1	Thursday, 20 October 2016	1	Wight v Eckhardt; indeed, he expressly makes the point
2	(10.00 am)	2	that winding up isn't the same as obtaining a judgment.
3	Submissions by MR DICKER (continued)	3	We also say that was Mr Justice Oliver's view in
4	LORD NEUBERGER: Mr Dicker.	4	Dynamics. One can tell that from his approach in
5	MR DICKER: My Lords, at the risk of extending my estimate	5	Lines Bros. If he had taken a view in Dynamics that the
6	by a few minutes I would like to have a further go at	6	conversion into sterling was in substitution for the
7	answering a couple of points raised yesterday, in	7	underlying debt, his response to
8	particular by my Lord, Lord Reed.	8	Lord Justice Brightman's comments about the surplus
9	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	9	wouldn't have been to say that he didn't assent that
10	MR DICKER: I do want to ensure your Lordships have our	10	that was a possible solution, he would have said that
11	submissions.	11	the issue simply doesn't arise. The underlying claim
12	The starting point is we agree with Lord Sumption as	12	has gone and there is therefore no question of any
13	he put it at page 159 of the transcript yesterday, when	13	residual claim capable of being paid out of the surplus.
14	he said:	14	Now, my Lord, Lord Neuberger said at page 133,
15	"The argument is surely simply that the admission of	15	lines 10 to 15:
16	a proof has an effect roughly corresponding to the	16	"So may it not be said that, by applying the
17	merger of a judgment with the underlying liability, and	17	judgment rate from the date in question, it makes sense
18	the whole argument really depends on whether that	18	that the conversion to sterling is treated as being on
19	proposition is correct."	19	that date generally, because otherwise why give a rate
20	We say that is the issue. We also say, as your	20	appropriate to a sterling date?"
21	Lordships know, that as between the creditor and the	21	Now, in response to that, we say that one needs to
22	debtor, it is not treated as a merger.	22	bear in mind how the statutory waterfall works. One has
23	My Lord, Lord Reed said at page 132:	23	to deal with each level in the statutory waterfall
24	"The scheme gives you exactly what you would have	24	separately. You might never get down to a subsequent
25	got if you had sued and got a judgment debt as at the	25	stage. There might be insufficient to pay creditors in
	Page 1		Page 3
1	date of winding up. You get the sterling equivalent at	1	full, in which case one is only concerned with
2	that date, plus the 8 per cent interest from then until	2	pari passu distribution. There might be more, in which
3	actual payment."	3	case there may be a distribution in respect of interest.
4	We agree that is how your claim is valued for the	4	In some cases, relatively rare, there may be sufficient
5	purposes of proof to ensure pari passu distribution, and	5	to pay interest in full as well and leave a surplus, at
6	we also agree that you may receive 8 per cent interest	6	which point the issue arises.
7	on that rate, but we say it doesn't follow that that is	7	Now, we do say it is important to bear in mind that
8	all that you are entitled to or all that you can ever	8	each stage has to be dealt with and completed before you
9	obtain pursuant to the statutory scheme.	9	get to the next stage. So the first stage is pari passu
10	Now, Miliangos obviously established that a creditor	10	distribution. To treat everyone equally, foreign
11	is entitled to be paid in the relevant foreign currency,	11	currency claims need to be converted into sterling at
12	and out of insolvency he is entitled to obtain judgment	12	the date of liquidation. That is why the scheme gives
13	in the foreign currency. He can enforce in that foreign	13	you a right to the sterling equivalent as at the date of
14	currency if there are foreign currency assets available,	14	liquidation. As I say, to ensure everyone is treated
15	he doesn't have to convert his claim into sterling if he	15	equally.
16	doesn't need to, but if he does, sterling will be	16	The next stage is statutory interest. If there is
17	converted at the last practical moment before	17	a surplus, creditors should be compensated for delay in
18	enforcement. That is essentially just a procedural	18	payment of their proved debts and be compensated on
19	matter.	19	an equal basis. For that reason, they are all given
20	Now, the question, as my Lord, Lord Sumption said,	20	a right to interest at the greater of the judgment set
21	is whether rule 2.86 is just, we would put it anyway,	21	rate or the rate applicable to the debt apart from the
22	a valuation mechanism for the purposes of proof or	22	administration but interest on their proved debt, in
23	effectively treats the creditor as if he had obtained	23	other words the sterling amount for which they have been
24	a judgment. We say obviously it is the former not the	24	permitted to prove.
25	latter. We say that is supported by Lord Hoffmann in	25	Now, as I say, that is done simply to ensure that at
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		1	Fage 4

1 (Pages 1 to 4)

Day 4

1	this stage, as well, creditors are treated equally.	1	judgment in a foreign currency not necessarily here,
2	They have all been paid equally by reference to	2	assume in New York carrying a rate of interest at
3	a sterling sum. They should all be compensated equally	3	9 per cent, then the statutory scheme on my learned
4	by reference to interest on a sterling sum. It doesn't	4	friend's case causes a double loss for the creditor.
5	follow, we say, that the effect of this scheme is	5	Not only does he not get back the full amount of
6	necessarily to say that their underlying claim is	6	principal, but nor does he get back the full amount of
7	essentially treated as if it were merged into a judgment	7	the interest that he would have received on his
8	and then be treated accordingly.	8	underlying foreign currency claim because, as I say, the
9	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes, you say my question is fine as far as	9	interest is payable in respect of his sterling proved
10	it goes, but it doesn't deal with the issue of the	10	debt.
11	underlying debt, it is merely consistent with them all	11	Now, my Lord, Lord Reed then raised the question at
12	being proved claims being converted, but the underlying	12	page 129, lines 6 to 10, of whether a foreign currency
13	debt still runs underneath.	13	creditor needs to give credit for the statutory interest
14	MR DICKER: Your Lordship has the point, absolutely.	14	that he has received. Now, we say this is a separate
15	Now, one needs to bear in mind in this respect,	15	question. First of all, one has to decide whether
16	conversion to sterling was part of the common law of	16	currency conversion claims exist at all. There is then
17	insolvency before rule 2.86 was introduced. By that	17	a question of how do you calculate the unpaid amount of
18	I mean the judges decided in Re Dynamics and Lines Bros	18	any underlying claim. We deal with this in our written
19	that that was how the statutory scheme should work. We	19	case at paragraph 169. I don't need to take your
20	say one can't link the conversion of claims into	20	Lordships to it. I briefly summarised the position.
21	sterling and the provision of interest at the	21	Mr Justice David Richards in Waterfall IIA dealt
22	Judgment Act rate as if they had both been introduced	22	with this issue at paragraphs 227 to 231. His
23	for the first time in the 1986 Act and as representing	23	conclusion is, or was, essentially that you don't have
24	a decision that the underlying claim should be	24	to give credit because, as I summarised yesterday,
25	extinguished and replaced with a new claim, equivalent	25	essentially the two things are intended to compensate
	Page 5		Page 7
1	to a judgment claim	1	you for different things: one for delay in payment the
1	to a judgment claim.	1	you for different things; one for delay in payment, the
2	As I submitted, rule 2.86, we say, was simply	2	second is intended to ensure that you get paid the full
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1 LORD NEUBERGER: It is effectively similar. 1 MR DICKER: My Lord, I am sure that the parties can check. 2 2 My understanding is, for what it is worth, standing MR DICKER: Yes. The only difference is there is wording 3 3 dealing with where there is a liquidation preceded by here, I am certainly not aware of any case in which the 4 an administration. 4 mere admission of a proof operates by way of 5 LORD NEUBERGER: Yes. 5 res judicata. 6 MR DICKER: That is all I was proposing to say by way of 6 LORD NEUBERGER: Presumably if it did, it would have been 7 difficult, you say, for Lord Hoffmann to say what he 7 dealing with points raised yesterday. 8 My Lords, when I finished yesterday I was dealing 8 said. 9 9 with a series of other aspects of the statutory scheme MR DICKER: Yes. My only hesitation, I suppose, is that one 10 which my learned friend relied upon, essentially, in 10 can imagine situations in a winding up where, as Lord Hoffmann said, I think, in Cambridge Gas, it is 11 support of his proposition that, if you look at those, 11 12 you can see or you can deduce that 2.86 must have been 12 occasionally necessary, actually, to determine, and 13 13 there may be no way of determining it, short of giving intended effectively to extinguish the old claim, 14 provide a new claim or, as he put it, ensure that 14 a creditor leave to commence proceedings and then 15 15 payment of that claim in sterling in full was payment of determine his claim in that way. Now, that may be 16 the underlying debt in full. 16 a different situation leading into a different result. 17 Just to finish that sequence of other aspects, 17 My Lord, two other matters, two other aspects. The 18 first is disclaimer. We deal with that in our written 18 I should, I think, say something very briefly about 19 future debts, but I can deal with them very briefly, for 19 case. I don't need to say anything more to your 20 20 Lordships about it. Our point is simply that if you this reason: the position in relation to future debts is 21 that you prove for the full amount of your future debt. 21 look at the wording in relation to the disclaimer 22 22 So if you have a debt of £100 payable in a year, your provision, that is the sort of wording that we say one 23 23 proof is admitted for the full £100. So there is no would expect to find if the underlying claim is 24 interference there. What then happens is rule 2.105 24 extinguished and replaced by something else. The 25 discounts that debt back to provide a present value, it 25 disclaimer provision is very clear. It says that it: Page 9 Page 11 1 says for the purposes of dividends; essentially to 1 "... operates to determine as from the date of 2 ensure that it is treated equally with every other debt. 2 disclaimer the rights, interests, and liabilities of the 3 In other words, they are all paid by reference to their 3 company in or in respect of the property disclaimed." 4 present value. And then, equally with every other debt, 4 And it expressly gives a right to damages in 5 it is also entitled to interest in respect of the period 5 exchange. Again, nothing that interferes with, we say, 6 for which it is out of the money provided that there is 6 the creditors first, members last principle, because the 7 sufficient to trigger 2.88. 7 damages claim is simply a secondary liability for the 8 So no issue in relation to future debts. Proved for 8 primary right. It is intended to provide the same level 9 the full amount. That is no detriment to the creditor; 9 of compensation, the only difference is that it has to 10 indeed, his claim, effectively, has been treated as 10 be estimated. But as an estimated claim, it is capable 11 accelerated subject to the discount then applied to 11 of being treated in the liquidation like every other 12 bring it back to present value. Compensation for any 12 estimated claim. Hindsight applies. If further 13 delay in payment of that present value, equally with 13 information suggests the estimate is wrong, it can be 14 every other creditor, pursuant to rule 2.88. 14 revised and treated accordingly. 15 LORD SUMPTION: Can I ask you a question that doesn't arise 15 Bankruptcy, we deal with in our written case at 16 out of the point that you have just made, although it is 16 paragraph 151. 17 broadly related to the issue we are dealing with. Has 17 LORD NEUBERGER: Yes. 18 it ever been suggested that any aspect of the rule of 18 MR DICKER: I don't think I need to say anything more in 19 res judicata applies to the admission of a proof in 19 relation to that 20 a winding up? You may need to have a look at that. It 20 My Lords, there is then a section of our case, 21 would be a tall order if you were to dredge it up 21 paragraphs 156 is to 174, dealing with what we describe 22 straight away. 22 as the merits, and I do just want to emphasise a few 23 MR DICKER: That is not is issue that I confess I have --23 points and pick up a few points arising out of yesterday 24 LORD SUMPTION: If it ever has, I am not aware that it has. 24 in relation to that section. 25 I would be interested to know. 25 The starting point, we say, is that you have Page 10 Page 12

