currency	21	law applied.
22	of the contract."	22	Authority for that can be found in a decision of
23	So, in other words, the argument that was being	23	Mr Justice David Richards in a follow up to this case,
24	advanced was that it was a win/win for the liquidator:	24	which is known as Waterfall IIA, which you will find
25	you win if the currency goes up, you win if it goes	25	I don't ask you to look at it now at F1, tab 14,
	Page 81		Page 83
	1 age of		1 age 03
1	down, and the argument was being made it was a lose/lose	1	page 1325, paragraph 129.
1 2	down, and the argument was being made it was a lose/lose for the creditor.	1 2	page 1325, paragraph 129. LORD NEUBERGER: Thank you.
2	for the creditor.	2	LORD NEUBERGER: Thank you.
2	for the creditor. Now, that is an interesting argument, but it doesn't	2 3	LORD NEUBERGER: Thank you. MR MILES: We also note from paragraph 86 of
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1	a rule which deals with surplus expressly, which is	1	The second point is we say it cannot seriously be
2	2.88(7), which tells you what happens in respect of	2	suggested that when setting out these words, when what
3	surplus.	3	the draughtsman had in mind was that the claimant could
4	Now, the third point is that this is to be read	4	bring both a provable claim and a non-provable claim in
5	together with rule 2.72, 1994	5	respect of the same debt, and, therefore, by using these
6	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	6	words, he was deliberately leaving open the non-provable
7	MR MILES: which we looked at before, which tells you	7	bit of it but saying this rule only applies to the
8	what it means to prove in an administration. That means	8	provable bit. We say that is a really farfetched
9	essentially claiming in writing to be a creditor of the	9	submission. They are not actually limiting words at
10	company.	10	all, they are not intended to preserve something, they
11	LORD NEUBERGER: Recovery of debt in whole or in part, is	11	are just describing the subject matter of the claim
12	the point.	12	brought by the claimant in the foreign currency. They
13	MR MILES: Yes. The reason for those words that you have	13	are just descriptive words.
14	just picked up, Lord Neuberger, is that if you hold	14	If you think perhaps they are intended to provide
15	security, you are not required to prove	15	some limit, there is another way of explaining it, which
16	LORD NEUBERGER: Absolutely.	16	is to say that this rule doesn't affect the position of,
17	MR MILES: You can choose to hang on to your security and	17	for example, sureties or co-debtors or security and it
18	you can prove in part for your debt, which is why	18	preserves the position in relation to those.
19	someone would do it. Obviously that is not what we are	19	But we say you don't even need that, it is just
20	dealing with here. They have proved in full for their	20	a description of the subject matter of the rule, and all
21	claim in foreign currency and the question is: what is	21	it is saying is where the creditor is claiming in
22	the consequence of that?	22	respect of a foreign currency debt, it shall be
23	Now, going back to 286, having just seen that rule	23	converted. It is nothing more than that.
24	on proving, the Court of Appeal was very struck, it	24	So we say that the Court of Appeal were really
25	appears, by the words "for the purpose of proving	25	misled by these words into thinking there was more in
	Page 85		Page 87
1	a debt". Lord Justice Briggs regarded that, it seems,	1	this claim than there really is.
2	as a highly important point at paragraph 148 of his	2	The third point on the words is that
3	judgment.	3	Lord Justice Briggs drew a distinction between this
4	Now, one has to ask oneself the question: where	4	wording and the wording in 2.85, which he accepted had
5	would this go to? It appears that what is being said is	5	substantive effect. That is the rule on set-off. He
6	that those words, "for the purpose of proving a debt",	6	said that the rule on set-off doesn't contain the same
7	are to be read as meaning something like, "for the	7	kind of phrase for the purpose of proving a debt.
8	purpose of proving but not for the purpose of bringing	8	But if you look at rule 2.85 which starts at
9	a non-provable claim in respect of the same debt".	9	page 2008, we have looked at this already, but you will
10	Something like that. In other words, they are to be	10	see at sub-rule (8) that it says:
11	read as limiting words or as words designed to reserve	11	"Only the balance, if any, of the account owed to
12	a different kind of claim.	12	the creditor provable in the administration."
13	Now, we suggest that the words just cannot carry	13	And he accepts that that reflects a rule of
14	anything like that weight. If you read it together with	14	substantive effect, but it uses the language of
15	2.72, which is the rule we just looked at on proving,	15	provability. It says that only the balance shall be
16	"for the purpose of proving a debt" simply means in	16	provable, and we say that, in substance, that is no
17	a case where a person is claiming to be a creditor of	17	different from the opening words of 2.86, which talk
18	the company in the foreign currency. It then says,	18	about something being for the purpose of proving a debt.
19	where that is happening, the amount of the debt which he	19	So we say, again, that if you do look at the other
20	is claiming shall be converted into sterling. That is	20	
			rules, including those which are acknowledged to have
21	the natural way of reading this. It just means where	21	substantive effect, the same language of provability
22	the person, the creditor, has claimed payment in respect	22	applies. The same can be said of the rule on contingent claim.
23	of a foreign currency debt. It shall then be converted.	23	The same can be said of the rule on contingent claim
24 25	That is the first point, and that is quite a simple	24	at 2.81, that is page 2004, where you will see that in
25	textual point.	25	rule 2 it says:
	Page 86		Page 88
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"Where the value of a debt is estimated under this 1 make, is that the absence of any statutory machinery for 2 2 rule, the amount provable in the administration in the dealing with the claims which are now asserted, these 3 3 case of that debt is valid(?) the estimate for the time currency conversion claims, or their ranking against 4 4 other claims, also tells against their existence. 5 This repeated refrain of provability is only saying 5 There is nothing in the statute to tell you how you 6 would value these claims or when they should be valued 6 that the amount that can be claimed in the 7 7 administration is that amount. or when they should be paid, and the contrast with the 8 8 LORD NEUBERGER: Yes. position of provable claims under chapter 10 here is 9 9 MR MILES: We also rely on the historical background to striking. It sets out in prescriptive terms how claims 10 this, reports of the Law Commission and Cork Committee. 10 are to be valued and how they are to be paid. 11 We have set that out, or rather it is probably better to 11 Now, this is something which is rather brushed aside 12 say Lord Justice Lewison set that out in his judgment 12 and Lord Justice Briggs was inclined to say it was 13 and summarised their effect in paragraph 85 of the 13 something that could be sorted out by the chancery 14 judgment. 14 judges, but, with respect, that is rather to miss the 15 He sets out the relevant passages at paragraph 65 15 point. It is the absence of any statutory provisions 16 which is a passage from the Cork report. He goes 16 about any of these points which is so striking. through this historically, dealing with the cases there 17 I have already touched in the context of questions 17 18 were at that point, and at 82, where he deals with 18 of fairness on these points, but it is entirely unclear 19 a report of the Law Commission which was 19 how this would work. 20 20 Go back to the example of the tort claimants in the in October 1983, and he comes to the conclusion that 21 they support the view that there was, as it were, to be 21 T&N case. Supposing that they brought claims late on in 22 22 no compensation for foreign currency creditors where the administration. How are their claims on the Court 23 23 of Appeal's approach to be dealt with as against there was depreciation of the currency. 24 Lord Justice Briggs, as far as the statutory background 24 currency conversion claims? How do you select a date 25 25 went or the history went, agreed at paragraph 156 that for valuing the claims in order to try and create some Page 89 Page 91 it supported the interpretation that we are putting sort of idea of fairness? How do you decide on the 1 1 2 forward. But as I say, he was rather impressed, it 2 ranking of those claims? There is not a hint of it in 3 3 seems, by the words for "for the purpose of proving", the statute and we say that the lack of anything about 4 4 which we say just don't have the impact that he thought this in the statute is telling. 5 5 Lord Justice Lewison dealt with this at 6 Now, we have set out the history in our case at 6 paragraph 96, page 557. You have looked at that already 7 7 paragraph 78 and following and I am not going to go you but this is dealing with a slightly different point, 8 8 through that again. The main answer that CVI come up which is that, as he says about two-thirds down the 9 Q with is to make the rather implausible suggestion, we paragraph: 10 suggest, that when the Law Commission reported 10 "It is not provided for in the rules and it is 11 in October 1983 and referred to the current state of the 11 impossible to see what would be the appropriate date in 12 12 law, or rather the present law, they had quoted that order to do justice as between different classes of 13 obiter passage from Lord Justice Brightman and they say, 13 non-provable claim." 14 oh, well, the present law includes the obiter comment of 14 There is nothing in the statute which gives you the 15 Lord Justice Brightman. But we suggest that is quite 15 answer to that. 16 an implausible reading of it, because in their report at 16 Contrast the position of the claims regarded as they properly are as provable claims, there is an absolutely 17 paragraph 2.23, which you will find at F8, tab 10, 17 18 18 page 3820, what they actually said was that there was no basic principle of insolvency law that they are all 19 direct authority on the point and they pointed out that 19 valued as at the cut-off date. That is the key way that 20 what Lord Justice Brightman had said was obiter. So it 20 you try and create a pari passu distribution. There is 21 is very unlikely that they took the view that his 21 nothing like that in relation to these claims. Are they 22 comments represented the present law. 22 simply valued when they are asserted? Are they to be 23 23 valued when they are paid? How does that apply if you So we say that the interpretation we put forward is 24 strongly supported by the legislative background. 24 have a series of non-provable claims coming in? 25 25 The next point, the next main submission I wanted to We say the absence of anything that even gives you Page 90 Page 92

1	a clue as to how to deal with that is very striking. It	1	The theory which is now being advanced in the
2	is not enough, as Lord Justice Briggs said, to say,	2	current case would go against that and would go against
3	well, it is something that could be worked out on a case	3	that in a very important way because what it does is to
4	by case basis. It doesn't meet the point.	4	allow the assertion of various claims based on the idea
