The Bank of England (BoE) published the stress scenario for its private markets system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES) on 19 June 2026. The scenario sets out a severe but plausible five-year global supply and geopolitical shock, with high inflation, falling output, tighter financial conditions and a slow recovery.
The exercise spans key actors across the private markets ecosystem, including alternative asset managers, banks, and institutional investors such as insurers and pension funds.
It is hypothetical and not a test of individual firm resilience or solvency. Instead, the BoE will use the SWES to examine how participants’ responses to stress could interact across markets and institutions, and whether those behaviours could amplify risks to UK financial stability and the real economy.
The publication of the scenario moves the private markets SWES into its next phase and gives firms a clearer view of the vulnerabilities the BoE wants to test.
Through its two-round structure, the SWES asks participants first to assess the impact of a common severe but plausible scenario and the actions they would take, before considering aggregated feedback on how other firms respond. This will allow the BoE to explore whether actions that are rational at firm level could amplify or dampen stress when taken together.
This makes behavioural assumptions central to the exercise. Actions such as capital preservation, reduced risk appetite, changes in asset allocation, reduced financing availability, redemption management, fund extensions or use of continuation vehicles could affect outcomes beyond the firm taking the action. For participating firms, and others active in private markets, governance and challenge around management actions may therefore be as important as the loss estimates themselves.
The scenario brings into focus how quickly valuation and liquidity conditions can become more tightly linked in a prolonged downturn. The BoE highlights infrequent private market valuations, limited price discovery and expectation mismatches between lenders, investors and sponsors, raising the possibility that apparently stable marks could adjust more abruptly under stress.
At the same time, weaker revenues, elevated funding costs, impaired exit markets and sizeable refinancing needs may keep assets in portfolios for longer. This highlights that resilience depends not only on headline valuation methodologies, but also on the robustness of internal valuation inputs and credit assessments.
A central question is whether stress in private and related credit markets could affect the flow of finance to UK corporates. This isn’t a test of individual firms, but an assessment of how firms’ actions under stress could interact across the financial system and affect the real economy.
Under the scenario, weaker earnings, higher borrowing costs and more difficult exit and refinancing conditions could put pressure on companies that depend on private market funding. The responses of banks, sponsors, asset managers and investors could either contain or deepen that pressure. This points to an important indirect channel through institutional investors, including pension schemes and insurers, where shifts in portfolios, risk appetite or capital allocation could have implications for policyholders and pension scheme members.
Translate the scenario into portfolio exposures and interconnections.
Test management actions, governance and execution under stress.
Strengthen valuation, liquidity and credit risk management.
Although the SWES is an exploratory exercise, it points to where regulatory attention may deepen.
Firms with material private markets or related credit exposures should assess whether they have a sufficiently joined-up view of risk across borrowers, sponsors, funds, lenders, investors and financing channels.
They should also translate the scenario into portfolio, borrower and counterparty-level impacts, including revenue pressure, covenant strain, valuation changes and liquidity demands. Management actions should be tested for credibility under stress, with clear trigger points, escalation routes, decision rights and operational capacity to support timely execution.
Particular attention is likely to fall on valuation governance and liquidity management. This includes the quality of underlying valuation inputs, such as internal credit assessments, borrower performance data, covenant information and exit assumptions. Firms should also consider whether redemption arrangements, fund extensions, exposure to maturity walls, third-party dependencies, data and reporting capabilities are robust enough to support decisions in a severe and correlated stress environment.
The BoE expects to share interim Round 1 findings later in 2026 and its final report in 2027. Firms should track those outputs and use them to test their own risk assumptions.
Stewart Cummins
David Croker
Nebil Shubbar
Director, Financial Instrument Valuations and Ratings Leader, PwC United Kingdom
+44 (0)7525 284246
Rush Parekh
Director, PwC United Kingdom
Burak Zatiturk
Hinna Akhtar