3 (Pages 9 to 12)

1	creditors who have not received the full currency amount	1	for the delivery of commodities possibly be in a similar
2	that they are owed. We say it is no answer to say they	2	position? A contract for, I don't know, whatever it
3	might have done better if sterling had appreciated, or	3	might be, oil futures or gold or whatever it is would
4	that things could have been different in a different	4	have a different value at the date of liquidation from
5	administration.	5	its value at the date of payment of a dividend.
6	The appellant's position is essentially that it must	6	MR DICKER: I suppose in specie claims obviously would be
7	be entitled to protection from what it describes as the	7	dealt with differently in a liquidation but, again,
8	one-way bet. The consequence of that is necessarily to	8	my Lord is right in the sense that the effect of the
9	require creditors to bear an exchange rate risk which	9	statutory scheme in its broadest sense in that situation
10	they never agreed to bear.	10	would be to ensure the creditor got back his asset,
11	Now, in relation to LBIE, there are foreign currency	11	effectively at the value it was worth.
12	creditors who, if the appellants are right, will simply	12	LORD NEUBERGER: So where you have an in specie claim,
13	not end up receiving the amount that they were entitled	13	I promise to deliver oil to you over the next five
14	to receive. We say no argument about taking the rough	14	years, specified instalments. I go insolvent.
15	with the smooth provides an answer to that. It may	15	MR DICKER: Yes, and you would
16	provide an answer when one is dealing with the position	16	LORD NEUBERGER: You prove for it. That is valued at the
17	as between creditors, but a shareholder is not entitled,	17	date.
18	we say, to a creditor, "I haven't paid you the full	18	MR DICKER: You would then get the value of that claim.
19	amount, but that is fair thing because otherwise, in	19	LORD NEUBERGER: So that is worth at a certain date, X. At
20	other circumstances, I might have ended up having to pay	20	the date of liquidation or administration, that is worth
21	you more or I might have ended up having to pay others	21	X, and that is what you get paid out of.
22	more".	22	MR DICKER: I mean, if it is an in specie claim, you would
23	LORD SUMPTION: One problem about the argument that you are	23	obviously get the gold back.
24	objecting to is that it is an argument that relates only	24	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
25	to this particular kind of claim. So if it is correct,	25	MR DICKER: But if it was a proprietary claim
	Page 13		Page 15
1	it would tand to suggest that any would have to fashion	1	LODD NEUDERCED. If I was willing to soll you oil and
2	it would tend to suggest that one would have to fashion a special rule in relation to undischarged claims in	2	LORD NEUBERGER: If I was willing to sell you oil and I hadn't got any oil, but you had made a loss because
3	foreign currency, but wouldn't necessarily apply to	3	you had agreed to buy oil to me at \$20 a barrel and the
4	other kinds of claims, or the kinds of non-provable	4	present price was \$50, you would prove for the value of
5	claims.	5	that contract, would you, or what? How would you prove
6	MR DICKER: Well, we say your Lordships wouldn't be	6	for that on the relevant date? Or how would it be
7	fashioning a special rule for this. One would simply be		valued?
8	applying the structure of the scheme, recognising that	8	
° 9		9	MR DICKER: It would be a contingent claim which would be
	the operation of the proof process hasn't discharged		given a present value. It would be capable of being
10	these creditors in full and permitting them to enforce	10	revalued as and when the value of that claim changed.
11	the remainder of their claim as a non-provable claim.	11	LORD NEUBERGER: But each day the oil falls to be delivered,
12	LORD NEUBERGER: Can you think of any other non-contingent	12	you would be entitled to look and say, well, that was
13	debt which this would apply other than a currency claim?	13	valued at \$20 a barrel on the basis of the date of
14	MR DICKER: The answer to that is no. It is something which	14	liquidation, the price has now gone down to \$10
15	arises because of the need to convert claims into	15	a barrel, therefore the right to be supplied to it or
16	sterling for the purposes of proof.	16	perhaps I have it the wrong way round, but at any rate
17	LORD NEUBERGER: You say that Lord Sumption's way of putting	17	you would revalue the value of the contract, or the
18	what he put to you is a somewhat I don't mean it	18	right to have the oil delivered, or to sell it to me, at
19	crudely to him loaded way.	19	the date of delivery, and you could get the balance, as
20	LORD SUMPTION: Oh, definitely loaded.	20	it were.
21	LORD NEUBERGER: As I say, I don't mean it	21	MR DICKER: Yes.
22	LORD SUMPTION: But I think Mr Dicker may well have	22	LORD NEUBERGER: I haven't put it very well, I am sorry.
23	misunderstood against whom the blunderbuss would be	23	MR DICKER: My Lord, can I just make a further point in
24	aimed.	24	relation to
25	LORD REED: I am just thinking aloud, but would a contract	25	LORD NEUBERGER: And that is more or less what Lord Hoffmann
	Page 14		Page 16

4 (Pages 13 to 16)