5	LORD REED: Can I ask you, Lord Justice Lewison made what	5	that parties have contractual rights which are not
6	I read as being a rather more fundamental point on the	6	affected by the insolvency and then to assert them.
7	basis of or by reference to Lord Justice Oliver's	7	There is the currency claims in this case, of
8	judgment in Lines, the point being that debt or	8	course, but in Waterfall IIA, which was a subsequent
9	liability are defined as meaning debt or liability to	9	decision of
10	which the company is subject at the date on which it	10	LORD NEUBERGER: You have referred to it already, yes.
11	goes into administration, and it is said it is	11	MR MILES: I have referred to that already. I will just
12	a misreading of Miliangos to think that because	12	give you the reference. That is in F1, tab 14.
13	a contract requires \$1,000 to be paid, therefore the	13	A number of other related arguments were run. So,
14	company's liability is \$1,000; the liability is the	14	for example, it was argued that the principle which
15	sterling equivalent.	15	I have already described of Bower v Marris, which is the
16	So if what you are concerned with is a liability to	16	idea of appropriation of debts, first against interest
17	which the company is subject at the date it goes into	17	and then against principle, survives in the case where
18	administration, then the liability is the sterling	18	there is a surplus, notwithstanding the terms rule 2.88.
19	equivalent of \$1,000 on that date, and if you pay that	19	Mr Justice David Richards rejected that argument.
20	amount, you have discharged the liability. That is the	20	There was also the argument that there is
21	rather	21	a non-provable claim in respect of the delay in paying
22	MR MILES: Yes. I am grateful. In a way, that goes back to	22	statutory interest. You will have seen that statutory
23	the very first point I was making, but I agree with	23	interest is calculated in respect of the period from the
24	that. He used the example also of, I think, an amount	24	insolvency cut-off date up to the date of payment of the
25	of gold, didn't he?	25	debt in full, and there was an argument based on
	Page 93		Page 95
1	LORD REED: Yes, you find that a bit earlier on in	1	reversion to contract that if that was not as much as
2	Mr Justice Lewison's judgment.	2	the creditors would have got under their contract for
3	MR MILES: That's right.	3	the whole period, then they can have another go. They
4	The next point	4	can claim again in respect of that. The judge also
5	LORD NEUBERGER: Lord Justice Lewison really says that,	5	rejected that argument.
6	quite apart from the arguments you have been putting	6	There were also arguments based on the Sempra Metals
7	forward on the rules and the wording, and the	7	case, which is essentially another way of arguing for
8	conception, he says, the fundamental conception is	8	interest on the basis that people should be compensated
9	consistent with his contemplation of what the nature of	9	for being kept out of their money. It is essentially
10	the debt is.	10	a contractual argument.
11	MR MILES: Yes.	11	There was a whole series, in other words, of
12	LORD NEUBERGER: What the obligation is.	12	arguments, not just currency conversion claims, which
13	MR MILES: The next point I wanted to make is that if the	13	were all being run on the basis of the reversion or
14	court does recognise the existence of these claims, and,	14	remission to contract theory.
15	indeed, other non-provable claims in related areas based	15	We say that this goes against the grain of the
16	on this idea of complete remission to contract, it would	16	insolvency legislation, which is to bring as much as
17	undermine the policy objective of simplifying and	17	possible into the ambit of the proof process and not to
18	streamlining insolvency administrations.	18	leave these loose ends. We say that exactly the same
19	Now, I don't suggest that that policy is an absolute	19	sort of reasoning as is being deployed in this case, the
20	one because, of course, there are bound to be	20	idea of very broad interpretation of Wight v Eckhardt,
21	complications in particular cases, but we have seen that	21	a very broad interpretation of the idea of reversion to
22	the trend of authority is to broaden the scope of what	22	contract, leaves open all of these further claims. Some
23	is meant by provable and to encompass as much as	23	of them probably have not even been thought of yet and
24	possible in the process of proof and the discharge of	24	a lot of legal ingenuity has been put into coming up
25	debts through payment.	25	with these claims, but the underlying principle of them
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1	is the same.	1	Then in the next tab, this is where we say the real
2	If this court recognises them in this case, what it	2	dispute comes, section 330, final distribution:
3	is actually doing is opening the door to a whole series	3	"When the trustee has realised all the bankruptcies
4	of non-provable claims. That is not said in terrorem,	4	stayed, or so much of it as can in the trustee's opinion
5	it is said because reading the statute in a sensible way	5	be realised without needlessly protracting the
6	does not, we say, leave open a hint that that is what	6	trusteeship, he shall give notice at a prescribed moment
7	the legislature intended. On the contrary, one of the	7	of the intention to declare a final dividend or no
8	legislative objectives was to simplify procedures and	8	dividend."
9	allow for the reasonably speedy winding up and	9	And then, if you go down to 5, and this is where the
10	administration of companies.	10	real dispute is:
11	Now, the next point is a slightly different	11	"If a surplus remains after payment in full and with
12	character of point, which is that it is instructive to	12	interest of all the bankrupt's creditors and the payment
13	see the position in personal bankruptcy because we say	13	of the expenses of the bankruptcy, the bankrupt is
14	that there is no room in personal bankruptcy for foreign	14	entitled to the surplus."
15	currency claims and there is no reason to think that the	15	Now, in a bankruptcy, the bankrupt himself is then
16	legislature would have intended a different outcome for	16	discharged from provable debts but not from non-provable
17	personal	17	debts. So the scheme is he gets the surplus under 335.
18	LORD NEUBERGER: Is it common ground that there is no room?	18	LORD NEUBERGER: And he is then liable to be sued for
19	MR MILES: No.	19	non-provable debts.
20	LORD NEUBERGER: It isn't?	20	MR MILES: For non-provable debts but not provable debts.
21	MR MILES: No, that is part of my submission.	21	He gets complete discharge in respect of
22	I will deal with this fairly	22	LORD NEUBERGER: In a way, it brings us back to the same
23	LORD NEUBERGER: It is a fairly	23	argument as we have here.
24	MR MILES: rapidly if I can.	24	MR MILES: It is not, with respect, because we say the
25	Shall I see if I can identify the point of	25	answer to this is that this the first point in
	Dags 07		Dagg 00
	Page 97		Page 99
1	difference between us?	1	330(5), you have to ask yourself the question, first of
2	LORD NEUBERGER: That would be very helpful.	2	all: what is meant by "all the bankrupt's creditors",
3	MR MILES: I will just take you through this quite quickly.	3	and this is the first difference between us.
4	If you could start at F2 at tab 43, this is	4	CVI say that means the provable and non-provable
5	a general rule, which is that:	5	creditors. So they say that it only goes back after
6	"Wherever the trustee has sufficient funds in hand	6	payment of the creditors, including the non-provable
7	for the purpose, he shall, subject to retention of such	7	creditors. But we say that is not a realistic
8	sums as may be necessary for the expenses of bankruptcy,	8	interpretation when you go through the sequence of
9	declare and distribute dividends amongst the creditors	9	sections that we have just been through. It is clear
10	in respect of the bankruptcy debts which they have	10	that this is talking, we say, about provable creditors
11	respectively proved."	11	because they are the people to whom the distribution is
12	So proved debts. The concept of bankruptcy debts is	12	to be made, and (5) simply follows on from (1) in this
13	defined in section 382, which is at 1806, tab 46 of the	13	section, which is to do with paying a dividend, and the
14	same bundle.	14	earlier provisions that we have seen, and in particular
15	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	15	324 are clearly dealing only with provable debts.
