The FCA set out good and poor practice on operational resilience on 11 November 2026. The findings draw on its review of firms’ 2025-26 operational resilience self-assessments.
The FCA expects firms to show what they can deliver now during severe but plausible disruption, not rely on planned remediation, transformation or future investment. The regulator also published a multi-firm review on the operational resilience of trading venues.
The FCA's good and poor practice is most relevant to firms subject to SYSC 15A but may also help other firms assess how disruption could affect consumers, clients and market integrity. It does not introduce new requirements but builds on the FCA's March 2026 findings and focuses on evidencing resilience in practice.
The FCA’s central message is that firms need to demonstrate current resilience, rather than rely on planned improvements. It identifies the quality of this evidence as the main area for development.
Firms should be able to demonstrate their ability to respond to severe cyber disruption, manage material third-party dependencies and minimise harm where full recovery within impact tolerance is not possible. They should also explain residual risks, capability gaps and key assumptions.
The FCA stresses the importance of explaining why services are identified as important business services (IBSs), how disruption could cause intolerable harm and how impact tolerances are calibrated. This includes combining time-based tolerances with wider harm indicators. Good practice also includes treating material changes to the business, technology, suppliers or operating model as a trigger to reconsider IBSs, impact tolerances and mapping.
Mapping should provide an end-to-end view of resources and dependencies supporting IBSs, including third and fourth parties, group services and shared infrastructure.
Poor practice includes pointing to future improvements without showing whether the firm can remain within impact tolerance now.
The FCA highlights testing how disruption to shared dependencies could affect several IBSs at once, across scenarios such as cyber disruption, data integrity issues, third-party failure and group service disruption. Self-assessments should explain recovery assumptions, the limits of workarounds and residual risks.
By contrast, the FCA found that some firms:
do not explain how they would maintain essential services where full recovery within tolerance is not possible
claim they can recover from every scenario within impact tolerance, or report few or no vulnerabilities, without supporting evidence.
The FCA expects firms to demonstrate that remediation has improved resilience, rather than treating closure of actions as sufficient evidence. This may include validating and, where needed, re-testing remediation, and distinguishing between remediated, open and risk-accepted vulnerabilities.
Communications should also be tested under disruption, including where normal channels or approval routes are unavailable, with alternative channels and escalation arrangements in place. Boards should receive clear evidence on current capabilities, vulnerabilities and residual risks. Board approval alone is not sufficient evidence of effective oversight, with the FCA also highlighting second and third line challenge.
The FCA's review of UK trading venues, including multilateral trading facilities, organised trading facilities and recognised investment exchanges, found that venues understood the importance of operational resilience and tested their processes regularly. However, areas for improvement remain, particularly around accountability, assurance, dependencies, third-party services, recovery testing and incident management.
Some venues lacked a complete view of group and third-party dependencies or concentration risks, and material providers were not always included in resilience testing. Exit plans were often high-level, with limited evidence that services could be maintained or restored following provider failure. The FCA also identified gaps in recovery testing following technology change and documenting incident escalation and lessons learned.
Evidence current resilience: Show what the firm can withstand today, including residual risks.
Strengthen mapping and testing: Test material dependencies, recovery assumptions and workarounds.
Enhance governance: Give Boards clear evidence of current resilience, vulnerabilities and residual risks.
While the FCA’s good and poor practice does not introduce new requirements, it gives firms a clear benchmark against which to assess whether their operational resilience arrangements are working effectively in practice.
Firms should use their next self-assessment to evidence their current resilience position, including remaining vulnerabilities, how risks are being managed and what would happen during severe disruption. The FCA expects firms to demonstrate that they understand their residual risk, and how testing, incidents and second and third line input have informed decisions.
The findings sit within a broader regulatory focus on operational and cyber resilience. In a speech on 22 October 2026, Katharine Braddick, Chief Executive Officer of the Prudential Regulation Authority, indicated the PRA would significantly increase its focus in these areas, including through a new dedicated directorate, and consult jointly with the FCA on a new supervisory statement by the end of 2026.
Against this backdrop, firms should focus on five management actions:
Taken together, these developments reinforce the need for resilience to inform business decisions and remain effective as firms’ operating models and risk exposures evolve.
“The FCA’s findings reinforce the need for firms to move beyond documenting resilience and demonstrate how it works in practice as the risk landscape evolves. Boards need a clear view of current capabilities, dependencies and vulnerabilities so resilience can inform decisions on investment, technology and transformation.”
James Houston
Partner
The FCA will continue discussing operational resilience through its supervisory engagement. The PRA and FCA are also due to consult on a new supervisory statement on operational and cyber resilience by the end of 2026. The new operational incident and third-party reporting regime takes effect on 18 March 2027.
Duncan Scott
Stella Nunn
Laura Marr
Hugo Rousseau