1	says when he talks about insurance policies in that	1	under 2.81 or whatever, then you would be left to your
2	passage.	2	claim as a non-provable claim?
3 N	MR DICKER: Yes.	3	MR DICKER: Well, if it is strictly a contingent provable
4	The advantage if it is a contingent claim is you	4	claim, I don't
5	don't need the non-provable analysis.	5	LORD NEUBERGER: If you don't adjust, you lose it.
6 I	LORD NEUBERGER: Right.	6	MR DICKER: It is difficult to see when you would ever need
7 N	MR DICKER: Because simply, as and when further information	7	a non-provable claim. Stanhope, I think, is a most
8	comes to light, you revalue it.	8	graphic example of that, because even post-dissolution.
9 I	LORD NEUBERGER: But you say in this case it is the same	9	LORD NEUBERGER: I see.
10	thing, it just happens not to be a contingent claim.	10	MR DICKER: you are able to come back and say,
11	But you are still	11	"Dissolution void, (inaudible) the liquidation, now
12 N	MR DICKER: The only difference is that in relation to two	12	I will submit a revised"
13	categories of claims, post-insolvency interest and	13	LORD NEUBERGER: It is a provable claim but you can't undo
14	currency conversion claims, that, as it were,	14	the distribution?
15	forward-looking benefit, if that is the right phrase for	15	MR DICKER: Yes.
16	it, isn't something for which you can prove, because the	16	LORD NEUBERGER: I see. Quite right, thank you.
17	way in which the cut-off date (inaudible) liquidation	17	MR DICKER: My Lord, I gave an example yesterday of
18	are assessed means that you simply exclude it for the	18	a company that went into liquidation or administration
19	purposes of proof. So the way the scheme has developed,	19	at a time when its assets and liabilities were both
20	you can only recover it as a non-provable claim.	20	denominated a foreign currency and of equal amounts. It
21 I	LORD REED: I wonder if it is completely analogous, because	21	is the example we give in our written case at
22	isn't the explanation given I think it may be	22	paragraph 160 at footnote 14.
23	Mr Justice Oliver in one of the cases, he explains the	23	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
24	theory behind the treatment of contingent claims where	24	MR DICKER: And I just wanted to respond to one point made
25	new information emerges as being that you can use	25	by my Lord, Lord Neuberger in relation to that. The
	Page 17		Page 19
1	hindsight as an (inaudible) valuing the claim as at the	1	example at paragraph 160, footnote 14.
2	date of liquidation. So it is still the liquidation	2	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
3	date value that is being assessed, albeit with the	3	MR DICKER: I won't take your Lordships through the detail
4	benefit of hindsight.	4	of the example; I outlined it yesterday.
5 N	MR DICKER: Yes, absolutely.	5	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
	LORD NEUBERGER: It might be said that the power under 2.81	6	MR DICKER: Now, my Lord, Lord Neuberger asked
7	to adjust a claim for a contingency is interesting in	7	yesterday: well, what happens if the pound, instead of
8	that there is no power to adjust for currency.	8	depreciating, appreciates? Don't creditors necessarily
9 N	MR DICKER: Correct. And we say	9	get a windfall in that situation? So the example in
	LORD NEUBERGER: Page 2040.	10	footnote 14 is sterling depreciates because the
	MR DICKER: In a sense, the statutory scheme could	11	liabilities are converted on the date of liquidation,
12	conceivably have done that. It could conceivably have	12	but the assets are converted later. Liabilities ended
13	treated both post-insolvency interest and currency	13	up being paid less than their full foreign currency
14	conversion claims as contingent, provable claims. It	14	amount.
15	could have said, "We know we are not going to make	15	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes, yes.
16	a distribution for a while, we will take a guess as to	16	MR DICKER: And the additional amount, effectively enures
10	how long and we will take a guess as to what it would be	17	for the benefit of shareholders. My Lord, Lord
18	worth, you know, as and when we will make a payment".	18	Neuberger said: what if it is the other way round, don't
19	But because of this image of collection and distribution	19	creditors benefit if sterling appreciates?
20	on day 1, that is not how the scheme works. So these	20	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
21	claims, and it may well be only these claims, are	21	MR DICKER: And we say the answer is they can never do
22	necessarily relegated to being non-provable claims, but	22	better in that situation than payment in full. And the
23	not, we say, extinguished; simply pushed down the	23	reason is simple. There are only essentially two
24	statutory waterfall.	24	possible scenarios, the first of which is the foreign
	LORD NEUBERGER: I see. So if the adjustment isn't made	25	currency liability is converted at the date of
	,		- y y

5 (Pages 17 to 20)

1	liquidation and the assets are converted on the same	1	My Lords, subject to your Lordships, those were our
2	date.	2	submissions.
3	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	3	LORD NEUBERGER: That is very kind, thank you very much
4	MR DICKER: In which case, they will get 100 cents in the	4	indeed. Thank you. Thank you, Mr Dicker.
5	dollar, but no more.	5	Mr Miles.
6	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	6	Submissions in reply by MR MILES
7	MR DICKER: Alternatively, the assets are converted later	7	MR MILES: May I start with a general point that crosses
8	but, again, in that situation they will simply make	8	over all three of the issues that I am dealing with,
9	a loss. So there is a downside but there is not	9	which is to do with the interpretation of section 107
10	an upside in relation to this.	10	and 146 of the Insolvency Act.
11	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes, I see.	11	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
12	MR DICKER: My Lord, another point we make is the injustice,	12	MR MILES: If you just take up bundle F2, tab 18.
13	we say, is also entirely one-sided. If the claim is by	13	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
14	LBIE against the third party, LBIE will continue to be	14	MR MILES: Page 1760.
15	entitled to payment in the relevant foreign currency.	15	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
16	So you have a situation in which LBIE can force everyone	16	MR MILES: Now, when we opened, we said that the reference
17	else to accept sterling, but if anyone owes LBIE money,	17	to liabilities there is clearly a reference to the
18	LBIE is entitled to insist on payment of the foreign	18	non-preferential provable liabilities; in other words,
19	currency amount.	19	the ordinary unsecured claims. The argument on the
20	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	20	other side, and it is supported by some things that were
21	MR DICKER: So that is another thing one has to add into the	21	said in the Court of Appeal, is that you don't read it
22	balance when one talks about effectively a one-way bet.	22	in that way; you have to read the reference to the
23	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes. If you make your final points quite	23	company's liabilities as being a reference to a series
24	shortly.	24	of classes or categories of liabilities, and you have to
25	MR DICKER: My Lord, yes.	25	read the section as saying that, subject to preferential
	Page 21		Page 23
			~
1	LORD NEUBERGER: I am not saying it is your fault.	1	payments, the company's property shall be applied in
2	MR DICKER: I deal with the one-way bet. I think I have	2	satisfaction of each class of liabilities, presumably
3	dealt with taking interest into account now.	3	pari passu within each class. So, in other words,
4	If I just remind your Lordships of paragraph 170,	4	notionally following the Nortel waterfall, you would
5	there is a paragraph that sets out why my learned friend	5	have to read that into the section.
6	is wrong to say foreign currency creditors would be	6	Now, the reason why the Court of Appeal was
7	better off than they otherwise would have been.		attracted by that argument is the business of how you
8	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	8	deal with statutory interest, because statutory interest
9	MR DICKER: I won't take your Lordship through that, nor	9	clearly has to be paid before the payment to members,
10	with our submissions on the limited force of the	10	which is referred to in the last part of this section.
11	reliance on the desire for simplicity.	11	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
12	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	12	MR MILES: And the conclusion that the Court of Appeal
13	MR DICKER: My Lord, in the last section of the our case, we	13	therefore reached was that you have to read liabilities
14 15	deal with the situation in which there is a shortfall of non-provable claims.	14 15	as including statutory interest. Now, we suggest that that is a misreading. If you
15	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	15	look in F1, tab 2, at section 189, which is the
10	MR DICKER: And essentially, the thrust of this is we	17	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
18	support Lord Justice Briggs's approach, which is	18	MR MILES: liquidation provision in relation to interest.
19	essentially in this situation, it is not expressly dealt	19	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
20	with by the statute, but it can no doubt be dealt with	20	MR MILES: The relevant bit is sub-section (2) which says:
20	as and when the problem arises. It's not something that	20	"Any surplus remaining after the payment of the debt
22	needs to trouble your Lordships today. It isn't	22	is proved in the winding up shall, before being applied
	re the second seco		
23	something which the courts have needed to address in the	2.3	TOT any other burbose, be abbried in Daving interest
23 24	something which the courts have needed to address in the last 250 years. Specific problems, if and when they can	23 24	for any other purpose, be applied in paying interest." LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
	something which the courts have needed to address in the last 250 years. Specific problems, if and when they can arise, can no doubt be dealt with at that stage.		
24	last 250 years. Specific problems, if and when they can	24	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.

6 (Pages 21 to 24)

1	sections is not to read liabilities as including	1	MR MILES: Now, this is the part that deals with compulsory
2	statutory interest, it is simply to say that 107 takes	2	liquidations, and the section there talks about the
3	effect subject to the overriding requirement of	3	company's creditors. But as LBIE said, you have to read
4	section $189(2)$, which says in terms that, before it is	4	that together with rule 4.181, which you will find in
5	paid for any other purpose, it shall be applied to this	5	F3, I am afraid.
6	purpose. And that is a completely sensible way of	6	LORD NEUBERGER: Well, wait a minute. We are construing the
7	reading it. In other words, the reconciliation is	7	statute. Talking about the two sections, is it right to
8	achieved not by reading the word	8	construe this using the rules
9	"liabilities" differently, it is simply by reading the	9	MR MILES: This is LBIE's own argument.
10	bit at the end of section 107, which says it will be	10	LORD NEUBERGER: I know it is, but I am asking you whether
11	applied in this particular way, as subject to the	11	it is right to construe 189 and 107 by reference to the
12	overriding requirement of section 189. That is	12	rules. That is all.
13	perfectly straightforward.	13	MR MILES: Well, my Lord, to the extent
14	It also fits in with the statutory history, because	14	LORD NEUBERGER: The fact LBIE do so doesn't mean it is
15	107 simply reflects earlier statutes. 189 was then	15	right.
16	introduced into the 1986 Act. It introduces a new	16	MR MILES: Okay, well, my general submission
17	obligation to pay statutory interest out of the surplus,	17	LORD REED: You say insofar as it is right.
18	and what has happened here is that the legislature	18	MR MILES: My general submission is you should be looking at
19	hasn't spelt out in the new 107 that further need to pay	19	the statute. I accept that.
20	out the interest. But that is a much more sensible	20	LORD NEUBERGER: But if we go down the road.
21	reading, we suggest.	21	MR MILES: If you go down the road.
22	LORD NEUBERGER: I can see how you say it is linguistically	22	LORD NEUBERGER: Fair enough.
23	more sensible, but, in the end, the argument against you	23	MR MILES: If you look at bundle F3, tab 56.
24	is that it is commercially less sensible, effectively.	24	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
25	MR MILES: Well, there is no reason for that, my Lord. If	25	MR MILES: You will see that this is the bit which
	Page 25		Page 27
1	what one is dealing with in 107, as it always has been	1	accontially reflects next of section 107. It is the
		1	essentially reflects part of section 107. It is the
2	interpreted until the Court of Appeal in this case, is	2	part which applies to compulsory liquidations. Debts
3	interpreted until the Court of Appeal in this case, is dealing with the proved debts, there is no reason to	2 3	part which applies to compulsory liquidations. Debts other than preferential debts rank equally in the
3 4	interpreted until the Court of Appeal in this case, is dealing with the proved debts, there is no reason to read it in a different way. I don't, with respect,	2 3 4	part which applies to compulsory liquidations. Debts other than preferential debts rank equally in the winding up, and after the preferential debt shall be
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7 (Pages 25 to 28)