16	MR MILES: It is essentially in the same terms as rule 13.12	16	So we say that they are just wrong about that, that
17	of the insolvency rules. So what one is dealing with is	17	it is quite clear that this section, when it talks about
18	provable debts.	18	"all the bankrupt's creditors", means the provable
19	Then, if you could go back to tab 44, section 328	19	creditors, and it would be very odd were that not the
20	sets out the priority of debts. So they will be	20	case, the surplus goes back after payment of the
21	essentially in (iii), debts which are neither	21	provable creditors.
22	preferential debts nor debts to which the next section	22	As for the question of discharge, again, we say that
23	applies, and then you will see in (iv), this is where	23	the point is clear that what this is intending to do is
24	the statutory interest comes in, bankruptcy, surplus,	24	say that the bankrupt is discharged from bankruptcy
25	paid by way of statutory interest.	25	debts, and if you go back to the definition of that in
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1 382, he is discharged from all of these debts, and we 1 LORD NEUBERGER: Okay.	
2 say if you look at 382, one of the debts he is 2 MR MILES: The final point that I wanted to make	this is
discharged from is the foreign currency claim because it a now quite a fundamental point, going back to the	
4 is a debt or liability to which he was subject at the 4 examination of the claims we suggest there is	
5 commencement of the bankruptcy, or a debt or liability 5 something essentially incoherent about the claim v	hich
6 to which he may become subject after commencement of the 6 is being run anyway.	
7 bankruptcy by reason of any obligation incurred before 7 It seems that the claim has to be seen either as	
8 the commencement of the bankruptcy. So he is discharged 8 some sort of claim for compensation arising from t	he
9 from those and all of the surplus is paid over to him. 9 operation of the statutory regime itself, which is ve	ry
10 So we say when you look at those sections together, 10 difficult to imagine, or it is merely part of the prov	ed
they show that there is no room for a currency 11 claim. It is part of the proved claim no doubt	
12 conversion claim in respect of person bankruptcy. 12 expressed in the foreign currency that then remains	3
13 LORD NEUBERGER: Have I missed something? You accept he 13 unsatisfied by the payment of dividends expressed	in
14 remains liable for non-provable liabilities? 14 that foreign currency. But that would appear simp	y to
15 MR MILES: I accept that it is probably better to put it 15 be the definition itself, the definition of a proved	
16 this way around: he is discharged from all bankruptcy 16 debt.	
17 debts as defined in 382. That is 17 LORD NEUBERGER: You say in a sense it is now you	ou don't see
18 LORD NEUBERGER: What is really said against you is this 18 it and now you do, or the other way round.	
19 doesn't apply ex hypothesi to non-provable debts, for 19 MR MILES: Yes, and we say that is not legally cohe	rent.
which he remains liable, and then that brings one back 20 If you go back to what is meant by a debt here, i	n
21 to the point that it is said insofar as there is a claim 21 F1, tab 6, 1184, this is the rule that you looked at i	n
for the balance, it is a non-provable debt. 22 (Inaudible), a debt in relation to the winding up of	a
23 MR MILES: But then you have to find a way, we say, if that 23 company, and it is applied, I should say, by (5) to	
24 argument is right, of finding out how it does not fit 24 administrations, means any of the following:	
25 within 382, which is the definition of bankruptcy debts. 25 "Any debt or liability to which a company is sub-	ject
Page 101 Page 103	
1 Because if he is discharged from the bankruptcy debts, 1 at the date at which it goes into liquidation, or any	
2 which he is, if the claim would fall within 382, he is 2 debt or liability to which the company may becom	
3 discharged from that. 3 subject after that date by reason of any obligation	
4 LORD NEUBERGER: For my part, it does seem to me that the 4 incurred before that date."	
5 arguments are not that dissimilar, and even if you are 5 If it falls within that, it is a proved debt. It is	
6 right on this, in the end, there are differences 6 impossible to see really why it doesn't fall within (b),
7 between 7 because what is being asserted is a claim, a debt of	•
8 MR MILES: There are, but 8 liability, to which the company may become subje	ct after
9 LORD NEUBERGER: You say this is not a sensible difference 9 the date by reason of an obligation incurred before	that
10 to have. 10 date. But the reason the claim arises, they say, is,	
11 MR MILES: That's right. There are no policy reasons.	
12 LORD NEUBERGER: When the bankruptcy and winding up or 12 pre-liquidation or pre-administration, and (2) decli	ne
13 administration provisions are drafted, they are drafted 13 in the currency. So, in other words, it is just	
not all together with one eye on the other, and there 14 a contingent provable claim, if it exists at all.	
15 will be occasional inconsistencies, but I see your 15 But, of course, it cannot be a provable claim	
16 point. 16 because that would be legally absurd.	
17 MR MILES: There will be, but there is also a general 17 LORD NEUBERGER: It is inherent in the present e	xchange rate
18 underlying objective in the legislation to assimilate 18 that it doesn't.	
19 the two where possible. 19 MR MILES: Yes, that that can happen, and the rules	on what
20 LORD NEUBERGER: Put it this way, if we are against you on 20 is provable tell you that you have to convert it into	
your arguments so far, this is unlikely to get you home. 21 sterling. There cannot be, as it were, a second	
22 MR MILES: If, on the other hand, you think that 22 provable claim.	
23 LORD NEUBERGER: If we are with you, you get comfort from 23 Now, they try and get out of that argument by	
24 it. 24 saying, well, it can't really be a provable claim	
25 MR MILES: I think that is a fair way of putting it. 25 because that would be contrary to the pari passu	
Page 102 Page 104	

1	principle and it would be contrary to the idea of there	1	LORD NEUBERGER: We are running half an hour ahead of
2	being a single cut-off date, so they cannot do that.	2	schedule.
3	That will not do because if it fits in the words, then	3	MR MILES: Yes, we are.
4	it just is a provable claim. You cannot say the words	4	MR WOLFSON: My Lord, we are.
5	don't really mean that for this kind of claim. It is	5	LORD NEUBERGER: I hope we can accelerate rather than
6	either within the words or it is not.	6	decelerate as a result of that.
7	We say this whole claim is legally incoherent. If	7	MR WOLFSON: I feel the pressure now and I have not actually
8	it exists at all, it would have to be a provable claim,	8	said anything yet.
9	but it cannot be a provable claim because that is	9	LORD NEUBERGER: That is just what I meant you to do.
10	absurd.	10	Submissions by MR WOLFSON
11	Now, the other way of putting it is to say that it	11	MR WOLFSON: As your Lordship will appreciate, I am
12	is a claim for some sort of loss which arises from the	12	addressing your Lordships on the determination of the
13	operation of the statute itself. Well, that cannot, we	13	Court of Appeal that if LBIE moves from its current
14	say, be a sensible reading of the statute. If the	14	distributing administration into liquidation, statutory
15	statute tells you how the valuation is to take place, it	15	interest which is payable in respect of the
16	cannot be sensible for there then to be a claim based on	16	administration period under rule 2.88(7) out of
17	the operation of a statute.	17	a surplus in the hands of LBIE's administrators, but
18	That seems to be the point, or that was a point	18	which is not in fact paid by those administrators, will
19	which, again, Lord Justice Lewison was struck by in	19	remain payable under rule 2.88(7) in the liquidation.
20	paragraph 100, again, this was	20	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
21	LORD NEUBERGER: One of his 10 points.	21	MR WOLFSON: This essentially the Court of Appeal's order at
22	MR MILES: One of his 10 points of 12, or whatever.	22	declaration 4, which your Lordships have in bundle D.
23	It is the first of the points. The way he puts it	23	LORD NEUBERGER: Thank you.
24	is to say there is only one contractual obligation. And	24	MR WOLFSON: So the factual premise, which is an important
25	the liability contracted by that obligation is provable	25	factual premise of these submissions, is that there is
	Page 105		Page 107
	<u> </u>		
1	<u> </u>	1	
1	in accordance with the rules. That is the point I have	1	in LBIE's administration a substantial surplus out of
2	in accordance with the rules. That is the point I have just been making.	2	in LBIE's administration a substantial surplus out of which statutory interest can be paid, but which the
2 3	in accordance with the rules. That is the point I have just been making. LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	2 3	in LBIE's administration a substantial surplus out of which statutory interest can be paid, but which the administrators decide (a) not to pay and (b) also decide
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2 3 4 5	in accordance with the rules. That is the point I have just been making. LORD NEUBERGER: Yes. MR MILES: "I agree with Mr Snowdon that it is impossible to suppose that when rule 2.86(1) and 4.91 [which is the	2 3 4 5	in LBIE's administration a substantial surplus out of which statutory interest can be paid, but which the administrators decide (a) not to pay and (b) also decide to go into liquidation. In summary, let me set out our three main
2 3 4 5 6	in accordance with the rules. That is the point I have just been making. LORD NEUBERGER: Yes. MR MILES: "I agree with Mr Snowdon that it is impossible to suppose that when rule 2.86(1) and 4.91 [which is the winding up equivalent] were introduced, parliament	2 3 4 5 6	in LBIE's administration a substantial surplus out of which statutory interest can be paid, but which the administrators decide (a) not to pay and (b) also decide to go into liquidation. In summary, let me set out our three main submissions in response to this. In summary, we say,
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1	that point later.	1	Lordships have that at F1/2.
2	We submit, contrary to that, as Lord Neuberger sets	2	It is critical in this regard to bear in mind that
3	out in Re Nortel, statutory interest in fact ranks	3	that provision was put in place in 1986 and has not been
4	number 6 in that waterfall and then only for the	4	changed, so it was put in place before distributing
5	liquidation period.	5	administrations or moves between administration and
6	Third, we seek to make a number of submissions as to	6	liquidation were possible. Your Lordships see that
7	the timing of the introduction of the relevant	7	under the heading, "This version in force from
8	provisions into the insolvency legislation, and this is	8	29 December 1986 to the present".
9	important because the relevant rule we are dealing with,	9	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
10	2.88(7) was inserted into the insolvency rules in 2003.	10	MR WOLFSON: So the issue arises which I am dealing with
11	I think my learned friend Mr Miles might have said this	11	because section 189(2) has not been amended to provide
12	morning that 2.88 came in 1996. 2.88(7) came in in 2003	12	for the statutory interest payable in the liquidation to
13	following the creation of the process of distributing	13	cover also the period of a preceding liquidation. And
14	administrations in the Enterprise Act 2002.	14	this is unlike the converse case, unlike the case where
15	As my Lord, Lord Neuberger said, these rules were	15	a winding up precedes an administration, where rule
16	amended and had to be amended to take account of two	16	2.88(7) has been amended by the insolvency amendment
17	important points: first of all, the creation of	17	rules in 2010 so that statutory interest payable in the
18	distributing administrations, and, secondly, the fact	18	administration also extends to the period of the prior
19	that you can move from administration into liquidation	19	winding up.
20	and also from liquidation into administration.	20	Your Lordships have that at F1/5, and your Lordships
21	We submit that, consistent with that legislative	21	see that essentially what the draughtsman has done is to
22	history, rule 2.88(7) does not flout and indeed take	22	assert the concept of the relevant date.
23	precedence over the longstanding provisions of the 1986	23	LORD NEUBERGER: Sorry, where are we looking?
24	act, which have, since 1986, and largely in unamended	24	MR WOLFSON: F1/5, the revised 2.88.
25	form, provided for the priority of various classes of	25	LORD NEUBERGER: I see. 1181, yes.
	, F		
	Page 109		Page 111
1	claims in liquidation, for example fixed charges,	1	MR WOLFSON: 1181, exactly.
2	liquidation expenses and preferential creditors.	2	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
3	• •		LOND NEODEROLK. 163.
5	Before developing those three points, let me say	3	
4	Before developing those three points, let me say a word about how the issue arises because we submit it		MR WOLFSON: And your Lordships see that, of course, what was done is you have the definition of the relevant date
		3	MR WOLFSON: And your Lordships see that, of course, what
4	a word about how the issue arises because we submit it is important.	3 4	MR WOLFSON: And your Lordships see that, of course, what was done is you have the definition of the relevant date and that, essentially, is the prior insolvency process.
4 5	a word about how the issue arises because we submit it is important. The issue arises because of two related points.	3 4 5	MR WOLFSON: And your Lordships see that, of course, what was done is you have the definition of the relevant date
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1	a third attempt to fill the lacuna, which is to allow	1	essentially, one has to look at the insolvency
2	claims for statutory interest in the administration	2	legislation as a complete code and apply it. This is
3	period to give rise to provable claims in the	3	not an area where, respectfully, the court should try to
4	liquidation.	4	rewrite primary legislation or create implied statutory
5	Until the (Inaudible) Court of Appeal, they conceded	5	charges.
6	that you could not run a provable claim argument, but	6	I am not sure whether I was write or wrong on the
7	then they reversed out of that and they maintained that	7	Greek point.
8	position, and that is their first cross-appeal before	8	LORD NEUBERGER: You were wrong.
9	your Lordships.	9	MR WOLFSON: Oh no, I apologise.
10	LORD NEUBERGER: Are you dealing with all three points?	10	LORD NEUBERGER: We can check. You can't, you are on your
11	MR WOLFSON: I was proposing to deal mainly with the first	11	feet. I think Lord Reed knew without looking up.
12	point. I will just say a word about the cross-appeals	12	MR WOLFSON: I will try and move from classical languages to
13	and I will deal with them if I need to say any more in	13	the rather more mundane points on the applicable rules.
14	the reply. We have set out our position on that in our	14	I was going to say a few words about the
15	written cases and I will give your Lordships the	15	cross-appeals but I will leave all that, if I may, until
16	reference in a moment.	16	after I have dealt with the Court of Appeal's approach.
17	LORD NEUBERGER: Right.	17	As I said earlier, it is important, we submit, to
	č	18	
18	MR WOLFSON: Essentially we say that the lacuna is not one	19	look at the legislative history and to appreciate how
19	which the court should fill.		this point has come about. Our essential point is that
20	LORD NEUBERGER: On the whole, if possible, it would be	20	section 189(2), there was nothing wrong with
21	quite good to hear, albeit in abbreviated form, if you	21	section 189(2) when it was passed and it remains
22	want, the totality of your arguments on this issue.	22	unamended. The initial context, your Lordships will
23	MR WOLFSON: I am happy to do that, my Lord.	23	appreciate, is a report of the Cork Committee, and your
24	LORD NEUBERGER: If you want to keep them short, that will	24	Lordships have that in F8, and the introduction of
25	not be objected to.	25	a complete code of post-insolvency interest, and then of
	Page 113		Page 115
	1480 110		1 480 110
1	MR WOLFSON: My Lord, what I will do is I will deal with the	1	course we have the Enterprise Act 2002 distributing
2	Court of Appeal solution first.	2	administrations and moves between administration and
3	LORD NEUBERGER: Of course, that is the one you are	3	liquidation.
4	appealing, I quite understand.	4	
_	MD WOLFGON F. 4		What the Cork Committee did was to identify the
5	MR WOLFSON: Exactly.	5	What the Cork Committee did was to identify the anomaly at that time between the availability of