1	non-provable debts. The only thing you find in the	1	So that argument cannot work because it seeks to
2	statute is a rule which tells you what debts are not	2	establish too much.
3	provable. There is nothing in the statute which deals	3	The second point is that they are then forced to
4	with the question of non-provable debt. There is	4	rely on clause 7 of the agreement, and the answer to
5	nothing in the statute which tells you how you would	5	that is that those provisions don't say anything about
6	bring about a pari passu distribution in respect of	6	proofing. As lord Sumption said in the course of the
7	non-provable debts. There are no rules for there being	7	discussion, if it is possible to agree not to prove, it
8	an insolvency cut-off date. There are no rules on	8	must also be possible to agree not to accept payment,
9	currency conversion. There are no rules on the	9	because that is something less than proving. What those
10	valuation of non-provable debts. There is nothing in	10	clauses are concerned with, is an agreement not to
11	the statute about that.	11	accept payment. But that fits perfectly well within the
12	That is a further reason, we suggest, for reading	12	idea that we prove, the claims are contingent, therefore
13	this in the way that it has always been interpreted. It	13	we don't share in a distribution if we are indeed
14	has been interpreted the way that we suggest by	14	subordinated, but it is nonetheless proved.
15	Lord Justice Patten in Danka. I will just give you the	15	That leads to a couple of points about how you value
16	reference: F1, tab 8 at page 1204E to F.	16	contingent claims. There was some discussion about
17	The predecessor of 143, read by Mr Justice Oliver in	17	this, and we suggest the discussion went slightly on the
18	Dynamics as referring to the proved debts of the	18	wrong footing, because it was suggested at times that we
19	company	19	are, as it were, putting in a proof for a nil amount.
20	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	20	That is not the way proving works.
21	MR MILES: that is in F1/9/1214. We suggest that this is	21	LORD NEUBERGER: No, it was valued at a nil amount.
22	an entirely novel reading, it is a wrong reading, and it	22	MR MILES: That's right. The creditor puts in the proof.
23	is taking the interpretation of this section, 107 and	23	LORD NEUBERGER: You say you want the lot.
24	section 143, down the wrong path. The only place you	24	MR MILES: And then the administrator values it.
25	will find it is in the Court of Appeal, in the courts	25	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
20	win ma wis in me court of Append, in the courts		
	Page 29		Page 31
1	below, in this case. We say that 143 does indeed have	1	MD MILES: Your Londohin also has the naint which was
1			MR MILES: Your Lordship also has the point, which was
2	to be read together with 4.181 and that tells you the	$\begin{vmatrix} 2\\ 2 \end{vmatrix}$	discussed today, that if you look at rule 2.81, which
3 4	answer. LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	3	you will find in F3, tab 74 at page 2004, this is where the contingent debts are dealt with, by way of
5	MR MILES: On the question of whether the subordinated debt	5	valuation. That rule itself includes the ability on the
6	is the ranking of it against the other claims.	6	administrator to revise the estimate that had been made.
7	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	7	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes, we looked at that, yes.
8	MR MILES: I have made my submissions on the question of	8	MR MILES: And that has a couple of implications. First,
9	interpretation. I will just say a couple of things on	9	that explains why we are not putting a claim with a nil
10	the question of whether it is provable, which only	10	valuation. That is not the way it works. We put in our
11	arises, of course, if we are wrong on our arguments	11	proof. If the events happen which fulfil the
12	about where it ranks.	12	contingency, then it is revised. That simply happens
12	In relation to that, they accept that we are	13	through the proving process. But also, when we come to
14	contingent creditors, which means that for the purposes	14	look at currency conversion claims, which I will turn to
15	of the rules we have a provable claim. So we have	15	in a minute, we say that it is striking that in the case
16	a provable claim within rule 12.3 and 13.12, we submit.	16	of contingent claims, there is a specific power here in
17	They then say, oh, well, you can exclude the right to	17	the rules to allow the revision of those claims, and you
18	prove by contract. But we say that the argument that	18	won't find anything similar in relation to currency
19	they rely upon, which is clause 4 of the agreements,	19	conversion when we look at that under 2.86. There is no
20	which is the one that says that we can bring	20	mechanism for the revision of the valuation of the
21	an application to wind up, or for insolvency, they say	21	claims.
22	well, that means that you can't prove. But that is	22	In relation to section 74, we rely on what we have
23	an argument that establishes too much, because they	23	already said about section 107 and how you should read
24	accept that we can prove at some point. The way that it	24	the word "liabilities" in that section. And if we are
25	was put in argument was that it is a timing point only.	25	right about that, we say that that throws some light
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8 (Pages 29 to 32)

1	back on section 74, which is part of the same statutory	1	amount of the dividend corresponding to what you are
2	scheme.	2	admitted to proof for. That is not, as I understand it,
3	In relation to what has been called, slightly	3	inconsistent with a subsequent further proof in respect
4	flippantly, the boot straps argument, we say that if you	4	of the same claim, indeed even after dissolution in
5	read section 189 together with 74, you can't use the 74	5	appropriate cases.
6	power to create a surplus for the purpose of giving rise	6	MR MILES: In the case of a contingent claim.
7	to a liability under 189.	7	LORD SUMPTION: All right. But that is a rather striking
8	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	8	difference between a judgment and the process of proving
9	MR MILES: Which then becomes a basis for a call under 74.	9	in a winding up, whatever stages you encompass in that
10	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	10	expression.
11	MR MILES: The answer to that that LBIE gives is that the	11	MR MILES: Yes. We say that that points out the difference,
12	right to call under section 74 is itself an asset of the	12	which is that there is a specific rule in relation to
13	company, and we respectfully say that it is important to	13	contingent claims where that is allowed to happen, as we
14	keep a firm distinction in mind here between the right	14	have just seen, and that is part of the statutory
15	to make the call, which is a right which is in the	15	process. There is no such provision in relation to
16	court, vested then in the liquidator, and the fruits of	16	2.86. We say it is a point that I made in opening
17	any such call. And it makes perfect sense to regard	17	there is a basic lack of coherence about what is being
18	those two things separately, and we also rely on, albeit	18	asserted here, because what they say at times is, oh,
19	only by way of analogy, with those sections in the Act	19	well, this is (inaudible). Indeed, Mr Dicker came close
20	which give the liquidator the power to seek to reverse	20	to accepting that there was a close analogy with it.
21	earlier transactions, for example as preferences, and	21	But it can't be a contingent provable claim because that
22	there is, we suggest, an analogy there.	22	would be legally incoherent.
23	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	23	Looking at it another way, if there was anything in
24	MR MILES: In relation to currency conversion claims	24	their argument, it would have to be characterised as
25	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	25	a provable claim, because all they are really saying is
	Page 33		Page 35
1	MR MILES: Mr Dicker at times framed the issue as whether	1	that some part of their provable debt has not been paid.
2	we could show that the 1986 legislation removed some	2	That is all it is. That is what the argument is. But
3	pre-existing recognised claim to such claims.	3	if that is the case, it would be a provable debt, but
4	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	4	they accept that it can't be that because the rules
5	MR MILES: Now, we say that an extremely ambitious argument,	5	don't allow it. For example, there would have to be
6	and indeed it is wrong, because there is no pre-1986	6	a further conversion, because it is still, on their
7	case.	7	case, an unsatisfied foreign currency debt. But then
8	LORD NEUBERGER: You say the furthest it goes is	8	how do you deal with it? Do you have to then convert it
9	Lord Justice Brightman's obiter thoughts.	9	again under 2.86? It would seem to be, if it is
10	MR MILES: That's right.	10	a proved claim. This is the point of now you see it,
11	LORD NEUBERGER: That is not enough to say there was an	11	now you don't; they then say, oh, well, then those rules
12	established position. Far from it.	12	don't apply.
13	MR MILES: Yes.	13	We say I use the words "payment in
14	LORD NEUBERGER: Okay.	14	full" advisedly, because what I mean is payment in full
15	MR MILES: And we also say in relation to the discussion	15	in accordance with the statutory scheme.
16	Mr Dicker had with Lord Sumption, we don't say that it	16	LORD NEUBERGER: You mean payment "in whole" rather than "in
17	is the admission to proof which necessarily satisfies	17	full".
18	the claim. We have said throughout our argument that	18	MR DICKER: "In whole", yes.
19	the treatment of the claim is the proof and it is	19	LORD NEUBERGER: Back to 2.72.
20	the payment in full of the claim which operates by way	20	MR MILES: Yes, and it is payment in whole in accordance
21	of satisfaction of the claims.	21	with the statutory scheme. The statutory scheme tells
22	LORD SUMPTION: Well, that rather begs the question, because	22	you how much you are to be paid. That accords with part
23	you have inserted the words "in full".	23	of the overall purpose of the 1986 legislation, which
24	MR MILES: In accordance with the statute.	24	was to bring as much as possible within the ambit of
25	LORD SUMPTION: I mean, suppose that you get paid the full	25	provability, and provide for its discharge. That is the
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9 (Pages 33 to 36)