6	LORD NEUBERGER: Is that what we are turning to now then?	l .	
		5	anomaly at that time between the availability of
6	LORD NEUBERGER: Is that what we are turning to now then?	5 6	anomaly at that time between the availability of interest at 4 per cent in a bankrupt's estate and the
6 7	LORD NEUBERGER: Is that what we are turning to now then? MR WOLFSON: Yes, I was just going to say a word about	5 6 7	anomaly at that time between the availability of interest at 4 per cent in a bankrupt's estate and the absence of any parallel provision in a company winding
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6 7 8 9 10 11	LORD NEUBERGER: Is that what we are turning to now then? MR WOLFSON: Yes, I was just going to say a word about calling it a lacuna. The first point we make is your Lordships will appreciate this is not a lacuna in the sense of a legal black hole which inescapably and inevitably arises.	5 6 7 8 9 10 11	anomaly at that time between the availability of interest at 4 per cent in a bankrupt's estate and the absence of any parallel provision in a company winding up, and they recommended that there be a common set of interest provisions in insolvency. For your Lordships' note, the reference is F8, tab 3, pages 315 to 316. Those provisions were accepted by the government
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		1	
1	The relevant rules applicable are set out in the same	1	company entered into administration."
2	judge's judgment in this case at D5, at paragraphs 18	2	So interests for the liquidation period and the
3	and then 113 to 117.	3	prior administration period would not be provable in
4	LORD NEUBERGER: Which paragraph of Lord Justice Lewison's	4	LBIE's winding up.
5	judgment were you talking about?	5	So, essentially, the scheme is that interest is
6	MR WOLFSON: He starts at paragraph 102.	6	provable until the date of entry into an insolvency
7	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes, thank you.	7	process, but thereafter the recovery is regulated by
8	MR WOLFSON: So the first point I was going to look at was	8	statute.
9	section 189, which you have at paragraph 104.	9	If LBIE therefore goes into liquidation after its
10	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes I see, thank you. Yes.	10	current administration, in the winding up, two points
11	MR WOLFSON: This was enacted in 1986 and it regulates	11	will apply. First of all, pre-administration interest
12	interest on debts in a winding up whether solvent or	12	and pre-liquidation interest will not be provable, that
13	insolvent. Paragraph 1, in a winding up he doesn't	13	is the effect of rule 4.93(1); and, secondly, statutory
14	set out paragraph 189, section 189(1), unfortunately.	14	interest under section 189(2) will only be payable for
15	For that you will have to go to F1, tab 2. There is	15	the period of the liquidation and not the prior
16	a point I want to make on section 189(1) because it says	16	administration.
17	this:	17	So the present issue essentially arises because
18	"In a winding up, interest is payable in accordance	18	section 189(2) has not been amended as rule 4.93 was.
19	with this section on any debt proved in the winding up,	19	Before Mr Justice David Richards, my learned friend
20	including so much of such debt as represents interest on	20	Mr Trace your Lordships will appreciate, the counsel
21	the remainder."	21	may change in this case, but the arguments remain
22	And we emphasise the words "in accordance with this	22	constant rose to the challenge, as the learned judge
23	section" because there is no indication in section 189	23	put it, of suggesting a policy reason or two as to why
24	that interest is payable in a winding up otherwise than	24	this might be the case. None of those policy reasons
25	in accordance with section 189. And that is certainly	25	impressed the learned judge.
	, and the second se	-	
	Page 117		Page 119
1	the way it has been understood by the various	1	We not it this way before your Lordshine; we simply
2	commentators. We have referred to Sealy & Milman, which		We put it this way before your Lordships: we simply don't know why section 189(2) has not been amended,
3	your Lordships have at F8, tab 17.	3	other than the obvious point that parliament is busy.
4	Section 189(2) is the provision which provides for a	4	It is most likely an oversight, as Mr Justice David
5	statutory interest in a liquidation, payable out of	5	Richards suggested in his judgment at paragraph 121, and
6	a surplus after payment of the debt proved in the	6	the learned judge is obviously also correct to note
7	winding up, and only in respect of the periods during	7	that, procedurally, it is much easier to amend the rules
8	which the debts have been outstanding since the company	8	than it is to amend primary legislation.
9	went into liquidation.	9	It is fair to say that there have been opportunities
10	Rule 4.93(1) describes the interest that can be	10	to address this lacuna. There has been quite a lot of
11	proved as part of a debt. Now, as originally enacted,	11	legislation in this area. The Deregulation Act 2015,
12	and your Lordships have this at F3, tab 51, rule 4.93	12	-
13	provided:	13	the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 also made changes to the administration and liquidation
14	"Where a debt proved in the liquidation bears	14	regimes. But the central point for my submissions is
15	interest, that interest is provable as part of the debt,	15	that section 189(2) has remained as it was and is since
16	except insofar as it is payable in respect of any period	16	enacted in 1986 and, as I say, before distributing
17	after the company went into liquidation."	17	administrations and moves between administration
18	So pre-liquidation interest is not provable. That	18	liquidation were made possible.
19	rule was amended following the Enterprise Act 2002 and	19	Therefore, we submit that this is not a case where
20	the amended form is at F3/53.	20	parliament made some mistake in drafting or enacting
21	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	21	section 189(2). Therefore, it is very different from
22	MR WOLFSON: Your Lordships see that what has been done is	21 22	cases which we will come to later where this court has
23	to add the words in square brackets there:	23	set out the basis on which the court can correct
23	"Or, if the liquidation was immediately preceded by	23	drafting errors in legislation. There was no drafting
25	the administration, any period after the date that	25	error in section 189(2) at the time it was passed.
43	and administration, any period after the date that	23	error in section 10/(2) at the time it was passed.
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1	There was no lacuna at that time.	1	the company entered administration"
2	The lacuna has arisen because section 189(2) has not	2	And then the square brackets have been added.
3	been amended to take into account other later changes to	3	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
4	the rules.	4	MR MILES: Then (7) is the surplus point.
5	That is the position as to payment of interest in	5	LORD NEUBERGER: Again, we looked at that.
6	a liquidation. To turn to the rules governing payment	6	MR WOLFSON: I will come to that. We emphasise the words:
7	of interest and administration, just to show your	7	" before being applied for any purpose, be
8	Lordships those provisions, that is obviously rule 2.88,	8	applied for paying interest on those debts in respect of
9	which is set out in Lord Justice Lewison's judgment just	9	the periods during which they have been outstanding and
10	in the next paragraph we were looking at.	10	since the company entered administration."
11	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	11	The court obviously will have noted the similarity
12	MR WOLFSON: But, my Lords, can I ask your Lordships just to	12	of wording between 189(2) and 2.88(7), and I will come
13	take it up in F1 for this reason.	13	back to that point as well.
14	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	14	LORD NEUBERGER: Okay.
15	MR WOLFSON: If your Lordships take it at F1, which is	15	MR WOLFSON: It is important to appreciate, as now occurs,
16	I think is where your Lordships were looking at it	16	when the administration proceeds a liquidation, prior
17	earlier today	17	to April 2010 there was a similar lacuna where there was
18	LORD NEUBERGER: That's right.	18	a winding up and then a subsequent administration,
19	MR WOLFSON: my learned friend Mr Miles said correctly	19	because 2.88(7) only provided for payment of interest
20	that part 10 should really be chapter 10.	20	since the date of entry into administration and didn't
21	LORD NEUBERGER: Page 2013, yes.	21	extend to the period of the earlier liquidation. That
22	MR WOLFSON: Page 1179, at least in mine.	22	lacuna was remedied through the amendments to rule 2.88
23	LORD NEUBERGER: Is it "Interest in administration"?	23	made by the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2010, which
24	MR WOLFSON: Yes, I am at 2.88(1), the version in force	24	amended the relevant provisions to read and your
25	from 1 April 2005 to 5 April 2010.	25	Lordship has it at F1, tab 5 it used the concept of