1	way that the court report put it. That is the way that	1	Lord Clarke asked at one point: what would actually
2	Lord Justice Lewison put it in his judgment and that is	2	happen if there was no insolvency, and a creditor
3	also a passage that you, Lord Neuberger, quoted in	3	obtained a judgment in here in a foreign currency, what
4	Nortel. That was one of the purposes of the Act.	4	would be the interest payable on that? Now, Mr Dicker
5	The idea behind it is that it tells you what the rights	5	didn't answer that question. We have answered it in,
6	of the creditor are in the insolvency.	6	and it is set out fully in our case at paragraph 114,
7	We say that the real question here is whether	7	which you will find in B at 238. And the English law
8	a creditor whose claim is converted into sterling under	8	position is if you get a judgment in a foreign currency
9	2.86 and is then paid 100 per cent of that amount in	9	in the English courts, the judgment rate interest you
10	sterling, and full sterling interest under rule 2.88,	10	get is essentially a commercial rate based on
11	then has a further claim on the assets of the company.	11	LORD NEUBERGER: Sorry, what paragraph was that?
12	If you ask the question in that way, we say that it	12	MR MILES: It is paragraph 114.
13	is obvious that there is no room for such a claim. The	13	LORD CLARKE: Thank you.
14	rules don't in any way contemplate such a claim. There	14	MR MILES: And there is authority which explains this. But
15	is no room for revising your claim. There is no room	15	the interest rate you will get is essentially the
16	for bringing a contingent claim for that amount, because	16	commercial foreign interest rate. You don't get
17	it would have to be a contingent provable claim, and	17	8 per cent.
18	they accept that that doesn't work.	18	Now, Mr Dicker today postulated a rather unlikely
19	We say our argument fits much more coherently into	19	situation where you are looking at someone who already
20	the scheme. 2.88 provides an entirely new statutory	20	has a foreign judgment as at the date of the liquidation
21	provision for post-liquidation interest. It is quite	21	from a foreign court, and he says, oh, well, that person
22	wrong to suggest that its a codification of earlier law.	22	might lose out because under the foreign law there might
23	The sterling rate under that is applicable to all	23	be a higher judgment rate in that place. But that is
24	creditors, both sterling and foreign, and that is	24	not the case we are looking at at all. We are dealing
25	an important consideration.	25	with the position of creditors. One can assume that in
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	Page 37		Page 39
1	The drives of the conditions are treated all site	1	concerned one is not dealing with indemont anotitons, one
1	The claims of the creditors are treated, albeit	1	general one is not dealing with judgment creditors, one
2	there is obviously no actual judgment, as if notionally	2	is looking at the ordinary creditors of the company, and
2 3	there is obviously no actual judgment, as if notionally there was a judgment at the date of the administration	2 3	is looking at the ordinary creditors of the company, and the proper comparison is between, we suggest, the
2 3 4	there is obviously no actual judgment, as if notionally there was a judgment at the date of the administration for all of the creditors, and that rule, we say, doesn't	2 3 4	is looking at the ordinary creditors of the company, and the proper comparison is between, we suggest, the sterling rate that they get under 2.88 and what they
2 3 4 5	there is obviously no actual judgment, as if notionally there was a judgment at the date of the administration for all of the creditors, and that rule, we say, doesn't embody any idea of remission to contract.	2 3 4 5	is looking at the ordinary creditors of the company, and the proper comparison is between, we suggest, the sterling rate that they get under 2.88 and what they would have got on an English law judgment in a foreign
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10 (Pages 37 to 40)

1	Their case is something of a mishmash. The claim is	1	appears in rule 2.86.
2	treated as converted into sterling. They get sterling	2	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes, I see. Thank you.
3	interest on that out of any surplus. But then they get	3	MR MILES: Now, Mr Dicker also suggested at times that
4	an extra dip, they say, for more, potentially, if	4	rule 2.88 was itself an example of a non-provable claim.
5	sterling has depreciated. What they don't have to do is	5	We say that that is clearly not right. One only has to
6	give anything back, including any extra interest they	6	look at the Nortel waterfall to see that it comes out
7	have earned, by virtue of it being in sterling, if the	7	before non-provable claims. That is clear from the
8	currency has appreciated. And we say that is not	8	statute itself. Secondly, 2.88 is an entirely novel
9	a coherent way of reading the rules.	9	provision dealing with post-insolvency interest. It is
10	And we also do suggest that Lord Neuberger was right	10	not simply retaining some non-provable right.
11	when he asked the question: how does the idea of the	11	But there is also another point that arises out of
12	appreciation of sterling fit in with the idea of the	12	that. If they are right in their argument, this appears
13	contractual rights of the parties simply carrying on	12	to be the only case one can find where something can be
13	unaffected by the insolvency?	13	
			both a provable debt and then a non-provable debt.
15	Now, we say that that is a telling point which	15	Post-insolvency interest doesn't fall within that
16	Mr Dicker wasn't really able to answer. He just said,	16	category.
17	well, that is the one-way bet point. But it is more	17	LORD NEUBERGER: No.
18	than that. It is clear that the liquidator can't take	18	MR MILES: It can't be proved. Then the statute gives
19	advantage of the rise in sterling by paying the creditor	19	a separate entitlement to post-insolvency interest. It
20	in the foreign currency. He has to pay dividends in	20	deals with it separately. If they are right all that
21	sterling. What that shows, we suggest, very clearly, is	21	they are really claiming for is what they call an unpaid
22	that this is a regime that affects creditors' rights	22	portion of the proved debt. They want to claim it as
23	substantively.	23	a non-provable debt because they realise that they can't
24	Where it appreciates, it is clear that it effects	24	claim it a second time as a provable debt.
25	their rights substantively, because they are able to	25	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
	Page 41		Page 43
1	keep that extra money and they keep it at the expense of	1	MR MILES: It is the only example, therefore, known to
1 2	keep that extra money and they keep it at the expense of everyone, including the members. Equally, we say if the	1 2	MR MILES: It is the only example, therefore, known to law
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2	everyone, including the members. Equally, we say if the	2	law
23	everyone, including the members. Equally, we say if the currency depreciates they, don't get more. We also do say, as a matter of textual analysis,	2 3	law LORD NEUBERGER: We have that point, yes. MR MILES: And we also suggest that it is relevant to ask
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11 (Pages 41 to 44)

1	Now, how does that competition then work with	1	that by that date the futurity has come in, as it were,
2	genuine non-provable claims? There is nothing in the	2	and they would simply say, "I want the full amount that
3	statute which provides even the hint of an answer as to	3	I haven't been paid. I want to be remitted to my
4	that. It is not good enough, we suggest, to say, well,	4	contractual rights." There is nothing in the scheme
5	the courts can work it out. The courts wouldn't be able	5	that prevents that, but it is clear that that doesn't
6	to work it out because there is nothing that tells you	6	work. If you have been paid in full the amount that the
7	how it is to work. Are these claimants to be postponed	7	scheme tells you that you are entitled to, that operates
8	in respect of the extra interest that they have	8	by way of discharge to the debt.
9	received? By definition, the tort claimants won't have	9	LORD NEUBERGER: Can you give me the reference again, the
10	received any interest. The rules are highly	10	judge and to
11	prescriptive in relation to where they do apply, as to	11	MR MILES: Yes paragraph 77, which is D5, page 100, and 94,
12	things like the valuation date, when interest runs from	12	D3, page 31.
13	and so on, but there is nothing in the statute which	13	LORD CLARKE: Thank you.
14	provides even the hint of how you deal with this	14	MR MILES: We suggest that is a very telling point, and they
15	situation. And that, we suggest, is very telling.	15	haven't suggested that what the courts below said there,
16	LORD NEUBERGER: Right.	16	was wrong. But it is a really clear illustration of how
17	MR MILES: Pre-legislative history. We ask you to read the	17	payment in full under the statutory scheme operates by
18	whole of that, rather than just the final Law Commission	18	way of discharge.
19	report. That is set out in our case at 87 to 100.	19	There is nothing, I suggest, loaded about the way
20	LORD NEUBERGER: Right.	20	I am putting that, because the creditor could come back
21	MR MILES: The reason for that is they expressly considered	21	and say, "Well, I haven't been paid in full because my
22	the question of whether there should be compensation for	22	contract gave me a higher right", but the statute tells
23	these kinds of claims.	23	you what the answer is. If they were able to make these
24	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	24	claims here, the same logic must apply in relation to
25	MR MILES: And the Law Commission in the end came to the	25	future debts.
	Page 45		Page 47
1	conclusion it did, which didn't give any such	1	My Lord, that I think covers the points I wanted to
2	compensation. We say that, in the light of that	2	make by way of reply.
3	legislative history, if there had been any intention to	3	LORD NEUBERGER: Very helpful, thank you very much indeed.
4	give them this second dip, it would have been spelt out	4	Thank you, Mr Miles.
5	in the code.	5	Mr Wolfson.
6	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	6	Submissions in reply by MR WOLFSON
7	MR MILES: On a couple of small points, the future debts, we	7	MR WOLFSON: My Lords, I do not intend to address your
8	suggest that the best place to look at this is in the	8	Lordships on the matters arising from the
9	judgment of Mr Justice David Richards at paragraph 77	9	Court of Appeal's decision on the post-insolvency
10	that is D, tab 5, page 100 and Lord Justice Lewison	10	interest point, which is my appeal. But, my Lords, I do
11	at 96 that is D3, tab 3, page 31. And what those	11	seek to respond briefly on LBIE's two cross-appeals,
12	passages should is that if you are paid the discounted	12	particularly in the way that these were developed orally
13	amount by way of dividend, that operates to discharge	13	beyond the ways that they were put in writing.
14	the debt in full.	14	LORD NEUBERGER: Fair enough.
15	Now, that is an important point, because it shows	15	MR WOLFSON: My Lord, LBIE's first cross-appeal, which is
16	that the statutory scheme operates by way of discharge	16	the argument that unpaid statutory interest in
17	when payment is made of the amount required to be made	17	an administration is a provable liability in
18	under the scheme. If they were right, a creditor in	18	a subsequent liquidation
19	that situation would be able to come back and say, "Oh,	19	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
20	look, the discount rate that I have been subjected to	20	MR WOLFSON: your Lordships will appreciate that there
21	under the statutory scheme" which is 5 per cent, in	21	are no prior judgments on this point for the obvious
22	other words very high at the moment "is way higher	22	reasons. I make three points in response to the way
23	than a commercial rate would be in order to create the	23	Mr Trower put it orally. The first point is the
24	present value of the claim. I should therefore have	24	starting point, which is my submission that the
25	another right to a top up" indeed, it is possible	25	fundamental principle of insolvency law, as set out in
	Page 46		Page 48