	Page 121		Page 123
١,	LODD MELIDED CED. Dec. 2012 Likely that is not seen as leader	,	4 1 414
1	LORD NEUBERGER: Page 2013. I think that is where we looked	1	the relevant date.
2	at it with Mr Miles.	2	So inserted 2.88(a)(i):
2 3	at it with Mr Miles. MR WOLFSON: I am looking at F1, tab 4.	2 3	So inserted 2.88(a)(i): "The relevant date means the date on which the
2 3 4	at it with Mr Miles. MR WOLFSON: I am looking at F1, tab 4. LORD NEUBERGER: Okay.	2 3 4	So inserted 2.88(a)(i): "The relevant date means the date on which the company entered administration, or, if the
2 3 4 5	at it with Mr Miles. MR WOLFSON: I am looking at F1, tab 4. LORD NEUBERGER: Okay. MR WOLFSON: I am sorry if it is in there twice. I'm happy	2 3 4 5	So inserted 2.88(a)(i): "The relevant date means the date on which the company entered administration, or, if the administration was preceded by a winding up, the date on
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8	at it with Mr Miles. MR WOLFSON: I am looking at F1, tab 4. LORD NEUBERGER: Okay. MR WOLFSON: I am sorry if it is in there twice. I'm happy to use LORD NEUBERGER: It doesn't matter, provided we are looking at the same rule.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	So inserted 2.88(a)(i): "The relevant date means the date on which the company entered administration, or, if the administration was preceded by a winding up, the date on which the company went into liquidation." And then 2.88(7) referred to the periods during which they have been outstanding since the relevant
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	at it with Mr Miles. MR WOLFSON: I am looking at F1, tab 4. LORD NEUBERGER: Okay. MR WOLFSON: I am sorry if it is in there twice. I'm happy to use LORD NEUBERGER: It doesn't matter, provided we are looking at the same rule. MR WOLFSON: Tab 74. LORD NEUBERGER: It is probably sensible to keep on looking at the same one on the same page. We did look at it	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	So inserted 2.88(a)(i): "The relevant date means the date on which the company entered administration, or, if the administration was preceded by a winding up, the date on which the company went into liquidation." And then 2.88(7) referred to the periods during which they have been outstanding since the relevant date, and so it cured the lacuna in a case where you have a liquidation followed by an administration. So by reason of this amendment to the rules, where
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1 purpose other than paying statutory interest. That is 1 was not the right solution because the prevailing policy 2 2 the way Lord Justice Lewison put it at paragraph 107, is to limit non-provable claims. 3 essentially in the second and third sentences of 3 Lord Justice Moore-Bick agreed with both other judges 4 paragraph 107. 4 and, of course, we support the Court of Appeal on that 5 He went on in that paragraph to say that it was not 5 point, ie the non-provable point. 6 necessary to become, to use his phrase, "bogged down" in 6 Turning to what we submit are the problems with the 7 7 selecting a suitable private law label for this Court of Appeal's approach, I have tried to group them 8 8 statutory instruction. under three heads. First, we say the Court of Appeal's 9 9 He used the word "burdened", if the surplus in the approach is inconsistent with the legislative scheme 10 hands of the administrator is burdened in this way, 10 and, in particular, the statutory waterfall in a winding there was no conflict with 189, and the reason for that up. Second, we submit that the lacuna is one for the 11 11 12 12 legislature and not this court to resolve or fill. 13 "If the fund comes into the hands of the liquidator 13 Third, we submit that the approach of the Court of 14 burdened by an obligation to pay interests to creditors 14 Appeal gives rise to unjustifiable discrepancies in 15 who proved in the administration, so much of the fund as 15 practice, when one actually works out how it works in 16 must be applied for that purpose will not count in the 16 practice. 17 liquidation as making up part of any future surplus." 17 To deal with those three areas, first of all, my 18 18 submissions on the inconsistency with the statutory Lord Justice Briggs, as your Lordships will have 19 seen, goes a little bit further and makes a comparison 19 20 to a Quistclose trust. At paragraph 135, he says that 20 The key problem, we submit, with the Court of 21 is the best way in legal terms of giving effect to the 21 Appeal's approach is that the continued application of 22 22 clear legislative intent embodied in the provision. rule 2.88(7) in a winding up is not what is provided for 23 23 Lord Justice Lewison recognised that rule 2.88(7) by the statutory scheme and is inconsistent with that 24 can only entitle those who have proved in the 24 scheme. The rules and the act provide two codes. There 25 administration to statutory interest, and also that the 25 is a code for distribution of assets by Page 125 Page 127 an administrator, and there is a second and different 1 Court of Appeal's interpretation of that rule would only 1 2 have practical affect in an administration that has 2 code for the distribution of assets by a liquidator. 3 3 become a distributing administration. There are different rules for interest in the 4 4 The effect of those two points is that the Court of administration and the liquidation and rule 2.88(7) is 5 Appeal's solution to the lacuna is at best only 5 applicable in the administration. 6 a partial solution anyway because it cannot help people 6 Under that broad head, we make five separate points 7 7 which I will try and identify separately. They are who prove a liquidation following an administration and 8 it will not apply when an administration is 8 short points. 9 9 non-distributing. The first is that rule 2.88(7) is part of the 10 Lord Justice Lewison recognised, of course, those 10 process of a distributing administration. I really made 11 two points, but at paragraph 108, he said a limited 11 this point already in the sense that I have shown your 12 solution was better than no solution at all. 12 Lordships that rule 2.88(7) was inserted into the rules 13 13 by the insolvency amendment rules in 2003, once Lord Justice Briggs also acknowledged at 14 14 paragraph 135 that the Court of Appeal's approach does distributing administrations became possible. 15 not provide a complete answer to what he called the 15 To make that point good, the explanatory notes to 16 puzzling lacuna thrown out by the combined effect of 16 the 2003 rules, which your Lordships have at F3, tab 29, 17 section 189(2) and rule 4.93(1) where administration 17 and if your Lordships could just turn that up, your 18 proceeds liquidation, and ended by saying: 18 Lordships see F3, tab 29, page 1907, in the third 19 "I agree with my Lord, Lord Justice Lewison, the 19 paragraph on that page beginning, "The main amendment", 20 sooner this inexplicable gap between contractual and 20 it makes the point that the reason why these rules are 21 21 statutory interests is remedied by amendment to the act being amended is to provide for distributing 22 or to the rules the better." 22 administrations. That is why they were there. 23 23 The other thing the Court of Appeal did was to say LORD NEUBERGER: That is self-evident. Until then, the 24 that the invention of a new species of non-provable 24 administrators could not distribute and so there 25 25 claim, which was Mr Justice David Richards's solution, wouldn't be -- yes. Page 126 Page 128

1	MR WOLFSON: Exactly. And that point is also made in the	1	appointed, the money remains in the company just as it
2	preamble to the 2003 rules themselves. That preamble,	2	was before.
3	which is at tab 28 of the same bundle, states that the	3	MR WOLFSON: Absolutely. The fact it may be the same person
4	rules are made by the Lord Chancellor in exercise of the	4	is a happenstance.
5	powers conferred on him by sections 411 and 412 of the	5	LORD NEUBERGER: Quite. It would be very odd if this
6	Insolvency Act. I will come back to that point in	6	applied differently depending whether the liquidator was
7	a moment.	7	the previous administrator or not, yes.
8	2.88(7), as we have seen, is part of chapter 10 of	8	MR WOLFSON: That cannot be right.
9	the new part 2 of the rules entitled "Administration	9	LORD NEUBERGER: I would not have thought so.
10	Procedure", and the scope of chapter 10 dealing with	10	MR WOLFSON: Therefore, we submit it involves no
11	distributions to creditors is made clear in a number of	11	contravention of rule 2.88(7) because of this point, he
12	sections. I can just refer to them, we don't need to go	12	is not applying the assets for a different purpose at
13	to them.	13	all.
14	First, rule 2.11(d), which provides that chapter 10	14	LORD NEUBERGER: Can it not be said that when the company
15	applies in respect of appointments of administrators in	15	goes into liquidation, as it were, all the assets are
16	the various ways, by a court, by a floating charge	16	being, as it were, applied for the Ayerst purpose rather
17	holder, by the directors.	17	than for the previous administration purpose?
18	Second, rule 2.68(1) provides that chapter 10	18	MR WOLFSON: Well
19	applies where the administrator makes or proposes to	19	LORD NEUBERGER: You say that is a misuse of the word
20	make a distribution to any class of creditors.	20	"apply".
21	Third, section (b) of chapter 10, which sets out the	21	MR WOLFSON: They are certainly not being applied by the
22	machinery of proving a debt in an administration.	22	administrator for that purpose.
23	So that is really why 2.88(7) was brought in in the	23	LORD NEUBERGER: It doesn't say who has to apply it, but you
24	first place.	24	say they are not being applied. It may be that they
25	The second point deals with what we mean by the	25	will be applied but they are not being applied at that
	Page 129		Page 131
1	vacation of office by an administrator. We submit that	1	moment
1	vacation of office by an administrator. We submit that	1	moment. MR WOLESON: They are not being applied and Lyvill come in
2	if a company moves from administration to liquidation,	2	MR WOLFSON: They are not being applied and I will come in
2 3	if a company moves from administration to liquidation, all that has happened, as far as the administrator is	2 3	MR WOLFSON: They are not being applied and I will come in a moment to the administrator point as well when I deal
2 3 4	if a company moves from administration to liquidation, all that has happened, as far as the administrator is concerned, is that he ceases to hold office and	2 3 4	MR WOLFSON: They are not being applied and I will come in a moment to the administrator point as well when I deal with the statutory instruction point.
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1	administrator has done or not done may well be able to	1	which on this approach enures into the liquidation and,
2	go to court and say, "This administrator has not	2	indeed, means that he has to pay out that interest at
3	provided any good reason for not paying out statutory	3	the very top of the waterfall, and we say that is
4	interest in accordance with rule 2.88(7), he is	4	plainly wrong.
5	proposing go into liquidation without paying that out	5	There is simply no indication in the provisions
6	and there is no good reason for it, we want an order	6	governing the distribution of a company property and
7	forcing him to pay out or preventing the company going	7	a liquidation that statutory interest for the period of
8	into liquidation".	8	an immediately prior administration is payable at the
9	So it is not as if the creditors are left with	9	top of the waterfall, which is the necessary effect of
10	simply no remedy, but it may well be that the	10	LBIE's submissions.
11	administrator says, "Actually, there are very good	11	LORD NEUBERGER: It is interesting that 2.88(7) is expressed
12	reasons for why I am doing what I am doing and, looking	12	in the passive sense. It doesn't say "the administrator
13	at the whole picture and not just the creditors who are	13	shall", and I notice that in one or two of the
14	entitled to statutory interest, this is the right thing	14	provisions, such as 2.96, admitting or rejecting proofs,
15	to do".	15	2.97 and 2.98, it is all in the active sense of the
16	LORD NEUBERGER: If that is right, he could not be said to	16	administrator making payment. Are there any other
17	be in breach of his duty under 2.88(7), if that is the	17	provisions that are expressed in the passive like
18	right way of characterising it, from what Mr Miles said,	18	2.88(7)?
19	unless you say being applied means being applied by	19	MR WOLFSON: My Lord, can I take that one for a little
20	anybody, even after the administration is over.	20	research?
21	MR WOLFSON: We submit that being applied means being	21	LORD NEUBERGER: On the face of it, one might say if it is
22	applied by the administrator.	22	the contrast to the administrator of (Inaudible) that
23	LORD NEUBERGER: That is really the issue, I suspect.	23	maybe this is intended to have a wider application or
24	MR WOLFSON: It may well be, yes.	24	longer application not just applying to the
25	Certainly, and I will come to this point, one of the	25	administrator?
	Page 133		Page 135
1	points are sort and I will develop this in a minute as	1 1	That may praye to be a had point if the other
1	points we say, and I will develop this in a minute, as	1	That may prove to be a bad point if the other
2	to the statutory instruction, the way the Court of	2	provisions are to be expressed in the passive like this
2 3	to the statutory instruction, the way the Court of Appeal is to say this is a statutory instruction, we say	2 3	provisions are to be expressed in the passive like this which impose obligations on the administrator.
2 3 4	to the statutory instruction, the way the Court of Appeal is to say this is a statutory instruction, we say the whole point about an instruction is that you really	2 3 4	provisions are to be expressed in the passive like this which impose obligations on the administrator. MR WOLFSON: I am happy to be corrected. I am not sure that
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2 3 4 5 6	to the statutory instruction, the way the Court of Appeal is to say this is a statutory instruction, we say the whole point about an instruction is that you really need two people, you need an instructor and somebody who is being instructed, and the person who is being	2 3 4 5 6	provisions are to be expressed in the passive like this which impose obligations on the administrator. MR WOLFSON: I am happy to be corrected. I am not sure that point has been previously raised, so I cannot answer it on my feet. I see your Lordship's point.
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1	up by the bootstraps.	1	part of the assets which he is dealing with in the
2	MR WOLFSON: Precisely.	2	liquidation, and as I said earlier, the assets in the
3	LORD NEUBERGER: But I repeat the question: is it that	3	liquidation may well be greater than the assets in the
4	surprising that it ranks ahead if one would have	4	administration.
5	expected it to be paid out before the company goes into	5	Secondly, LBIE picks up the language of statutory
6	liquidation?	6	instruction, and to repeat the point I made a moment
7	MR WOLFSON: 2.88(7) doesn't say it must be done in all	7	ago, we say the important thing about 2.88(7), and
8	circumstances, 2.88(7) says before it can be applied for	8	I will come back to your Lordship on the passive
9	any other purpose, it must be done this way.	9	language, we know who is doing the instructing, that is
10	I think it becomes a little bit circular at this	10	parliament, but we submit that the person being
11	stage.	11	instructed is the administrator and not the liquidator.
12	LORD NEUBERGER: Fair enough.	12	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
13	MR WOLFSON: Of course, just to finish off this point, the	13	MR WOLFSON: The fourth point is that rule 2.88(7), we
14	effect would be, if it is paid out at the top of the	14	submit, does not create a statutory fund burden or
15	waterfall, that this would rank above unsecured claims	15	trust. We made the point in writing that where the act
16	to principle in the liquidation, because of course there	16	intends for a charge to be imposed it says so expressly,
17	may be people who have not been able to claim for one	17	and we gave the example for paragraph 99 of schedule B1.
18	reason or another in the administration who are claiming	18	There is no such express provision here to create
19	for the first time in the liquidation, for example	19	a charge and we submit there is no scope for the
20	a tort claimant, and it might be thought to be	20	imposition of a trust otherwise. Mr Justice David
21	surprising that a creditor who has had his claim paid in	21	Richards was correct to say at paragraph 71 of his
22	full gets statutory interest on his claim at 8 per cent	22	judgment that rule 2.88(7):
23	before the tort claimant, who has a principal claim in	23	" does not create a proprietary or equitable
24	the liquidation, actually gets anything at all.	24	interest in the surplus in favour of those creditors.
25	Now, LBIE's attempt to answer this is to say that	25	Rule 2.88(7) is simply part of the statutory scheme for
	D 425		D 440
	Page 137		Page 139
1	what it calls the rule 2.88(7) fund "does not form part	1	distributing assets in a distributing administration."
2	of the liquidation estate". That is the way it is put	2	On this point, LBIE's response at paragraph 88.1 of
3	at paragraph 87 of their written case.	3	its written case is:
4	LORD NEUBERGER: This is consistent with a sort of	4	"The fact that the statutory scheme is capable of
5	Quistclose trust, in other words.	5	creating expressly an obligation binding on the assets
6	MR WOLFSON: Essentially, yes, my Lord. We say,	6	after they passed from the hands of the administrators
7	respectfully, that beyond LBIE's say-so, there is no	7	into the hands of the liquidator does not of itself
8	basis for such a proposition. There is no carve out in	8	preclude the statutory regime from creating such
9	the mandatory and unqualified provisions which provide	9	an obligation by necessary implication."
10	the statutory scheme for distribution in a winding up to	10	And we respectfully disagree on both parts of that
11	exclude from the company's assets, assets which were	11	phrase. First of all, we disagree that any implication
12	previously administered by the administrator and formed	12	would be necessary. Secondly, and more fundamentally,
13	a surplus in his hands after the payment of debts proved	13	perhaps, we take issue with the notion that this is
14	in the administration. The company's assets, which the	14	an area where obligations or charge-like interests
15	liquidator takes control of, means all of the company's	15	should arise by implication. On the contrary, this is
16	assets and there is no segregated fund.	16	an area where certainty is essential and where
17	When LBIE propounds the defined term, "the rule	17	insolvency practitioners up and down the country have to
18	2.88(7) fund", it can give the impression that what we	18	know clearly, and ought to be able to know just by
19	are talking about here is some sort of segregated or	19	reading rules, what it is they ought to do, and we
20	separate fund which is passed on to the liquidator	20	shouldn't be implying charges or trusts into the
21	subject to some sort of purpose trust or charge, but we	21	legislation at all.