12 (Pages 45 to 48)

Lehman Brothers - Waterfall I

1	the scheme, is that once a company has gone into	1	critical to bear in mind that rule 13.12(1) applies both
2	an insolvency process, that stops the clock as far as	2	to an administration and to a liquidation. And that is
3	interest is concerned, and gives rise to a fundamental	3	made clear by 13.12(5), which provides in terms:
4	feature of the pari passu scheme. We saw that arising	4	"This rule shall apply where a company is in
5	out of the recommendations of the Cork Committee, that	5	administration and shall be read as if references to
6	in the event of a surplus, interests should run on	6	a winding up were a reference to an administration."
7	proved debts and liabilities until a final dividend is	7	So 13.12(1) must be read consistently in both
8	declared.	8	insolvency processes.
9	As enacted, the scheme provide for interest accrued	9	Now, where a winding up precedes an administration,
10	prior to the insolvency process to be provable, whereas	10	your Lordship will recall that rule 2.88(7) provides, as
11	interest which accrues during the insolvency process is	11	now amended, for statutory interest to be payable in the
12	paid on a statutory footing from any surplus in that	12	administration for both the period of the administration
13	process.	13	but also the period of the earlier winding up. Rule
14	My Lords, I do emphasise "on a statutory footing"	14	2.88(1) provides for interest to be provable as part of
15	because, in my respectful submission, even when one is	15	the debt in the administration only up to the date of
16	getting interest from the surplus at a contractual	16	the preceding winding up.
17	right, because the contractual rate happens to be higher	17	Therefore, we submit that, in circumstances where
18	than the judgment rate, that interest is still being	18	you have a winding up and then an administration, we see
19	paid on a statutory footing, albeit that the statute is	19	that statutory interest is payable in the administration
20	providing that you get that interest at your contractual	20	for both the period of the winding up and the period of
21	rate. It is not a contractual right to interest you are	21	the following administration.
22	relying on. You are still getting interest pursuant to	22	So, accordingly, in the conversion situation to the
23	statute, which provides that you get it at the higher of	23	one we have in this case, interest for the first
24	the contractual and Judgment Act rates. And your	24	insolvency process, in this example the winding up, is
25	Lordships will recall, this was the difference between	25	not provable in the second insolvency process, the
	• •		
	Page 49		Page 51
1	the scheme as enacted and the recommendation of the Cork	1	administration, but interest is only payable as
2	Committee.	2	statutory interest in that second insolvency process.
3	There is no provision, and we submit it was plainly	3	LORD NEUBERGER: What about the simple point that might be
4	not the draftsman's intention, to render interest which	4	said that 2.88(7) isn't addressed to anyone, it simply
5	accrues during an insolvency process a provable debt,	5	says you can't pay anything out of the debts until you
6	even where and this is the important point one	6	have paid this interest, and when the money is passed to
7	type of insolvency process is followed by another. In	7	the liquidator, or passes the liquidator, he is bound by
8	fact, my Lords, as we set out in our case at	8	that, too?
9	paragraph 58(2), and this point was not addressed by my	9	MR WOLFSON: Well, your Lordships have my submissions on
10	learned friend Mr Trower at all, we submit that the	10	that. This is an instruction to the administrator. It
10	legislation itself shows that when you have one	11	doesn't
11	insolvency process followed by another, the interest	12	LORD NEUBERGER: Well, sorry to bang on about it, but it
	arising in the first insolvency process is not	13	doesn't say its addressed to the administrator, it is
13	ansing in the first insolvency process is not	15	-
1/	a provable debt in the second	1/	expressed in the passive
14	a provable debt in the second.	14	expressed in the passive.
15	My Lords, the example we give is the converse	15	MR WOLFSON: It is expressed in the passive and it can't be
15 16	My Lords, the example we give is the converse example to this case, ie where one has a liquidation,	15 16	MR WOLFSON: It is expressed in the passive and it can't be applied for any other purpose.
15 16 17	My Lords, the example we give is the converse example to this case, ie where one has a liquidation, followed by an administration. My Lord, the argument we	15 16 17	MR WOLFSON: It is expressed in the passive and it can't be applied for any other purpose. LORD NEUBERGER: Quite.
15 16 17 18	My Lords, the example we give is the converse example to this case, ie where one has a liquidation, followed by an administration. My Lord, the argument we set out in writing, but perhaps I can just take two	15 16 17 18	MR WOLFSON: It is expressed in the passive and it can't be applied for any other purpose.LORD NEUBERGER: Quite.MR WOLFSON: Your Lordship has my submission that when the
15 16 17 18 19	My Lords, the example we give is the converse example to this case, ie where one has a liquidation, followed by an administration. My Lord, the argument we set out in writing, but perhaps I can just take two minutes to just go through it orally.	15 16 17 18 19	 MR WOLFSON: It is expressed in the passive and it can't be applied for any other purpose. LORD NEUBERGER: Quite. MR WOLFSON: Your Lordship has my submission that when the administrator vacates office, he is not applying
15 16 17 18 19 20	My Lords, the example we give is the converse example to this case, ie where one has a liquidation, followed by an administration. My Lord, the argument we set out in writing, but perhaps I can just take two minutes to just go through it orally. LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.	15 16 17 18 19 20	 MR WOLFSON: It is expressed in the passive and it can't be applied for any other purpose. LORD NEUBERGER: Quite. MR WOLFSON: Your Lordship has my submission that when the administrator vacates office, he is not applying LORD NEUBERGER: I appreciate he is not applying
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13 (Pages 49 to 52)

1	one sub-rule to work out what effectively he had to do	1	Interest is given its own special treatment in
2	with the assets. Your Lordship also has my submissions	2	paragraph (c), and it is not possible, in our respectful
3	as to the affect that that has on the Nortel waterfall	3	submission, to shoehorn what is effectively a claim for
4	and the two bites of the cherry, if I can mix metaphors	4	interest into (a), nor is it right in this context, as
5	horribly, the two opportunities to get money out of the	5	Mr Trower put it on Tuesday, to submit that
6	waterfall, at stage 1 and at stage 6. Because if you	6	post-administration interest somehow loses its character
7	wouldn't be paid your statutory interest in full from	7	as interest if a creditor seeks to prove for it in
8	the surplus, you would effectively take statutory	8	winding up, which is how LBIE seeks to shoehorn this
9	interest right at the top of the waterfall and then	9	into paragraph (a). This is clear from the example
10	again at stage 6.	10	I gave a few moments ago as to when you have a winding
11	LORD NEUBERGER: Right, thank you.	11	up and then an administration.
12	MR WOLFSON: My Lord, just to finish the point I was making,	12	We submit that to allow this cross-appeal would run
13	as your Lordships have it on the converse situation, in	13	contrary to the basic features of the statutory scheme
14	my respectful submission, by positing the converse	14	and also to give 13.12(1) different meanings depending
15	example, where one has a winding up and then	15	on which order the two insolvency processes arrive.
16	an administration, one sees that statutory interest in	16	Essentially this court would, were to it allow the
17	the winding up would not be a provable debt in the	17	appeal, fall into the trap that beguiled the
18	subsequent administration because statutory interest in	18	Court of Appeal, ie identify a lacuna and then try to
19	the administration covers both the period of the winding	19	find a way to fill it in a way that we submit is
20	up and also the period of the subsequent administration.	20	contrary to the rules.
20	And interest for the liquidation period, in my example	20	My Lords, I see the time. I can be quite short on
21	the first insolvency process, cannot be both provable	21	the cross-appeal. I might go slightly over the
22	and payable as statutory interest in the subsequent	22	half-hour mark.
23	administration.	23	LORD NEUBERGER: Well, you shouldn't. I see, half past,
24	We respectfully submit, therefore, that LBIE's	24	fine.
23	we respectfully sublint, increase, that EBIE's	23	The.
	Page 53		Page 55
		1	
1	argument regarding the provability of statutory interest	1	MR WOLFSON: Yes, I wasn't suggesting
2	does not work, and cannot work, where a winding up	2	LORD NEUBERGER: Fair enough.
3	precedes an administration, and because 13.12(1) must	3	MR WOLFSON: My Lords, if I can therefore turn to the second
4	mean the same thing in all circumstances, it must be	4	cross-appeal, your Lordships appreciate that this is the
5	wrong equally when an administration precedes a winding	5	point as to having a non-provable claim. So the
6	up. And as I say, Mr Trower has not addressed that	6	argument is that there is a non-provable claim for the
7	point at all. That is the first point I was making in	7	statutory interest.
8	this context. There are two further short points.	8	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
9	The second point is we submit that there is a good	9	MR WOLFSON: We submit that this is simply anathema to the
10	policy reason for post-insolvency interest not being	10	statutory scheme. In argument, and I will just give
11	provable, because the consequence of LBIE's argument	11	your Lordships the transcript references, my learned
12	would be to create a new provable debt in respect of	12	friend Mr Trower accepted that there are circumstances
13	statutory interest for the administration period in the	13	in which the statutory scheme can affect the underlying
14	liquidation, which would compete with unsecured claims	14	liability. That was on Tuesday, page 175, lines 14 to
15	for principal proved for the first time in the	15	16. He further accepted that there are provisions of
16	liquidation, the putative torts claimant, and it would	16	the insolvency code which deal with interest and are
17	be surprising, we respectfully submit, if that was the intention of the scheme.	17	intended to provide a complete answer to the interest
18		18	entitlements with which it engages same day,
19			following page 176 lines 12 to 16 by the mount of
	Thirdly, and also shortly, in relation to the point	19	following page, 176, lines 13 to 16 but then went on
20	Thirdly, and also shortly, in relation to the point on the interrelationship of rules 13.12(1)(a) and (c),	19 20	to say that if the judge was right on declaration 5 and
21	Thirdly, and also shortly, in relation to the point on the interrelationship of rules 13.12(1)(a) and (c), we respectfully adopt the point made in argument by my	19 20 21	to say that if the judge was right on declaration 5 and the liability was not provable:
21 22	Thirdly, and also shortly, in relation to the point on the interrelationship of rules 13.12(1)(a) and (c), we respectfully adopt the point made in argument by my Lord, Lord Reed. If one were to read the rule	19 20 21 22	to say that if the judge was right on declaration 5 and the liability was not provable: "The scheme taken as a whole simply does not deal at
21 22 23	Thirdly, and also shortly, in relation to the point on the interrelationship of rules $13.12(1)(a)$ and (c), we respectfully adopt the point made in argument by my Lord, Lord Reed. If one were to read the rule 13.12(1)(a) in the expansive way that LBIE does,	19 20 21 22 23	to say that if the judge was right on declaration 5 and the liability was not provable: "The scheme taken as a whole simply does not deal at all with interest accruing between the commencement of
21 22 23 24	Thirdly, and also shortly, in relation to the point on the interrelationship of rules $13.12(1)(a)$ and (c), we respectfully adopt the point made in argument by my Lord, Lord Reed. If one were to read the rule 13.12(1)(a) in the expansive way that LBIE does, 13.12(1)(c) would be unnecessary, and that cannot be	19 20 21 22 23 24	to say that if the judge was right on declaration 5 and the liability was not provable: "The scheme taken as a whole simply does not deal at all with interest accruing between the commencement of the administration and the commencement of any
21 22 23	Thirdly, and also shortly, in relation to the point on the interrelationship of rules $13.12(1)(a)$ and (c), we respectfully adopt the point made in argument by my Lord, Lord Reed. If one were to read the rule 13.12(1)(a) in the expansive way that LBIE does,	19 20 21 22 23	to say that if the judge was right on declaration 5 and the liability was not provable: "The scheme taken as a whole simply does not deal at all with interest accruing between the commencement of
21 22 23 24	Thirdly, and also shortly, in relation to the point on the interrelationship of rules $13.12(1)(a)$ and (c), we respectfully adopt the point made in argument by my Lord, Lord Reed. If one were to read the rule 13.12(1)(a) in the expansive way that LBIE does, 13.12(1)(c) would be unnecessary, and that cannot be	19 20 21 22 23 24	to say that if the judge was right on declaration 5 and the liability was not provable: "The scheme taken as a whole simply does not deal at all with interest accruing between the commencement of the administration and the commencement of any

14 (Pages 53 to 56)

1	if that is the case, there is no reason to conclude that	1	Would your Lordships wish me to continue now?
2	the legislature intended to provide for the underlying	2	LORD NEUBERGER: I think in the circumstances it would be
3	right to be replaced."	3	better for us to continue to finish. You are absolutely
4	With respect, that entirely misses the point. The	4	right, thank you very much for that.
5	non-provable claims which LBIE contends for are claims	5	MR ISAACS: I am grateful.
6	for interest other than arising under the statutory	6	Submissions in reply by MR ISAACS
7	scheme. LBIE is contending that if the administrators	7	MR ISAACS: Your Lordships, I start with a correction and
8	fail to pay out under, essentially, 2.88(7), then in the	8	an apology. I told your Lordships that Hasty's(?) case
9	liquidation, creditors can assert their contractual	9	was referred to in the judgment of
10	rights to interest as non-provable claims.	10	Mr Justice David Richards below. In fact, it wasn't and
11	We respectfully submit this is remarkable for two	11	that was a mistake. It was included in my skeleton
12	reasons. First, this would be a non-provable claim that	12	argument in the Court of Appeal but it wasn't included
13	is said to exist even though the statute does allow for	13	in any of the judgments below.
14	the payment of interest in the administration period,	14	LORD NEUBERGER: Thank you very much. In the grand scheme
15	namely payment of statutory interest by the	15	of mistakes, it is a pretty small one.
16	administrators. So the genesis of this non-provable	16	MR ISAACS: Yes, it is.
17	claim is in fact the statutory scheme itself, because it	17	I will first reply to the two cases on which my
18	is only a non-provable claim if the administrators	18	learned friend Mr Trower relied in relation to proof and
19	haven't followed the instruction in rule 2.88(7).	19	set-off and then I will address your Lordships on the
20	Secondly, and relatedly, the non-provable claims	20	contributory rule.
21	which would arise are therefore inconsistent with the	21	I start with the decision of the Privy Council in
22	statutory scheme, because they are not for statutory	22	Newton v Anglo-Australian Investment, and that is in the
23	interest, but rather for interest arising otherwise than	23	supplemental bundle at G/13.
24	under the statute. We submit that the right to	24	LORD NEUBERGER: Thank you. Yes.
25	statutory interest extinguishes such contractual or	25	MR ISAACS: There are three important matters of fact which
	Page 57		Page 59
1	other rights creditors have to interest for the	1	appear from the headnote on page 13.
2	administration period.	2	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
3	It can't be right that those contractual rights are	3	MR ISAACS: The first is that this case concerned a company
4	somehow resurrected. If the administrators were to pay	4	limited by shares.
5	out under $2.88(7)$, they would be paying out under	5	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
6	statute. The contractual right has gone. So how does	6	MR ISAACS: The second is that the issue in the case was
7	it, we ask rhetorically, resurrect when the	7	whether a limited company could create a charge upon its
8	administration ends and the liquidation begins?	8	uncalled capital
9	We respectfully submit that non-provable claims	9	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
10	exist when there is a true black hole, such as the tort	10	MR ISAACS: so as to confer priority in the winding up.
11	claimants in T&N before it was amended or such tort	11	The third is that Re Pyle Works was approved by the
12	claimants as now fall outside of the legislative effect	12	Privy Council.
13	given to the judgment in T&N. Non-provable claims,	13	LORD NEUBERGER: Right.
14	however, cannot arise out of the statutory scheme	14	MR ISAACS: Lord MacNaghten refers to Re Pyle Works at the
15	itself, which is the essential basis of my learned	15	bottom of page 16
16	friend's argument, and they cannot exist in a manner	16	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
17	which is fundamentally contrary to that statutory	17	MR ISAACS: having considered a number of cases which had
18	scheme.	18	looked at the question of whether a limited company
19	seneme.	1	
	Therefore, for those two reasons, LBIE's second	19	could charge its uncalled capital. Your Lordship sees
20		19 20	at the top of page 17, the bottom of page 16, he says:
	Therefore, for those two reasons, LBIE's second		
20	Therefore, for those two reasons, LBIE's second cross-appeal should be dismissed.	20	at the top of page 17, the bottom of page 16, he says:
20 21	Therefore, for those two reasons, LBIE's second cross-appeal should be dismissed. My Lords, unless I can assist your Lordships	20 21	at the top of page 17, the bottom of page 16, he says: "After examining all of the previous authorities and
20 21 22	Therefore, for those two reasons, LBIE's second cross-appeal should be dismissed. My Lords, unless I can assist your Lordships further, those are our submissions on the cross-appeals.	20 21 22	at the top of page 17, the bottom of page 16, he says: "After examining all of the previous authorities and discussing the matter very fully, Lord Justices Cotton
20 21 22 23	Therefore, for those two reasons, LBIE's second cross-appeal should be dismissed. My Lords, unless I can assist your Lordships further, those are our submissions on the cross-appeals. LORD NEUBERGER: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Wolfson.	20 21 22 23	at the top of page 17, the bottom of page 16, he says: "After examining all of the previous authorities and discussing the matter very fully, Lord Justices Cotton and Lindley upheld a charge on uncalled capital."
20 21 22 23 24	Therefore, for those two reasons, LBIE's second cross-appeal should be dismissed. My Lords, unless I can assist your Lordships further, those are our submissions on the cross-appeals. LORD NEUBERGER: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Wolfson. Mr Isaacs.	20 21 22 23 24	at the top of page 17, the bottom of page 16, he says: "After examining all of the previous authorities and discussing the matter very fully, Lord Justices Cotton and Lindley upheld a charge on uncalled capital." And then a couple of sentences later is the one