22	submit there is simply nothing of the sort. It is just	22	As far as the Quistclose analogy of
23	part of the company's assets which, once the	23	Lord Justice Briggs is concerned in this context, and
24	administrator has ceased to run the administration and	24	dealing with this fairly quickly, we have set out in our
25	vacates his office, the liquidator takes it and forms	25	written case why we submit respectfully this is not
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	Page 138		Page 140

a fair analogy. That is paragraph 34 and footnote 7. Lilli. appears to agree that if tale 28817) does give reliance to a surface of the periods of the working and the comply with the formal equipments for a particular comply with the formal equipments for a particular system of the desiration and the system of the surface and the state of the desiration and the system of the administration waterfall. System of privile law treat, and so the Quicklobes analogy does not anally appear to be contended for by either party of the control of the party of the administration, waterfall. United syour Londolps with the to say arm more about a subminister. Thank you. Which was your paragraph number again to the contended for by either and the subministration. Subministration and the party of the periods during which they have been outstanding since the company went into liquidation." In ISBN DELIBERGER: Thank you. Which was your paragraph number again. MR WOLISON: Dealing with Quasiclose? MR WOLISON: Dealing with Quasiclose? MR WOLISON: The filth and last poart an this past of my thank the party of the periods of the periods of the periods of the periods of the period in the administration. MR WOLISON: The filth and last poart an this past of my thank the party of the period of the periods of the period of the period in the administration. MR WOLISON: The filth and last poart an this past of my the period of				
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1	sub-points on my first submission. My second	1	of making that constitutional point, we do make it and,
2	overarching submission was that this is a lacuna for the	2	as has been said before, this building is important,
3	legislature and not the court to resolve. Let me just	3	this building is important, the Palace of Westminster is
4	say a word about that.	4	important, but what is also important is the patch of
5	We accept that now you can have both distributing	5	grass between the two. The separation is important. We
6	administrations and moves between administration and	6	respectfully submit that this is a case where the
7	liquidation, the legislature might wish to consider	7	remedy, if there is to be one, should be left to
8	amending 189(2), but the key point is that there was	8	parliament.
9	nothing wrong with 189(2) when it was passed and if one	9	My Lords, that leaves me with a few submissions on
10	looks at the question of drafting mistakes in the sense	10	some discrepancies which arise from the Court of
11		11	Appeal's approach and then, if I may take up Lord
12	described by Lord Nicholls in the Inco Europe case, that	12	7 7 1
	just does not arise here.	13	Neuberger's invitation, because it will save time on
13	Can I show your Lordships that in the few minutes		Thursday, I will say a few words about the cross-appeals
14	I have left.	14	as well in the morning, but I am confident that not only
15	LORD NEUBERGER: That is to do with mistakes when it is	15	will I pass over the baton to my learned friend with the
16	drafted, not with mistakes that result from changes in	16	same amount of time available, hopefully I will have
17	the law.	17	increased it as well.
18	MR WOLFSON: Exactly, Exactly, and the point Lord Nicholls	18	LORD NEUBERGER: Very well. Then we will resume again at
19	was making there, really, was any court has to be very	19	10.00 tomorrow.
20	careful about amending or writing in or adding to	20	Thank you very much indeed. Court is now adjourned.
21	legislation. But, he says, if you can show that when	21	(4.00 pm)
22	passing that legislation, the case there was the	22	(The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)
23	Arbitration Act and appeals up the system from decisions	23	
24	at first instance, if you can show that when the	24	
25	relevant provision was passed there was a mistake, that	25	
	Page 145		Page 147
	1 age 143		1 age 147
1	is good example of where the court can intervene,	1	INDEX
1 2	is good example of where the court can intervene, provided you can see, one, that there has been	1 2	INDEX
		1	INDEX Submissions by MR MILES1
2	provided you can see, one, that there has been	2	
2 3	provided you can see, one, that there has been a mistake; two, exactly what the mistake was; and,	2 3	Submissions by MR MILES1
2 3 4	provided you can see, one, that there has been a mistake; two, exactly what the mistake was; and, third, what words should be used, more or less, to put	2 3 4	Submissions by MR MILES1
2 3 4 5	provided you can see, one, that there has been a mistake; two, exactly what the mistake was; and, third, what words should be used, more or less, to put the mistake right. Here there is no mistake.	2 3 4 5	Submissions by MR MILES1
2 3 4 5 6	provided you can see, one, that there has been a mistake; two, exactly what the mistake was; and, third, what words should be used, more or less, to put the mistake right. Here there is no mistake. At the risk of running a highfalutin point at 3.58,	2 3 4 5 6	Submissions by MR MILES1
2 3 4 5 6 7	provided you can see, one, that there has been a mistake; two, exactly what the mistake was; and, third, what words should be used, more or less, to put the mistake right. Here there is no mistake. At the risk of running a highfalutin point at 3.58, this court would respectfully overstep its bounds if it	2 3 4 5 6 7	Submissions by MR MILES1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	provided you can see, one, that there has been a mistake; two, exactly what the mistake was; and, third, what words should be used, more or less, to put the mistake right. Here there is no mistake. At the risk of running a highfalutin point at 3.58, this court would respectfully overstep its bounds if it was to amend 189(2) because it would be writing in to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Submissions by MR MILES1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	provided you can see, one, that there has been a mistake; two, exactly what the mistake was; and, third, what words should be used, more or less, to put the mistake right. Here there is no mistake. At the risk of running a highfalutin point at 3.58, this court would respectfully overstep its bounds if it was to amend 189(2) because it would be writing in to primary legislation something which is not there and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Submissions by MR MILES1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	provided you can see, one, that there has been a mistake; two, exactly what the mistake was; and, third, what words should be used, more or less, to put the mistake right. Here there is no mistake. At the risk of running a highfalutin point at 3.58, this court would respectfully overstep its bounds if it was to amend 189(2) because it would be writing in to primary legislation something which is not there and where there was no mistake.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Submissions by MR MILES1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	provided you can see, one, that there has been a mistake; two, exactly what the mistake was; and, third, what words should be used, more or less, to put the mistake right. Here there is no mistake. At the risk of running a highfalutin point at 3.58, this court would respectfully overstep its bounds if it was to amend 189(2) because it would be writing in to primary legislation something which is not there and where there was no mistake. Insofar as a mistake has been made here, it is that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Submissions by MR MILES1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	provided you can see, one, that there has been a mistake; two, exactly what the mistake was; and, third, what words should be used, more or less, to put the mistake right. Here there is no mistake. At the risk of running a highfalutin point at 3.58, this court would respectfully overstep its bounds if it was to amend 189(2) because it would be writing in to primary legislation something which is not there and where there was no mistake. Insofar as a mistake has been made here, it is that parliament has not kept up, has not kept 189(2) up with	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Submissions by MR MILES1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	provided you can see, one, that there has been a mistake; two, exactly what the mistake was; and, third, what words should be used, more or less, to put the mistake right. Here there is no mistake. At the risk of running a highfalutin point at 3.58, this court would respectfully overstep its bounds if it was to amend 189(2) because it would be writing in to primary legislation something which is not there and where there was no mistake. Insofar as a mistake has been made here, it is that parliament has not kept up, has not kept 189(2) up with the changes in the insolvency provisions(?). There is	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Submissions by MR MILES1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	provided you can see, one, that there has been a mistake; two, exactly what the mistake was; and, third, what words should be used, more or less, to put the mistake right. Here there is no mistake. At the risk of running a highfalutin point at 3.58, this court would respectfully overstep its bounds if it was to amend 189(2) because it would be writing in to primary legislation something which is not there and where there was no mistake. Insofar as a mistake has been made here, it is that parliament has not kept up, has not kept 189(2) up with the changes in the insolvency provisions(?). There is nothing wrong with the rules, and there is nothing wrong	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Submissions by MR MILES1
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