15 (Pages 57 to 60)

1	relies on the statement that:	1	the company is wound up, and then he makes the same
2	"The liability of a contributory to pay calls in the	2	point again later in the paragraph, where he says if the
3	winding up is not a liability springing into existence	3	winding up should take place, then after the winding up
4	for the first time on the company going into	4	has taken place.
5	liquidation."	5	The third point relates to the Latin. The point
6	There can be no doubt that this is a reference to	6	about this is it recognises that the section 74
7	a call for the unpaid capital of a limited company.	7	liability is indeed a contingent liability upon the
8	That is clear from four matters. The first is the	8	winding up taking place. Indeed, the liability depends
9	reference to uncalled capital at the top of the page.	9	upon multiple contingencies, for example the settling of
10	The second is that the case concerned solely whether	10	the list by the liquidator, the inclusion of the member
11	unpaid capital of a limited company could be charged.	11	in the list and the making of a call by the liquidator
12	The third is the last three sentences in the same	12	on the member. There is no support in this case or any
13	paragraph:	13	other case for the proposition that the section 74
14	"The question is: what does belong to the company?	14	liability is a contingent liability before the winding
15	What are its assets or its property? That must depend	15	up.
16	on what dispositions have been made and what charges	16	I now propose to turn to the contributory rule.
17	have been validly created while the company, acting	17	I submit that the courts below were correct to reject
18	within its powers, was free to deal as it pleased with	18	LBIE's submission that the contributory rule should be
19	its own. The company is free to deal as it pleases with	19	extended and I make four short points in support of
20	its unpaid capital. An unlimited company cannot deal	20	that.
21	with the section 74 liability at all."	21	Firstly, the rule is intended to give effect to the
22	And then in the next paragraph, Lord MacNaghten	22	obligation imposed upon contributories in a winding up
23	said:	23	and the rule is that the contributory must pay all sums
24	"Their Lordships see no reason to differ from the	24	due from him in respect of calls before he can take
25	conclusion at which the Court of Appeal arrived in the	25	something from the common fund. It is no part of the
	D (1		D (2
	Page 61		Page 63
1	case of Re Pyle Works."	1	statutory scheme to pay calls in respect of the
1 2	case of Re Pyle Works." So the Newton case has nothing at all to do with the	1 2	statutory scheme to pay calls in respect of the section 74 liability to a company in administration.
	So the Newton case has nothing at all to do with the		
2		2	section 74 liability to a company in administration.
2 3	So the Newton case has nothing at all to do with the section 74 liability of an unlimited company, which is	2 3	section 74 liability to a company in administration. Secondly, the expansion of the contributory rule for
2 3 4	So the Newton case has nothing at all to do with the section 74 liability of an unlimited company, which is the subject matter of this appeal. Its relevance, if	2 3 4	section 74 liability to a company in administration. Secondly, the expansion of the contributory rule for which LBIE contends would be unjust because it would
2 3 4 5	So the Newton case has nothing at all to do with the section 74 liability of an unlimited company, which is the subject matter of this appeal. Its relevance, if anything, is that it approved Pyle Works, on which	2 3 4 5	section 74 liability to a company in administration. Secondly, the expansion of the contributory rule for which LBIE contends would be unjust because it would prevent contributories from receiving distributions in
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Day 4

1	inconsistent with LBIE's cross-appeal, since it shows	1	secured creditors in small part, and expenses and so on
2	that the contributory rule does not apply during	2	relating to the insolvency of the same legal entity.
3	a liquidation to the contingent liability of	3	So that is the reason why we respectfully submit
4	a contributory to meet calls, and this was explained by	4	that one has to look at the question of the contributory
5	Mr Justice David Richards at paragraphs 190 to 192.	5	rule and set-off together, and seek to find a solution
6	Unless I can be of further assistance, my Lords,	6	which does not artificially distort the way in which the
7	those are my submissions.	7	scheme ought to work in its totality.
8	LORD NEUBERGER: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Isaacs.	8	That is really all I wanted to say by way of reply.
9	Submissions in reply by MR TROWER	9	My Lord, can I just give one final illustration in
10	MR TROWER: My Lords, given the shortness of those	10	relation to this. It arises out of a question that
11	submissions in relation to the contributory rule, it is	11	I was asked at the end of my submissions yesterday, when
12	probably not right for me to say very much about it by	12	my Lord, Lord Neuberger asked me about the interface
13	way of reply, because that is what I am expected to	13	between the contributory rule and set-off in the context
14	respond to by way of reply, but can I just say this: one	14	of the liability
15	of the submissions that my learned friend has just made	15	LORD NEUBERGER: Yes.
16	in relation to the contributory rule related to the	16	MR TROWER: that might arise under section 74.
17	application of the statutory scheme and how it fitted.	17	My Lord, can I just remind my Lords of this: the
18	That, of itself, fits in with the submissions in	18	liability that arises under section 74 and is part of
19	relation to set-off. So one has the set-off and the	19	the totality of the scheme is deemed by the statute to
20	contributory rule together, which are the aspects of	20	be a contract debt. That is what the statute deems it
21	this part of the case, as far as LBIE is concerned.	21	to be. So when one is thinking about the totality
22	The question for my Lords, in our respectful	22	and the point is dealt with by Lord Justice Briggs in
23	submission, is a question of stepping back and looking	23	paragraphs 207 to 211 of his judgment of the
24	at the two possible solutions that are presented by	24	statutory scheme, one is thinking about that liability
25	LBIE, whether by way of set-off or by way of application	25	arising under section 74 being treated as a contract
25	EDIE, when of by way of set on of by way of application	25	arising under section 74 being treated as a contract
	Page 65		Page 67
1	of the contributory rule, to ensure that what we say	1	debt under section 80, and it is a contract debt under
2	would end up being a distortion of the statutory scheme	2	section 80, and it is that liability that one is seeking
3	would occur.	3	to preserve as an asset within the totality of the
4	Put in short terms, we respectfully submit that when	4	statutory scheme.
5	one is looking at the statutory scheme for these	5	So, with respect, the sorts of points that were
6	purposes, the contributory rule or set-off, your	6	being put to me by my Lord, Lord Sumption yesterday in
7	Lordships are looking at the totality of the statutory	7	relation to, well, could one have a liability that was
8	scheme. One needs to be careful about saying there is	8	a pure statutory liability without there being
9	a statutory scheme that is applicable and only capable	9	a creditor, is not quite the right way of looking at it
10	of being applicable to the winding up, and a statutory	10	if you look at the statutory scheme as a whole.
11	scheme that is applicable and only capable of being	11	LORD SUMPTION: Do we have section 80 anywhere?
12	applicable to an administration.	12	MR TROWER: Yes, my Lord, we do. It is in the bundles,
13	Of course, one accepts that there are provisions of	13	tab 9, page 4045.
14	the Act and provisions of the rules that, in terms, are	14	LORD NEUBERGER: Thank you very much.
15	designed to deal with the liquidation and are designed	15	MR TROWER: So, my Lords, unless I can assist your Lordships
16	to deal with an administration, for one and not the	16	any further, I think that is what I was entitled to
17	other. But also within the statutory scheme there is	17	reply on and I don't have any other submissions to make.
18	a complete contemplation that companies are going to	18	LORD NEUBERGER: That is very fair, thank you very much
19	move seamlessly from liquidation to administration, and	19	indeed.
20	now the other way round.	20	Well, thank you all very much indeed for your oral
21	In our respectful submission, one has to be careful	21	submissions and for making what is a difficult and
22	about ending up with the result in which there is too	22	potentially complex case as clear as it could have been.
23	hard and sharp and fast a division between the two	23	Not that you have necessarily made our task any easier
24	elements of what is ultimately a coherent statutory	24	by your arguments. Thank you also to all of those who
25	scheme dealing with the position of unsecured creditors,	25	were involved in preparing the written cases.
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Day 4

$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\\25\end{array} $	We will consider this matter and let you know our decision in due course. Thank you all very much. The court is now adjourned. (11.46 am) (The hearing concluded) Submissions by MR DICKER (continued)1 Submissions in reply by MR MILES23 Submissions in reply by MR WOLFSON48 Submissions in reply by MR ISAACS59 Submissions in reply by MR TROWER65	
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